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Abstract 
Multi-agent systems are a new computational approach for solving real world, dynamic and open system 
problems. Problems are conceptualized as a collection of decentralised autonomous agents that collaborate 
to reach the overall solution. Because of the agents autonomy, their limited rationality, and the distributed 
nature of most real world problems, the key issue in multi-agent system research is how to model inter- 
actions between agents. Negotiation models have emerged as suitable candidates to solve this interaction 
problem due to their decentralised nature, emphasis on mutual selection of an action, and the prevalence of 
negotiation in real social systems. 
The central problem addressed in this thesis is the design and engineering of a negotiation model for 
autonomous agents for sharing tasks and/or resources. To solve this problem a negotiation protocol and 
a set of deliberation mechanisms are presented which together coordinate the actions of a multiple agent 
system. 
In more detail, the negotiation protocol constrains the action selection problem solving of the agents 
through the use of normative rules of interaction. These rules temporally order, according to the agents' 
roles, communication utterances by specifying both who can say what, as well as when. Specifically, 
the presented protocol is a repeated, sequential model where offers are iteratively exchanged. Under this 
protocol, agents are assumed to be fully committed to their utterances and utterances are private between 
the two agents. The protocol is distributed, symmetric, supports bi and/or multi-agent negotiation as well 
as distributive and integrative negotiation. 
In addition to coordinating the agent interactions through normative rules, a set of mechanisms are pre- 
sented that coordinate the deliberation process of the agents during the ongoing negotiation. Whereas the 
protocol normatively describes the orderings of actions, the mechanisms describe the possible set of agent 
strategies in using the protocol. These strategies are captured by a negotiation architecture that is composed 
of responsive and deliberative decision mechanisms. Decision making with the former mechanism is based 
on a linear combination of simple functions called tactics, which manipulate the utility of deals. The latter 
mechanisms are subdivided into trade-off and issue manipulation mechanisms. The trade-off mechanism 
generates offers that manipulate the value, rather than the overall utility, of the offer. The issue manipu- 
Abstract 12 
lation mechanism aims to increase the likelihood of an agreement by adding and removing issues into the 
negotiation set. When taken together, these mechanisms represent a continuum of possible decision making 
capabilities: ranging from behaviours that exhibit greater awareness of environmental resources and less to 
solution quality, to behaviours that attempt to acquire a given solution quality independently of the resource 
consumption. 
The protocol and mechanisms are empirically evaluated and have been applied to real world task 
distribution problems in the domains of business process management and telecommunication management. 
The main contribution and novelty of this research are: i) a domain independent computational model 
of negotiation that agents can use to support a wide variety of decision making strategies, ii) an empirical 
evaluation of the negotiation model for a given agent architecture in a number of different negotiation en- 
vironments, and iii) the application of the developed model to a number of target domains. An increased 
strategy set is needed because the developed protocol is less restrictive and less constrained than the tradi- 
tional ones, thus supporting development of strategic interaction models that belong more to open systems. 
Furthermore, because of the combination of the large number of environmental possibilities and the size of 
the set of possible strategies, the model has been empirically investigated to evaluate the success of strate- 
gies in different environments. These experiments have facilitated the development of general guidelines 
that can be used by designers interested in developing strategic negotiating agents. The developed model 
is grounded from the requirement considerations from both the business process management and telecom- 
munication application domains. It has also been successfully applied to five other real world scenarios. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The topic of this thesis is interaction, a temporary or permanent coupling between deliberating entities in a 
distributed system. The entities of interest in this thesis are digital and inhabit a digital system. The focus 
of attention is how to computationally model interactions among these digital entities. The need for such 
models is seen in the current explosion of auction portals (AuctionBot, eBay, Amazon, i2, Rodrfguez et al. ), 
which together with standardized communication enabling infrastructures such as the WWW, Java and the 
Knowledge Query Manipulation Language (KQML, (Neches et al. 1991, Finin & Fritzson 1994)), allow 
multiple buyers and sellers, across organizations (business-to-business), as well as individuals (customer- 
to-customer or business-to-customer), to enter electronic institutions and trade with one another for goods, 
resources or services, in open and real time electronic market places. In particular, the subject of this thesis is 
an extension of the current e-commerce technology to bi-lateral interactions/tradings between autonomous 
computational units called agents that represent buyers and sellers. Specifically, this work engineers an 
electronic negotiation framework for interactions in electronic commerce between autonomous agents that 
bargain for multi-dimensional goods called services. Here this computational-based trading is referred to 
as agent based electronic commerce of services. 
Electronic commerce is just one exemplar of a system that incorporates interaction between computa- 
tional components. The problem of modeling such interactions in a distributed computational system was 
first framed within the Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) community. DAI is concerned with under- 
standing and modeling action and knowledge in a collaborative and distributed enterprise consisting of a 
number of agents (Gasser 1991). Distribution of intelligence among a set of agents is seen as necessary 
when (Bond & Gasser 1988): 
9 knowledge or activities are inherently distributed (e. g medical diagnosis or traffic control) 
" there is a need for fail-soft degradation through distribution of control 
" there is a need to compute solutions to large scale problems given bounded computational resources 
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" there is a need for reliability, a distributed system can provide cross-checking of solutions and trian- 
gulation of results 
" there is a need for the integration of existing legacy systems 
9 there is a need for expert development of separate units through modular knowledge acquisition and 
management 
" the design of a monolithic system is too problematic and costly and instead the costs involved in the 
development of a large number of simple communicating units is more effective 
" there is a need for a greater adaptive power by allowing alternative solutions to be formed from units 
which have different logical, semantical, temporal or spatial perspectives 
9 central processing may be too slow compared to enhanced speed through parallel computation 
These benefits have been observed in the wide variety of real world problems to which DAI solutions have 
been applied. These include: problems in manufacturing (YAMS (Parunak 1987)), process control (elec- 
tricity transportation, ARCHON (Jennings et al. 1996d), nuclear industry (Wang & Wang 1997), spacecraft 
control (Schwuttke & Quan 1993), (Ingrand, Georgeff, & Rao 1992), climate control (Clearwater et al. 
1996)), telecommunication systems (feature interaction (Griffeth & Velthuijsen 1994), service management 
(Faratin et al. 2000), (Busuoic & Griffits 1994), network management (Adler et al. 1989), (Rao & Georgeff 
1990)), air traffic control (Ljungberg & Lucas 1992), traffic and transport management ((Burmeister, Had- 
dadi, & Matylis 1997), (Fischer, Miller, & Pischel 1996)), information filtering and gathering ((Sycara et at. 
1996), (Chen & Sycara 1998), (Etzioni 1996), (Liberman 1995), (Kautz, Selman, & Shah 1997)), electronic 
commerce ((Chavez & Maes 1996), (Krulwich 1996), (Doorenbos, Etzioni, & Weld 1997), (Tsvetovatyy 
et al. 1997)), business process management ((Faratin, Sierra, & Jennings 1998), (Jennings et al. 2000a), 
(Jennings et al. 2000b), (Huhns & Singh 1998)), entertainment (Grand & Cliff 1998), and medical care 
((Hayes-Roth et al. 1989), (Decker & Li 1998)). 
These problem domains are suitable for DAI technology (also known as agent technology (Bond & 
Gasser 1988)) because they exhibit one or more of the above features. For example, a manufacturing 
process is inherently a distributed system where production chains, or its components, can be represented as 
computational agents whose capabilities are captured using plans, and who share these capabilities through 
negotiation. Similarly, control systems can detect, diagnose and remedy problems if control subprocesses 
are delegated to agents that not only provide cross checking of results, but also form solutions to problems 
from different and novel perspectives and exhibit graceful degradation in case of node(s) failure(s). 
Although distribution can be beneficial, it gives rise to the following questions that need to be addressed 
(Bond & Gasser 1988): 
1.1. Aims of the Research 15 
1. How to formulate, represent, decompose and allocate the problem and how to synthesis the results 
among a group of intelligent agents. 
2. Sub-problems may interact which requires the agents to communicate and interact. If interaction is 
required then the problem arises of how to model the language and the protocol of this interaction. 
3. how to achieve global coherency from local processing. That is, how to ensure that agents act coher- 
ently in making decisions or taking actions, reasoning about the non-local effects of local decisions 
and avoiding harmful interactions. 
4. If there is a need for interaction and coordination, then how should agents represent and reason about 
the actions, plans and knowledge of other agents. 
5. How are agents to recognize and resolve and/or synthesize disparate view points on a sub-problem. 
These conflicts can be caused either by uncertainty in the world, different reasoning procedures or 
limited resources. 
6. How to actually engineer and constrain practical DAI systems through the design of platforms and 
methodologies. 
Each of the above problems emphasize different facets and perspectives of a DAI system. The first problem 
is the central problem in DAI and is centered on the problem the system is designed to solve in a distributed 
manner. In addition, distributed problem solvers need coordination (the third problem), agent communica- 
tion languages (the second problem), and agent reasoning mechanisms (fourth and fifth problems). Finally, 
there is a need to engineer a distributed system that implements the solutions to the above problems. As 
Gasser notes, the solutions to these problems are not independent: 
... different procedures 
for communication and interaction have implications for coordination 
and coherent behaviour. Different problem solving and task decompositions may yield different 
interactions or agent-modeling requirements. Coherent, coordinated behaviour depends on how 
knowledge disparities are resolved, which agent resolves them, etc (Gasser 1991). 
Given this, it can be seen that the coordination issue is a quintessential problem in DAI (Decker 1995). 
To this end, the contribution of this thesis is the development of a formal model of agent reasoning that 
attempts to address the coordination problem. 
1.1 Aims of the Research 
The central aim of this thesis is a formal specification and evaluation of a coordination framework for 
computational units, called agents, that buy and sell services from one another and operate in either open 
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or closed distributed systems (defined below). Here a coordination framework is defined as a collection of 
three components: 
1. the public rules of behaviour specifying the permissible actions agents can take in the course of 
interactions 
2. the subject of interactions 
3. the deliberation mechanism that assists agents in making decisions 
These components roughly specify when to interact, what to interact over and how to interact, respectively. 
The major contribution of this work sa formal model of the third component. This component will be 
referred to as a wrapper layer because it is seen as supplementing an asocial domain problem solver with 
additional functionality that the domain problem solver was not designed for in the first place, i. e. to interact. 
The wrapper can also be thought of as a "plug and interact" module of systems that need to interact with 
other systems. - 
The subject of agent interactions are services. Services capture and represent in an abstract way, 
similar to methods in object oriented paradigm (Coad & Yourdon 1991), the local capability of agents 
in performing tasks. There are numerous examples of services in the real world which individuals need. 
Database validation, financial forecasts, medical diagnosis, fault prediction are but a few examples where 
the capability of an agent is represented as services it can provide to others who need it. Services, in 
a similar manner to methods, are reusable for other types of problems that require the expertise of that 
agent. However, agents differ from objects in that their services can not be invoked by a simple procedure 
call because, as will be shown below, they are assumed to be autonomous. Therefore, the agent must be 
persuaded to perform its service(s). Access to services in real social systems is gained through various 
means such as long term contracts (for example, companies often have long term contracts with companies 
that provide fiscal forecast information) or conventions of organizations (for example, access to shared and 
public services such as medical expertise, is still determined not by who can pay most, but on need basis). 
However, the type of persuasion considered in this thesis is negotiation: 
Definition 1a process by which a joint decision is made by two or more parties. The parties first verbalize 
contradictory demands and then move towards agreement by a process of concession making or search for 
new alternatives (Pruitt 1981). 
In summary, the aim of this thesis is the development of a coordination framework that specifies: i) the 
public rules of behaviour during the negotiation, ii) the services which agents "produce" and "consume" 
and iii) the deliberation mechanisms that the agents use during negotiation. This coordination framework 
is designed for both closed and open systems. In this thesis, a closed agent system (also referred to as a 
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Distributed Problem Solving (DPS) system (Yang & Zhang 1995, Durfee & Rosenschein 1994)) is charac- 
terized by a central designer(s) undertaking the following steps in the system design methodology: 
1. definition of the global problem(s) 
2. mapping and assigning subproblems and resources, either dynamically at run-time or statically at 
design-time, to agents 
3. central configuration of all the agents, specifying their agent's behaviour in the course of interactions 
4. using an agent communication language to allow the agents to solve the problems in stepl. 
This methodology is problem centered (step 1); a central designer creates a fixed and static society of 
computational agents (step 2), who interact repeatedly (exchanging goals, plans or information) using a 
communication language (step 4), to collectively solve a well structured and objective global problem. 
Agents are often homogeneous in architecture, languages and reasoning (step 3), and are cooperatively 
motivated to help one another to solve the global problem at hand. This benevolent agent attitude directly 
follows from the assumption in closed systems that agents share a common goal. Thus agents cooperate 
with one another because they are aware of the fact that they share a common goal. Any conflicts are 
subjective, arising as a consequence of an incomplete or incorrect local view of the world, rather than 
objective contradictory interests. 
Conversely, an open agent system (Hewitt & de Jong 1984) (also referred to as a Multi-Agent System, 
MAS (Bond & Gasser 1988, Durfee & Rosenschein 1994, Durfee & Lesser 1989)) is characterized by a 
number of designers undertaking the following steps in the system design methodology: 
1. either defining the global problem or allowing the problem to dynamically emerge 
2. nominating/selecting (pre-existing) autonomous agents to enter interactions 
3. configurating of your agent(s) 
4. using an agent communication language to allow the agents to identify conflicting issues and solve 
problems in step 1 
Open environments are better characterized as encounters, where pre-existing agents come together infre- 
quently to solve a problem, trade goods, or, alternatively, where problems emerge dynamically "on the fly" 
in the course of interactions. This interaction centered, as opposed to problem centered, stance means that 
the agent society is more dynamic. Agents can come and go. There is no globally shared goal(s), hence the 
motivations in interactions are more selfish. There is a large degree of uncertainty about the other agents. 
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The agents themselves are heterogeneous in architecture, languages and reasoning procedures. The prob- 
lem structure itself is ill defined, no objectively correct solution exists and instead preferences are given 
more importance. Under these circumstances, assumptions about the system (such as agents, resources, 
information and goals) are not only difficult to make, but may also often be invalid. 
The characterization of agents as selfishly and autonomously pursuing multiple goals has a number of 
important implications. The pursuit of individual goals is beneficial in that it decouples agents from one 
another. Thus, self interest, as a behaviour guideline, encourages separation between individual and group 
problem solving. This is useful when an agent is vulnerable to the malicious behaviour of others, or when 
there is a need to reduce the influence of agents who have erroneous information or deliberation models. 
Also the assumption in MAS that agents may have multiple, and at least partially, conflicting goals produces 
social dilemmas or real conflict, which cannot be resolved simply by increasing the awareness of an agent 
through information exchange. Finally, the autonomy assumption means that agents can create and pursue 
their own goals in a self-interested manner. The decision of whether to adopt the goals of others is based 
on whether these adopted goals contribute to changing the current world state into a personal desired and 
motivated state. 
This thesis aims to develop a specification of a coordination framework (the rules, objects and de- 
liberation components of interactions) that can operate in both closed and open systems; usable by both 
a closed system designer, to define each agent's interaction capabilities (step 3 in the closed system de- 
sign), or, alternatively, by an open system participant who would like his/her agent to interact with other 
pre-existing agents, designed by other designers (step 3, in open system design). Thus, the coordination 
framework should be easily configurable and applicable to different types of systems. This configurability 
is motivated by the principles of re-usability and flexibility. Re-usability is achieved by i) making as few 
commitments to the agent architecture as possible, ii) dissociating interaction decisions from the protocol 
of interactions and iii) emphasizing the notion of services. Flexibility, in turn, is sought by avoiding un- 
reasonable or strong assumptions that limit the applicability of the framework to a single domain or agent 
architecture. Specifically, this requirement amounts to the design of a framework that does not assume the 
agent is unbounded in computational resources or information (Bond & Gasser 1988). This is because real 
world environments are often characterized by uncertainty and limited computational resources which need 
to be devoted to solving the domain problem the agent was actually designed for in the first place. In fact, 
interaction is an added cost to the agent in not only computation, but also communication. Additionally, not 
only can communication be expensive, but it can also be unreliable. Prolonged communication may also 
cause non-terminal chains of beliefs and goals updates because as the length of communication increases 
so does the chain of beliefs and goals that support the deliberation in the course of interactions (Huhns & 
Stephens 1999). 
1.2. Functional Architecture of the Coordination Framework 19 
Therefore, the aim is to design and engineer a re-usable and flexible computational coordination 
framework for both open and closed distributed and multi-agent systems. Like computational auctions 
(Varian 1992, Vulkan & Jennings 1998, Sandholm 1999), where agents interact and trade with one another 
according to normative rules of an electronic institution (Rosenschein & Zlotkin 1994), a computational 
negotiation framework is sought that permits individual agent designers to specify negotiation strategies for 
the trading of services, for both closed and open systems, given the rules of interactions. As will be shown, 
auctions are computationally different to negotiation and a different framework of negotiated interactions 
is necessary (sections 3.1.8,3.2.8). The stance adopted in this thesis is that the framework should formally, 
and minimally, represent: 
9 the set of agents involved in negotiation 
" the conflict object(s) 
9 the public rules of interaction 
9 the strategic resolution decisions available to an agent 
Note the last aim-specification of the strategic choices an agent has in conflict resolution. This relates 
to the "configuration" step in both the open and closed agent system design methodology (step 3). A 
framework, as opposed to a unique solution, is sought that makes available to agent designers different 
types of negotiation decision strategies. In this sense, the framework is descriptive and the designer is free 
to "configure" the agent according to some objective. However, in order to assist the designer, the developed 
resolution strategies are empirically evaluated in a number of environments (see chapter 5). 
1.2 Functional Architecture of the Coordination Framework 
The above requirements are captured in the functional architecture of the coordination framework/system 
shown in figure 1.1.1 The coordination system consists of. 
9 the coordination deliberation module (the coordination model, the service description and the agent 
knowledge bases AM (Acquaintance Model) & SM (Self Model), defined below, in figure 1.1)- 
together these modules are referred to as the negotiation wrapper. 
. the communication protocol (agent communication protocol). 
The communication functionality of the coordination system is supported by the interaction enabling 
in- 
frastructure (labelled middle-ware (Coulouris, Dollimore, & Kindberg 1994, Brenner, Zarnekow, & Wittig 
1998) in figure 1.1). The negotiation wrapper is seen as assisting the domain problem solver in interactions. 
'The terms interaction and coordination will be used interchangeably throughout he thesis. 
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The domain problem solver is informally defined as an autonomous entity that has knowledge (represented 
as the domain information model in figure 1.1) about the domain in which it operates, but that needs the as- 



























(Jennings et al. 1996d), is divided into two parts, representing the service provisioning and service exe- 
cution phases of agent activities (shown as the division marked by the dotted line in figure 1.1). Service 
provisioning is defined as the processes involved in procuring the necessary resources required to perform 
an activity. Service execution, in turn, is defined as the actual performance of the provisioned activity. 
This division expresses the differences between the processes involved in provisioning a service from those 
involved in its execution. The processes involved in provisioning are procurement processes involving 
scheduling local actions, identifying those actions/tasks that can not be performed locally, contacting the 
appropriate service provider(s), followed by negotiating the required service. The processes involved in 
service execution are more like management activities involving monitoring the agreed service execution 
Domain B 
---- -- Problem ---- - 
Solver 
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plan (circle marked Commitment Model in figure 1.1) and initiating recovery procedures when execution 
has failed or is predicted to fail. The division between these two types of processes is informally captured 
as the service life-cycle (depicted as the service provisioning service execution cycle in figure 1.1). The 
service life-cycle consists of firstly provisioning and then executing a service. Another episode of service 
provisioning may be initiated if the current execution fails. The focus of this work is on a negotiation 
model for the service provisioning phase. Therefore, the subsequent exposition will concentrate solely on 
the service provisioning phase of the life-cycle. 
Figure 1.1 shows two domain problem solvers, and their associated domain information models (the 
boxes labelled, Domain Problem Solver and Domain Information Model respectively). The negotiation 
wrapper is depicted as 
än oval that is connected to the domain problem solver. The exposition of the 
negotiation wrapper will concentrate on the internal processes and structures of the agent on the right hand 
side (the circle containing three boxes labelled AM & SM, Coordination Model and Service Description). 
Assume for now that this agent is the client of a service. Only one agent will be discussed because the 
negotiation deliberation component of the wrapper does not make any assumptions about the architecture 
of the other interacting agent. Thus, heterogeneous agents can inter-operate, as long as they obey the rules 
of the protocol specified by the Agent Communication Language. In fact, from the perspective of a very 
simple agent (unable to model others), the other agent can simply be viewed as a black box (box labelled 
with a question mark) that receives inputs, in the form of messages, and generates outputs, again in the form 
of messages. 
Furthermore, note that the domain problem solver is separated from the wrapper layer by a Service 
Description layer. A service description is defined as an enumeration of the dimensions of a service (or 
identification of the issues involved in the provisioning of a service) and the specification of preferences the 
domain problem solver has over each of these identified dimensions. This description of a service is then 
"handed" to the wrapper to provision. This design philosophy is also shared by the work of Kraus: 
There are two aspects to the development of agent architectures: what is the architecture of 
each agent and how do they interconnect, coordinate their activities and cooperate. There are 
many approaches to the development of a single agent. ... We provide a separate module for 
the strategic negotiation, and thus, we are willing to adopt any definition or model of a single 
agent. Our only assumption is that the agents can communicate with each other and that our 
negotiation module can be added to the agents (Kraus 2000). 
The domain problem solver initiates service requests with the wrapper via this service description layer 
(link labelled A) during the service's provisioning phase, describing the issues involved in negotiation as 
well as the domain problem solver's preferences over these issues. Successful negotiation with the other 
server agent will result in a contract that is then passed back to the domain problem solver from the wrapper 
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(link labelled B). During, or previously, to the service request, both the domain problem solver and the 
coordination module read and write to their information models, labelled Domain Information Model and 
AM & SM respectively. The AM & SM are the wrapper's repositories for knowledge about itself and others 
in its environment respectively (Jennings et al. 2000b). The SM maintains information such as the services 
it can provide, the resources available to perform it, and its current schedule of activities. In its acquaintance 
model (AM), the agent stores information about the existence and known capability of other agents. 
The above view of provisioning is agent-centric, concentrating on the internals of the agent. However, 
there are also inter-agent processes and structures involved. All inter-agent communication is physically 
routed via a suite of middleware services that assist distributed computation (box labelled MiddleWare). 
These services, possibly provided by other agents, may include: yellow and white page directory services, 
assisting agents in locating one another; platforms for message routing services (such as DAIS (DAIS 
1984) or ORBIX (orbix 2000)); authentication services; security services; mediation services and brokerage 
services (see (Vogel 1996) for a full description of middleware services). The implemented middleware 
architecture for communication of this research has been a combination of DAIS (DAIS 1984) and the 
FIPA Open Source routing platforms (FIPA-OS 2000). 
Finally, the syntax and pragmatics of messages are checked against the normative rules of the commu- 
nication protocol, stored in the agent communication language component of the coordination system, and 
correct messages are sent via the middleware to the intended recipient. Otherwise an error is flagged and 
the sender is notified of the divergence from the rules of the protocol. 
The details of the negotiation wrapper (the coordination module and its associated information models 
and service description), and the agent communication language modules of the architecture are revisited in 
more depth in chapters two, three and four. What constitutes an agent is discussed next, prior to an in-depth 
discussion of focused concepts such as coordination, interaction and negotiation. 
1.3 Agents and the Coordination Problem 
An agent definition is presented in this section followed by an in-depth examination of the problem of 
coordination, its definitions, rationale, properties and types. 
1.3.1 Agent Definition 
Agents, rather than a group of agents, are the kernel of the investigation reported in this work. The term 
agent, however, has been the subject of much debate recently, ranging from definitions that allow the in- 
clusion of almost all possible objects, to definitions which only permit a very closed set of possibilities 
as candidates for agency (see (Russell & Norvig 1995), (Maes 1995), (Hayes-Roth 1995), (Wooldridge & 
Jennings 1995) for some definitions). 
In this work, an agent is defined as a combination of the domain problem solver and the wrapper (where 
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the latter component is concerned with providing interaction capabilities and communication knowledge for 
the former): 
agent = domain problem solver + wrapper 
The domain problem solver is assumed to be capable of symbolically representing and reasoning about its 
internal state utilizing its domain knowledge. Reactive agents (Brooks 1991) are therefore excluded from 
this research. The domain problem solver is also assumed to be autonomous. Stated simply, autonomy 
means that the agents operate without the direct intervention of humans or others, and that they have some 
kind of control over their actions and internal state (Castlefranchi 1995). In this work, autonomy amounts to 
the wrapper having local control in selecting its strategies in negotiation. Indeed, autonomy is a necessary 
condition for negotiation since agents cannot be made or ordered to perform task(s) by other peer agents. 2 
Finally, agents are assumed to be capable of being both self or group motivated when making deci- 
sions at the interaction phase of their problem solving. In this thesis selfishness is informally defined as 
the achievement of one's goal(s) independently of the other(s) goals. On the other hand, group motivated 
decisions are defined as achievement of one's own goal(s), but in a manner that is helpful to others' goal(s). 
This local and global goal motivational stances of an agent are given more concrete definitions in terms of 
maximization of individual and social welfare in proceeding chapters when quantitative models of nego- 
tiation are introduced. The choice of which attitude to adopt is not hardwired into the agent architecture, 
rather it is a function of the agent's environment. As was seen in section 1.1, the motivations of agents have 
been one of the key features that has been used in order to differentiate DPS from MAS. 
1.3.2 The Coordination Problem 
In this section, the concept of coordination is examined from a DAI perspective (see chapter 3 and (Decker 
1995), (Kraus 1997b), (Walton & Krabbe 1995) for a more detailed treatment from other related fields). 
This exposition will lay the foundations for introducing different models of coordination in subsequent 
chapters. 
1.3.2.1 Definitions of Coordination 
Holt informally defines coordination as "a kind of dynamic glue that binds tasks together into a larger 
meaningful whole" (Holt 1988). More specific definitions place the main emphasis on the outcome of 
coordination in creating collective actions. For example, Bond and Gasser define coordination to be: 
... a property of 
interaction among some set of agents performing some collective activity 
(Bond & Gasser 1988). 
2Autonomy is often a feature of the organizational structure of the society. Thus, whereas a peer can not order other peers to 
perform a task, in a master-slave relationship orders are permitted, and often practiced in real social systems, to ensure coordinated 
actions that incur little or no communication and deliberation load (Scott 1987). 
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This definition is centered on the outcome of coordination. However, it is too abstract to be of any use 
operationally. For example, the notion of collective activity alludes to the existence of a shared goal to act 
collectively, since for collective activity agents must share the goal to collaborate with one another in the 
first instance (Bratman 1990). Such goals are explicitly included in definitions by Singh and Malone: 
The integration and harmonious adjustment of individual work efforts towards the accomplish- 
ment of a larger goal (Singh 1994). 
The act of managing interdependencies between activities performed to achieve a goal (Malone 
& Crowston 1990). 
That is, with these views, coordination is the process of aligning and adjusting agents' actions to manage 
interdependencies, where success leads to achieving some global system-goal. Although the concept is 
given a more concrete definition in terms of both outcome ("goal") and the processes involved, terms such 
as "work efforts" or "integration" or "management" do not constrain different interpretations. For example, 
which entity is responsible for managing the interdependencies-the individuals or a centralized controller? 
Likewise, it is not clear what is the object of "work effort"; an agent's goals, plans or desires, or some other 
construct? The following two definitions offer an alternative perspective on coordination, emphasizing a 
local, rather than a central, locus of coordination: 
Coordination, the process by which an agent reasons about its local actions and the (anticipated) 
actions of others to try and ensure the community acts in a coherent manner,... (Jennings 
1996), p. 187. 
and additionally, a process whose domain of operation is the satisfaction of preferences: 
... a solution to a coordination problem constitutes an equilibrium, a compromise that assures 
somehow "maximal" attainment of different interests of all involved individuals (Ossowski 
1999). 
The process of coordination is also central to Jennings' definition. However, whereas the previous defi- 
nitions were ambiguous about how it was achieved, in this definition, coordination is actively brought about 
via local, rather than some centralized, explicit reasoning process of each agent. Likewise, Ossowski's 
definition emphasizes the local locus of control in coordination. However, in addition to this, the "work 
effort" is the conflicting interests of individuals that need to be resolved in coordination. As will be shown 
in later chapters, Ossowski's definition belongs to game theoretic models of coordination that emphasize 
notions of solutions and equilibrium (an emergent property that is coordination). 
Finally, whereas all the above definitions are based on achieving collective actions, Huhns argues that 
although coordination is a property of collective actions, it is "not an all or nothing property. Rather it can 
exhibit degrees of satisfaction: 
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... a property of the system of agents performing some activity in a shared environment. The 
degree of coordination is the extent to which they avoid extraneous activity by reducing re- 
source contention, avoiding live-lock and deadlock, and maintaining applicable safety condi- 
tions (Huhns & Stephens 1999), p. 83. 
The definition of coordination is made more complex because the perspective of the definition needs 
to be unambiguously determined. Generally, when the system of agents is viewed from a behaviouristic 
perspective (by observing the behaviour of the system only), then it is difficult to assess whether agents 
have engaged in coordinated action (Jennings 1996). Agents may have indeed coordinated their actions, 
but the resulting system behaviour may be incoherent, due to erroneous models, lack of information or 
insufficient resources. Conversely, the system may exhibit coherent collective actions, but the agents did 
not actually intend to coordinate their actions (see (Searle 1990) for a description of the problem). For these 
reasons, some researchers in the field have proposed that a satisfactory definition of coordination cannot be 
based on behaviourism alone (Castlefranchi & Conte 1997). Instead, a satisfactory theory of coordination 
must account for and be based on intentional attitudes such as beliefs as well as higher order attitudes 
(or pro-attitudes) such as intentions and desires of the agents (Dennett 1987, Castlefranchi & Conte 1997, 
Wooldridge & Jennings 1995). 
In general, the definitions all share the point that the outcome of coordination is coherent, collective 
actions. However, there is no consensus over how, and by whom, coordination is achieved, nor what is the 
object of coordination. The proposed definitions are informally summarized as: 
the coordination problem consists of composing (relating, harmonizing, adjusting, integrating) 
some coordination objects (tasks, goals, decisions, plans) with respect to some coordination 
process, which solves the coordination problem by composing co-ordination objects in line 
with the coordination direction (Ossowski 1999). 
This view of coordination will be used as the working definition throughout this work. Finally, in this 
work a distinction is made between processes that help bring about coordinated action and the processes 
that maintain coordination. This distinction is reflected in real social systems where the processes that bring 
about "signing of a deal" are separate from processes that maintain "honouring of deals" (Scott 1987). The 
work reported here is primarily an attempt to address the processes necessary for achieving coordination, 
although structures are provided to assist the second stage of coordination. 
1.3.2.2 Rationale for Coordination 
Coordination is needed when there are interdependencies between agents' actions, between local actions 
and some global criteria that needs to be satisfied, or when there are differences in expertise or levels of 
resources (Bond & Gasser 1988, Huhns & Stephens 1999). Action dependencies (Bond & Gasser 1988) 
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occur when the local actions of one agent directly or indirectly have an effect on the actions and plans of 
others. (Jennings 1996) gives the following examples to illustrate interdependency between agents. Action 
dependencies arise when the local activities of agents contribute to the solution of a larger problem (e. g. 
building a house), there is a need to coordinate each individual action, since the local decision of one agent 
directly impacts actions of other community members. Interdependencies in activities may also arise when 
there is contention for resources in problem solving (e. g. a hammer may be needed by two agents simulta- 
neously to perform their tasks or a bridge that must be used by two convoys of trucks traveling in opposite 
directions). Likewise, local actions may need to satisfy some global criteria (e. g. the budget for building a 
house cannot exceed £30000). Furthermore, in many types of problems no one agent has sufficient compe- 
tence, resources or information to achieves its goal(s) (e. g. successful diagnosis of a disease often involves 
many different sources of expertise, information and equipment). Generally, coordination in most of these 
contexts closely resembles a distributed optimization problem used for ordering individual tasks, select- 
ing who and how to accomplish them, as well as the resources needed for their satisfaction (Decker 1995, 
Ossowski 1999). Another view is that the outcome of coordination can be divided into three basic classes, 
reflecting decisions at three levels: specification of what goals or objectives to achieve (creating shared 
goals); planning of how to achieve them (expressing potential sets of tasks to achieve goals); scheduling of 
when to perform the actions (task assignment, shared schedules and resource allocation) (Decker 1995). 
In the above cases, coordination functions to inform local activities. Coordination is an informing 
process for the types of problems that have concerned the classic distributed planning community, where 
interdependencies exists among agents' activities (Durfee 1998, Durfee & Lesser 1989, Georgeff 1983, 
Corkill & Lesser 1983, Durfee, Lesser, & Corkill 1988). Thus the source of conflict is the lack of knowledge 
in producing effective local actions. In such cases, coordination is used as a method of informing individual 
agents of the plans of others, who then integrate their partial plans into a coherent global plan. Furthermore, 
agents are assumed to be helpful and the informing process assists agents in cooperatively synthesizing a 
solution to the given problem. 
However, agents may not always cooperatively agree to perform a task when asked by other agents. 
They may need convincing. This is necessary when the helpful assumption is dropped and the object of 
coordination is the individual preferences of agents. For example, agents may no longer share the same 
goal, and instead they may have goals that are mutually exclusive. For example, a, buyer wants to buy a 
good at a low price, whereas a seller wants to sell at a high price. Alternatively consider the example of two 
trucks wanting to simultaneously cross a bridge that can only support one truck crossing at a time. In both 
examples there are no shared goals. In fact, the goals of the agents are mutually exclusive. The goals of an 
individual may also be mutually exclusive (e. g. company A wants to increase wages to satisfy its workers, 
but also wants to cut down on expenditure). In such cases, coordination may involve more than informing 
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others of plans or goals (one truck driver can not simply state its intention that it intends to use the bridge 
first. It must convince the other driver of this schedule). Indeed, under the non-cooperative assumption even 
the validity of information can not be taken at face value since agents may be untruthful (Rosenschein & 
Zlotkin 1994). 
In such contexts, coordination is needed because of conflicts of interests. In the case of helpful agents, 
coordination resembles a distributed optimization problem (optimally ordering tasks, resourcing, assigning 
and scheduling of tasks to agents). In the case of selfish agents, a coordination mechanism is needed that 
more closely resembles a distributed conflict resolution problem because optimization of activities and 
resources may be an intractable problem given that information may be incorrect (selfish agents may be 
untruthful about the information they communicate), uncertain (information is not publicly available hence 
agents have to make uncertain decisions about actions of others) and partial (no one agent has a complete 
view of the overall problem). Therefore, optimization of the overall problem becomes intractable. The 
problem then becomes how to resolve each individual's preferences in the collective activity. 
Finally, even if coordination is not needed (actions are independent and resources are plentiful) it may 
still be beneficial if agents coordinated. For example, information discovered independently by one agent 
can be transmitted to others which can be used to reduce the complexity of their search (Decker 1995). As 
will be shown in section 3.2.1, negotiation based on this assumption has been popular with the work of 
Rosenchein and Zlotkin. 
1.3.2.3 Properties of Coordination 
The properties, or characteristics, of coordination are closely related to the definition of coordination from 
section 1.3.2.1, and are meant to capture, in some objective way, what the system as a whole should exhibit 
for it to be considered coherent. Operational definitions of what is a coherent action have yielded several 
criteria along measurable objectives such as solution quality, efficiency, clarity and graceful degradation 
(Bond & Gasser 1988). Specifically, a coordinated system must (Corkill & Lesser 1983): 
" ensure all the necessary overall problems are included in the activities of at least one agent-coverage 
9 permit interactions between activities to be developed and integrated into an overall solution- 
connectivity 
ensure the above objectives are achieved within the available computational and resource limitation- 
capability 
Malone, in addition to the above, proposes flexibility and efficiency tradeoff criteria for evaluating the suc- 
cess of coordination (Malone 1990). This criteria can be used to differentiate one type of system that 
is highly structured, with formalized procedures for all possible eventualities, to systems that are loosely 
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coupled structures that depend on massive amounts of informal communication and mutual adjustments to 
adapt to rapidly changing and complex environments. 
Finally, quantitative models of coordination specify properties for both the outcome and the process 
of coordination. In these models, which will be described in more detail in chapter three, satisfactory 
coordination should be efficient (either in the speed of convergence to coordinated behaviours or in the 
quality of the coordinated outcome, or both) and stable (where the individual's strategy of interaction is self 
enforcing and deviations from this are irrational (Binmore 1992)). Additionally, the coordinating process 
itself should not treat individuals differently. This symmetric treatment of agents is a desirable property 
because a coordination solution that treats one agent more preferentially than another is unlikely to be 
adopted by the agent who fares worse. Furthermore, to maintain the benefits of the distribution (section 1), it 
should be distributed, requiring no central decision maker (Rosenschein & Zlotkin 1994). These properties 
are then used as a benchmark to evaluate different coordination solutions (Rosenschein & Zlotkin 1994). 
1.3.3 Types of Coordination 
There are numerous different types of coordination techniques (where each type differs in its rationale, 
methodology and effects). Therefore, for comparison purposes, Walton and Krabbe defined the following 
interaction set based on the initial context and the joint and individual aims of the concerned parties: (Walton 
& Krabbe 1995) 3 
" Persuasion-Persuasion begins with the identification of a conflict and a mutual adoption of the goal 
to resolve this conflict. The primary motivation of each agent is to modify the belief of the opponent 
while avoiding revision of the agent's own beliefs. However, each agent implicitly acknowledges the 
willingness to modify its own beliefs. 
" Inquiry-In inquiry the aim of each agent is the shared aim of all agents, which is to substantiate or 
derive a proof for a claim. 
Deliberation-Deliberation is not initiated from a conflict, but is rather directed from a need for 
action. The aim of deliberation is to jointly arrive at a decision or form a plan of action. Like 
negotiation and persuasion, deliberation is a non-cooperative interaction in that agents attempt to 
reach a plan of action or decision which benefits themselves. 
" Negotiation-The interaction type used for the problems addressed in this research is negotiation 
which, like persuasion, but unlike deliberation, is initiated from a conflict of interests. Furthermore, 
similarly to persuasion, negotiation is motivated by a need to make a deal while selfishly maximizing 
; Only the relevant classes of interactions are included here. See (Walton & Krabbe 1995) for a more formal treatment of these and 
other types of interactions. 
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personal goals. However, whereas the aim of a persuasion dialogue is to reach an agreement, in 
negotiation dialogue it is not a necessary condition to reach a settlement-other than agreeing to a 
particular deal. Thus the beliefs of each agent may still remain diametrically opposite at the end of 
negotiation. It is in this sense that negotiation is viewed throughout this thesis. - 
The object of interactions, in this research, over which agents have conflicts is called a service. In 
service-oriented negotiation, one agent (the client) requires a service to be performed on its behalf by some 
other agent (the server). 
A service is a solution to a problem. It is formulated and assigned to agents who then act as experts 
in solving that type of problem. Examples include diagnosing a fault (performing a task), buying a group 
of shares in the stock market or allocating bandwidth to transmit a video-conference (gaining access to 
a resource). Agents that then require that expertise must interact (or negotiate) with agents who own the 
expertise. Thus solutions to problems are accessed via a computational economy, where the activities of 
interest are described in terms of the production and consumption of services (Mullen & Wellman 1995). 
Services partially capture what Malone calls the 'fundamental components of coordination ", the allocation 
of scarce resources and the communication of intermediate results (Malone 1990). In this thesis, a service 
is an abstraction of an agent's capabilities to perform both tasks and provide resources. As will be shown 
in proceeding sections, a considerable number of models of negotiation have been developed for either the 
problem of task allocation (for example, the Contract Net Protocol, see section 3.2.3), where negotiation 
is viewed as connecting and gaining access to capabilities of other agents (such as security expertise), 
or resource allocation, where negotiation is establishing usage rights to a shared resource that is owned 
mutually (such as a bridge). This dichotomy is principally due to the process that maps the given problem 
into a MAS (this process will be referred to as agentification). Generally, although tasks are assigned to 
agents, the associated resources necessary to perform the tasks can either be mutually or privately owned. In 
either case, agents must interact with one another and establish usage rights of tasks as well as of mutually 
or privately owned resources. Note, that the choice of agentification (assignment of services and resources 
to achieve these services) directly influences the coordination wrapper, in terms of coverage, connectivity 
and capability of the agents to the problem (see section 1.3.2.3). For example, an inappropriate assignment 
of resources to an agent to perform the service will reduce the effectiveness of the negotiation wrapper. 
This is because if the resources to perform a service s are provided by several other agents, then the agent 
that wants to provide s to another agent must engage in a number of other negotiations with providers of 
resources for s. 
To achieve one of the aims of this research (a domain independent negotiation wrapper) the process of 
agentifying the problem must not only assign individual tasks to agents, but must also assign the resources 
necessary to perform the tasks. Thus, ownership is assigned over both tasks and resources and specifies 
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the roles of an individual over a service, specifying whether the agent is a provider or consumer of a ser- 
vice. Access to these services is then achieved through trading/bargaining over the service and its multiple 
features, such as its price, quality, start-time, as well as other service features. 
Moreover, in service-oriented contexts, negotiation involves determining a contract under certain terms 
and conditions. A contract is informally defined as: 
a statement of the rights and obligations of each party to a transaction or transactions. A 
contract, familiarly envisaged, is a formal written statement of the terms of the transaction or 
relationship: a house purchase or a pop star's deal with a record company (Bannock, Baxter, & 
Davis 1992). 
Thus, agents negotiate for services, defined as multi-dimensional goods, and successful negotiation results 
in agreements in the form of contracts. 
As will be shown in later chapters, the characterization of objects of interaction as services permits 
abstraction and decoupling of coordination reasoning from the problem domain at hand. The latter problem 
is handled by the domain expert who then specifies the service(s) it requires and its preferences over the 
service(s) to the wrapper. Contracts, in turn, explicitly model commitments made at the end of successful 
interactions. 
An agent's motivation was a central classification criteria in the above coordination taxonomy. As was 
shown previously, this attribute has been instrumental in classifying DAI approaches and their techniques 
into closed (DPS) and open (MAS) system paradigms. Two application domains, one an example of a 
closed system and the other of an open system, are presented next. The domain problems of these two 
applications have been instrumental in grounding the research direction of this thesis and have been fully 
implemented as systems of multiple interacting agents. 
1.4 Exemplar Problem Domains 
This section presents two application domains, business process management (section 1.4.1) and telecom- 
munication service management (section 1.4.2), that have jointly motivated and grounded the design of the 
interaction wrapper. These two application domains can be viewed as typical real-world exemplars of appli- 
cations that are well suited to an agent-based approach (i. e. they exhibit a number of the features described 
in section 1). See (Jennings et al. 2000a), (Jennings et al. 2000b), (Jennings, Norman, & Faratin 1998), 
(Faratin, Sierra, & Jennings 1998), (Sierra, Faratin, & Jennings 1997), (Norman et al. 1996), (Jennings et 
al. 1996c), (Jennings et al. 1996b), for publications on the business process management (ADEPT) project 
and (Faratin, Sierra, & Jennings 2000), (Faratin et al. 1999b), (Faratin et al. 2000), (Sierra, Faratin, 
& 
Jennings 1999) and (Faratin et al. 1999a) for publications on the telecommunication service management 
project. In addition to these application domains, the developed wrapper: 
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1. has been deployed in a European Union project (ESPRIT 27064), called CASBA (Competitive 
Agents for Secure Business Applications) (CASBA 2000). CASBA is an e-commerce marketplace 
where agents buy and sell items (travel packages for example, as well as business to business appli- 
cations). Here the wrapper has been used to model the decision making functionalities of the agents. 
2. has been used to demonstrate negotiation within Service Impact Analysis and Service Level re- 
negotiation within Nortel Networks (property of Nortel Networks, hence no public document exists 
for referencing). Service impact negotiation relates to network level negotiation for the provisioning 
of resources for the network to recover from the impact of a failure. Agents representing differ- 
ent nodes within the network negotiate using the wrapper to recover from the network failure. The 
wrapper has also been used to dynamically re-provision telecommunication service failures with the 
affected customer at the service level. Agents representing the service provider and effected cus- 
tomers utilize the negotiation wrapper to re-negotiate the committed Service Level Agreement to 
enable a continued service. 
3. has been incorporated as a generic component into the agent framework used within Nortel for de- 
veloping multi-agent systems. The wrapper technology within the agent framework has been used to 
construct a number of concept demonstrators, including: 
(a) Security Negotiation: utilizing the negotiation wrapper to enable the required security level to 
be established between calling parties depending on their individual requirements. 
(b) Shuffle project (Shuffle 2000). The wrapper is also intended to be used in the European Union's 
Fifth Framework Project Shuffle (An agent based approach to controlling resources in UMTS 
networks). The aim of the project is to use negotiating agents in a resource configuration sys- 
tem that dynamically allocates radio and associated fixed network resources in third generation 
mobile communication systems. Third generation mobile systems are seen as being the technol- 
ogy to bring the new broadband services being developed for the Internet (and for broadband 
networks in general) to the mobile user. However, providing flexible, higher bandwidth ser- 
vices in a mobile environment leads to increased complexity in resource control and resource 
management because of the variable bandwidth requirements of the applications, the new radio 
architecture and the varying demands on the fixed part of the infrastructure. Such complex- 
ity requires the use of sophisticated control and management techniques. Negotiating agent 
technology is intended to be used to manage this complexity. 
Together these seven applications of the wrapper to diverse domains from business process management, 
to security levels for telecommunication management, to travel agency, procedurally demonstrate the flex- 
ibility and re-usability aims of this research. The expertise of agents (management of sub-processes of a 
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business or management of a telecommunication infrastructure or network security) is bought and sold as 
services to and by agents, to satisfy either individual goals (for example, buying any commodity, such as 
security expertise for personal purposes) or some joint goal (for example, to collectively manage, through 
buying and selling of services, sub-processes of a business). In all these cases, the negotiation wrapper 
can be "configured" to "connect" a buyer to a server of a service independently of what is being bought 
and sold. The details of how it is configured are deferred until later chapters, but, informally, agents are 
configured by specifying the issues over which they negotiate, their preferences over these issues, and the 
behaviours the designer wants the agents to exhibit in the course of negotiation in order to achieve these 
preferences. A protocol is then used to allow agents to communicate and solve (or "connect") either their 
individual or their joint problems. 
1.4.1 Business Process Management-ADEPT, 
The initial scenario is the British Telecom (BT) business process of providing a quotation for designing a 
network to provide particular services to a customer (figure 1.2)4. The overall process receives a customer 
service request as its input and generates as its output a quote specifying how much it would cost to build a 
network to realize that service. It involves up to six agent types: the sales department agent, the customer 
service division agent, the legal department agent, the design division agent, the surveyor department agent, 
and the various agents who provide the out-sourced service of vetting customers. All negotiations are 
centered on a multi-attribute object, where attributes are, for instance, price, quality, duration of a service 
(see (Jennings et al. 1996a) and section 2.2.1 for more details). The process is initiated by the sales agent 
which negotiates with the CSD agent (mainly over time, but also over the number of invocations and the 
form in which the final result should be delivered) for the service of providing a customer quote. The first 
stages of the Provide_Customer_Quote service involve the CSD agent capturing the customer's details 
and vetting the customer in terms of their credit worthiness. The latter sub-service is actually performed 
by one of the VC agents. Negotiation is used to determine which VC agent should be selected-the main 
attributes negotiated over are the price of the service, the penalty for contract violation, the desired quality 
of the service and the time by which the service should be performed. If the customer fails the vetting 
procedure, then the quote process terminates. Assuming the customer is satisfactory, the CSD agent maps 
their requirements against a service portfolio. If the requirements can be met by a standard off-the-shelf 
portfolio item, then an immediate quote can be offered based on previous examples. In the case of bespoke 
services, however, the process is more complex. The CSD agent negotiates with the DD agent (over time and 
quality) for the service of designing and costing the desired network service. In order for the DD agent to 
provide this service, it must negotiate with the LD agent (over time) and perhaps with the SD agent. The LD 
4The negotiations between the agents are denoted by arrows (arrow head toward client) and the service involved in the negotiation 
is juxtaposed to the respective arrow. 
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agent checks the design to ensure the legality of the proposed service (e. g. it is illegal to send unauthorized 
encrypted messages across France). If the desired service is illegal, then the entire quote process terminates 
and the customer is informed. If the requested service is legal, then the design phase can start. To prepare 
a network design, it is usually necessary to have a detailed plan of the existing equipment at the customer's 
premises. Sometimes such plans might not exist and sometimes they may be out of date. In either case, 
the DD agent determines whether the customer site(s) should be surveyed. If such a survey is warranted, 
the DD agent negotiates with the SD agent (over price and time) for the Survey_Customer_Site service. 
On completion of the network design and costing, the DD agent informs the CSD agent, which informs the 
customer of the service quote. The business process then terminates. 
1.4.2 Telecommunication Service Management 
The FIPA Agent Communication Technologies and Services (FACTS) telecommunication management 
problem was part of the ACTS programme of the Fourth framework of the European Community (FACTS 
1998). The problem scenario is based on the use of negotiation to coordinate the dynamic provisioning of 
resources for a Virtual Private Network (VPN) used for meeting scheduling by end users. A VPN refers to 
the use of a public network (such as the Internet) in a private manner. This service is provided to the users 
by service and network providers. The scenario is composed of a number of agents that represent the users, 
the service providers and the network providers (see figure 1.3). 
Individuals using the system are represented by user agents that are collectively referred to as Personal 
Communication Agents or PCAs. PCA agents are composed of IPCA and RPCAs; the Initiating PCA 
represents the user who wants to initiate the meeting and the Receiving PCAs represent the party/parties 
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that are required to attend the meeting. Interactions between PCAs can be multilateral (involving one 
IPCA and multiple RPCAs) and are centered around negotiation over meeting scheduling. Each agent 
negotiates on behalf of their user and has the goal of establishing the most appropriate time and security 
level (see below) for the service requested by the IPCA. The set of issues over which PCAs negotiate 
are: [Service-Type, Security, Price, Start-Time, Duration]. Service-Type denotes the choice of the 
service (e. g. video, audio or mixture of both). Price is the share of the price the agents should pay for the 
service. Start_Time and Duration are the time the service will commence and its length, respectively. 
Security encodes the privacy of the meeting and is represented by both the method of security (e. g. in the 
order of value to PCAs: Entrust, Verisign or Microsoft) and the level of the security method (again in the 
order of value: confidentiality, integrity and authentication). 
The requirements of the IPCA and the RPCAs are constrained by what resources are available at the 
network level. For example, the network may be heavily loaded at the time the service is required by the 
PCAs. Since the network is only visible to the IPCA through the Service Provider Agents (SPAs), the threads 
of IPCA and RPCAs negotiation are executed in parallel with negotiations between IPCA and SPAs. Note 
however that the interactions between IPCA and SPA directly influence the meeting scheduling negotiations 
between IPCA and RPCAs. In fact, PCAs agents often have to make trade-off between issues given the 
constraints at the network level. For example, in cases of high network load the SPA may offer PCAs a later 
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Start-Time for a longer Duration. Furthermore, only bilateral negotiation is assumed between IPCA 
and SPAs. However, each SPA can make agreements with IPCA for services and then out-source these 
commitments by initiating negotiation with other SPAs. The set of issues in the negotiation between IPCA 
and SPAS is the same as that between IPCA and RPCAs except there is the additional element Participants 
(the list of users, represented by RPCAs, specified to be included in the requested service). 
Either concurrently, or after the service is provisioned between IPCA and SPA, multiple threads of 
negotiation are initiated between the SPA and the Network Provider Agents, NPAs, that manage the infras- 
tructure and low level aspects of the IP network. These threads of interaction are multilateral since each NPA 
manages only a subset of the IP network. Therefore, the SPA must negotiate with a number of NPAs in order 
to secure resources for the services it provides to IPCA. The set of issues in the thread of negotiation between 
SPA and NPAs includes: [Quality-of -Service, 
Security, Participants, Price, Start-Time, Duration]. 
Here Quality-of _Service, or 
QoS, represents the "goodness" of the service from an agent's perspective. 
QoS is often discussed as if it were composed of a number of sub issues such as, the Bandwidth (capacity 
of the link), the latency (delay imposed by the network on packets), the jitter (maximum time deviation 
acceptable during transmission), the availability (percentage of time over which the service is required) 
and packetloss (percentage of total packets lost during lifetime of the provisioned service). Additionally, 
the sub issues that represent the QoS can change in the course of negotiation. For example, negotiation over 
QoS may begin with concerns over only the Bandwidth capacity of the link, but later include packetloss 
if the client of a service requires a higher service quality. Alternatively, sub issues may be removed from 
the set of issues that define QoS. For example, the SPA may remove jitter from the set of QoS negotiation 
issues with NPAs if the end users have agreed to hold a video-conference at a geographically close location 
(since jitter will no longer be a concern). 
Additionally, these agents operate in a highly dynamic environment: services need to be updated, new 
ones come on line, old services are removed and currently agreed services fail. Customer's requirements 
may also change: new services may be required, services may be required sooner or later than initially 
anticipated or higher quality may become more important. In all of these cases, negotiation is the means 
of managing this complexity. New services become candidates of provisioning, those effected by the failed 
services can be re-provisioned, and service conditions can be dynamically configured or reconfigured. 
1.4.3 Characteristics and Assumptions of Problem Domains 
The following negotiation characteristics can be observed in the scenarios above. These characteristics 
form part of the requirements that need to be adequately modeled and which will be used as a benchmark 
for analysis of other related approaches to similar problems (chapter 3). Moreover, it is believed that 
these characteristics are likely to be common to a wide range of service-oriented negotiations between 
autonomous agents because these features are identified at a sufficiently abstract level (such as presence or 
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absence of time limits or organizational structure) to be applicable to most complex and real-time interaction 
problems. 
The main feature of the above scenarios relates to the design of open and closed systems, mentioned 
in section 1.1. A distributed system is either formed centrally by a designer, or else created dynamically 
through encounters. In the above two scenarios, the set of BT agents in the ADEPT system and the SPAs 
and NPAs in the FACTS scenario, represent a closed system. These agents have been created centrally by 
designer(s) according to some MAS design methodology (see (Jennings et al. 2000b) for the methodology 
for creating ADEPT agents). On the other hand, the design of, and the interactions between, the VC agents 
and the BT agents in the ADEPT system, and the IPCAs with the SPAs, in the FACTS scenario, is not a 
centralized process. In fact these agents can, and do, freely enter and leave interactions (for example, in 
a deregulated telecommunication industry where customers can choose amongst a wide range of service 
providers, SPA agents are unlikely to encounter the same PCA agents). As will be shown below, this open 
versus closed design directly influences agent interactions along a number of dimensions such as: different 
agent architectures, languages and reasoning procedures, varying certainty levels, autonomy, motivations 
and conflict types, different patterns of temporal persistancy (or the period an agent is "alive" in a negoti- 
ation), and different frequency of encounters. It is precisely for these reasons that no single coordination 
mechanism can be designed that solves this type of problem. Rather, the emphasis of this thesis is on a 
configurable negotiation framework. 
In more detail, what can be said about the two domains above are: 
" There are roles. Individual agents can be both clients and servers for different services in different 
negotiation contexts. 
" Interactions can be either amongst group members (e. g. the BT agents or the PCAs) or individuals 
from different organizations (e. g. VC and CSD agents). The organization of agents has four closely 
related implications: 
- conflict types: The conflict between individual and system goals determines the style of interac- 
tion. Three types of conflict can be identified within the above two domains. Some negotiations 
involve entities within the same organization (e. g. between the CSD and DD agents) where 
agents share the goal of the organization. Hence, the types of interactions are generally cooper- 
ative in nature. Other negotiations are inter-organizational and purely competitive-involving 
self interested, utility maximizing agents (e. g. between the VC agents and the CSD agent, or 
between the PCA and the SPA agents). Finally, agents may share the same system goal but 
have different individual preferences (e. g. the scheduling of meetings by the PCAs requires 
resolution of different preferences even though individuals all agree that they want to meet). 
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- motivation types: Note also that a single agent may enter different types of conflict scenarios. 
For example, the style of negotiation between the CSD agent (or IPCA) against DD (or RPCAs) 
is cooperative in nature, whereas the CSD (or IPCA) negotiations with VC (or SPAs) may be 
more selfish. Therefore the attitude of the agents is not fixed. 
- autonomy: The solution to problems, especially in inter-organizational contexts, is based on 
mutual selection of outcomes. Therefore no single agent has control over the other in terms of 
the selection of the final choice. 
- uncertainty types: Some groups of agents often negotiate with one another for the same service 
(e. g. the CSD and DD agents), whereas other negotiations are more open in nature (for example, 
the set of VC agents changes frequently and hence the CSD agent often negotiates with unknown 
agents). 
" Negotiations can range over a number of issues (e. g. price, duration and start time). Each successful 
negotiation requires a range of such issues to be resolved to the satisfaction of both parties. Agents 
may be required to make trade-offs between issues (e. g. faster completion time for lower quality) in 
order to come to an agreement or dynamically change the set of issues involved in negotiation. 
" As the agents are autonomous, the factors which influence their negotiation stance and behaviour 
are private and not available to their opponents (especially in inter-organizational and open settings). 
Thus, agents do not know what utilities their opponents place on various outcomes, they do not 
know what reasoning models they employ, they do not know their opponent's constraints and they 
do not know whether an agreement is even possible at the outset (i. e. the participants may have 
non-intersecting ranges of acceptability). 
" Since negotiation takes place within a highly intertwined web of activity (the business process or a 
video-conference schedule), time is a critical factor. Timings are important on two distinct levels: (i) 
the time it takes to reach an agreement must be reasonable; and (ii) the time by which the negotiated 
service must be executed is important in most cases and crucial in others. The former means that the 
agents should not become involved in unnecessarily complex and time consuming negotiations-the 
time spent negotiating should be reasonable with respect to the value of the service agreement. The 
latter means that the agents sometimes have hard deadlines by which agreements must be in place 
(this occurs mainly when multiple services need to be combined or closely coordinated). 
" The quantity of a particular resource has a strong and direct influence on the behaviour of agents, 
and, moreover, the correct appreciation of the remaining resources is an essential characteristic of 
good negotiators. Resources from the client's point of view relate directly to the number of servers 
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engaged in the ongoing negotiation; likewise from the server's point of view. Thus, the quantity of 
resource has a similar effect on the agents' behaviour as time. 
These features (or characteristics) will be used as the basis for a critical evaluation of related ap- 
proaches and finally for the design of the negotiation wrapper itself. 
1.5 Contributions of the Research 
The work reported here is a formalization and engineering of an interaction wrapper that can be configured 
for use by asocial agents that need to interact with other agents in a number of different environments. It 
is an engineering endeavor because the wrapper's coordination model utilizes and integrates models from 
artificial intelligence and economics. Techniques from these disciplines have been used to design a strategic 
negotiation framework in environments characterized by direct and structured interactions between two 
agents, who have conflicting preferences over multiple issues, and where time and computation are bounded 
and information is uncertain. The majority of current multi-agent systems have tended to model indirect 
interactions between one to many (auctions) or many to many (markets), where the agents are simple and 
the institution, as the mediator, controls and, at times, specifies the strategies of interactions. 
More specifically, this shift in emphasis towards direct and strategic interactions between autonomous 
agents has necessitated: 
. employing extant communication knowledge so that agents can understand and interact with the rules 
of the protocol. This knowledge is modeled as an agent communication language which normatively 
specifies the syntax, semantics and pragmatics of possible utterances. 
" developing a novel coordination architecture for strategically selecting actions given the normative 
rules of the protocol. The communication language above is knowledge "poor", leaving the deci- 
sions about when to use the protocol and what information to transmit to the designer. However, the 
currently available decision models that the designer could use to guide decision making in such sit- 
uations often make unrealistic assumptions about the agent (such as perfect information or unlimited 
computational resources). In contrast, the developed coordination wrapper is based on the realistic 
assumptions that agents have limited information about their world and their reasoning capability is 
constrained by time and computational limitations. This relaxation of the strong assumptions has 
meant that the developed model only aims to compute satisfiable, rather than optimal, solutions. 
The major contributions of this thesis, implemented as a decision architecture within the wrapper, 
are: 
1. A more in-depth description of the environment of multi issue negotiation that agents can use 
for decision making. This description represents: the negotiation issues, their importance, their 
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reservations, the agent's preference over the issues, 'time deadlines and conversation threads. 
The presented model incorporates more negotiation concepts than previously proposed systems, 
thereby allowing richer reasoning mechanisms. 
2. Two fully developed and novel offer generation algorithms, called responsive and trade-off 
mechanisms, which together search the space of possible negotiation outcomes. Another novel, 
but as to date undeveloped, mechanism is the issue-set manipulation mechanism which performs 
a different type of search. 
The responsive mechanism is the computationally simplest algorithm. It generates offers based 
on the negotiation context such as the time remaining in negotiation, the current resource usage 
levels in negotiation or the behaviour of the other agent. The mechanism generates offers solely 
on these factors and independently of the benefits that can be gained by both parties. In this 
sense it can be seen as a selfish mechanism. 
The trade-off and issue-set manipulation algorithms are computationally more complex and de- 
mand relatively more information about the other agent in generating offers than the responsive 
algorithm. The trade-off algorithm generates, unlike the responsive algorithm, offers that have 
the same benefit to the agent as previously, but that may be more beneficial to the other agent 
than the previous offer. This decision is uncertain because an agent does not know the evaluation 
function of its opponent. Fuzzy decision techniques are provided that support uncertain decision 
making during trade-off negotiations. Since the search for mutually more beneficial outcomes 
is computationally more complex than its responsive algorithm counterpart, the trade-off algo- 
rithm is considered as a more cooperative process. This is because an agent that implements 
such an algorithm will have to dedicate more computational resources to decision making than 
it would for the corresponding responsive algorithm. 
The issue-set manipulation model is also computationally more complex than the responsive 
mechanism (because of this increased computational complexity, this algorithm, together with 
the trade-off algorithm, constitute what is termed as the deliberative components of the wrap- 
per). Issue-manipulation operates by dynamically changing the set of negotiation issues by 
adding and/or removing issues at negotiation time. The model has been developed to escape 
negotiation deadlocks by removing "noisy" issues that are obstructing the progress of negotia- 
tions, or by adding new issues into the negotiation that may increase the benefit to both parties. 
Again these evaluations are uncertain and are supported by fuzzy decision making techniques. 
The issue-set manipulation is the least developed component of the wrapper architecture and, 
unlike the responsive and trade-off algorithms, still requires the specification of an algorithm 
given the developed formal model. 
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In summary, all three mechanisms are decentralized. The responsive mechanism is novel be- 
cause it formally models a concession protocol based on the environment of the agent. This 
allows agents to explicitly reason about how to concede in negotiation. The novelty of the 
trade-off mechanism is that, for the first time, it formally models this important negotiation 
mechanism. Furthermore, although the trade-off mechanism is computationally more complex 
than the responsive mechanism, it is nonetheless tractable. Finally, the issue-set manipulation 
mechanism formally models another type of negotiation decision mechanism that has to date 
not been addressed elsewhere. 
3. A meta-strategy model that guides the decision making about which of the available negotiation 
algorithms to use. Given that there are three choices of methods to generate offers in negotiation, 
another level of decision making is required to make the choice about which technique to apply. 
This level of decision making is referred to as a meta-strategy. Decisions about which algorithm 
to use in generating an offer can be based on a number of internal or external factors to the 
agent, for example, the history of interactions, the time limits and so on. An important decision 
criteria is based on the fact that the responsive and deliberative components of the wrapper can 
implement both selfish or cooperative behaviours, respectively. Whereas in traditional DPS the 
attitude of the agent is hardwired into the protocol, moving towards open environments requires 
decoupling this strategic decision from the protocol. In some environments it may be beneficial 
to be selfish and follow the agent's own goals, whereas in other cases being cooperative is more 
beneficial. This novel way of coupling strategies of interactions to environments and goals via 
meta-strategies, rather than the protocol itself, also results in a wrapper that is more domain 
independent than other traditional DPS protocols. 
The requirement that the wrapper is operational in both open and closed environments has resulted in a 
need to develop a coordination framework that is reusable. Re-usability is achieved by separating the 
wrapper from the domain problem solver layer of an agent through a service layer. The domain expert 
can then develop domain dependent code for the problem at hand, but use this service layer to achieve 
effective coordination when problems interact with other autonomous entities. Designers can then build 
agents without significant expertise in the development of coordination strategies. 
Furthermore, the designer is provided with not only a coordination framework, but also a preliminary 
empirical evaluation of its components. This evaluation can be used to guide the selection of strategies in 
a wide range of environments. Such evaluation is needed because the wrapper is only a formal description 
of possible strategic negotiation behaviour and there is no way to predict which strategy is best for a given 
environment. This can only be achieved by empirically evaluating the developed coordination framework 
in a number of environments. 
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1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. The requirements defined in section 1.4.3, as well as 
additional considerations, are given a more detailed treatment in the next chapter. These requirements are 
considered, and introduced, as elements that need to be modeled in negotiation which then serve as inputs 
into the wrapper layer. This chapter also elaborates on some of the assumptions made in the main body of 
this work. Economically and computationally motivated coordination models are then introduced in chapter 
three and critically evaluated for their appropriateness for the problems and requirements mentioned above. 
Next, in chapter four, the developed negotiation model is presented, followed by an empirical evaluation of 
its behaviour in a number of different environments in the penultimate chapter. Finally, chapter six presents 
the conclusions reached and outlines some potential future directions of this research. 
Chapter 2 
Components of a Negotiation Wrapper 
The aim of this chapter is to define the scope of the research and justify the working assumptions. The scope 
of the research is presented through a description of the elements of interaction that need to be captured in 
the negotiation wrapper, as well as the dependency relationship(s) between these elements. This analysis 
and specification is in part grounded in the two application domains described in the previous chapter, and 
in part from the re-usability and flexibility requirements. The activities involved in the design of a wrapper 
are divided into: i) the identification of the important elements of negotiation that need to be captured, 
followed by ii) the formal or informal modeling of the identified issues. This chapter expands on the first 
phase of the design process. The following chapter (chapter 3) is a review of attempts to model them. 
The choice of which negotiation factor(s) to model and which to omit has a direct impact on the 
applicability of the wrapper, in terms of not only the adequacy of the computed solution, but also the 
computability of the solution itself. In real world interactions, there are a large number of factors that 
directly influence the process and outcome of negotiation, including: 
" the symmetry of agents in information and resources. Agents are in a symmetric context when they 
both have the same information and resources (Gibbons 1992). When this symmetry is broken, the 
relationship between the agents is often qualitatively transformed (Raiffa 1982)-the agent that has 
more information and/or resources can exert a larger influence on the direction the final outcome will 
take; the agent is said to have more "power" (Corfman & Gupta 1993). 
" whether there are hard or soft deadlines. As was discussed in the previous chapter, time deadlines are 
important in a negotiated settlement. Hard deadlines represent absolute and inflexible time schedules 
by which some activity must be completed by. On the other hand, the achievement of an activity 
within a soft deadline is less absolute and more flexible. 
" the protocol of interaction. The protocol of the interaction defines the language and rules of interac- 
tion between the agents. Negotiation protocols will be expanded on in more depth in this chapter. 
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" the strategies of interactions. A strategy is informally defined as an individually (or locally) chosen 
action of an agent given the rules of group (or global) behaviour. It is strategic because the agent can 
have a number of choices of the actions that will result in the achievement of a goal. This multiple 
choices of actions leads to agents having preferences and behaving strategically over which action to 
take. 
" the rationality of the agents. The term rationality is informally defined as making appropriate de- 
cisions, or "doing the right thing" (Russell & Wefald 1991). The rationality of an agent is defined 
with respect to the type of agent that is being designed. For example, rationality of a cognitive agent 
is defined in terms of what actions are legitimate given the agent's current beliefs, desires and in- 
tentions (the so called BDI architecture (Bratman 1990, Cohen & Levesque 1990, Rao & Georgeff 
1991). The rationality of an economic agent, on the other hand, is defined in terms of maximiza- 
tion of the agent's preferences, modeled as a utility function, over states of the world (Kreps 1990, 
Gibbons 1992, Binmore 1992). Agents in this thesis are economic and thereby abide by the latter 
principle of rationality. 
. the possibility of coalitions. Coalition refers to interactions between different groups of agents (Sand- 
holm 1999), as opposed to "monolithic" agents that only represent themselves and not others (Raiffa 
1982). 
" the risks and uncertainty. Uncertainty arises because agents seldom have full access to the entire 
information about their world. This lack of information can be due to either "laziness" (too much 
to be known in the world), declarative ignorance (limited knowledge of the domain-for example, 
chemical science has no complete theory of the science), or procedural ignorance (consequences of 
effects of actions are unknown) (Russell & Norvig 1995). Risks, in turn, characterize the attitude of 
the decision maker in choices (or what is called lotteries (Neumann & Morgernstern 1944)) between 
a sure outcome and an expected (or uncertain) outcome (Neumann & Morgernstern 1944). 
The benefit of formalizing all the issues involved in negotiation is that the behaviour of the system is 
likely to be more predictable. However, the object of consideration of this research is only a subset of the 
aforementioned issues. This is because the benefit gained from formalizing all of the issues is offset by the 
computational difficulties they incur on coordination (for example, the information required or the amount 
of time it takes to reach a solution). Therefore, the first stage of the design of the negotiation wrapper 
(which issues to model) has been constrained by the inclusion and consideration of only the most important 
negotiation issues. In the main, these have been derived from the general, as opposed to problem/domain 
specific, properties of the two scenarios described previously and the configurability requirement of the 
wrapper for use in different types of domains. These issues can be roughly categorized into cognitive (or 
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informational), affective (or choice) and conative (or action) (Kiss 1992). The chapter can also be viewed 
as a description of the following coordination components of figure 1.1: 1 
9 the set of possible inputs (motivations, section 2.1.2, issues, section 2.2.1, information, section 2.2.6), 
. the set of possible outputs (action and strategies, section 2.1.3, contracts, section 2.2.5) 
" the set of possible environments (the agent society, section 2.1.1, protocols, section 2.1.3, time dead- 
lines, section 2.2.7, bounded rationality, section 2.2.8, commitments, section 2.2.5) 
To define the scope of this research and justify the working assumptions, the exposition is structured 
along two dimensions; the characteristics of the society of agents (section 2.1), and its interactions (section 
2.2). The former is a description of the issues involved in modeling interactions from a multi-agent perspec- 
tive, and the latter is the set of issues involved in modeling interaction from an agent-centric perspective. 
2.1 Characteristics of the Society 
Kraus presents a classification of coordination methods for multi agent systems that is based on i) the size 
of the society, ii) the motivations of the agents and iii) the presence or absence of a protocol of interaction 
(Kraus 1997b). These criteria, and additionally the frequency of interactions, are used below to define the 
scope of the research and the underlying assumptions about the agent society. The frequency of interactions 
is an important criteria that helps to distinguish a closed from an open system, and, as will be shown below, 
directly influences other factors in interactions like learning, reputations and trust. 
2.1.1 Society Size 
One of the aims of this research is to develop a negotiation technology for direct interactions amongst two 
agents (bi-lateral negotiation), as opposed to large scale societies requiring coordination mechanisms such 
as organizations, markets, auctions, voting or social decision schemes (see (Corfman & Gupta 1993) for 
an overview of the different decision mechanisms from bargaining, social welfare, organization, marketing 
and psychological disciplines). Bargaining models, defined and explained in depth in the next chapter, are 
in the main designed for bi-lateral negotiations (Gibbons 1992) (Nash is an exception (Nash 1950)). These 
models describe interactions between economically rational agents that attempt to maximize some utility. 
Market and auction mechanisms also model economically rational agents, but are only adequate for large 
number of agents (Sandholm 1999). Social decision schemes (e. g. plurality, majority, proportionality), 
are also inappropriate for bi-lateral negotiations because they need to form a decision based on agreements 
1Note that nothing will be mentioned about the middleware component of figure 1.1. Issues involved at this level of coordination 
include synchronicity of the messages and control protocols (Parunak 1999, DAIS 1984, Mowbray & Zahavi 1995, OMG 1996) which 
themselves are technologies that facilitate coordination. 
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of more than two agents (Laughlin 1980, Laughlin & Earley 1982). Coordination techniques for large 
groups must also model the possibility of coalition (Kahan & Rapoport 1984, Shehory & Kraus 1995, 
Sandholm & Lesser 1997) and differential power (Binmore, Shaked, & Sutton 1984) amongst members. 
Since the focus of this work is interaction between few agents, bargaining models are the most appro- 
priate candidate mechanism (or at least, as will be shown, its solution criteria, protocols and quantitative 
modeling tools) for building the coordination model component of the negotiation wrapper in figure 1.1. As 
will be shown below, the preferences of individuals and the rules of interactions are central in these models. 
Although the work reported here is exclusively on the design, engineering and evaluation of the framework 
for bi-lateral negotiation, the framework has nonetheless been designed so that its extension to multi-lateral 
negotiations should not be problematic. This is achieved via modular design of the negotiation mechanisms 
that generate offers for bi-lateral negotiations. Multi-lateral negotiation is then achievable through concur- 
rent reasoning over multiple independent threads (defined in section 4.2.3) of bi-lateral negotiations. Thus, 
the stance taken in this work is that bi-lateral negotiation is an appropriate first case assumption, which is 
extendible to multi-lateral negotiations. In fact, as will be shown in the next chapter, bi-lateral negotiation is 
a harder problem to solve than multi-lateral negotiation whose solution can be found in the form of auction 
or market mechanisms. 
2.1.2 Society Motivations 
Agents act in order to achieve some goal(s). The agent is then said to be motivated to achieve a given set 
of goals (Russell & Norvig 1995). Individual motivations of agents to achieve their own goals (or local 
goals) directly influences the nature and outcome of negotiations when local goals of agents interact. The 
importance of an agent's motivation is best illustrated by an abstract game called the Prisoner's Dilemma 
(figure 2.1) 2 There are two players in this game and each has a choice of defecting or cooperating. Each 
1 1 
cooperate defect 
cooperate 3,3 0,5 
defect 5,0 1,1 11 
Figure 2.1: The Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
player receives a payoff, or utility, that determines how good, in some subjective way, the outcome is for the 
player. This payoff is often taken to mean the degree of satisfaction of the agent's preferences, modeled as a 
utility function. The combination of individual payoffs then defines the group welfare (also called social or 
global welfare), according to some combination function. The respective payoffs for each player are shown 
211e game is actually a demonstration of the principle of trust (Raiffa 1982), and has been applied to a large class of problems in 
political sciences, biology, computer science, psychology and philosophy. See (Axelrod 1984) for a full description. 
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as row and column entries. If the agents are cooperative and cared only for the equity of the group then 
they should both choose to cooperate, since the sum of the individual payoffs (the group welfare) is greatest 
when they both cooperate (3 + 3). However, individually the only rational move is for an agent to defect, 
resulting in higher individual payoffs (5), but a lower group welfare (5 +0 or 0+ 5). Hence the dilemma. 
Thus, motivation is an important element of agent design that strongly affects the outcomes of nego- 
tiation. This point was discussed in the previous chapter in the description of the differences between DPS 
and MAS. This distinction is also acknowledged in the social sciences, where an agent's attitude is a func- 
tion of whether it belongs to an organization or not. Agents in an organization exist to perform a function 
that is externally formed and controlled. Agents not belonging to any organizations (primary, as opposed 
to, institutional agents (Faris 1953)), on the other hand, are more self motivated and are not centrally con- 
trolled. Thus a different organizational status in turn motivates the attitude of an agent towards interactions. 
Members of an organization are more likely to be concerned about the benefit of the group choice than their 
own preferences. Conversely, an agent participating in negotiation and not belonging to an organization is 
more likely to place greater emphasis on its own preferences. 
As will be shown in more detail in the next chapter, there are two choices of bargaining models that 
individually model different types of agent motivations. The decisions and processes involved in negotiation 
when an agent's preferences are important (i. e. self motivated) are, better modeled by non-cooperative 
bargaining models. On the other hand, agents that care about equity (or welfare) of the others are better 
modeled using cooperative bargaining models. 
2.1.3 Protocols: Normative Rules and Languages 
Computational agents require ordered and structured interactions (Bond & Gasser 1988). Such structuring 
is needed because in the absence of any normative rules of public behaviour, interactions lead to chaotic 
dynamics where agents can send messages that cannot be understood or the message is inappropriate given 
the history of the current interaction. The term "normative" states prescriptive rules of behaviour (Rosen- 
schein & Zlotkin 1994) (what ought to be), as opposed to descriptive observation of behaviour (what is). 
Throughout this work, the term "protocol" refers to these high level normative rules of public behaviour. 
The protocol of interaction (also referred to as the "resolution protocol") must specify three aspects of 
public behaviour: 
" the permissible content of interactions; the objects agents exchange with one another. 
" the permissible process of interactions; when and how to exchange the above objects of exchange. 
" the language of interaction; the language to use in exchanges. 
The choice of a protocol directly influences the uncertainties involved in negotiation (section 2.2.6) 
and the quality of the outcome. Quality of an outcome is defined in more depth in section 2.2.3, but 
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generally it refers to the degree of satisfaction of either or both agents' aspiration levels. Also shown, 
in later sections, is the relationship of how quality of an outcome is directly effected by the content of 
negotiation when more than one goal needs to be resolved. In particular, different resolution protocols 
can be used to differentially specify rules of interactions to reach settlements. For example, in multi-issue 
negotiations (also called integrative negotiations (Raiffa 1982)) the protocol must specify whether agents 
can generate offers over "packages" of issues, or alternatively over sub-packages, or reach a settlement on 
the most important issue first, then try and resolve other issues one by one (Raiffa 1982). These different 
possibilities, each implemented by a different protocol, have a direct influence on the outcome quality. For 
example, consider bi-lateral negotiation over two issues. In an issue by issue resolution protocol, depending 
on the strategies of both agents (see section 2.2.4 for a definition of strategies), one agent may gain very 
little in negotiation on both issues. However, in a package resolution protocol, a loss on the first issue and 
a simultaneous gain on the second may result in a better outcome for that agent. 
Furthermore, there is a need to constrain the process of negotiation, otherwise agents may fail to syn- 
chronize their utterances, dispatching and receiving utterances randomly. For example, rules must specify 
who must begin the negotiation round (as will be shown in section 2.2.5 who starts first again directly in- 
fluences the outcome of negotiation), whether negotiation is a turn taking, sequential alternating round of 
offers and counter-offers, or whether the resolution mechanism is a mediated one-shot simultaneous offer 
whose mid point of intersection is chosen by a third party as the final settlement, or a one-shot take it or 
leave it (divide the pie or ultimatum game (Gibbons 1992)) from one agent to another. The quality of the 
solution, itself possibly a function of the costs to reach the solution and the number of rounds in negotiation, 
and the benefits gained either individually or collectively, is directly dependent on the chosen protocol of 
interaction. For example, if the quality of a solution is a function of the number of messages exchanged 
between agents, then clearly a single-shot protocol is more "efficient" than the sequential iterated proto- 
col. As will be shown in the next chapter, the majority of game theory models attempt to achieve speed 
of resolution by constraining agents' choices of strategies through the design of negotiation protocols that, 
although they can be iterative, are, nonetheless, single-shot (or instant) when agents act rationally. 
In addition to normatively specifying the permissible content and process of interactions, a protocol 
must specify the language of the interaction. The language of interaction is a model of the syntax and 
semantics of utterances that agents can make during their interactions (Finin & Fritzson 1994). The syntax 
of the agent communication language functions to distinguish messages based on grammatical forms, and 
adherence to this syntax assists comprehension of messages. The semantics of utterances, on the other hand, 
distinguishes messages based on their intrinsic meaning, which can be informing, querying, requesting or 
ordering (Cohen & Perrault 1979, Werner 1989). Furthermore, there is a need to map the terms and concepts 
of the individual agents into a shared representation (or a common ontology (Gruber 1994, Huhns & Singh 
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1997, Guha & Lenat 1990)) for successful coordination and communication. 
All of these design choices can be dictated by the designer(s) for a closed system. However, in more 
open environments there is possibly a need for a pre-negotiation phase where agents come to mutual agree- 
ments over not only the rules and language of interactions, but also, as will be shown below in section 2.2.2. 
the set of issues that need to be resolved (or the content of negotiation) and their resolution protocol. 
2.1.4 Frequency of Interactions 
When agents interact with one another, they do so either anonymously (as drivers on a highway) 
or their identity must be known (as dealers in a stock exchange). The issue of identity is particu- 
larly important if interactions are repeated. The possibility of repetition of encounters directly influ- 
ences the type of models that can be used for modeling interactions. A model may be sensitive to 
whether agents meet again or not. For example, in repeated interactions, models are needed that can 
capture an agent's ability to learn others' strategies and/or their preferences (Zeng & Sycara 1997, 
Bui, Kieronska, & Venkatesh 1996). Furthermore, in repeated interactions, reputations become important. 
Kreps and Wilson have shown that early in the interaction history, agents attempt to acquire a reputation of 
being "tough" or "benevolent" (Kreps & Wilson 1982). They demonstrated this "reputation effect" where 
agents take actions that appear individually costly but yield a reputation that is beneficial later. Milgrom 
and Robert identified information uncertainty and repeated actions with the possibility of observing past 
behaviours as the two factors that lead to the emergence of a reputation (Milgrom & Roberts 1982). 
Although repeated interaction is a realistic possibility, especially in closed systems, the negotiation 
model developed in this work is for single encounter interactions. This is for two main reasons. Firstly, 
the number of issues involved in the modeling of interactions is already large. Therefore, as a first case 
assumption, a model of negotiation is sought that adequately describes and predicts the core elements 
of negotiation. Once achieved, this assumption can then be relaxed and the developed model updated 
(possibly with multi-agent learning algorithms, to account for repeated interactions). Secondly, although 
possible, interactions in open systems are unlikely to be repeated. Agents have an incentive to enter and 
leave different electronic communities with evolving degree of services provided by each community. 3 For 
these two reasons, the simplifying assumption that interactions are isolated is made. 
2.2 Characteristics of Interactions 
Having defined the characteristics of the agent society, this section presents the set of issues involved in 
modeling interaction from an agent-centric perspective. 
3For example, although convenient, it is not necessary for an individual to buy weekly groceries from the same store all the time. 
Better offers, the possibility of Internet shopping and other factors may give sufficient incentive to the consumer to break the routine 
of going to the same store and buy products from varied vendors. 
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2.2.1 Object of Negotiation-Issues 
The design of the wrapper must firstly include what agents exchange with one another in the course of 
negotiations-that is, the content, or object, of communication. In classical DPS, negotiation objects may 
be plans, goals or information. In other explicit coordination models, these objects may be other high level 
constructs such as intentions, arguments or, justifications (Kraus, Nirkhe, & Sycara 1998, Parsons, Sierra, 
& Jennings 1998). However, since agents in this work are viewed as buyers and sellers of services, the 
objects of negotiation are offers and counter offers over a set of service issues. Issues represent various 
dimensions of a service production or consumption. Services are represented as multi-dimensional goods, 
since complex services in the real world are seldom adequately described in terms of a single feature. 
Pricing is one method of describing goods using a single issue. However, although useful for describing 
commodities, a decision maker is presented with a random choice in the face of two or more equally priced 
services. Other dimensions of a good must be provided to the decision maker in order to differentiate the 
goods and better support allocation decisions of the good (see section 3.2.9 for arguments against pricing). 
For example, a banking service is not just defined in terms of the interest rates it offers, but also its loan 
schemes and/or repayment methods. Likewise, access to a shared resource, such as parallel computers, 
may be described in terms of features such as job waiting length, speed or memory limits. Issues therefore 
describe features of a domain, which may be qualitative in nature (e. g. repayment schemes) or quantitative 
(e. g. waiting length of the que) with discrete or continuous domain values respectively. 
Generally speaking, issues are rarely viewed as equally important. For example, a banking service 
provider may deem the interest rate more important than the repayment scheme or memory usage may be 
more important than CPU usage on a parallel computer. Issues also have reservation values associated 
with them. For example, there is a maximum amount of memory a user may be permitted to utilize on 
a parallel computer. Conversely, there is a minimum interest rate that the institution will not consider 
economically viable for a lending policy. Generally, for autonomous agents, these reservation values can 
be viewed as constraints associated with the issues that typically represent the limitations placed on: 4 the 
resources needed to produce a service, together with their usage schedule (e. g. quality, number or volume, 
delivery time); the information required for executing a service and the information produced as the output 
at the end of the service execution; the penalty for decommiting from an agreed contract; or the price of 
a service. Issues, importance levels and reservation values are highly domain typed (domain specific in 
nature), reflecting dimensions of the problem at the level of the domain problem solving. Therefore, these 
factors are viewed as inputs (originating from the domain problem solver) into the coordination model. 
Once formulated, these issues, their relative importance and their satisfaction constraints must be repre- 
sented to the negotiation wrapper by the domain problem solver. The task of the wrapper is then informally 
4This is a possible set of constraints because issues may vary in different domains. 
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defined as the goal to achieve the satisfaction of the issues, given their constraints, or the maximization of 
some satisfaction function when interacting with other agents for service provisioning. More formally, the 
decision problem P of the negotiation wrapper is described by the tuple: 
P= (I, C, Criteria) (2.1) 
where I is the set of negotiation issues, C is their associated constraints and Criteria is a set of cost/benefit 
functions for each issue that the wrapper must minimize/maximize respectively. Negotiation, then, is 
viewed as a process of settling disputes over each of the issues in the set I when the satisfaction of an 
agent's goal interact negatively with the satisfaction of the others' goals. As mentioned earlier, goals inter- 
act because the fulfillment of one goal has a negative effect on the fulfilment of another agent's goal, due to 
exclusive goal state desired by two or more agents (e. g. a buyer wants to buy a service at a low price and a 
seller wants to sell at a high price). 
2.2.2 Issue Set Identification and Modification 
The above discussion assumed that agents shared the same goal set I, and that conflict resolution arises due 
to a conflict of preferences over goals. However, before goal satisfaction can commence, agents have to 
identify which goals are actually in conflict: 
... these (coordination techniques) presuppose that the agents already 
know what they are "ar- 
guing" about, and what remains to be done is to settle the "argument". It is my contention 
that, in many domains, a substantial part of the negotiation effort is involved in figuring out 
what needs to be settled. As our computational agents are increasingly applied in dynamically 
evolving worlds (like on the Internet), capabilities for identifying who needs to negotiate and 
over what, rather than having these predefined by the system developers or users, will come to 
the fore (Durfee 1998). 
Therefore, in addition to resolving conflicting goals (section 2.1.3), the resolution protocol must generate 
a unified and mutually agreed upon set of issues for the agents to negotiate over in the first place. This 
requirement can be captured by a protocol that includes a pre-negotiation phase, where agents enumerate, 
discuss and select which of their goals are in conflict and need to be resolved. Furthermore, since in an 
open system the space of possible concerns can evolve continuously, the negotiation protocol must specify 
whether this mutually agreed upon set of issues is static or can be added to or deleted throughout the negoti- 
ation phase. For example, the inclusion of issues into the negotiation set is often permitted and functions as 
a "side-payment" altering the dynamics of the negotiation (Binmore & Dasgupta 1989). Likewise, "noisy" 
issues may be removed either because they jeopardize successful negotiations, thus helping escape local 
minima in the negotiation dynamics, or because "negotiating over the root causes of numerous disagree- 
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ments can sometimes be more cost-effective than negotiating over each individual disagreement separately" 
(Durfee 1998). 
2.2.3 Solution Quality 
The quality of an outcome measures how good the outcome is from the perspective of either the individual 
or the society (individual and joint welfare respectively). Consideration of the quality of the wrapper's 
output (a contract to the domain problem solver) must be considered in the wrapper design process for two 
reasons. 
Firstly, as was discussed in section 2.1.2, the motivations of the domain problem solver can be either 
self or group interested (selfish and benevolent respectively), corresponding to increasing the individual 
or the groups' quality of the final outcome respectively. This motivational stance can then be used by the 
wrapper as a decision criteria about how to behave in negotiation. For example, in the context of a minimum 
task load and plentiful computational resources, the domain problem solver may prefer solutions from the 
wrapper that increases the satisfaction of all parties involved in negotiation (the problem solver is motivated 
by joint welfare). Alternatively, under time pressures or where there is a large task load, a domain problem 
solver may be satisfied with a lower individual solution quality (the problem solver is motivated by task 
completion). Therefore, a notion of solution quality is needed that objectively measures the outcome of 
negotiations from both a local individual perspective and a global social perspective. As will be shown 
later, the quality of a solution is closely linked to the boundedness of an agent (see section 2.2.8). 
Another justification for having a measure of solution quality, independently of the motivations of the 
domain problem solver, is that the joint welfare can be increased directly as a consequence of describing 
services in a multi-dimensional manner. Quantitative models (see chapter three) often distinguish between 
zero-sum and non-zero sum games (Gibbons 1992) (or distributive and integrative negotiations respectively 
(Raiffa 1982)). Zero-sum games are defined as games where the addition of the individual payoffs for an 
outcome sum to zero. More formally. Let I be the set of n agents. Let S be the space of joint strategies, 
S= Sl,... , 
S (for example, defect, defect strategies in the Prisoner's dilemma described in section 2.1.2), 
each agent choosing from a finite set of individual strategies Si = ail,... , Q;,,, (again, the strategy choices 
are defect, cooperate in the Prisoner's dilemma). Let P be a set of payoff functions P; for each player i, 
each of which is of the form P; :S -+ JR (the prison sentences issued in the Prisoner's dilemma described 
section 2.1.2). Then a zero-sum game is defined as: 
n 
Va E S. Pi(v) =0 
where the payoffs always sum to zero. Poker is a classic example of a zero-sum game because whatever 
money is won by one agent is necessarily lost by the others. It follows that in a two player zero-sum game 
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the interests of the agents are in conflict and self interested agents will attempt to maximize their minimum 
payoff (maximin criteria of rationality-a player takes an action and the opponent reacts with its best action, 
which due to the nature of the zero-sum game, results in the minimum outcome for the player (Binmore 
1992)). 
There are also constant sum games where the agents' payoffs always sum to a fixed constant c (Bin- 
more 1992). It can be shown that any constant-sum game can be changed into an equivalent zero-sum game 
by simply subtracting the constant c from all of one of the player's payoffs (Binmore 1992). 
In non-constant sum games (or integrative bargaining), on the other hand, the interests of the agents 
are not totally antagonistic. A non-constant sum game is defined as: 
nn 
3o, Q E S. EP; (a) 0 Eps(Q ) 
i=l i=l 
where at least one strategy combination is better from the view point of the group. This allows agents to 
search for mutually more satisfactory outcomes (called "win-win" bargaining (Raiffa 1982)). In integrative 
negotiation involving a number of issues it is no longer true that if one party gets more the other necessarily 
has to get less; they both can get more (Raiffa 1982). 
Therefore, some objective measure(s) of the quality of outcomes can serve as a benchmark in (empiri- 
cally) analyzing the performance of the developed negotiation reasoning mechanism(s), given that theoret- 
ically multi-issue negotiations should result in better global outcomes than purely conflicting single issue 
negotiations. 
2.2.4 Decisions, Actions, Strategies and Rationality 
Given the desired goal state, the wrapper's coordination module is then faced with the task of how to trans- 
form the current world state to the goal state, in such a way as to not only satisfy, either fully or partially, 
its own goal(s), but perhaps also the goal(s) of others involved in the interactions. This task can either 
be viewed as problem solving or decision making (Laughlin 1980). This distinction expresses a division 
between coordination tasks that involve the construction of resolution alternatives that are demonstrably 
correct and tasks that involve decision making when no objectively correct answer exists and the resolution 
process emphasizes the selection of alternatives based on an agent's preferences. Problem solving coordina- 
tion tasks are better modeled using an argumentation based mechanism (Walton & Krabbe 1995), requiring 
explicit communication of high level objects like justifications, arguments and beliefs (see section 2.2.1), 
where arguments and justifications serve to modify others' beliefs (recall the taxonomy of different types 
of coordination techniques, such as persuasion, argumentation and negotiation, based on their differential 
rationale, methodology and effects). Decision making coordination tasks, on the other hand, are better mod- 
eled by a negotiation mechanism, where the objects of communication are preferences/demands over goals. 
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The task of the negotiation wrapper in this body of work is decision making since no objectively correct 
answer existsý and the object of coordination is an agent's goals and its preferences over these goals. As 
will be shown in the next chapter, this decision problem has a solution in bargaining models of game theory, 
where the problem reduces to representing preference relationships quantitatively as utilities, that satisO 
(rather than cause) the preferences (Neumann & Morgernstern 1944). Rational behaviour then consists of 
acting as though to maximize this utility function. 
Furthermore, due to the privacy of information and the uncertainties involved in negotiation (see sec- 
tion 2.2.6), the conflict resolution protocol is likely to be iterative, involving more than one round of nego- 
tiations. If agents had perfect information and unlimited computational capabilities, then a resolution could 
be arrived at immediately (Kraus 1997a). However, resolution may not be immediate in uncertain and com- 
putationally bounded environments (Kraus 1997a). Thus agents are faced with a problem of constructing a 
sequence of actions (called a strategy). The notion of a strategy is closely tied to the protocol of interaction, 
where strategies are taken to mean the individual, private, and centrally uncontrolled, usage of permissible 
actions available given the protocol rules of interaction. The decision problem is further complicated by 
strict constraints on the decision mechanisms uch as computational or informational limitations. This latter 
point is described in more detail in section 2.2.8. In this sub-section the concept of actions and strategies 
are described in more detail. 
The task of a coordination wrapper is the formulation of individual actions for the agent throughout 
the negotiation and the specification of how to combine these individual actions in the course of negotiation 
into a coherent strategy that achieves the goal of resolving the conflict, while respecting i) the normative 
rules of the protocol and ii) the bounded nature of the domain problem solver. 
In negotiation, actions can be roughly divided into evaluatory and offer generation decision categories. 
Specifically, during negotiation the coordination module of the wrapper must make the following decisions: 
1. what is the range of acceptable agreements? 
2. what initial offers should be sent out? 
3. what counter offers should be generated? 
4. when should negotiation be abandoned? 
5. when is an agreement reached? 
The first point represents the set of possible outcomes, determining individually acceptable (or indi- 
vidually rational) settlements of the conflict over the issues. Note that these settlement regions are closely 
linked to the notion of partial and complete fulfillment of goals, represented as utility values. This range of 
possible agreements is formally represented in section 3.1.4. An important assumption in this work is that 
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this set of acceptable agreements is independent of the existence of outside options, a central assumption 
of non-cooperative game theory also (see chapter three). An agent is said to have an outside option if in the 
course of negotiation with one agent it has already established, possibly a tentative, agreement with another 
agent. The process and outcome of negotiation is directly influenced when agents have outside options, 
giving greater power to those with more valuable outside options because they can legitimately threaten to 
leave negotiations (Corfman & Gupta 1993). However, rather than modeling the influence of an agent over 
decisions (its power), throughout his work the range of acceptable agreements is bounded to zero utility at 
the minimum (the conflict outcome (Zlotkin & Rosenchein 1992)). Thus, all negotiation decisions are made 
with respect to a failure reference point (no fulfilment) specified by this conflict outcome that determines 
agents' payoffs in cases of failure to reach a resolution. 
Given the range of acceptable agreements and the information history of interaction, the chain of deci- 
sions between points two to five above then constitutes an agent's strategy. The set of resolution strategies 
available can be classified into the following strategies: 5 
log-rolling: where each agent slightly relaxes its constraints (Pruitt 198 1). This strategy is also often 
referred to as a concession strategy (Pruitt 1981). 
9 bridging: involving the development of a completely new solution that satisfies only the most impor- 
tant constraints (Pruitt 1981). 
" unlinking: involving overlooking weak interactions among constraints (Pruitt 1981). 
* pursuing goals independently: where each agent pursues its goal(s) without taking into consideration 
the goal(s) of others (Sycara 1987). 
anti-planning: where an agent forms a plan to prevent another agent from fulfilling its goal(s) or 
prevents others from interfering with its own plans (Schank & Abelson 1977). An agent persuading 
another agent to abandon its goals is an example of one anti-planning strategy. 
The above is not an exhaustive list of strategies that an agent can follow throughout negotiation, but 
rather enumerates a set of likely courses of actions open to an agent. Further resolution strategies can be 
composed by combining individual strategies into what will be referred to as meta-strategy, in response to 
the intrinsic or extrinsic conditions of an agent. For example, due to the lack of an immediate deadline 
or the perceived importance of the given goal, the negotiation wrapper may select a course of action that 
implements an anti-planning strategy. However, in the course of negotiation the chosen strategy may lead 
to a deadlock and necessitate achange of strategy to a log-rolling strategy. Thus, the wrapper is required to 
SNote that the presented strategy list is for iterative protocols. There are a whole wealth of strategies according to the type of 
protocol (Binmore 1992). 
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not only initiate a strategy, but also monitor and, if required, reassess its applicability, given that the agents' 
tasks and goals may change in the course of negotiation. 
2.2.5 Commitments 
Once a conflict has been resolved, it is desirable to ensure these resolutions are kept by all parties. Commit- 
ments function to provide this stability of resolutions. Commitments are inextricably linked to the notion of 
trust and different coordination mechanisms model trust differently. For example, in cooperative domains 
agents implicitly trust one another, since it is common knowledge that agents share a common goal and per- 
sonal preferences can be overridden. Non-cooperative models of negotiation, on the other hand, implicitly 
model trust through a notion of equilibrium (see next chapter), specifying a strategy for each agent where 
deviation from these strategies is individually irrational. Hence, trust is self enforcing. 
The problem of trust is nicely shown in the simple game shown in figure 2.2 by Raiffa. This game also 
demonstrates the role of commitments in more quantitative models of negotiation (Raiffa 1982). The game 
is an abstraction of Camp David negotiations between Israel and Egypt. 
Payoffs 




Figure 2.2: Commitment Game 
There are two players Mrs. Shee and Mr Hee, playing a game that consists of an alternating offer 
protocol between the two players. The permissible moves in this game are up or down and Mrs. Shee is 
given the control to move first. Then it is the turn of Mr Hee to move either up or down. The respective 
payoffs of each player are shown on the right hand side of the figure. Suppose the game is played only 
once, the players are fully informed of the rules of the game and the outcome scores, and there is no 
communication. Mrs. Shee might think as follows. "If I choose down then we both get 0.6 If I choose up, 
6ThiS line of reasoning assumes that agents can make inter-personal payoff comparison, an assumption that will be returned to in 
the next chapter. 
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then he will certainly choose down, since he would rather get 2 than 1. Hence if I choose up I'll get - 1. I'm 
better off choosing down (maximizing the minimum loss, or maximin, strategy). It is too bad we cannot talk 
to each other and agree that we both should choose up". Now assume that the players can communicate, but 
that now the agreements are non-binding, or non committal. The game might then be played as follows. Mr 
Hee might say, "it doesn't make sense for you to choose down. If we both choose up then we'll get I". She 
might respond: "True. But how do I know that you won't switch to down later on, when I have committed 
to up? ". Her problem is whether she can trust him. His intentions may indeed be to commit himself to up, 
now, but later on, due to some unforeseen event, he may be forced to choose down when she has chosen 
UP. 7 After explaining her fears of his switch she then proposes to Mr Hee that "I'm going to choose the 
down alternative, unless you can take some binding action now to reduce that payoff of 2 units to a value 
below I" (calledfree disposal by economists, (Binmore 1992)). 
The dynamics of the game are altered if the game is repeated an infinite number of times. She would 
then know that if his response to her choice of up was down, then in the next stage she will choose down. 9 
This outcome also underlines the importance of repeated interactions, described in section 2.1.4. This 
simple game shows the central role commitments play in joint activity. As Lesser notes: 
The ability to appropriately bound the intentions of agents and to create and sufficiently guaran- 
tee the commitments of agents to accomplish certain tasks is at the heart of efficient, organized 
behaviour (Lesser 1998) 
Commitments, in DAL are viewed as pledges to undertake a certain course of action (Jennings 1996). 
In classical distributed planning, it provides a certain degree of predictability to the agents, so that they can 
take thefuture courses of actions of others into account when there are interdependencies, resource conflicts 
or global constraints. 
When proposals are fully binding, agents cannot retract a proposal once it has made it. Therefore 
agents need to make sure they "look" before they "leap" (Durfee 1998). However, commitments can also 
be temporally bounded and different coordination mechanisms are based on different time scales where the 
commitments may be valid. For example, organizations, a coordination mechanism, model commitments 
via the notion of roles, which are static and long term (Carley & Gasser 1999). When agents agree to play 
a role within an organization they commit themselves to comply with the behaviour that the role and their 
relationships imply (Ossowski 1999). On the other hand, in the multi-agent planning paradigm, agents 
7This example nicely shows the role of turn taking in negotiation, since clearly the person that moves first is at a disadvantage. 
This is another issue which a protocol of interaction must take into accounL 
However, the game is complicated in cases where there is a finite number Of iterations and both players know this number 
'This 
can lead to backward induction reasoning resulting in playing down. The discussion of this point is a divergence, but details of the 
game can be found in the actual example by Raiffa (Raiffa 1982), p. 199. 
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commit to behave in accordance with the generated joint plan of future actions and interactions. However, 
since plans can change, due to unforeseen events occurring in a dynamic environment, successful execution 
of a multi-agent plan can not be a priori assumed. Instead agents must re-plan and commitments must 
be managed. In such contexts, commitments can be managed through a notion of conventions (Jennings 
1993) which i) constrain the conditions under which commitments should be reassessed and ii) specify the 
associated actions that should be undertaken. Conversely, a negotiation mechanism for coordination can 
be based both on short or long term commitments, where the process dynamically generates commitments 
between agents. In cases of failures, commitments can be re-negotiated; thus either amending the original 
commitment or generating a new commitment. 
Commitments, and their temporal validity, become increasingly important in cases of selfish agents. 
Commitments in such cases have been modeled quantitatively (from game theory) by conditioning the 
commitment to a contract (called contingency contracts (Sandholm 1999)) on the probabilistically known 
future events-that is, the obligations of the contract are made contingent on future events (Raiffa 1982). 
if this approach is adopted, then Sandholm identifies two issues that need to be addressed for modeling 
commitments for automated and selfish agents (Sandholm 1999). Firstly, contingency contracts may be 
good for a small number of events, but there may be a potentially combinatorial explosion in the number of 
events in real world problems that need to be conditioned on. It is often practically impossible to enumerate 
all possible relevant future events in advance. Secondly, the verification of the occurrence of an event among 
selfish agents is problematic, because events may only be observable by a single agent which may have an 
incentive to lie. Thus, to be viable, a contingency contract needs a mechanism to correctly detect and verify 
events that is not manipulable, complicated or costly. 
2.2.6 Information 
An essential component of any decision making is information. Information is informally defined as knowl- 
edge about all those factors, both intrinsic and extrinsic to the decision maker, which affects the ability of 
an individual to make choices in any given situation (Young 1975). These factors correspond to the contents 
of the Self and Acquaintance components of the wrapper in figure 1.1 respectively. As mentioned earlier, 
in most DPS systems negotiation protocols are used to inform agents of the plans and goals of other agents. 
Indeed, if agents held complete knowledge of the goals, actions and interactions of other agents then co- 
ordination would not be needed (removing the problem mentioned in section 1). since agents would know 
exactly the current and future state of other agents. However, the perfect knowledge assumption is often 
invalid in real world contexts. This means it is necessary to include mechanisms within the wrapper for 
handling sources of uncertainty over the plans, goals and actions of other agents during interactions. The 
aim of this section is to elaborate on the sources and solutions to the uncertainty problem in coordination. 
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2.2.6.1 Uncertainty and Incomplete Information 
The availability of information involving choices among alternatives is central to an individual's choice. 
However, in negotiation the availability of information about the potential choices of other agents introduces 
a further degree of complexity into an individual's decision making process. The most important source of 
uncertainty in negotiation is the beliefs of the other agent(s), and, as will be shown below, these uncertainties 
directly influence the processes and outcomes of interactions. If an agent is economically rational, as 
modeled in this thesis, then the goal of the agent is to maximize its utility. What is uncertain is how (what 
strategy) agent(s) take to achieve their goal. 
A condition for coherence of a multi-agent system and conflict avoidance is reasoning about the non- 
local effects of local decisions (see section 1.3). However, if the behaviour between two member of a group 
involving a choice of action is contingent on that individual's estimates of the actions (or choices) of others 
in the group, then the actions of each of the relevant others are based on a similar estimate of the behaviour 
of group members other than itself. This is referred to as strategic interaction (SI). As Rapoport notes: 
strategic behaviour will occur whenever two or more individuals all find that the outcome 
associated with their choices are partially controlled by each other (Rapoport 1964). 
Most rational decision making models have often ignored the issue of uncertainty by assuming perfect 
information (Young 1975). The models therefore assume the environment of the decision maker is fixed or 
else treat it as if it were fixed. The environment of a decision maker is fixed by assuming that either the 
values that describe the environmental variables are fixed (e. g. sunny 365 days or a probability distribution) 
or by appealing to the law of large numbers (e. g. if there are a large number of individuals involved in a given 
activity, such as the economy, then each individual is perceived as insignificant (Young 1975)). However, 
whereas the concept of information is reasonably straightforward in choice situations involving a decision 
making environment which is fixed, or can be treated as such, the concept itself becomes ambiguous under 
conditions of strategic interactions and consequently negotiation, since negotiation is strategic itself. 
2.2.6.2 Single Agent Information Requirements-Fixed Environment 
Even if no strategic interactions occur, the rational decision models identify the following information 
requirements for a decision maker (Young 1975): 9 
1. a set of alternative outcomes 
2. a set of preferences over outcomes 
3. an attitude towards risk 
9Much of the following exposition is classic game theory basics and the reader is referred to text books such as (Gibbons 1992) for 
a more in-depth exposition of the concepts. 
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4. a set of mechanisms for uncertainty management 
The first requirement amounts to the problem of identifying the decision maker's context by specifying a 
range of distinct alternatives which the individual must choose from. Normally this is solved in deductive 
models by assuming that these outcomes are given on an a priori basis (Gibbons 1992). However, this 
assumption leads to two further difficulties. Firstly, in some contexts the set of alternative outcomes can be 
infinitely large. For example, there can be an infinite division of a cake, or a dollar, or any divisible good. 
This problem is addressed in more depth in section 2.2.8. Secondly, the assumption abstracts away all the 
problems associated with shifts (by adding or removing alternatives) in the range of alternatives, a context 
that is realizable if agents are permitted to alter the set of issues involved in negotiation, thereby modifying 
the possible set of outcomes. 
The second requirement is that the decision maker must also have a complete knowledge of its own 
preference orderings or utility function. That is, the individual must be able to create a confidence ranking 
of all the alternatives in its environment in terms of its preference. Furthermore, it is assumed that if each 
alternative represents acertain outcome, the decision maker needs to: i) only specify its preference ordering 
in ordinal terms and ii) these preference ordering are transitive and consistent over time (Gibbons 1992). 
However, the presence of uncertainty makes it impossible to characterize decisions perfectly. Therefore, 
the decision maker needs information about the probabilities associated with various outcomes in order to 
make a rational choice. Thus the decision maker describes its environment in terms of fixed probabilities 
and therefore specifies its preference orderings in cardinal terms. 
Finally, in cases where it is not possible to calculate the probabilities in ordinal or cardinal terms, the 
decision maker requires knowledge of some technique(s) for handling uncertainty. However, problems of 
this kind are difficult to deal with when the phenomena re intrinsically non-iterative because the decision 
maker cannot even attempt to calculate probabilities in terms of empirical frequencies (Young 1975). A 
possible solution is to assume that the individual makes subjective probabilities. Subjective probabilities 
is a distribution that characterize and agent's degree of belief (Russell & Norvig 1995). However, this 
abstracts away the question of how individuals obtain specific values for subjective probabilities especially 
with respect to events that are non-iterative. One-off encounters between agents in an open system are likely 
to be non-iterative, where agents meet, interact and disappear. 
2.2.6.3 Dyad Information Requirements-Dynamic Environment 
The problem of dealing with and managing information is extensive even when the environment is fixed. 
However, the introduction of strategic interactions expands the set of information requirements for a deci- 
sion maker (section 2.2.6.2) to include information describing the probable choices of others. This, in turn, 
introduces additional problems for an agent in i) identifying others upon whose choice its own choices are 
contingent and ii) acquiring information about the probable behaviour of these individuals. 
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One solution to the latter problem is to remove strategic interactions altogether by forming confident 
expectations through acquiring information (Young 1975). For example, an agent may confidently expect 
(the derivation of which will be explained below) that the other agent will call back when their call was 
cut off, so there is no need to call. Then when a decision maker discovers its choices are interdependent, 
it should, at best, acquire sufficient information about the relevant other(s) to form accurate predictions 
of their choices, or, at least, form confident expectations concerning their probable behaviour. Then the 
decision maker's choice problem becomes a game against nature (Young 1975). Complications caused by 
strategic interactions would no longer exist since the choices of other(s) would no longer be contingent 
on its choices. Thus the agent would be able to treat its decision making environment as if it were fixed. 
However, this is only logically possible, since the concept of strategic interaction means, by definition, that 
the choices of others will depend on the choices of the decision maker. To eliminate strategic interactions, 
the decision maker is assumed to require to know: 
1. the range of alternatives available to others 
2. their preference orderings over these alternatives 
3. the probability distribution affecting the other individual's choices and attributable to nature rather 
than the presence of strategic interactions 
4. others' reaction to, and techniques for, coping with strategic interactions since they are facing the 
same prediction problems 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the decision maker knows the identity of the others and that they are 
rational. However, in open digital systems an individual is fortunate if it can identify others yet alone know 
points one to four above (Cranor & Resnick 2000). Even if rational decision models can cope with the first 
three points above, the problem still remains that other individual's efforts to cope with strategic interactions 
will be contingent on the behaviour of other(s) whose efforts in turn depend on the first individual. This 
is commonly referred to as the out guessing regress problem and its occurrence makes the procedures of 
forming accurate predictions or confident expectations impossible (Luce & Raiffa 1957). 10 
However, decision makers are capable of making choices under conditions of strategic interactions in 
the real world-whenever a decision maker does make a choice he automatically eliminates or reduces the 
strategic aspects of interaction (Young 1975). Therefore, in designing a negotiation wrapper, one can look 
for models which accurately explain and predict the actual problem solving processes involved in strategic 
decision making since real social systems have developed solutions to the SI problem. 
101n fact, if one decision maker is irrational, by ignoring the fact hat its choices are dependent o  other(s) (Le behaves in a very 
stylized fashion), then there xists achance that a rational individual can accurately predict the irrational individual's behaviour and 
hence scaping out-guessing re ress (Young 1975). 
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There are several methods for handling strategic interactions in the real world that can be implemented 
by a computational protocol. One such mechanism is to make the decision of all the participants sequential 
rather than simultaneous (or independent and the encounter is restricted to a single move (Gibbons 1992)). 
Sequential interactions permit agents to evaluate their beliefs, given an observation. SI can also be elimi- 
nated or reduced by formulating subjective estimates of the probable choices of other(s). If successful, then 
the agent fixes its decision making environment and the SI problem is removed. However, the formulation 
of subjective estimates raises two other problems. Firstly, as mentioned above, in some contexts it may be 
inappropriate to assign probabilities to outcomes that are infinitely large, such as division of a dollar. Sec- 
ondly, formulation of subjective probabilities leads to "silent out-guessing" (Young 1975). A designer of a 
negotiating agent may use any number of heuristics in making these estimates, but the result will be highly 
subjective because they will be based on guesses about the probable choices of others, whose choice will, 
in turn, depend on guesses about the probable choices of the first. Therefore, the process of formulating 
subjective estimates will involve some silent out-guessing. 
Uncertainty in decision making can also be handled by attempts to manipulate the decision making 
environment (Young 1975). More specifically, the choices of others are made more predictable by gaining 
as much influence or leverage over their behaviour as possible (Pruitt 198 1). Under complete control, the 
behaviour of others is predictable so the problem of SI disappears. An agent can gain control of others 
either through a pre-specified organizational structure or via various manipulation tactics (such as lying) 
in the information others utilize in their decision making processes (Rosenschein & Zlotkin 1994). The 
effectiveness of the latter tactics, however, must take into account hat others may also be using such tactics 
in manipulating the agent's information set. SI can also be overcome through organizational typologies 
that have formal structures and communication channels. Simon quotes an illustrative example which 
demonstrates the role of organizations in decision making: It is not reasonable to allow the production 
department and the marketing department in the widget company to make independent estimates of next 
year's demandfor widgets if the production department is to make the widgets that the market department 
is to sell. In matters like this, and also matters ofproduct design, it may be preferable that all the relevant 
departments operate on the same body ofassumptions even if ... the uncertainties mightjustify quite a range 
ofdifferent assumptions. Injacing uncertainty, standardization and coordination, achieved through agreed- 
jupon assumptions and specifications, may 
be more effective than prediction (Simon 1996). 
Therefore uncertainty is absorbed by the organizational structure through coordination. In the work 
reported here, the protocol of interaction is for bi-lateral negotiation, where there is no organizational struc- 
ture. Furthermore, the protocol treats each agent symmetrically, meaning that no one agent has direct 
control over another. Therefore no one agent can control, or has more power over, the other(s), thereby 
influencing their decision making. 
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SI can also be resolved by transforming a given relationship qualitatively (Young 1975). That is, some 
third party can strategically intervene by imposing a settlement of the issues. Judicial and governmental en- 
forcement mechanisms are two examples in the real world where the settlement is through the intervention 
of a third party who imposes its will on the participants rather than a settlement based on the activities of the 
individuals themselves. Under these conditions, so far as the individuals are concerned, there is no longer 
any SI. However, the mechanism is no longer negotiation since negotiation ordinarily refers to the settle- 
ment of the situation involving SI through the activities of the original participants themselves. Situations 
involving interdependent decision making can be partially transformed, as above, but without producing 
a determinate solution for the issues. Arbitration and facilitation are such mechanisms, where negotiation 
interacts with such transforming procedures (Cross 1969). 
Alternatively, an agent engaged in SI may attempt to acquire additional information about the other 
agent(s). Although not directly solving the SI problem (because the choices of other(s) will still depend 
on choices of the agent no matter how much effort is directed towards computing probable behaviours), 
this procedure may help in the formulation of subjective estimates or the selection of specific strategies in 
the negotiation. In addition to this feed forward (prediction of the future through expectation formation to 
deal with uncertain future events), an agent can also use feedback to correct for unexpected or incorrectly 
predicted actions of other(s). Therefore, adaptive decision making can remain stable even through large 
fluctuations in the environment through a feedback control. 
Finally, note that the choice of an uncertainty handling method, implemented by a protocol, also di- 
rectly influences the solution quality (section 2.2.3) and the efficiency of the protocol. For example, a single 
move sequential protocol may result in lowering the quality of outcomes (a single move prevents search for 
-win-win" outcomes), but may be more efficient in terms of speed. Conversely, an iterated sequential pro- 
tocol may result in better outcomes, but at the expense of lower efficiency. A designer of a negotiation 
protocol must therefore be aware of these tradeoffs between solution quality, the efficiency of the protocol 
and the amount of information it assumes agents have about one another in reaching agreements. 
2.2.7 Time 
As noted in the previous chapter (section 1.4.3) time is a significant factor in decision making. " Indeed, 
time is an important feature of all complex and distributed systems (Bond & Gasser 1988). Classic AI the- 
ories are limited in modeling such systems because they emphasized not only single agents, but also static 
and atemporal environments, where the only source of change was the agent, operating in a predictable and 
static environment (Russell & Norvig 1995). However, complex systems are characterized by interacting 
subcomponents, operating in real time and dynamic environments. Thus, theories are needed that not only 
II When the United States negotiated with the North Vietnamese toward the close of the Vietnam War, the two sides met in Paris. 
The first move in the negotiation was taken by the Vietnamese: they leased a house for a two year period (Raiffa 1982). 
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model multi-agents, but also their operation in dynamic and temporal environments. 
Time affects the process of negotiation in two ways. Firstly, decision processes are affected quantita. 
tively by time: 
.... the passage of time has a cost in terms of 
both dollars and the sacrifice of utility which stems 
from the postponement of consumption, and it will be precisely this cost which motivates the 
whole bargaining process. If it did not matter when parties agreed, it would not matter whether 
they agreed at all (Cross 1969). 
Therefore, time manipulates the preferences of the agents through their attitudes to time-dependent 
costs. Secondly, time also influences the qualitative nature of interactions, by constraining and limiting the 
computational and communicational resources needed for interaction. Since interdependent activities are 
temporally sequenced (for example the design process of BT), activities of individuals are often subject to 
soft or hard time limits that directly influence the rationality of an agent. Rationality, or the ability to "do 
the right thine' (see section 2.2.8), requires computation and communication resources. However, if time 
limits must be met for joint activities then conflicts must be resolved and agreements reached within these 
time limits. This must be achieved with limited computational and communication resources-, agents do not 
have infinite time to reach agreements. Thus, the presence of different time limits requires both simple and 
communicatively less expensive coordination decision mechanisms, and more complex mechanisms that 
take more time and may be more costly in communication. As will be shown in the next chapter, the issue 
of time has been central to formal game theoretic models of negotiation, that specify optimal behaviour, 
instantly attainable by agents. 
2.2.8 Bounded Rationality 
Another source of uncertainty in decision making relates to the local complexity of computation. In chess, 
for example, the size of the state space of the game (moves by both players) is 35100 (Marsland & Schaeffer 
1990). Hence. there is no time to compute the exact sequences of actions. Instead, one has to guess (make 
uncertain decisions) and act before being certain of which action to take. This trade-off between accuracy 
and time costs is also reflected in negotiation decisions, where agents are time bounded and mechanisms 
are needed that respect this constraint. The aim, therefore, is to produce good, rather than optimal solutions. 
The complexity of computation is shown in the ADEPT negotiation scenario, for the DD agent, the 
client of the survey-customer-site service, over two issues, (price and quantity). Associated with each 
issue is the reservation value of that issue, representing the constraint for an issue's value. Let these reser- 
vations be represented as the pair [min, max]-[I, 20] and [2,10] for price and quantity respectively. 
12 
Finally, offers over the pair of issues (or contracts) are evaluated in terms of utility to the client of the 
12COnceptS such as reservation values and utility are given a forrnal sernantics in proceeding chapters. 
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contract. The decision problem of an agent is then to generate a contract that maximizes the utility of the 
contract. The environment of this decision problem is represented as a utility state-space problem in figure 






Figure 2.3: Search State Space 
2.3. The initial state rnay be the contract offer (1.0,10.0), corresponding to maximal satisfaction of the 
agent's preferences, or utility of 1.0. This is one possible starting offer because an agent can offer any 
contract with different utility values according to its strategy. The final state in figure 2.3 can be any of 
the states that correspond to where negotiation has terminated successfully or unsuccessfully (not shown in 
figure 2.3 because the final state is mutually selected by the two agents). 
Agents traverse the graph of the state-space using the state-space operators (actions). Operators can 
be: i) concede on utility (shown as dashed arrows in figure 2.3), ii) to demand exactly the same contract 
corresponding to the same utility state (called boulware and shown as the dash-dot-dot arrows), or alterna- 
tively, iii) demand the same utility but of a contract that is different to the previously offered one (shown 
as solid arrows in figure 2.3). A path is then any sequence of actions (concession or demand) leading from 
one state to another. The path cost is the cost of moving from one state to another and the goal-test is the 
evaluation to determine whether the agent is at the goal state or not. The goal state is an agreement that 
maximizes either the individual or the group utility according to the agent's motivations (see section 2.1.2). 
Given this problem (defined by the initial state, operators, paths, path-cost and goal-test), search algorithms 
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can then be designed that select a sequence of actions that lead to a desired state. 
However, a search algorithm for the above contract negotiation has to operate with two sources of un- 
certainty. Firstly, the client has missing information about what the server (SD) agent will offer. Therefore 
it cannot formulate a certain sequence of actions in the possible state-space. In fact, the client is unaware 
whether an agreement is even possible, since the information about the overlap of reservation values be- 
tween the client and the server is not publicly known. In addition to this, since price and quantity are 
continuous variables, the range of possible values for each issue is infinite. This uncertainty over the over- 
lap of the reservation values and the continuous valued nature of the issues means that the solution to the 
negotiation may lie at any depth. Likewise, the breadth of the state-space adds to search complexity. The 
branching factor (the number of sibling states from a parent state) in general is infinitely large. This combi- 
nation of i) the infinite depth of the state-space, ii) the branching factor as the number of issues is scaled up 
from two and iii) the presence of time deadlines in negotiation leads to computational uncertainties about 
what is the best strategy. Game theory attempts to solve this search problem by assuming agents are ratio- 
nal (thus allowing pruning of segments of the search tree, such as alpha-beta pruning used in parlor games 
(Knuth & Moore 1975)) and supplementing this assumption with protocols that: i) constrain interactions 
(for example, a sequential, one round protocol can reduce the depth of the search tree to one level deep), ii) 
supply the agents with additional knowledge so as to better direct the search, or iii) eliminate the need for 
search on behalf of the agent altogether by publically supplying all the agents with the information about 
which strategies are optimal. 
Computation, in general, functions to reach decisions that are better than no computation (such as 
randomness) or that result in successful outcomes. However, different computations have different costs, 
as well as different likelihoods of resulting in successful outcomes. Thus, in addition to developing search 
algorithms there is also a need for reasoning about computation (meta-reasoning (Russell & Wefald 199 1)). 
Russell and Wefald call this meta-level rationality (or P3)-the capacity to optimally select the combination 
of action and computation as opposed to perfect rationality (or Pj)--the capacity to generate successful 
behaviour given available information (Russell & Wefald 1991). The evaluation of which search'should 
be implemented can then be delegated to a meta-level reasoner whose decisions can be based on factors 
such as the opponent's perceived strategy, the on-line cost of communication, the off-line cost of the search 
algorithm (or its path cost), the structure of the problem or the optimality of the search mechanism in 
terms of completeness (finding an agreement when one exists), the time and space (measured as memory 
requirements) complexity of the search mechanism, and the solution optimality of the mechanism when 
more than one agreement is feasible. The combination of this evaluation function and a description of the 
permissible mechanism state transitions can then be used by a meta-level reasoner to select amongst the 
available set of mechanisms. 
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2.3 Summary 
The key issues in the design of a negotiation wrapper architecture were informally identified in this chapter. 
These issues relate to how the size of a society (section 2.1.1), the motivation (section 2.1.2) and the frequen- 
cies of the encounters (section 2.1.4) of the individual agents constrain the choice of models of negotiation. 
Also discussed was the relationship between the normative rules, the content and the language requirements 
of an agent communication protocol (section 2.1.3) and the computational considerations of how the choice 
of this protocol influences the quality of final outcome (section 2.2.3), the levels of uncertainties (section 
2.2.6) and the commitments made (section 2.2.5). The nature and the role of the object, or issues, of negoti- 
ation were also outlined (section 2.2.1) as were the problems of their identification and modification (section 
2.2.2). The decision making of the individual agent was then presented (section 2.2.4) and shown to be a 
highly uncertain activity, requiring various uncertainty management methodologies, supported by different 
protocols (section 2.2.6). Decision making was also shown to occur under time restrictions (section 2.2.7) 
and limited computational capability of the decision maker (section 2.2.8). 
The adopted position in this research over these key issues is to develop a decision architecture for the 
negotiation wrapper that: 
supports one-off bi-lateral negotiations. Many-to-many, many-to-few and one-to-many negotiations 
have been successfully modeled through market, voting and auction mechanisms. Computational 
models of bi-lateral negotiation lag behind. As a simplifying assumption, agents are assumed to meet 
only once. 
o supports both selfish and benevolent ypes of attitudes corresponding to maximization of individual 
and global welfare (or solution quality) respectively. 
supports the requirements of an iterated and sequential integrative negotiation protocol. This proto- 
col is chosen because information is assumed to be private and negotiation over "packagee' trans- 
forms fully conflicting games into partially conflicting ones, where agents can search for better joint 
outcomes (increased global solution quality). Furthermore, the wrapper decision architecture must 
support the permissible modification of the "package'during the course of negotiation. 
supports a wide range of negotiation strategies given that agents are not only under time, information 
and computational constraints, but they have different motivations. These strategies are introduced 
as mechanisms and function to direct the agents' negotiation decision making. One mechanism, a 
depth-first strategy (see figure 2.3), is formally presented as responsive mechanism (see chapter three), 
where the depth visited is a function of concession rate, which itself is a function of the resources 
left in negotiation, the time limits in negotiation and the behaviour of the other agents. Other more 
complex search strategies (not shown in the figure 2.3) implement a combination of depth-first and 
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breadth-first strategies. This mechanism, called the trade-off mechanism, searches for contracts that 
have the same utility as a given state node, but which may lie at different depths or breadths of the 
utility state-space. Thus, the trade-off mechanism can explore other nodes' siblings, as opposed to the 
siblings of the given node alone. Finally, a mechanism, called the issue-set manipulation mechanism, 
is also provided that re-formulates the problem by changing the branching factor through the addition 
or retraction of issues in the negotiation. As will be shown later, each mechanism also implements a 
different goal-test function that evaluates whether a goal state has been reached or not. 
9 supports full and short term committed contracts. The contracts are re-negotiable. The contracts 
may also function as representations for other commitment honoring coordination models during 
the service execution life cycle (see commitment model in figure 1.1). Thus, the choice of whether 
to initiate re-negotiation or enact other recovery processes as directed by the commitment model, 
is left to the domain problem solver (possible models of which choice to make may be based on 
a decision theoretic cost benefit analysis of re-negotiation versus the execution of some model of 
commitment). The contract representation also supports both commitment failure recovery during 
the service execution and service provisioning phases. 
Against this background, the aim of this research is to instantiate these selected issues and associated 
simplification assumptions into a practical negotiation framework that successfully solves the problems 
of the two target domains. Moreover, this framework should be configurable so that it can be evolved 
into other domains with a minimal amount of effort. The assumptions, methodology and solutions of the 
research reported here are compared next in the following chapter with game theoretic bargaining models 
of negotiation and selected computational models of the issues identified in this chapter. 
Chapter 3 
Related Work 
In the previous chapter a set of important cognitive (informational), affective (choice) and conative (ac- 
tion) issues involved in negotiation were identified and emphasized. The second phase of the wrapper 
design is the modeling of these issues. To this end, this chapter critically reviews candidate models of 
these issues, in particular analyzing their application adequacy and assumptions, for the task of modeling 
the wrapper system. The content of this chapter will be concerned with models of negotiation utilized 
by the wrapper (coordination module and the associated information models, figure 1.1). This emphasis 
on the negotiation, rather than the communication, aspects of coordination is because the communication 
aspect of this research is not novel. Communication protocol such as the Knowledge Query and Manipu- 
lation Language (KQML) and the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA (FIPA97 1997)) agent 
communication language (ACL) have been proposed as two solutions to the agent communication problem. 
KQML is a language and a protocol for exchanging information (Neches et al. 199 1, Finin & Fritzson 1994, 
Huhns & Stephens 1999) and FIPA ACL is also, like KQM1, a language that allows agents to communicate 
between themselves using messages (communicative acts). However, whereas the semantics of the KQML 
performatives were described informally by natural language descriptions, the FIPA ACL was designed 
to carry a clearer semantics. The communication protocol of this thesis is simply a set of primitives and 
associated rules for their usage. 
The subject of negotiated coordination has received an in-depth treatment from a number of diverse 
fields, such as social welfare theory (Arrow 1950), social psychology (Pruitt 198 1), economics (see section 
3.1 below), marketing (Curry, Menasco, & van Ark 1991), organizational theory (Carley & Gasser 1999), 
operation research (Shehory & Kraus 1995), and more recently DAI (see section 3.2 below). However, for 
the reasons presented in the previous chapter, only decentralized models will be reviewed here. 
Furthermore, since the concern of this work is negotiation for two agents, as opposed to large scale 
societies, coordination models such as market mechanisms, 1 voting and auctions are excluded from the 
I Furthermore, since services in this work are unique (as opposed to being an unrestricted number of commodities) and are not 
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review process (see (Sandholm 1999) for a comprehensive review of these mechanisms). The class of 
coordination models of particular interest in this work are bargaining models which are derived from Game 
Theory. Game theoretic models of bargaining are discussed in section 3.1, followed by DAI extensions of 
these models for computational systems, in section 3.2. Finally, the overall adequacy of both approaches is 
discussed in section 3.3. 
3.1 Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining 
The central focus of economic models is the rational allocation of scarce resources through coordination 
mechanisms uch as markets or bargaining (Binmore & Dasgupta 1989). The class of models which are 
of direct relevance to this research are the micro economic models of Game Theory (as opposed to macro 
models which model perfect competition (Gibbons 1992)) which replace the coordination mechanism of 
the market by individual bargaining in imperfect competition situations such as bilateral monopolies (one 
seller (monopoly) and one buyer (monopsony)) and oligopolies (few large suppliers (Bannock, Baxter, & 
Davis 1992)). 
The aims (section 3.1.1) and representative key concepts of game theory (sections 3.1.2,3.1.3.3.1.4, 
3.1.5,3.1.6 and 3.1.8) are discussed in the sections below, before a general discussion of the theory of games 
is presented. Due to the enormity of the discipline, only the underlying assumptions of the classic models 
are discussed and evaluated. 2 A concrete, and highly relevant, model is then presented in section 3.1.7 to 
illustrate some of the specifics of this approach. With the exception of this case study, little attempt is made 
to cover actual solutions for given problems since the object of the analysis is to determine the adequacy of 
the underlying assumptions of the models. 
3.1.1 Aims of Game Theory 
In game theory an agent is viewed as an individual, a firm or some more complex organization. A game is 
informally defined as the rules of an encounter between players, who have strategies and associated payoffs 
(see section 3.1.5 for a formal treatment of games). For example, the rules of driving specify drivers of the 
cars (the players) and a choice of actions open to the agents (to drive on the left or right hand-side). An 
agent then formulates its strategy given its beliefs or knowledge of the other agent's action. The selected 
strategies result in payoffs. For example, the games where both agents drive on the left or one drives on the 
left and the other on the right hand side of the road will result in payoffs of no crash and crash respectively. 
Given these rules, the object of game theory is to analyze what are the players' best choices-either both 
drive on the left or both on the right hand side. As will be shown formally below, the elements of a game 
infinitely indivisible, the general equilibrium of market mechanisms cannot be used (Varian 1992, Kreps 1990). 
2An explanation of standard game theory terms and concepts can be found in any of the classic text books such as the highly 
entertaining (Biamore 1992) or (Gibbons 1992), both of which are referenced extensively in this chapter. 
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are players, actions, information, strategies, payoffs, outcomes and equilibria. The players, actions and 
the outcomes are then collectively called the rules of the game. A player then selects a strategy with the 
available information at hand given the rules of the game. The selected strategy then results in a payoff. 
The motivation of an agent (or collection of agents) is reductionist in nature. An agent is an optimizer 
of some function, be it genetic prosperity or maximization of profit (Binmore 1990). The aim of game 
theory models is to provide a general explanation of data based on a set of assumptions. Concerned by 
the prediction, explanation and design of economic systems, game theory models are motivated by the 
necessity to demonstrate that a complex system can be described and predicted without recourse to some 
hidden variable or indivisible hand (Binmore 1990). 3 Its practitioners assert that the models do not claim 
that this is the way the world is or must be, but rather the models describe how the world could be (Binmore 
1990). It is this emphasis on informed design of systems (rather than heuristic approaches to modeling 
interactions) which has attracted recent interest in designing computational systems based on game theoretic 
models (Binmore & Vulkan 1997, Zlotkin & Rosenchein 1992, Rosenschein & Zlotkin 1994, Rosenchein 
& Genesereth 1985, Zlotkin & Rosenchein 1996, Sandholm 1996, Vulkan & Jennings 1998,2000, Kraus & 
Lehmann 1995, Kraus, Wilkenfeld, & Zlotkin 1995, Shehory & Kraus 1995, Ephrati & Rosenschein 1994, 
Ito & Yano 1995). 
The methodological stance of classic game theory is essentially testing the internal logic of the eco- 
nomic models through "mind experiments"using factual and counter-factual cases and simply ignoring the 
realizability or realism of the hypothesis; there is no need to verify or refute a theory's conclusions as long 
as it is logically consistent (Binmore & Dasgupta 1989). 
3.1.2 Game Theory Versus Social Choice Theory 
Game theory (strictly speaking, cooperative game theory, see section 3-1.3) is closely related to social 
choice theory (Arrow 1950), (Guillbaud 1966), (Rosenchein & Genesereth 1985), (Genesereth, Ginsberg, 
& Rosenchein 1986). However, game theory is concerned with: 
the benefit of the individual rather than the group: Social choice theory specifies how the group 
should behave so that its actions are consistent with some postulate of rationality. In game theory, 
on the other hand, the rationality principle is imposed on the individual, not the group. Thus, social 
choice theory seeks to determine the expected group utility function, whereas game theory seeksfirst 
to determine the individual benefits for each alternative, before determining the group's benefit. 
3Adam Smith believed that individuals in a society pursued their own goals and the greatest benefit to the society came from people 
being free to do so. Each individual was -led by an indivisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his Intention" (Smith 
1776). 
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modeling the conflict point: The conflict point plays a central role in game theory. It occurs where 
players can either break-off negotiation and receive the conflict benefit or continue to reach a deal 
whose benefit is relative to this conflict point. Consequently, the notion of threats becomes an impor- 
tant concept that needs to be modeled. A conflict outcome is not needed for a theory that is concerned 
with how a group should behave as a single unit. Another important consequence of the conflict point 
is that it (together with the assumption that agents' cardinal utilities really represent ordinal prefer- 
ences, thus making it possible to transform local utilities-the so-called invariance assumption see 
(Nash 1950)) eliminates the need to make interpersonal comparison of benefits. Interpersonal com- 
parison of benefits informally means that agents can reason about other's benefits-for example, "for 
agreement AI will receive a benefit of X and the other agent will receive the benefit Y". In social 
choice theory, a single group decision requires an exogenous pecification of the relative weights of 
each individual, implying the need for interpersonal comparison among agents (Harsanyi 1967 1968). 
Therefore, social choice models require more information. 
In this thesis the importance of the individual's rationality is, like game theory models, given primary status 
because agents are assumed to be selfish. However, and again similar to game theory models, decision 
mechanisms have been developed that also consider the group's welfare. but only when the individual's 
welfare for a given outcome has been determined. 
3.1.3 Cooperative Versus Non-Cooperative Models 
Coordination in game theory can be analyzed from two perspectives. One perspective assumes that the 
players of a game mistrust one another and try to maximize their own benefit irrespective of others (recall 
the Prisoner's Dilemma game, section 2.1.2). Conversely, the other perspective assumes that the agents 
make binding agreements to coordinate their strategies. These perspectives are known as non-cooperative 
and cooperative games respectively. In cooperative games there is a possibility of pre-play negotiations 
where a joint course of action is agreed on for the ensuing game. As will be shown later, this pre-negotiation 
communication phase eliminates the problem that occurs when multiple strategies are all the best strategy 
to use, referred to as multiple equilibria in cooperative games (Gibbons 1992). Nash suggested (in what has 
become to be referred to as the Nash program (Nash 195 1)), that the analysis of the game should start by 
embedding the original pre-negotiation game within a larger game in which the possible negotiation steps 
appear as formal moves in the expanded game. 
The most suitable coordination model on which to have the design of the negotiation wrapper is the 
non-cooperative model., This is for two main reasons. Firstly, there is no pre-negotiation communication 
in the problem domains of this research. Secondly, and more importantly, cooperative models concentrate 
on the outcomes of negotiation. Because of this they are unable to: i) model the negotiation process 
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and ii) predict the time of agreements. Instead they concentrate on the desired properties of the outcome 
alternatives. However, since the agents in this research have to operate under time constraints, they need a 
model of the process of negotiation. 
Despite its deficiencies, cooperative game theory is nevertheless beneficial to this research because 
it has produced a number of outcome criteria that formalize the quality of the outcome. These criteria 
can be used to evaluate the optimality of the designed search mechanisms. Optimality in these models 
is described in terms of equity (how good an outcome is in its distribution of benefits and losses to the 
group) and efficiency (if there is another group outcome that an individual member would prefer over the 
current one). Sandholm states that the problem of negotiation can be computationally viewed as two related 
optimization problems; one is how to optimize local decisions and the other is how to optimize a global 
criteria (Sandholm 1996). Social welfare, and game theories have both produced a number of solutions to 
this tradeoff problem (called the impossibility problem (Arrow 1950)) which can be used to evaluate the 
performance of the wrapper (see section 2.2.3). However, for the reasons given in section 3.1.2, welfare 
theory models are less appropriate than game theoretic models since the goal of this research is the design 
of a wrapper coordination mechanism for the individual agents, rather than the group. 
Finally, as will be seen below, computational models of negotiation in MAS are grounded in both 
cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining models. Therefore, both types of bargaining models will be 
reviewed first to assist review of the computational models . 
3.1.4 The Theory of Cooperative Games 
Cooperative models are also known as axiomatic theories, where axioms reflect the desirable properties of 
solutions (Gibbons 1992). A solution in game theory is generally taken to mean agents' strategies are in 
equilibrium; one agent's strategy is the best response to the other's strategies, and vice versa (see section 
3.1.5 for a formal definition). Then, outcomes, rather than the processes, that satisfy these axioms are 
sought. Non-cooperative theories are also known as strategic bargaining theories since in non-cooperative 
models the bargaining situation is modeled as a game and the outcome is based on an analysis of which of 
the players' strategies are in equilibrium. 
The Nash bargaining solution is the most popular solution concept in cooperative models (Nash 1950). 
In the problems considered, there are two agents who have to negotiate an outcome oE0, where 0 is 
the set of possible outcomes. If they reach an agreement, then they each receive a payoff dictated by their 
utility function defined as Ui :0 -+ R, iE [1,2]. A utility function U represents the preference relation >-- 
of an agent over the set of outcomes 0 (Binmore 1992). If they fail to reach a deal, they receive the conflict 
payoff, Uj (o,,,, fjj, t). The set of possible outcomes and the conflict point c (payoffs (0,0)) is shown in 
figure 3. L The space of feasible outcomes (call this B) is bounded by the Pareto Optimal line (Debreu 
1959). Formally, pareto optimality is defined for a bargaining game (B, c) (the pairs formed by the set of 
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feasible outcomes and the conflict point) as follows. Suppose there are two outcomes b and d such that they 
both belong to the feasible set, bEB, dEB. If Uj (d) > Uj (b), for i= [1,2], then the negotiators never 
agree on b whenever another available outcome d is better for at least one of the agents. This is formally 
represented as a function that given the game defined by the pair B and c does not select b-f (B, c) 0 b. 
Note the assumption here, that agents must be able to know and be able to communicate that d is better than 
b. One implication of pareto optimality is that a deal should always be reached since c is not pareto optimal. 
Pareto optimality is a useful evaluation criteria of different negotiation outcomes because it takes a global 
perspective of the efficiency of the mechanism in terms of global good (see argument in section 3.1.3). In 
the remaining part of this section, two measures of equity of outcomes will be reviewed. 
The outcome region B is bounded because the pareto optimal line represents outcomes that dominate 
all possible feasible outcomes (i. e. outcomes on the pareto optimal line are the best). However, agents can 
negotiate on an altered outcome set in a number of ways. Firstly, more solution points in area B can be 
represented by extending pure strategies to mixed strategies. Assume agents a and b have choices of actions, 
sl, s2 and tl i t2 respectively. A pure strategy is then pairings such as 
(81, t0, (S1 i t2) s(82 s t1) s(82 i t2)- 
a pure strategy is the action of one player given the other's action ( (Neumann & Morgernstern 1944), 
(Binmore 1992), p. 175). A mixed strategy, on the other hand, is achieved by a lottery, where strategies are 
selected from a probability distribution. In the example above this means that agent a, for example, plays 
strategy sl and 82 with a probability of say 0.3 and 0.7 respectively, given that b has played tj for example. 
Given that strategies can be specified with a certain probability, the set of outcomes is now expanded from 
the original pure strategy case. Another way of changing the set B is to allow agents to change their payoff 
values before the game starts (i. e. "bum some money" -free disposal, section 2.2.5). Alternatively, agents 
may be permitted to sign types of contracts that specify some transfer of utility from one agent to another 
after the game ("side payments'ý--use of pure strategies followed by transfer of 0.5 utility, for example, 
from agent 1 to agent 2). These three choices can help agents to expand the set of agreements which are not 
present in the original representation of the problem. - 
Given the above solution points, payoffs and strategies the key question of cooperative game theories 
is "what will rational agents choose! --what von Neumann and Morgenstern termed thefeasible bargaining 
set (Neumann & Morgernstern 1944). A bargaining set is individually rational and pareto optinwl. An 
agreement is individually rational if it assigns each agent a utility that is at least as large as an agent can 
guarantee for itself from the conflict outcome c-if o >= c. They argued that the outcome was indetermi- 
nate, since any point on the pareto optimal line is as good as another. That is all that can be said. 
The aim of other cooperative theories, on the other hand, is to specify axioms that lead to the selection 
of a single point on the pareto optimal line, given the bargaining problem (B, C). 4 Three popular solutions 
4The process of how to actually reach this point is of no concern to cooperative game theorists. 
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Figure 3.1: Outcome space for a pair of negotiating agents. 
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are: Nash Solution (Nash 1950), Reference Outcome, (Raiffa 1982) (Gupta & Livine 1988) and Kalai- 
Smorodinsky, (Kalai & Smorodinsky 1975). The latter solution concept is not expanded on here since 
the wrapper evaluation is adequately achieved via the first two solution concepts (referred to (Kalai & 
Smorodinsky 1975) for an exposition). The Nash solution is based on four axioms that must be satisfied 
(Nash 1950): 
e Invariance under affine transfornuition. That is, the particular chosen scale of the utility function 
ought not change the outcome, only the numbers associated with the outcomes. This axiom is used 
to prevent the need to make interpersonal comparisons in utility, since negotiators may want or need 
to transform their utility functions. For example, if one agent has S20 in the bank, and evaluates the 
deal that gives it Cx as having a utility 20 + x, while another agent evaluates such a deal as having 
x, it should not influence the Nash solution. That is, a change of origin does not affect the solution. 
Symmetry. Also known as the anonymity axiom. This states only the utilities associated with feasible 
outcomes and the conflict outcome determine the final outcome. No other information is required to 
select an outcome, and switching the labels of agents does not affect the outcomes. 
independence of irrelevant outcomes. It states that if some outcomes o are removed, but o* is not, 
then o* is still the solution. 
Pareto efficiency. As mentioned above, this axiom states the maximum amount of utility that can be 
reached. Note, this is the maximum attainable amount and not a complete aspiration achievement by 
both parties (point referred to as utopia in figure 3.1 because any gains by one agent above this line 
result in a loss to another and therefore will not be selected. Indeed, utopia can not be the maximum 
of the gains because of this conflict of interest-one's gain is the other's loss. 
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The unique solution that satisfies the above axioms is the Nash solution, defined as: 
o* = arg max[UI (o) - Ul W] [U2 (0) - U2 (C)] 
This corresponds to the points that maximize the product of individual utilities for a deal, relative to the 
conflict payoff c (Nash 1950). 5 When individual utilities calibrate an agent's preferences over certain alter- 
natives, or what is called a value function, as opposed to an agent's preferences over uncertain alternatives 
(see (Raiffa 1982), (Luce & Raiffa 1957) for an account of risk-less and risky utility functions respec- 
tively), the multiplicative form of the Nash solution represents the concern for equity-the product of the 
value gains is maximized more for more equal individual gains. Thus if each agent agrees to the four 
axioms above, then each is motivated by proportionate cooperation (MacCrimmon & Messick 1976). Con- 
sequently, both should choose the Nash solution as the outcome. However, if only one agent is not motivated 
by this proportionate cooperation principle then the the choice of the two agents is not the Nash solution. 
The Nash solution is the most popular solution point to the bargaining problem. The other is the 
reference point. This is also observed in experimental bargaining problems where a prominent outcome is 
used by negotiators to anchor a point in the set of outcomes B (Raiffa 1982). The negotiators can then use 
this anchorage / reference point as point of improvement to the final point (Raiffa 1982). This point can be 
used either as a commonly agreed on starting-point, a credible final point, or simply a focal point (Schelling 
1960), (Roth 1985). In multi-issue negotiations, the mid point of each issue of both agents' reservation 
can serve as such a reference point, from which negotiators may attempt to jointly improve (Pruitt 198 1), 
(Raiffa 1982). For example, if the price of a service being discussed between two agents is between CO 
(free) and X40 (the buyer preferring values towards 0 and the seller preferring prices closer to 40), then the 
reference point is X20 for the issue price. 
Gupta and Livne's solution formally represents a reference point by replacing the conflict point as 
an outcome which both parties should attempt to improve jointly (Gupta & Livine 1988). The solution 
proposed by Gupta and Livne is a point that lies on the pareto optimal line and connects this reference point 
with the maximum achievement of each party's aspiration levels (utopia, see figure 3.1). This reference 
outcome has been shown to be appropriate for concession models (log-rolling (Wilson 1969), (Coleman 
1973), (Raiffa 1982)) of integrative multi-issue negotiations (Gupta 1989), making it a highly relevant 
evaluation criteria of the wrapper. 
There are other proposed solution points in the space of possible outcomes B which will not be dis- 
cussed here (see (Corfman & Gupta 1993)). The choice of which solution concept o choose for determining 
an outcome has itself been problematic, because they are all based on a set of simple and plausible axioms 
5This is referred to as the regular Nash bargaining solution. A generalized Nash bargaining solution also exists and this models 
the -bargaining powers" of both agents. See (Binmore 1992), page 181 for properties of this solution. - 
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(see (Damme 1986) for postulates that provide some solution to this indeterminacy problem). Indeed, prob- 
lems arise (empirically supported in social psychology findings (Roth 1995)) if each agent is motivated by 
a different solution concept / social motive. Thus, if designers of different agents are motivated by different 
social motives, then a difficulty arises over which solution concept to use in axiomatically resolving the 
conflict. Designers would have to agree a priori on a solution concept and the agents would need to be 
bound to this solution concept independently of their environment., As will be shown below, this is the 
approach adopted by some computational models of negotiation using principles of mechanism design (see 
section 3.1-8). 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the cognitive (motivational) factors of agents are implicitly 
embedded within the solution concept. Thus a pair of agents who select the Nash solution are motivated 
by the principle of proportionate cooperation. Alternatively, selection of the reference point as a tentative 
solution to be improved upon indicates the motivation of agents to mutually search for better outcomes. 
The assumption in the work reported here is that the social motivations of agents should be explicitly 
represented, and reasoning over which social motive to choose from is a dynamic function of the task- 
environment of the agent, changing depending on its computational, communicational or task load. The 
reason for this choice is best illustrated by the following quote: 
... the distinction 
between self-interested (competitive) agents that are trying to optimize their 
own local performance and cooperative (benevolent) agents that are trying to optimize overall 
system performance is important but not an overriding factor in the design of coordination 
mechanisms for complex agent societies that operate in open environments. In fact, I feel 
agents that populate such societies will use performance criteria that combine both local and 
nonlocal perspectives and that these performance criteria, in terms of the balance between local 
and nonlocal performance objectives, will change based on emerging conditions. Thus, I see 
this distinction between self-interested and cooperative agents blurring in the next generation 
of large and complex multi-agent systems. The basis of this view is that agents that operate in 
these complex societies and open environments will have to cope with a tremendous amount 
of uncertainty, due to limited computational and communicational resources, about how to 
best perform their local activities ... These factors will lead to self-interested agents behaving 
in more cooperative ways so that they can acquire useful information from other agents and 
help other agents in ways which will eventually improve their local performance. In turn, 
cooperative agents will behave in more self-interested ways given the costs of understanding 
the more global ramifications of their actions, as a way of optimizing overall performance of 
the society. (Lesser 1998) 
As will be shown later, non-cooperative models are more appropriate for the computational modeling of 
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the negotiation process. Nonetheless, the axiomatic models provide a set of useful tools for analyzing the 
performance of the wrapper. Cooperative bargaining models lead to further difficulties because they do not 
consider the computational difficulties involved in the computation of some of the above solution concepts. 
These computational difficulties are discussed below in the cases of negotiation over a single and multiple 
issues. Figure 3.2 a) represents the pareto optimal line and Nash bargaining solution involving only a single 
issue (distributive bargaining). When only one issue is involved, all the possible outcomes lie on the pareto- 
optimal line-the feasible set. Furthermore, because of the conflicting linear value functions of each agent, 
the sum of each outcome is 1 (called zero-sum games (Gibbons 1992)). ' The point that maximizes the 
product of the individual utilities (the Nash bargaining solution) is easily computed as the mid point (and 
most equitable) of both agents' value function (Le (0.5,0.5)). The situation is made more complex when 
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Figure 3.2: Outcome space for a pair of negotiating agents for linear value function and a) single issue and 
b) multiple issues. 
multiple issues are involved. This is important for the types of domains considered in this research where 
negotiation is over multi-dimensional services. Due to multiple issues, each having a different importance 
level and linear value function, the outcomes are transformed to a non-constant sum game (where the sum 
of the individual values for an outcome does not necessarily add up to 1). It is precisely for this reason 
that agents can look for "win-win" outcomes, improving on the outcome. The pareto-optimal line for 
integrative bargaining is shown in figure 3.2 b. The only points on this line where the sums of the individual 
values add to 1 is at the point of connection to the x and y axis. Different points along the pareto-optimal 
line then do not necessarily add to 1 and do not necessarily have the same addition. 7 More importantly, 
6The preferences of agents in the work reported here are modeled as a linear additive value function for each negotiation issue. 
The details of the function and its behaviour are deferred until the next chapter. 
7Note, the argument is true for a pair of perfectly opposing linear utility functions. The introduction of non-linearity changes the 
cardinality of values along the pareto-optimal line, meaning that the sum of the individual utilities that lie on the line do not add up to 
1. 
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outcomes of negotiation can now lie below the pareto-optimal line because agents may attach different 
importance weightings to each of the issues. Thus, an agent who places a lower importance on one issue 
than another, but possibly more on yet another issue, can result in outcomes that lie below the pareto-optimal 
line. Compare this to the distributive bargaining case, where the outcome of a negotiation had to be on the 
pareto-optimal line (due to the conflicting linear value functions and the importance weighting of value 1. 
the sum of individual values has to add to 1). Furthermore, the Nash bargaining solution is no longer at 
(0.5,0.5), because the pareto-optimal line has moved from the constant sum line to another point. Indeed 
(0.5,0.5) can now be viewed as the focal point. 
There are a number of computational implications in integrative bargaining. Specifically, whereas the 
maximization of the sum of the individual values is computationally straightforward, the same is not true of 
the computation involving the maximization of the product of the utilities (or the Nash bargaining solution). 
The Nash bargaining solution is inadequate in cases of multiple issues because its computation becomes 
intractable in the presence of multiple issue reservation values and weights. The maximization problem 
then becomes maximization of a quadratic function with restrictions (the reservation values of an issue), 
where the solution to the quadratic function may violate the restrictions. It is a quadratic problem because 
the individual utilities of agents are linear: 
max E wi Ui (o) 
(>wU(o)) 
i=l S=l 
Numeric methods, such as active sets, can handle such problems (Luenberger 1973). However, with this 
method as the number of issues increases then so does the complexity of the computation involved in solving 
the quadratic problem. Therefore, active sets become unlikely candidates for computing the Nash solution 
for bargaining problems involving large number of issues. 
To summarize, in this section the theory and assumptions of cooperative games were briefly reviewed. 
It was shown that although impractical for modeling the processes of negotiation, cooperative game theory 
has nonetheless produced: i) a formal definition of the possible space of outcomes and how this space can be 
represented and transformed and ii) a number of global evaluation criteria (such as pareto-optimality, Nash, 
reference and Gupta-Livne solutions), a number of which will be used in the empirical evaluation phase of 
this research. Finally, the last section discussed the effect of bargaining problems involving more than one 
issue on: i) some of the global measures and ii) the computations involved in finding a solution. Implicit 
in the above arguments was the availability of information in making social decisions. For example, to 
compute the reference point, or outcomes that actually lie on the pareto-optimal line, agents have to know 
the utilities the other agent places on all the set of outcomes. The treatment of information in game theory 
is discussed in the next section. 
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3.1.5 Complete Information Games 
The theory of complete information is not directly relevant to the research reported here. In this research 
it is assumed that information is private in interactions. Nonetheless, the theory of complete information 
is reviewed here because it formally represents ome important concepts (such as Nash equilibrium) and 
assumptions of game theory (such as the rationality and common knowledge of agents). Furthermore, 
the exposition will provide a framework for better understanding a number of computational models of 
negotiation, reviewed in section 3.2, which are a natural extension of complete information cooperative 
games. 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (Neumann & Morgernstern 1944) classified games into games of com- 
plete and incomplete information. ' In games of complete information the players are assumed to know all 
the relevant information-that is, they have knowledge of. 
1. The rules of the game: The rules, or the protocol of interaction, are a specification of when an agent 
may act, the actions available at these permissible times and the information concerning the history 
of the game until the current decision point. A player then formulates a strategy for the game, given 
the rules. 
2. The players of the game: A player is specified by: a) their preferences: represented as payoffs or a 
utility function. The utility functions are defined on the set of possible outcomes of the game. b) their 
beliefs: formally represented by a subjective probability distribution over a set of possible states of 
the world. It is the combination of the chosen strategies and the states of the world which determine 
the outcome of the game. States of the world are attributed to chance moves. 
More formally, a game is described in normal form as: 
Definition 2 7he normalfonn representation of an n-player game specifies the player's strategy spaces 
Sl,..., Sn and their payofffunctionsul,... un. The game is then denoted by G= (S,, ---, Sn; uls ... Un) 
Game theory then predicts a unique solution to the game (such as the Nash bargaining solution) as to what 
each agent will choose. However, in order for this prediction to be true, it is necessary for each agent to be 
willing to choose the strategy predicted by the theory. Thus, the predicted strategy for each agent must be 
the agent's best response to the predicted strategies of the other agents. Rationality is then the adherence to 
this self-enforcing property (because no single agent wants to deviate from its predicted strategy), while at 
the same time maximizing its expected utility. 
In a game of complete information, all the above are common knowledge (Aumann 1976). The impli- 
cation is that not only does each agent know it, but also that each agent knows that each agent knows it, 
SGames of incomplete information are also referred to as "asymmetric information" in the game theory literature (Gibbons 1992). 
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that each agent knows that each agent knows that each agent knows it, and so on ad infinitum (Mertens & 
fiect. For Zamir 1985). In addition to this, in a game of complete information the information need not be per 
example, chess is a game of perfect information, where for each decision node each agent always knows the 
complete history of the game. Conversely, in a game like poker an agent has imperfect information about 
the history of the game thus far; a player does not know what cards other players hold when at a decision 
node. 
Although the players have common knowledge about the state of the world, their subjective beliefs 
about what strategy the other player is following are determined by the analysis of the game. The question 
of which analysis is the appropriate one is itself problematic (Binmore & Dasgupta 1986). In particular, the 
infinite regress problem means that all strategies appear equally reasonable (Luce & Raiffa 1957). Infinite 
regression allows reasoning of the kind, "if I believe, that he believes, that I believe, that he believes, etc. ". 
which, in turn, makes all possible strategies candidates for selection. To overcome these difficulties, three 
additional requirements, representing the nature of rationality, are needed: 
* c) A rational player quantifies all uncertainties using a subjective probability distribution. The player 
then maximizes its utility given this distribution. Thus the subjective probability distribution is com. 
mon knowledge to all the other players. 
e d) All rational players are computationally equivalent. Thus if one player is given the same infor- 
mation as another, then it can duplicate its reasoning process. This does not mean that an agent 
knows everything (is omniscient); rather, the agent is infinitely capable of introspecting other agent's 
reasoning. 
e) Rationality of players is common knowledge. In game theory, rationality requires that an agent 
maximizes its utility and each agent will necessarily select an equilibrium strategy when choosing 
independently and privately. 
The implications of assumptions d) and e) are that it is common knowledge that the players are rational 
(what is referred to as consulting the same game theory book which contains all the commonly held as- 
sumptions such as the rationality and beliefs of agents as conventions (Binmore 1992), p. 484). Taken 
together, it is possible to- show that assumptions a) to e) sanction any choice of pair of strategies which 
are not in equilibrium. In economics, an equilibrium is defined to occur when the actions of an agent are 
consistent given the actions of others (Gibbons 1992). There are numerous equilibria concepts in game 
theory, each stricter in sanctioning possible strategies, but the most popular one is the Nash equilibrium. 9 
This is formally defined as: 
Not to be confused with Nash bargaining solution which was defined in section 3.1.4. 
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Definition 3 In the n-player normal-form game G= (SI,..., S"; Ul'... u. ), the strategies s, *, ) are 
a Nash equilibrium if, for each player i, sý is player V8 best response to the strategies specifiedfor the 
n-1 otherplayers, (81*, ..., 8j* #-1,841, ..., 8*n): 
sj*-I, sj*, sj*+,,... , S, 
*, ) ý: ui(s*,,... , si-I I Sis Si+i I ... i Sn) 
for eachfeasible strategy si E Si. That is, s? maximizes: S 
maxui(sl*,... si*-ltsilsi*+,, ... 9 Sn*) siESi 
Assumption e) enables plan recognition which, in turn, supports assumption d) and without it an agent is 
incapable of predicting other agent's behaviour. The assumption states that all agents are rational in that: 
a) they are utility maximizers and b) they will independently choose an equilibrium strategy. Under as- 
sumption d), a rational agent can only model (or predict) the behaviour of another rational agent. However, 
if assumption e) is violated, in that an agent chooses a non-equilibrium strategy (and hence behaves iffa- 
tionally by deviating from the Nash equilibrium) then the rational agent can no longer predict the behaviour 
of the irrational one because of the violation of assumption d). However, the rational agent can derive more 
utility (by deviating from Nash equilibrium) if it can model this irrationality on the part of the other agent 
(using another assumption, say d*). As Luce and Raiffa (Luce & Raiffa 1957), have argued: 
Even if we were tempted at first to call a Nash non-conformist "irrational", we would have to 
admit that his opponent might be "irrational" in which case it would be "rational" for him to 
be "irrational". 
Therefore, if the rationality assumptions, included to solve the infinite regress problem, are violated, then 
the outcome of interaction is indeterminate since any non-Nash pair of strategies can be chosen. However, 
the knowledge that agents are all perfectly rational, or the assumption on the part of the agent that other 
agents are also rational (consult the same game theory book), does substantially reduce the decision problem 
of the agent to one of selecting the strategy that is known to be in equilibrium independently of what the 
other agent does. As will be seen in section 3.2, a similar notion of perfect rationality is also developed 
in computational models of negotiation where agent designers are provided with negotiation protocols that 
have known equilibrium strategies. This fact is publicly known and deviation from it is irrational. Therefore, 
an agent designer can design his/her agent to behave independently of the other's choices. 
3.1.6 Games of Incomplete Information 
The arguments above concentrated on models of complete information which are suitable for games like 
chess. However, in real environments agents seldom know as much as the above models assume. What is 
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also required are models of decision making with uncertainty over both the rules of the game as well as 
the preferences and beliefs of others. Such models are highly relevant to the domain of this research, once 
again, because of the privacy of information assumption. 
Harsanyi developed a model which represents optimal behaviour given the fact that an agent has in- 
complete information about its world (Harsanyi 1955). Since uncertainties over the rules of a game can be 
expressed as uncertainties over the payoffs, assumption b) is the most fundamental assumption which needs 
to be relaxed. If assumption b) is relaxed, then the agents are no longer certain as to the type of the other 
players. To know an agent's type is to have complete knowledge of its preferences and beliefs. Each agent 
then only knows for certain its own type and its uncertainties of the other agent's type may be expressed as 
a probability distribution over the set containing all possible types. 
Given the above, an agent's uncertainty over the types of others is modeled by introducing a chance 
move at the first step of the game where nature selects the type of the player of the ensuing game with a 
probability distribution which is common knowledge to all players. Then, before the game begins, each 
agent updates its belief about the type of all others, given it has been chosen using Bayes rule. The in- 
troduction of the move by nature at the first step converts the game of incomplete information to a game 
of imperfect information, where at some point in the game the player with the move does not know the 
complete history of the game thus far. 
In essence, uncertainty is dealt with by assuming that the agents have a certain limitation on the form 
of their utility functions. Thus, there exists a known set of all possible utility functions. Each agent is 
then assigned a type based on which of those utility functions it is currently using. Other agents then 
update their beliefs about the type of others by acquiring information in the process of interaction. Then the 
choice problem reduces to a point that is fundamentally the same as a game against nature (for example, 
probability that it will rain tomorrow, given that it is sunny today) as in a traditional single-agent decision 
making situation. 
3.1.7 Non-Cooperative Games 
Non-cooperative models are also known as strategic bargaining theories, where the bargaining situation 
is modeled as a game, and the outcome is based on an analysis of which of the players' strategies are in 
equilibrium. This type of model was first motivated by Harsanyi (Harsanyi 1956), but is best represented 
through the Sequential Alternating Protocol (SAP) ((Rubinstein 1982), (Rubinstein 1985b), (Osbome & 
Rubinstein 1990)). The SAP, unlike the cooperative models, models the process of negotiation, one of the 
requirements of the problem domains of this research. The complete information version of the game is 
described first, followed by the incomplete information one. 
There are two players 1 and 2, whose task is to divide $1, and receive the share they each agree to. If 
they fail to agree, they get the conflict payoff of $0. The bargaining process is normatively specified by the 
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sequential alternating protocol where player 1 makes an initial offer of its share for the dollar at stage 0. 
Player 2 immediately accepts or rejects the offer. If the offer is rejected, then player 2 makes a counter-offer 
at T=1. This process is repeated until either a successful settlement is reached or else both players receive 
the conflict payoff. In cases of successful outcomes, the payoff to player 1(player 2) is computed as the 
tt). The discount factor represents the share of the dollar agreed at stage t, modified by a discountfactor 51 (J2 
incentive to reach an agreement early and btl, 6t2 < 1. Thus in round one the dollar is worth 1, in round two 
it s worth 3, in round three it is worth 62, and so on. A strategy is then a specification of the proposal/reply 
at each stage of the game as a function of the history to that point. 
Since the dollar is an infinitely divisible good, any division of the dollar is a Nash equilibrium. A 
stronger equilibrium solution was introduced by Rubinstein to solve the indeterminacy problem, called the 
subgame perfect equilibrium (Rubinstein 1982). Subgame perfect equilibrium sanctions commitments to 
contingent courses of action that would result in lower payoff to a player if the contingency did actually 
arise. For example, a threat by player 1 to walk off from negotiation if it did not receive 90 cents of the 
dollar is not credible, because if player 2 did offer 10 it would not be in the interest of player 1 to enforce 
the threat. Thus subgame perfect equilibria effectively prunes the search tree on the assumption that the 
other agent is rational (see section 2.2.8). 
In the above model the subgame-perfect equilibrium is unique and agreements are immediate with 
player 1 receiving share (1 - J2) J1 J2), while player 2 receives the share 1- ((1 - J2) J1 J2)) - 
Thus the more impatient an agent (the larger the value of 6), the smaller the final payoff. 
For example, consider a finite version of the divide the dollar game with 61 = 62 = 0.9. Table 3.3 
shows the offer's maximal claim that are acceptable to the other agent. Assume that in the last round (T) 
agent 2 would accept $0. However, in the next to last round, 2 can keep 0.1, because it knows this is how 
much 1 will lose if it waits till the next round (1 - 61 * 1). This reasoning continues backwards and the 
process terminates when the time limits of the game has been reached. 
Round I's share 2s share Offerer 
T-3 0.819 0.181 2 
T-2 0.91 0.09 1 
T- 1 0.9 0.1 2 
T 1 0 1 
Figure 3.3: Maximal acceptable claims of an offerer for a finite game 
Problems occurs when the protocol permits an infinite rounds of bargaining and non-discounted offers. 
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Under such circumstances any splits of the dollar is Nash equilibrium. However, as mentioned above, 
Rubinstein showed that for an infinite game where offers are discounted then a solution does exist and it 
is reachable within the first step of the protocol. The proof is as follows. Let the maximum and minimum 
agent 1 can get in any round be denoted as A, and a, respectively. Conversely, let B2 and b2 denote the 
maximum and minimum agent 2 can get in any round respectively. The proof consists of showing A, = a, 
and B2 = b2- If agent 1 makes the first offer then the maximum it can claim of the dollar has to satisfy the 
inequality: 
A1<1-b252 (3.2) 
That is, the maximum agent 1 can claim on its turn for agent 2 to be indifferent between accepting and 
refusing is what remains of the dollar once the discounted minimum of agent 2 has been allocated to 2. 
Conversely, the minimum agent 1 can claim on its turn has to satisfy the inequality: 
al >1- B252 (3.3) 
To see this, suppose 1 offers 2 an offer that violates this inequality, x<1- B262. Let x<y<1- B282. 
Then since 1-y> B262, a demand of y by 1 at time 0 will be accepted by 2, -because if 2 refuses y then the 
maximum 2 can get in the next time step is B262 which is less than 1-y. Thus 2 gets more by accepting 
1-y at time 0 than waiting until the next round. It follows that it can not be optimal for 1 to demand an 
offer x which will be rejected when another demand y exists which will be accepted at time 0. This logic is 
used to show agreements are reached instantly. 
Two further inequalities are then needed to compute the final share each agent receives. These in- 
equalities are derived by exchanging the roles of the agents, giving the requirements of the maximum and 
minimum demands (B2 and b2 respectively) of agent 2 as: 
B2 :51-a, Jl (3.4) 
b2 > 1- Alas (3.5) 
Substituting 3.5 for b2 in 3.2 gives: 
AI: 5 1- b282: 51- 62(l - A161) = 1- 
62 + A16,62 
Therefore 
1-62 
At :5 -f- (3.6) 162 
Similarly, by substituting 3.4 for B2 in 3.3 we get: 
at ý: 1- B282 ý: 1- 82(l - albi) =1- 82 + a, 8182 
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Therefore 
1-b2 
al 1- 5162 (3.7) 
Therefore, since al and Al are the minimum and maximum demands of agent 1, then a, :5A,. Thus 3.6 
and 3.7 and the corresponding inequalities for B2 and b2 imply that: 
a, =A, = 
1-62 
b2 = B2 
1-82 
1- 6162 - 6162 
The above model not only addresses ome of the key issues identified in chapter two (the protocol of 
interaction, time, strategies, commitments and costs), but it also has the desirable property that agreements 
are immediate. However, the SAP's adequacy is weakened for application to the problems of this domain 
because there are possibilities of inefficient delays and deadlocks when information is incomplete. In the 
SAP, the problem of incomplete information in a service market would be addressed by specifying a seller 
and a buyer type (see section 3.1.6), where the seller's type represents the lowest price value for which the 
seller is willing to sell a service, and the buyer's type represents the highest price the buyer is prepared 
to pay for the service. Each agent is certain about its type and the uncertainty over the other's type is 
represented by either a continuous distribution or discrete probabilities (e. g. a buyer with a high or low 
price valuation). These distributions are common knowledge. Uncertainties can then either be two sided 
(Fudenberg & Tirole 1983), (Perry 1986) or one-sided (Cramton 1991), (Admati & Perry 1987). 
As a consequence of these uncertainties there is no subgame-perfect equilibrium. The analysis is 
instead made using the stronger equilibrium concept of sequential equilibria (Rubinstein 1982), where 
in addition to specifying a strategy, each uncertain player's belief must be specified given every possible 
history. Then, a sequential equilibrium is a set of strategies and beliefs such that for every possible history 
each player's strategy is optimum given the other's strategy and its beliefs about other's valuation. Beliefs 
are made consistent by using Bayes rules. Since agents are bound to the protocol of communication that 
permits only the transmission of offers and counter offers, the process of learning other's types through 
Bayes rule typically requires multiple stages, leading to delays in reaching agreements. However, if the 
other agent's behaviour is off the equilibrium path, then Bayesian updating is not possible since these off 
equilibrium paths are assigned zero probability. This may result in incentives for agents to deviate from 
the equilibrium to increase the number of possible outcomes. Out of equilibrium behaviour cannot be ruled 
out in games of both sided uncertainty and a sequential alternating protocol (this problem is solvable for 
one-sided uncertainty and a protocol where the uninformed agent makes all the offers and the informed 
agent either accepts or rejects offers (Vincent 1989)). 
In addition to the above properties, the results from non-cooperative models of the negotiation process 
are highly sensitive to the particular assumptions made about the bargaining process (Sutton 1986). For 
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example, two-sided versus one-sided uncertainty ((Fudenberg & Tirole 1983) and (Sobel & Takahashi 1983) 
respectively), finite horizon versus infinite horizon time limits ((Fudenberg & Tirole 1983) and (Rubinstein 
1985a) respectively), possibility of strategic delays (Admati & Perry 1987), different bargaining costs (Perry 
1986), different offer patterns (alternating versus uninformed player makes all the offers (Rubinstein 1985a) 
and (Cramton 1991) respectively), all result in a different process of bargaining. For example, the SAP 
protocol can be altered to allow strategic delays where the players are allowed to make offers at any time 
after some minimum time between offers has passed. This leads to agents strategically delaying their offers 
which is interpreted as a signal of the position of the delaying agent (Admati & Perry 1987). Consequently, 
different outcomes are selected. 
In summary the SAP is a more operational protocol for computational purposes than cooperative game 
theoretic models of negotiation. Not only does it model the protocol of interaction, but it also includes the 
time of reaching agreements, strategies and commitments in interaction. However, small variations in this 
protocol, and non-cooperative models in general ((Binmore 1992) page 196) result in the protocol selecting 
different outcomes. Nonetheless, as will be shown in section 3.2.2, the SAP has been usefully extended by 
Kraus to solve a number of computational problems. 
3.1.8 Mechanism Design 
In addition to its explanatory purposes, game theory models are used for the design and implementation 
of organizations, or of an activity within an organization, where the participants do not share the same 
goals but there exist opportunities for mutual cooperation as well as real conflict (see (Marschak & Radner 
1972) for a theory of the team who share a common goal). Previous sections have concentrated on two 
different perspectives of how to model interactions between agents. The aim of this section is to discuss 
how such models can be used to design and implement interacting systems, an activity highly relevant to 
computational systems. 10 Indeed, the best example of mechanism design is the various types of auctions 
that exist on the Internet. Additionally, as will be shown in section 3.2, mechanism design has also been 
heavily used to design computational negotiation protocols that have certain useful features. Therefore, this 
section will briefly introduce the key concepts that will assist in later exposition. 
The problem of designing and implementing activities is referred to as the "implementation problem" 
or mechanism design where the designer's preferred negotiated outcome (in terms of some criteria such as 
social or individual welfare) is derivable from a given specification of the rules of the game (see (Rosen- 
schein & Zlotkin 1994)). It is called a mechanism because what is being designed is not a specific game 
(concrete utilities), but a "gameform" (utility types). In general, the aim of mechanism design is to create 
IOMechanism design can be thought of the problem of design a system that implements a game theory text book, containing the 
assumptions and implications of the theory. For example, a mechanism is designed such that the players in that mechanism commonly 
know what the most rational strategy is. 
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a society of agents who are engaged in a cooperative venture for mutual gains. Rules, laws and regulations 
(or protocols) are used to define a game which specifies the feasible set of negotiated solutions and elim- 
inate individuals' feasible set of actions. As will be shown in section 3.2.1, mechanism design has been 
central to computational models of negotiation in MAS, by constructing games whose equilibria have some 
centrally desired properties(s). However, since the computational models of coordination in MAS come 
from mechanism design, the principles are described in this section. 
The problem of mechanism design is formulated in game-theoretic terms as the principle agent(s) 
problem (Binmore 1990). The most popular application of the principle-agent problem is auctions (see 
(Sandholm 1999)), where the principle is a seller of some good and the agent(s) can be one or more buyers. 
The problem then is reformulated as one of devising a selling mechanism that satisfies some features such 
as efficiency and individual rationality (see section 3.1.4), given that the seller does not know the reser- 
vation values of the buyers. Because the principle cannot observe the hidden reservations, the problem is 
sometimes called hidden type, borrowing from Harsanyi's theory of incomplete information (section 3.1.6). 
11 This lack of knowledge is addressed by devising incentive schemes that reward the agents that submit 
bids that are at their true reservation values. 
In summary, the principle attempts to induce the agents to behave in a certain manner using a mech- 
anism M. However, the principle does not know the types of agents, but it is common knowledge how 
chance selects the agents for each buying role. The principle's choice of M then serves as a rule of the 
game G. The agent's actions in G then determine an outcome o. Given that the agents are rational, then 
the principle will be offered a choice of outcome o in G that is Nash equilibrium. This o is then said to 
be implementable for the principle-it can get o if it wants it by selecting mechanism M. The decision of 
whether or not an outcome is implementable is simplified through another principle called the revelation 
principle (Binmore 1992). If a mechanism asks an agent what its type is, then it is a direct mechanism. 
Then based on the declared type the mechanism generates ome outcome. If the agents are not asked what 
their type is, then mechanism is called indirect. The revelation principle then states that whatever can be 
done with an indirect mechanism can also be done with a direct mechanism (called incentive compatible). 
Thus any social function implemented by an indirect mechanism can also be implemented by a direct one 
where agents have an incentive to declare their true types. 
This simple principle that "if something can be done, then it can be done by just asking people to 
reveal their true characteristics" (Binmore 1992) is useful in designing optimal mechanisms-to decide 
what outcomes are implementable, it is only necessary to consider outcomes that are implementable by 
II The Principle-agent problem is studied under the subject ofmoral hazards (Binmore 1992), because the principle is taking arisk 
if it relies on the morals of agent(s) tocarry out what they committed to in a contract. In the literature, moral hazards are also called 
hidden action and adverse lection problems (Binmore 1992). 
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a direct mechanism. As will be shown in section 3.2.1. a number of MAS have used these principles of 
mechanism design for the design of computational models of negotiation. 
3.1.9 An Evaluation of Game Theory 
Game theory has proved useful in modeling social phenomena in disciplines such as economics, politi- 
cal theory, evolutionary theory, moral philosophy, social psychology and sociology. The reasons for this 
success have been its (Castlefranchi & Conte 1997): i) conceptualization of a synthetic, meaningful and 
formal prototypical context as games which are open to experimental analysis; ii) its ability to predict and 
explain these games in a manner which does not rely on post-hoc explanation, but rather uses formal and 
sound notions; and iii) identification and conceptualization of a host of social problems such as frec-riding, 
cheating, reciprocation, coalition formation, reputation and emergence of norms. The first two contribu- 
tions are highly relevant to the research reported here because the formal elements of game theory permit 
unambiguous modeling of the decision making involved in negotiation. In addition to providing a "model- 
ing language' the theory provides formal concepts such as Nash solution, pareto-optimality and reference 
point that can be used to empirically evaluate the developed components of the negotiation wrapper. 
In addition to the above, the impact of game theory within DAI has been to (Castlefranchi & Conte 
1997): iv) challenge the benevolence assumption as well as notions of common problem, social goal and 
global utility; v) demonstrate that cooperation can emerge from local utilities; and vi) quantify the costs 
and benefits associated with actions (e. g communication, exchange and formation of groups as coalition). 
This emphasis of game theoretic models on local preferences makes them highly appropriate for modeling 
the type of tasks faced by the wrapper (section 2.2.4). Recall that the task of the negotiation wrapper in 
this body of work is decision making since no objectively correct answer exists (tasks where an objectively 
correct answer exists are termed problem solving (Laughlin 1980)). In decision making tasks, the object of 
coordination is an agent's goals and its preferences over these goals. 
However, game theory models have generated considerable debate as to their efficacy and the theory's 
usefulness in guiding the design of an agent (Castlefranchi & Conte 1997, Fishbum 1981, Simon 1996, 
Zeng & Sycara 1997, Binmore 1990). An adequate evaluation of game theory, due to the enormity of the 
discipline, is beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore, only a few select problems relevant to this research 
are presented below. 
The greatest criticism of game theory from the perspective of the objectives of this thesis is its rational- 
ity assumption that i) beliefs are common knowledge, and ii) individuals are optimizers and computationally 
unbounded. 
The first assumption is appropriate for games such as chess where the choices of the individuals, 
and their interactions, are written into the rules of the game. Players motivations are also common 
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knowledge--each prefers to win. However, in the real world there is no rule book which describes 
how individuals actually acquire beliefs. The assumptions are based on an "ideal" world in which 
beliefs deduced rationally from a common prior can be common knowledge. Yet, the world is not 
"ideal'! --there are imperfections in our knowledge. 
0 The assumption that individuals are optimizers has also been critically challenged. The question of 
what is optimal, in game theory models, is independent of actual human behaviour-the question is 
reformulated from one of how do people actually behave to how should people behave given that each 
individual were to maximize his utility. Cognitively inspired modelers and designers state that game 
theory only models a subset of the cognitive makeup of an agent. In particular, economic rationality 
is not a model of rationality in general but only one of a large subset of human goals (Castlefranchi 
& Conte 1997). The subjective expected utility model (Neumann & Morgemstern 1944) rules out 
decisions and behaviours which may be perfectly rational but which are economically irrational. For 
example, to persevere in an investment which has a lower utility than another investment (sunk costs) 
may be subjectively rational if the agent desires to avoid public admission of failure. Cognitive scien- 
tists claim that game theory does not consider the entire set of an agent's goals when formulating the 
criteria of rational behaviour. This observation is supported by the fact the theory is experimentally 
unsupported (Roth 1995). 
Related to the above point, is the concern that the theory is one of behaviourism and that it excludes 
from the models any deliberative intervention. The theory models the actions of an agent given its 
information set, whereas a satisfactory theory of cooperation requires the modeling of the agent's 
cognition, especially its goals, motivations and intentions rather than the knowledge only. Further- 
more, the theory is silent with regards to the contents of preferences, their legitimacy, their nature and 
their social desirability (Fishbum 198 1). 
In addition, most of the models described above assume perfect computational rationality (assumption 
d in section 3.1.5). Under this assumption, no computation is required to find mutually acceptable 
solutions within the feasible range. Furthermore, this space of possible deals is assumed to be fully 
known by the agents, as are the potential outcome values. Generally, the theory is silent with respect 
to the actual computational rationality of the agents (Simon 1996). To know a solution exists , is not 
to know what the solution is. Chess is a classic example of this point. The game has a solution-a 
strategy for white or black which is either a win or a draw, but the search is computationally complex. 
Game theory models are of type P, (the capacity to generate successful behaviour given available 
information), whereas a more satisfactory model of rationality may be of type P3 (the capacity to 
optimally select the combination of action and computation as opposed to perfect rationality-see 
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section 2.2.8). The perfect rationality of all agents, although useful in designing, predicting and 
proving properties of a system, is not altogether useful in system design since it: 
- does not exist (physical mechanisms take time to process information and select actions). Hence 
the behaviour of real agents cannot immediately reflect changes in the environment and will 
generally be sub-optimal (Simon 1982) 
- does not provide for the analysis of the internal design of an agent; one perfectly rational agent is 
as good as another. Therefore, what is required are different agent architectures that implement 
different search mechanisms, capable of heuristically exploring a set of possible outcomes, 
under both limited information and computation assumptions. 
In particular, as Sandholm notes, 
future work should focus on developing methods where the cost of search (deliberation) 
for solutions is explicit, and it is decision-theoretically traded off against the bargaining 
gains that the search provides. This becomes particularly important as the bargaining 
techniques are scaled up to combinatorial problems with a multi-dimensional negotiation 
space as opposed to combinatorially simple ones like splitting the dollar (Sandholm 1999). 
The theory is a closed system. It has failed to generate a general model governing rational choice in 
interdependent situations (Zeng & Sycara 1997). Instead, the discipline has produced a number of 
highly specialized models applicable to specific types of inter-dependent decision making (e. g. the 
von Neurnann-Morgenstern solution to two-person). As Binmore notes: 
... conclusions (of non-cooperative models) only apply to one specific game. If the details 
of the rules are changed slightly, the conclusions reached need no longer be valid (Binmore 
1992), p. 196. 
Classical game theorists claim that the models are prescriptive and consequently cannot invalidate them- 
selves if they were universally adopted by all players (if all agents consulted the same game theory text 
book-if other agents play according to the theory's prescription then the behaviour prescribed to the agent 
is already optimal). However, even though the internal logics of the models may be true, the models still 
remain a poor description of the world. 
Other game theorists have addressed some of the above criticisms by replacing prescriptive (or educ- 
tive) models of rationality, based on omniscient unbounded decision makers, by descriptive (or evolutive) 
models which are based on myopically simple agents (Smith 1982), (Axelrod 1984), (Binmore 1990), (Ito 
& Yano 1995). The theory has also been criticized for its characterization of individuals as logical and 
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rational agents. Rational theories (or what Binmore calls eductive models (Binmore 1990)) are inappropri- 
ate for the equilibrium existence and selection problems. The former problem appears in games where the 
determination of equilibria is problematic and, conversely, the latter problem occurs for types of games that 
have multiple equilibria (Gibbons 1992). Some game theorists claim that the indeterminacy of deciding 
which strategies are in equilibria is the result of assuming that the process that brings about equilibrium 
is a logical and rational process, rather than a "myopic titonnenmene' (or blind groping) process, similar 
to evolutionary mechanisms (Binmore 1990). For such theorists, rational behaviour is itself the subject of 
selection and one that has survived after less successful ones have been eliminated. In humans, the process 
that brings about equilibrium is very complex, employing coordination mechanisms uch as thinking and 
signaling (Binmore 1990). However, although complex, rational behaviour does exhibit imperfections due 
to its assuming an infinite capability to reason (perfectly rational). Therefore, it is a mistake to take it for 
granted that decision makers are perfectly rational 12 and as Binmore notes (Binmore & Dasgupta 1986): 
... the most important equilibrating mechanisms, as in animal biology, are those which operate 
through the short-sighted and mechanical adjustment of strategies in the indefinitely repeated 
play of a game. 
There exists a vast literature on the equilibria selection problem which is beyond the scope of the discussion 
here (see (Gibbons 1992) for an introduction to the problem). It is generally accepted that if the equilibrating 
mechanism is a rational and conscious process then the choice of which equilibria to select is determined 
by negotiation among the players of that game (Nash 1951). Conversely, if rational behaviour has been 
made by unthinking evolutionary forces then the selection problem becomes a meaningless problem since 
the choice of the actual equilibrium observed is due to random fluctuations in the equilibrating process. 
The individual is merely a strategy which is subjected to survival criteria in a population of other 
strategies. The problems associated with the prescriptive models are eliminated by replacing the agents with 
simple stimulus-response machines-the beliefs, motivations and abilities of the agents are no longer an 
issue and the equilibrating mechanisms is no longer the reasoning process of the agents but an evolutionary 
process. Under this methodology rationality itself is a candidate for change. However, the solution is bought 
at a cost. Descriptive models may address the above problems but they may be too specific by assuming far 
too much that can be justified, as well as generating dynamic systems that are too complex to analyze. 
An additional problem raised is the level of complexity of the agents in the generated descriptive mod- 
els. For example, even single celled organisms can learn from their experience. Therefore any descriptive 
model must take into consideration ot only the learning aspect of the agent but also the level of complexity 
of the learning involved (for example, should agents be modeled as learners of other's learning process). 
12 Even professional economists can not be relied on to behave rationally in the simplest of bargaining games (Guth, Schmittherger, 
& Schwarze 1982). 
Chapter 3. Related Work 92 
Learning rules have been suggested as a possible strategy candidate (Smith 1982), (Axelrod 1984) and the 
criteria of how complex these learning rules are delegated to the principle of bounded rationality, since 
increasing the complexity of an individual incurs costs (search and management) which, in turn, imposes 
a constraint on the models of the individual. This bounded rationality will constrain the complexity of the 
agent. 
As was mentioned at the beginning of this section, the approach adopted in this work is to adopt the 
formal game theoretic constructs such as protocols, outcomes, utilities, and strategies (represented compu- 
tationally as permissible state-space transitions, terminal states given paths from an initial state, traversal 
strategies, state utilities and path selection strategy, respectively in search algorithm terminology), as well 
as solution concepts such as pareto-optimality, Nash bargaining solution and reference point. However, for 
computational and informational reasons, the assumption that rationality is selection of outcomes that are 
optimum (lie on the Pareto optimal line) is relaxed. Agents operate in dynamic and uncertain environments, 
where, at best, even the identity of the other agents is uncertain, let alone the assumption that there is com- 
mon knowledge of the prior distribution of others' types. The combination of uncertainty and computational 
boundedness of physical systems, results in a sub-optimal heuristic search that may not be able to select 
feasible outcomes on the pareto-optimal line. Under such contexts, there is a tradeoff between solution 
quality and the computational and informational requirements-the optimality of the search outcome will 
be a function of the certainty levels and the computational efforts. 
The computational and domain specificity problems of game theory have also been one of the central 
concerns of DAI models of negotiation. To this end, a number of key representative computational models 
from this paradigm are discussed in the following section. 
3.2 Computational Models of Negotiation 
This section is a description of the class of models which this research is primarily concerned with, namely 
computational agents that use negotiation to further coordination. Sections below describe in more detail 
models from a mainly MAS perspective (with the exception of the Contract Net Protocol, section 3.2.3, 
which belongs to the Cooperative Distributed Problem Solving paradigm). The presented work below can 
be viewed as proposals for the design of negotiation protocols that are progressively less restrictive on the 
agents and where interactions become more direct. 
3.2.1 Domain Theory of Negotiation 
The application of mechanism design (see section 3.1.8 above) to different types of computational domains 
has been central to the work of Rosenchein and Zlotkin, (Rosenschein & Zlotkin 1994). The main idea 
behind this body of work is that protocols of interaction can be designed that are self-enforcing and that 
have certain desirable properties for different domains. These properties can then be used by agent designers 
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as a standard of interaction. The assumptions of this body of work are as follows: 
1. Expected Utility Maximizers: individual decisions are rational only if they maximize the expected 
utility of an agent. 
2. One-off Negotiation: Agents' current actions are not dependent on future encounters. This indepen- 
dence of histories on the current encounter is common knowledge. 
3. Inter-agent Comparison of Utility: Agents, or the designers of agentsý have a means of transforming 
others' utility into a common utility. 
4. Symmetric Abilities: All agents are capable of performing the same set of actions. Also, the cost 
associated with each action is independent of the agent carrying out the action. Costs are specified as 
a part of the agent's utility function. 
5. Binding Commitments: Designers design their agents to keep all their commitments. 
6. No Explicit Utility Transfer: Agents cannot explicitly transfer utility between one another-there 
is no side payment (section 3.1.4). Utility is however transferred implicitly as agreements. 
Based on these assumptions the authors use the principles of mechanism design to construct protocols of 
interaction: 
We are interested in social engineering for machines. We want to understand the kinds of 
negotiation protocols, and punitive and incentive mechanisms, that would cause individual 
designers to build machines that act in particular ways. Since we assume that the agents' 
designers are basically interested in their own goals, we want to find interaction techniques that 
are "stable', that make it worthwhile for the agent designer not to have his machines deviate 
from the target behaviour (Rosenschein & Zlotkin 1994), p. 4-5. 
The function of a protocol is the specification of the set of possible deals agents can make together with the 
sequences of permissible offers and counter-offers. Properties of protocols are then analyzed so as to guide 
agent designers' decisions about which protocol to use for different domains. The properties the authors 
suggest are (note the similarity with the axioms of Nash bargaining solution, section 3.1.4): 
efficiency: agreements hould be either Pareto-Optimal or globally optimal. The latter is achieved 
when the sum of the agents' utilities is maximized. 
2. stability: no agent has an incentive to deviate from the strategy specified by the protocol-"the strat- 
egy that agents adopt can be proposed as part of the interaction environment design " (Rosenschein 
& Zlotkin 1994), p. 2 1. 
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Figure 3.4: Three Outcomes That Maximize the Sum of the Utilities. 
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3. simplicity: related to the two points above is the property that the protocol should make low com- 
putational and communication demands on the agent. If a protocol is simple, then fewer sYstem 
resources are used up by the negotiation. Hence simplicity increases efficiency. Similarly, simplicity 
is achieved when a protocol is stable, since the agent does not need to spend a significant amount of 
resource in thinking about the optimal strategy. The optimal behaviour has been publicly provided 
by the protocol and the best thing the agent can do is to carry out this optimal suggestion. 
4. distributed: the protocol is not centralized. 
5. symmetric: the protocol should not favor one agent over another. Symmetry implies that the outcome 
of the negotiation will not be affected if an agent was replaced by another of exactly the same type. 
The efficiency property of a protocol relates to the social welfare function that it implements, here it is the 
sum of the agents' utilities. Requiring that the sum of the utilities be maximized reduces the number of 
possible outcomes and rules out many social behaviours. However, Arrow's impossibility theory remains 
(section 3.1.3)-even though some outcomes are ruled out, there are still multiple outcomes that maximize 
the social welfare (equity), but each agent prefers a different social outcome (efficiency). This is represented 
in figure 3.4, where each of the three hypothetical points maximize the sum of the individual utilities. The 
point shown by the utility vector (0.3,0.9) is preferred by player 2, since it gives more weight to player 
2. Conversely, the point at utility vector (0.9,0.3) is preferred by player 1, since it gives more weight to 
player 1. Therefore, each agent prefers a different outcome. Negotiation, then, is defined as reaching an 
agreement over the division of the group utility. The regular Nash bargaining solution (section 3.1.4) is used 
to solve this fairness problem, resulting in the selection of point (0.6,0.6). 13 If there is more than one Nash 
BNote these different solution points on this efficient line (such as (0.3,0.9) or (0.9,0.3)) can be selected using the generalized 
Nash bargaining solution which models the power, or weight. of the negotiators (Binmore 1992). 
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solution (recall that the Nash bargaining solution maximizes the product of the deal) then the protocol will 
select the deal that maximizes the sum and the product of the utilities. Finally, if there is more than one deal 
that maximizes the product and the sum of the utilities, then the protocol randomly selects one deal. The 
authors then concern themselves with the class of protocols that satisfy these efficiency criteria. They refer 
to this type of protocol as Product Maximizing Mechanisms or PMMs-or the Nash bargaining solution. 14 
The stability property of the protocol is its ability to select and maintain equilibrium strategies. This is 
a highly advantageous property for open societies where malicious agents can enter with their own strate- 
gies and attempt to extract the best deal for themselves (what economists call extracting the entire surplus 
from the interactions (Binmore 1992)). However, if strategies are stable then they are the best responses 
irrespective of the private strategies of others and the protocol is immune to attack (Smith 1982). 
The simplicity property is derived directly from the revelation principle introduced in section 3.1.8. 
Strategies are simple because PMM protocols are direct, giving agent designers the incentive to declare 
their utility types (see incentive compatibility in section 3.1.8). 
Given this set of properties, an agent designer is then told that for domain D: protocol Prl is dis- 
tributed, symmetric, stable, simple but inefficient; and Pr2 is distributed, symmetric and stable, but more 
efficient and complex. The novelty of the approach is this domain theory of negotiation, which can be used 
for classifying interaction types and assisting designers to choose the appropriate negotiation protocols. The 
domains they suggest are: 
Task Oriented Domains (TOD): Agents in TOD attempt to achieve their tasks, which do not interact 
with other agents' tasks. However, benefits can be gained by all parties under certain task redistri- 
bution patterns. These are inherently cooperative domains, where agents attempt to find mutually 
beneficial task distributions. 
State Oriented Domains (SOD): SOD represents classic Al problem domains, where agents attempt 
to move the world from an initial state to a goal state. In comparison to TOD, real conflict is possible 
in SOD because the agents have different goals and there may be no single goal state that mutually 
satisfies all the agents. 
0 Worth Oriented Domains (WOD): In WOD agents can express a desirability scale, or worth func- 
tion, to potential outcomes. In both TOD and SOD agents can only wholly satisfy their goals (in 
TOD a goal is completion of tasks, in SOD a goal is a state an agent wishes to reach); they cannot 
relax their initial goals to reach an agreement. In WOD, however, a continuous worth function (as 
opposed to the binary functions of TOD and SOD) allows agents to compromise on their goals, and 
even increase the overall efficiency of the agreements. Negotiation is then cooperative. 
14A mechanism. in their terms, is both the protocol and the strategy. 
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Overall, agents can compromise and reach deals over how much work they do (TOD), which final state they 
reach (SOD), as well as how much worth they extract from the deals. In the types of problems considered 
in this research, agents do have conflicting goals and conflict resolution is assumed to be a concession over 
demands. Indeed, some of the most interesting results from integrative bargaining come from the ability of 
agents to concede and/or make demand on goals. 
3.2.1.1 Evaluation of Domain Theory 
The work of Rosenchein and Zlotkin has been pioneering in its contribution towards the design of protocols 
of negotiation for MAS. In addition to being the first to apply cooperative game theoretic models and 
mechanism design to computational agents, the domain theory of negotiation has been particularly useful 
in guiding the design of different negotiation protocols for different domains. However, in adopting the 
Nash solution and principles of mechanism design the approach inherits the criticisms raised in section 
3.1-9. 
More specifically, a domain theory of negotiation is a step towards developing a general theory of 
negotiation (one of the criticisms outlined above in section 3.1.9), but, like most game theoretic models, at 
the cost of making further assumptions that are unrealistic. For example, the fourth assumption above states 
that agents have the same ability. This allows the modeling of symmetric interactions where negotiation is 
seen as the optimal sharing or swapping of a set of tasks (in TOD), or the desired final states (in SOD) or 
worth (in WOD). Worth in WOD is shared implicitly when an agent "agrees to do more work in a joint 
plan that achieves both agents'goals, he increases the utility ofthe second agent" (Rosenschein & Zlotkin 
1994), page 150. However, in the domains of interest of this research, agents do not have symmetric abilities 
and they cannot trade off worth with tasks. In fact, agents interact and negotiate for services which they 
themselves cannot perform in the first place. Negotiation then is not about swapping, but rather delegating 
tasks to other agents to perform. The worth of a goal can no longer be traded off against tasks. 
There may also be circumstances when the social function (or the global utility) cannot be maximized 
due to not only the uncertainty and computational boundedness of agents, but also the structure of the prob- 
lem domain. 'One possible way to increase the global utility function (but not maximize it, again due to 
privacy of information or computational limitations of agents) is to search for "win-win " outcomes in in- 
tegrative bargaining, involving more than one negotiation issue, as opposed to distributive bargaining over, 
for example, tasks, states or worth only. As mentioned earlier, real world problems are seldom described 
with preferences over a single issue. Furthermore, in the domains targeted by this research, agents cannot 
exchange tasks. These two points taken together mean that the protocols developed by Rosenchein and 
Zlotkin are inappropriate for the problem addressed in this thesis-the global maximization of utility by the 
PMM protocol depends on the exchange of tasks, states or worths. There is a need for other search mecha- 
nisms that solve problems that do not just involve exchange and that attempt to increase the social welfare. 
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For the above reasons, the generality of the domain theory is restricted to domains that are characterized by 
the trading of the goals (or tasks, states or worth). 
Furthermore, the assumptions that the cost of an action is independent of the agent that carries it out 
and that each agent has sufficient resources to potentially handle all of the tasks of all agents are unrealistic. 
These assumptions are clearly violated in real world problems such as scheduling (see section 3.2.4 below 
for an in-depth discussion) where agents are endowed with different tasks, resources and costs to achieve 
them. The implications and consequences of asymmetry for a general domain theory are themselves re- 
search questions and ones that the authors do not address. The modeling of cost and its assymetric nature 
has been one of the central contributions of the work of Sandholm (section 3.2.4). 
Finally, the authors use principles from mechanism design to transform direct to indirect interactions, 
in a similar manner to auctions. The declaration of preferences or any information to a principle (either an 
auctioneer or the protocol) achieves some desirable properties such as efficiency, simplicity and stability, 
thereby addressing the bounded rationality problem of agents since agents don't need to out-guess others' 
strategies or engage in costly deliberations for strategy selection. Thus agent designers know what the 
optimal strategy is for a given domain and they program such behaviours into their agents. In this way, 
the protocol is restrictive; agents are free to choose any strategy they wish, but the best strategy is public 
knowledge and deviations from it are irrational. However. mechanism design is ineffective if agents, or 
their designers, fail to agree to declare their types to a protocol designer. Incentive mechanisms can be 
constructed to implement a direct mechanism only after the designers have agreed to reveal their types. 
This is in effect a pre-negotiation egotiation among the designers. The theory is not applicable if there 
are no such agreements between the designers themselves. Interactions therefore need to be direct, and 
mechanisms are needed that assist agents in the direct interactions with one another when their preferences 
are private knowledge. The authors do not assess the implications on the behaviour of protocols when the 
assumption that agents, or their designers, can compare other agent's utilities (assumption three) is yiolated. 
Agents may refuse to reveal their utilities. 
3.2.2 Non-Cooperative Computational Negotiation 
A number of key principles from mechanism design (section 3.1.8) and non-cooperative models (sec- 
tion 3.1.7) for problems that involve time and resource restrictions in worth oriented domains have 
been central to the work of Kraus; see (Kraus 1997b, 2000) for an overview of this body of work 
and (Kraus & Wilkenfeld 1995,1993, Kraus, Wilkenfeld, & Zlotkin 1995, Kraus & Lehmann 1995, 
Kraus 1997a) for details of the models. In this body of work, strategic models of negotiation have been 
applied to bilateral and multi-lateral negotiations, single and multiple encounters, complete and incomplete 
information in negotiations, as well as the impact of time on the utility of deals. The contribution of this 
body of work is its ability to: 
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provide the agent with domain dependent utility functions that take into consideration the passage 
of time and the costs of negotiation. In the work described in the previous section, "the source of 
the utility function or the preferences of the agents, ..., was rarely discussed. It was assumed that 
each agent knows its utility function (and has some knowledge of its opponents' utility function). 
However, a designer of an automated agent is required to provide the agent with a utility function or 
a preference relation. Without doing so, formal models cannot be used for automated agents" (Kraus 
2000). 
model power relationships. In the types of problems considered by Kraus, in the process of negoti- 
ation one agent can gain while another loses utility. Therefore, "the stronger agent may be able to 
"force" the other agent to reach an agreement which is best for it, among the deals that are possible" 
(Kraus 2000). 
* models strictly conflicting preferences, where agents' preferences are diametrically opposite. For 
example, "if two agents need the same resource at the same time, and each would like to use it as 
much as possible, then their preferences are conflicting" (Kraus 2000). 
* tackle the computational problems of "developing low complexity techniques for searching for ap- 
propriate strategiee' (Kraus 1997b), p. 84. 
In more detail, Rubinstein's strategic sequential alternating model (section 3.1-7) has been modified to 
provide a unified solution to both task and resource allocation problems. These modifications include the 
modeling of. i) the way time influences the preferences of agents, ii) the discrete, as opposed to continuous, 
outcomes, and iii) the possibility that both agents can opt out of the negotiation as well as their preferences 
for doing so. The model is evaluated by the amount of time it takes to reach deals, as well as the efficiency, 
15 simplicity and stability of the deals. 
Agents' preferences over the time of the outcome are achieved by building time-dependent preferences 
into their utility functions. Moreover, Kraus argues that whereas formal theories all acknowledge the impor- 
tance of a utility function, none of the actually provide any such function. This makes them unoperational; 
a designer of an automated agent is required to provide the agent with a utility function or a preference re- 
lationship. The actual utility function is likely to be domain dependent, but Kraus identifies three categories 
(Kraus 2000): 
1. Fixed loses/gains per time unit: Ui (o, t) = U'(0,0) + t-Ci, where o is an outcome, t is the current 
time in negotiation, 0 is the set of possible of outcomes, and Ci is the cost/gain to agent i. Each agent 
15EMciency in this work is viewed not in terms of pareto-optimality. Rather, in resource allocation problems an efficient outcome 
is one where the resource is not in use only when no agent in the group needs the resource. 
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has a utility function that carries a cost gain or loss, due to delays, for each period of negotiation. 16 
Costs may be communication load, negotiation costs, resource storage costs or task execution costs, 
and gains can be the usage of the resource which is the subject of negotiation. 
2. Time constant discount rate: Ui (o, t) = 6j'Ui (o, 0), where 0< bi < 1. Similar to the SAP where 
each agent has a fixed time discount rate that modifies the utility of an outcome. 
A 
3. Finite-horizon models with fixed losses per time unit: U'(0,0 = Ui (0,0) - (1 - tl N) - t. C for AA 
t <N, CER. where N is a finite number of steps in negotiation. Like the previous case, there is 
a constant gain or loss over time during the negotiation process. However. the utility function also 
quantifies the gains after the end of the negotiation, when the outcome of the negotiation is valid for 
A 
N periods and at each time step after the end of negotiation the agents can gain Ui(o, 0). 
it is these preferences over time, together with agents having the option to opt outý that motivate them to- 
wards reaching deals. However, since time plays no important role in the agent's utility models described in 
the domain theory of negotiation, presented in the previous section, new strategies are provided. Strategies 
are, like classic strategies, any function that maps the history of the negotiation to a next move, specifying 
what the agent has to do next. At each turn of an agent to respond, a strategy specifies i) which offer to 
make, and ii) whether to accept or reject an offer or alternatively opt out of negotiation. It is this evaluation 
component of the strategy that is different from the strategies presented in the previous section where time 
is taken into account. 
Given the possible set of outcomes and the agents' utility functions, an agent's strategy is then ana- 
lyzed using subgame perfect equilibrium (for games of perfect information) and sequential equilibria (for 
games of incomplete information) as solutions (see section 3.1.7) that any agent will necessarily select if it 
was rational. Given this property of the non-cooperative model, a mechanism (or the rules of the alternating 
sequential protocol) is designed that is incentive compatible with selecting the subgame perfect equilib- 
rium strategy for games of perfect information and sequential equilibria strategy for games of incomplete 
information. 
Another major contribution of this body of work is an implementation that addresses the issue of the 
complexity involved in having to compute strategies, rather than having the equilibrium strategy publicly 
known (Lemel 1995): 
The drawback of the game theory approach is that finding equilibrium strategies is not mechan- 
ical (computational): an agent must somehow make a guess that some strategy combination is 
in equilibrium before it tests it and there is no general way to make the initial guess (Kraus 
1997a), p. 48. 
16The range of these utility functions are not in the interval (0,11. 
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The implementation solution Kraus proposes is to store strategies in libraries represented as AND/OR trees 
where the internal nodes consist of conditions (such as the possibility of opting out of negotiation, the cost 
of negotiation, the time left in negotiation or the number of negotiators) and the strategies are stored in the 
leaves of the tree. These strategies, in turn, consist of compiled functions with variables, some of which are 
already instantiated during the search in the tree, and others of which are instantiated during the execution 
of the function. 
3.2.2.1 Evaluation of the Non-cooperative Computational Negotiation Model 
one of the key driving forces of agreements in the work of Kraus is the time and cost consideration in 
negotiation. The agent's decision problem is formulated as the selection of an offer that maximizes the 
utility given the time and costs involved. However, although useful, no model of time or cost consideration is 
provided. Even if such models were provided, they are likely to be domain dependent reflecting the concerns 
of the domain. Furthermore, "building" into the agents' utility functions additional deliberation factors can 
result in functions that are over complicated and difficult to design and analyze. This task is not easy for an 
agent designer who is not an expert in utility theory. Instead, what is required for a flexible and configurable 
negotiation wrapper are utility functions that are domain independent. To achieve this, simpler utility 
functions are sought that evaluate the worth of the offer independently of the time and cost considerations. 
These considerations, and indeed any other environmental consideration(s) such the behaviour of the other 
agent, are delegated to other agent's deliberation mechanisms. These mechanisms then generate offers, 
each possibly having a different worth to the agent, based on a number of environmental considerations. In 
this manner a single generic utility function can be provided to the designer inside the negotiation wrapper 
who can then add additional mechanisms in a modular fashion without affecting the utility function. 
Finally, in this thesis only the protocol of the SAP is used to model the process of negotiation, because 
the assumption that agents "consult he same game theory book" (see section 3.1.5) is not a valid assumption 
and also because small variations in the parameters of the SAP (brought about by making different set of 
assumptions) lead to indeterminacy of equilibrium strategies and inefficient delays (see section 3.1.7). 
3.2.3 The Contract Net Protocol 
The contract net protocol (CNP) is a classic example of a DPS system (cooperative solution synthesis 
through a decentralized, loosely coupled collection of problem solvers-see section 1.3) used for the task 
distribution phase of cooperative problem solving (Smith 1980). Therefore, it does not belong to the class 
of quantitative models of bargaining, although its operation closely resembles a market-like mechanism. 
The protocol focuses on the traditional problem of how to resolve disparate viewpoints in task allocation 
problems in a simulated distributed sensor network for acoustic interpretation. Nonetheless, it is included 
here because: i) it was traditionally the first negotiation protocol in DAI, ii) it models contracts and iii) its 
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extension by Sandholm (section 3.2.4) brings it into the class of quantitative models of negotiation. 
The CNP was motivated by the problem that distribution by its very nature requires supplying problem 
solvers with only a limited local view of the problem. However this conflicts with the desire to achieve 
global effects (solution to a problem). Therefore, coordinated activity within the system cannot be guar- 
anteed. To overcome this problem, the CNP solution was derived as a mechanism that extends across the 
network nodes and that can be used as the foundation for cooperation and organization. Cooperation is 
designed into the system through a communication protocol which facilitates and organizes communication 
among entities and a problem solving protocol which organizes the group of problem solver's activities. 
The two protocols bring about form and content respectively; how to communicate and what to solve. The 
discussion below will center mainly around the problem solving protocol because it is the most relevant 
model for the decision processes involved in the negotiation wrapper. 
The CNP consists of a collection of nodes, referred to as contract net, where each node in the net 
may take on the role of a manager, responsible for monitoring the execution and processing the result of 
a task, or a contractor. responsible for the actual execution of the task. Roles can be adopted dynamically 
by all nodes at runtime, therefore nodes are not a priori tied to any particular control hierarchy. The 
negotiation process is then initiated by the generation of a new task by a node. That node announces the 
newly generated task using a task announcement message and becomes the manager of that task. Other 
nodes in the network evaluate their level of interest in the announced task with respect to their specialized 
resources (e. g. hardware). If the task is of sufficient interest, a node then submits a bid which indicates 
the execution capabilities of the bidder. The manager may receive several bids for a single task and it then 
selects one or more of the bids (based on the information regarding the execution capabilities disclosed in 
the bid). The selected nodes then assume responsibility for the execution of the task and each is called 
a contractor for that task. The contractor may need to subdivide the task into sub-tasks and become the 
manager for these tasks. The manager may also terminate contracts and the contractor can inform its 
manager of either the partial or completed state of its task(s). 
Sandholm, compares the CNP to a directed government contracting scheme, where "each pany is 
allowed to make one bid for each announcement it receives, and the bids of the other parties are not 
revealed to it. The negotiations are directed in the sense that an announcement is not sent to all other 
agents-only to likely contractees (Sandholm 1996). 
The description above, although simplistic, has a number of important contributions. Firstly, commit- 
ments are explicitly represented as contracts-a contract is an explicit agreement between nodes. Further- 
more, compared to the game theoretical models of section 3.1 the process of negotiation is also explicitly 
represented in the protocol: 
establishing a contract is a process of mutual selection. Available contractors evaluate task 
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announcements until they find one of interest; the managers then evaluate the bids received 
from potential contractors and select he ones they determine the most appropriate. Both parties 
to the agreement have evaluated the information supplied by the other and a mutual selection 
has been made (Smith 1980). 
In summary, the CNP framework provides a mechanism for coordinated behaviour that is symmetric (that 
is both the caller, or manager, and the respondent, the contractor, have a selection to make) 17 through: i) the 
concept of negotiation as a mechanism for interaction, ii) a common language shared by all nodes and iii) 
the announcement-bid-award sequence of messages which offers some support for cooperation since due to 
incomplete knowledge, the messages give a node an understanding of who else has the relevant information. 
3.2.3.1 Evaluation of the CNP 
The CNP provides a coordination architecture which is distributed and addresses a number of factors de- 
scribed in chapter two. It has been applied to job dispatching among machines within a manufacturing 
plant (Parunak 1987), allocation of computational jobs among processors in a network (Malone et aL 1988) 
(where the choice of processor is based on expected completion time), and to distributed meeting schedul- 
ing (Sen 1994). However, the protocol has a number of limitations which are borne out of the fact that 
it belongs to CPS system. In particular, cooperation is an integral part of the protocol. There cannot be 
any conflict between the agents to start the CNP. Furthermore, in non-cooperative domains the search for 
acceptable solutions may be more elaborate than two messages-negotiation, especially in uncertain and 
open environments, is an iterative process of search for possible agreements. In addition to this, the CNP is 
a theory of the system architecture and is silent with respect o the agent architecture. This latter problem 
was addressed by the work of Sandholm, described next. 
3.2.4 The Contracting and Coalition Model of Negotiation 
A decision theoretic agent architecture for the CNP that solves some of the limitations of the CNP was pro- 
posed by Sandholm. Additionally, he developed a game theoretic negotiation mechanism that normatively 
and quantitatively solves the computational difficulties of game theory (the problem of bounded rationality 
of selfish agents). Sandholm notes that: 
the traditional CNP is not an off-the-shelf mature technology that can be applied to different 
domains as is. The protocol really includes an enormous numbers of design alternatives. ... 
For example. previous work on the CNP has not addressed the risk attitude of an agent toward 
being committed to activities it may not be able to honor, or the honoring of which may turn out 
to be unbeneficial. Additionally, in previous CNP implementations, tasks have been negotiated 
17SyMMetriC autonomy of both parties (or bi-directional selection of caller and respondent) was first modeled in PUP6 (Lenat 1975) 
which viewed selection as a discussion between the caller and potential respondents. 
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one at a time. This is insufficient, if the effort of carrying out a task depends on the carrying out 
of other tasks. The framework is extended to handle task interactions, among other methods, 
by clustering tasks into sets to be negotiated over as atomic bargaining items. ... . Finally, 
the question of local deliberation scheduling in the negotiations has not been discussed earlier, 
.... The hypothesis is that distributed contracting can be developed into an efficient-in terms 
of results and computational complexity-interaction mechanisms for self-interested agents 
whose rationality is bounded by limited computational resources (Sandholm 1996), p. 67-68. 
From this, it can be seen that commitments to, and the efficiency of contracts given the computational 
boundedness of agents are the main concerns of the work. The type of problem considered for negotiation 
is the distribution of agents' tasks. However, tasks can be achieved by other agents and each agent has 
assymetric costs (compare to the work of Rosenchein and Zlotkin, section 3.2.1, where an agent's task set 
could also be performed by other agents. However, costs are not assumed to be symmetric). Given that 
agents have differing costs and are capable of performing others' tasks, a task reallocation mechanism Is 
can be prescribed that is beneficial to all agents through cost savings. 
Concrete domains that influenced the design of, Sandholm's negotiation mechanism were the dis- 
tributed vehicle routing problem, the production planning and scheduling problem in manufacturing, and 
meeting scheduling (Sandholm 1996). The second scenario is expanded below to better illustrate not only 
the contributions and drawbacks of this quantitative line of work, but also the limitations of the symmetric 
cost assumption made by Rosenchein and Zlotkin's domain theory (section 3.2.1). 
In the manufacturing production planning and scheduling problem, an agent has a set of tasks (such as 
manufacturing operations and setup operations) and a set of resources (such as machines, people and storage 
area). The problem then is the scheduling (planning the assignment of tasks to resources for given time 
windows) for the execution of the tasks on the resources. The problem structure has many cost functions 
(e. g. minimization of lateness ofjobs or completion time). These cost functions, also referred to as objective 
functions by Sandholm, are subject to constraints uch as the order in which tasks can feasibly be executed 
or the resource capacity. The combination of the objective functions and the constraints define a constrained 
optimization problem. Furthermore, different manufacturing enterprises can handle the same operations. 
Therefore, there are potential savings that can be achieved by negotiation. Another feature of the considered 
domains is that different enterprises may behave cooperatively or selfishly. 
In summary, the features of the problems considered are: 
e problems are combinatorially difficult. The solution costs and feasibility of the task distribution 
problems limit the rationality of agents, since they cannot locally compute the costs and benefits 
I gin this subsection, mechanism is interchangeably referred to as protocol and (reallocation) algorithm. 
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associated with delegating or accepting tasks to other agents exactly. 
* the asymmetric costs among agents for handling others' tasks often makes it beneficial (individually 
rational) to reallocate tasks among agents. 
e individual members (companies in the case of manufacturing or centers in the case of vehicle dis- 
tribution routing) can form virtual enterprises by joining together and cooperatively, although the 
intention of each individual is selfish, taking care of production or delivery tasks more economically 
than if performed individually. 
agents can be selfish or cooperative in task allocation. Cooperative agents attempt to maximize social 
welfare, measured as the sum of the agent utilities. They are willing to accept task distribution 
allocations that lower their individual utility but increase the utility of the group. Selfish agents, on 
the other hand, want to maximize their own profit without regards for other distribution centers or 
manufacturing companies involved in the virtual enterprise. 
The second feature is where Sandholm's work diverges from that of standard game theory. This is because 
his notion of individual rationality is different from the game theory concept of individual rationality as 
maximization of payoff. For Sandholm, an agent may reject an individually rational contract if it believes 
it will be better off waiting for a more beneficial contract that cannot be accepted if the former contract is 
accepted. Likewise, an agent may accept a non individually rational contract in "anticipation ofa synergic 
later contract that will make the combination beneficial" (Sandholm 1999), p. 237. 
Given these features, Sandholm presents a negotiation model that addresses three areas of negotiation: 
contracting, coalitionformation and contract execution. In contracting negotiations (referred to as the con- 
tracting protocol), agents iteratively reallocate tasks amongst themselves to reach a globally more desirable 
solution. Whereas in contracting all the agents work in one large coalition, in coalition formation game 
theoretic normative models are used to analyze the stability of coalitions of agents (the so called "virtual 
enterprises") where task allocation and problem solving are "pooled to occur centrally within each coali- 
tion ". Finally, in contract execution an exchange mechanism is developed that solves the problems that 
occur in honoring task execution in environments where agents may "vanish easily, and the connection 
between the agent and the real world parry it represents is often hard to detect". In this thesis negotiation 
is in the main between two agents, thus coalitions of large numbers of agents are not possible. Therefore, 
the coalition protocol is not relevant to the research reported here. Likewise, in this research the problem 
of contract execution is not addressed. All that is said is that there are execution monitoring protocols (or 
a commitment model (commitment model in figure 1.1, section 1.2)) that can be added to the service ex- 
ecution phase of the service life cycle, that assists in the execution phase. Coordination mechanisms are 
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sought for only the service provisioning phase. Although it is acknowledged that negotiation can be suc- 
cessfully applied to service execution, the object of this thesis is focused on the provisioning phase. For 
these reasons, only the contracting contribution of the work is detailed below. 
Contracting negotiation, developed as the Transport Cooperation Net (TRACONET (Sandholm 1996)), 
addresses the CNP problem mentioned earlier; namely how to formally model announcing, bidding and 
awarding decisions involved in the contracting of tasks (Sandholm 1996,1993). These decisions are based 
entirely on marginal costs for performing a task. Marginal costs are formally presented below, but infor- 
mally they represent the difference between the total cost of having to perform another agent's task as well 
as agent's own task and the set of agent's own tasks. Agents pay one another to perform tasks. Because de- 
cisions are based purely on the marginal costs (defined next) analysis (as opposed to the CNP where agents 
freely perform the tasks of others) this pricing mechanism generalizes the CNP to work for both cooperative 
and selfish agents. 
Sandholm defines the task allocation problem as follows (Sandholm 1999), p. 234. The task allocation 
problem is defined by a set of Tasks T, a set of agents A, a cost function Ci : 2T -+ RUf 001 (or 
the cost agent i incurs by handling a subset of tasks) and the initial allocation of tasks among the agents 
(Tinit,... , TliAnli% where UiEATiinit = T. and Tinit n Tinit ij0 
for all i0j. Given this definition, the 
decision schemes for computing offers are as follows. When an agent makes an announcement for a task, it 
tries to buy some other agent's capability to perform a task. In announcing, an agent specifies the maximum 
price it is willing to pay for its task(s) to be carried out. Call this pannounce. When agents make a bid for 
an announced task. the agents try and sell their services at a bid price, uttered in a bid. Call this pbid. Given 
an announcement and a bid, a reward is then a contract between two agent, details of which are described 
below. Then, an agent i will make an announcement if- 
announce - remove announcelT, ) p Ci (T 
where cir"O" (Tannounce jTj) is agent i's marginal cost for removing the task set Tannounce from all of its 
tasks Ti: 
Cremove announcelT, ) announce) s 
(T = ci(Ti) - cig, nT 
where ci(Ti) is the cost of optimally achieving all the tasks T for agent i and Tj = Tinit. Sandholm 
suggests the use of approximation schemes for computing ei emOve (Tannounce IT, ), since it is intractable for 
most types of problems. 
When an announcement has been received by an agent, an agent sends out a bid, pb"', if the maximum 
announced price pannounce is higher than the price that the task will incur on the agent to perform it. Bidder 
bids according to: 
bid = Cýdd announcelT (T J) 
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cadd (T`111""' ITj) is agent j's marginal cost for adding the task set Ta,, *",,, to all of its current where 
tasks Tj: 
dd announceIT announ,, ) _ Cj (T cja (T j) = cj(Tj UT J) 
Again, marginal costs are computed using an approximation method. Finally, the awarding price, paward 
is computed using a new task set of the announcer, Tj'. This is because the task set of i may have changed 
within the window of announcing the tasks and waiting to receive all bids. paward is computed as: 
award = Cremove nnouncelT, ) (T 
If paward is greater than the lowest bid, the task is awarded to the least expensive bid and "by convention 
the contract takes place by the awarder paying the bidder the price (pbid +P award )/2. 
The protocol (or, as Sandholm refers to it, the algorithm) is as follows. Initially each agent computes 
a solution to the tasks in its own task set (referred to as the local optimization problem). Then, each agent 
can potentially negotiate with other agents to take on some of its task or, alternatively, take on some of their 
tasks for a price. Note, that agents in Sandholm's work are allowed to make side payments for the task al- 
location problem through payments, whereas for agents in Rosenchein and Zlotkin's work no side-payment 
is allowed. Negotiation is then the exchange of task sets that are profitable (i. e. at a lower cost-referred to 
as individually rational). The task redistribution protocol is then an iterative exchange mechanism that in- 
creases the global utility of agents by traversing a sequence of task allocation configurations among agents. 
At every step of the iteration, an agent computes a feasible solution for the tasks it has been allocated (a 
feasible solution consists of an agent assigning resources for the tasks allocated). The task re-allocation 
procedure is a real-time, anytime hill-climbing algorithm. It is real-time because at each iteration a price 
equilibrium has to be reached in the task set exchanges before the next iteration-after each contract is 
made the exchange of tasks and payments are made immediately. It is anytime because the algorithm can 
be terminated at any point in time and a solution is available that is both individually rational to all the 
agents and is globally better than the initial solution if each agent carried out its tasks individually. It is 
hill-climbing because at each iteration a global solution closer to the optimum is reached (in a distributed 
manner). In comparison, the PMM protocols of Rubinstein and Zlotkin are not anytime. Agents first reveal 
their costs for all possible task distributions. Then the PMM selects the allocation that maximizes the sum 
of the utilities and assigns payoffs according to the Nash bargaining solution. This is not anytime because 
all task allocations have to be evaluated before any agreement is reached. 
Contracts in a contracting protocol are given search operator semantics by Sandholm. That is, if the 
task reallocation (or contracting) protocol is interpreted as a global hill-climbing algorithm, then contracts 
can be interpreted as its search operators. The search for a global optimum is also made more efficient 
by supplying the contracting protocol with different contract types. Rather than negotiating over single 
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tasks, one at a time, Sandholm shows that a hill-climbing algorithm can reach an optimal task allocation, 
in a finite number of steps, when agents combine clustering, swap and multi-agent contracts into a single 
contract called an OCSM-contract. 0 contracts are over a single task (as in the original CNP) and they 
are shown to lead the reallocation algorithm into local minima - where contracts are individually rational 
(agents are better off with the contract), but are not globally optimum. In cluster contracts, C contracts, a set 
of tasks is contracted from one agent to another, whereas in S contracts a pair of agents swap tasks. Finally, 
in multi-agent M contracts, tasks are exchanged between multiple agents. It is also shown that when used 
individually, or in pairs or threes, these contract types are insufficient for the maximization of global utility. 
However, when each individual contract type is applied simultaneously (called OCSM-contract) they: 
* allow the algorithm to hill-climb from a task-allocation to any other task allocation with a single 
contract 
" bring about the existence of a sequence path from an individually rational OCSM-contract to the 
optimal one. 
" allow the algorithm to reach the optimal allocation in a finite number of contracts, for any sequence 
of contracts. This result means that i) no central processor is required to select the contract sequence 
and ii) agents can accept any OCSM-contract that is individually rational, and need not wait for more 
profitable contracts. 
* the algorithm need not backtrack, since there are no local minima. 
These properties are achieved because with OCSM-contracts there are no local minima, since the global 
optimum can be reached with a single contract. 
The above contracting protocol has been extended to handle partial commitment contracts (Sandholm 
1996, ). Informally, partial commitments represent tentative, as opposed to absolute, agreements to perform 
the agreed task(s) (see section 2.2.5). The contracting protocol described above consists of, like the Cn 
a single round announcement, bid and award because all offers are fully binding. An iterative contracting 
protocol, called the leveled commitment protocol, is also presented. Under this protocol, commitments are 
not fixed and are themselves made a negotiation item. This new protocol allows unilateral decommitment at 
anypoint in time, as opposed to conditioning the contract on possible future events, as is done in contingency 
contracts (see section 2.2.5). Agents negotiate over decommitment penalties, one for each agent, and if an 
agent wants to decommit then it does so through the payment of the decommitment penalty specified in the 
agreed contract. It is also shown that selfish rational agents are reluctant to decommit because there are no 
incentives to do so. Therefore, it is to the best interest of even selfish agents to honour their commitments. 
The computational boundedness of agents is given a treatment in the analysis and empirical evaluation 
of methods for decreasing the local computational costs. Sandholm identifies three categories of tradeoffs 
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which in some contexts are guaranteed to reduce the cost of computation. Firstly, agents can tradeoff the 
complexity of marginal cost computations (discussed above) against the monetary risk. That is, agents 
can use different cost approximation schemes to make bids and awards while their previous bids are still 
pending. It is shown that some approximation schemes lower computational costs whereas others do not. 
Alternatively, agents can tradeoff obtaining more precise marginal cost estimations (and save computation) 
against being able to participate in multiple negotiations simultaneously. However, it is shown that this 
tradeoff only works in some contexts. Finally, agents can reduce their computational costs by trading off 
sending messages early on against waiting for more incoming offers. 
3.2.4.1 Evaluation of the Contracting and Coalition Model of Negotiation 
The contracting protocol presented by Sandholm computationally models the process of negotiation, rather 
than analyzing the optimal outcomes. This computational model thus supports the design and implemen- 
tation of autonomous negotiating agents. The negotiation model differs along several dimensions from the 
one proposed by Rosenchein and Zlotkin in that their protocol resulted in negotiation reaching an outcome 
in a single round and assumed: i) agents were able to optimally compute their decision problems without 
any costs, ii) there were no side-payments, iii) negotiation was bi-lateral involving only two agents, and 
iv) the costs and capabilities of agents were symmetric. Sandholm's contracting protocol, on the other 
hand, is iterative and because of the complexities of the problems he assumes agents cannot compute their 
local optimization problem exactly. Furthermore, side-payments are allowed (through payment for task 
re-allocation). Negotiation is also extended from bi-lateral to multi-lateral interactions, in a market-like 
context, where agents buy and sell tasks from one another. Finally, different agents carry different costs and 
capabilities, therefore the symmetric assumption has been dropped. 
However, the developed contracting protocol can only operate given an existing configuration of task 
allocations. Indeed, hill-climbing is the process of ascending some objective function once a configuration 
of tasks has already been reached. Thus, the contracting protocol of Sandholm can be used to re-allocate 
already existing task configurations but not to allocate, or configure, tasks in the first instance. 
The CNP is further extended in the leveled commitment protocol by allowing iteration in interactions. 
In the problem domains of this thesis, it is this the iterative exchange of offers and counter-offers, due 
to informational uncertainty and the nature of preferences, that clearly mark interactions. Since iterations 
are both communicatively and computationally costly, then not only do agents need mechanisms to reason 
about the cost and benefit of continued negotiation, but the design of an interaction protocol must take this 
added complexity into consideration. 
In addition to an interaction protocol, Sandholm provides a formal model of the decisions involved 
in agents announcing, bidding and awarding tasks. This extends the original CNP with a formal agent 
architecture. However, as was shown in some of the target problem domains of this thesis (section 1.4), 
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negotiation decisions are richer than just considerations of costs alone. A richer agent architecture is re- 
quired that formally accounts for more decision factors such as the time limits of negotiation (similar to the 
work of Kraus section 3.2.2) or the behaviour of the other agents (especially in environments where there 
are uncertainties in the what an agent knows about the other(s)). 
The combination of contract types into OCSM-contracts. (where agents can allocate tasks via combin- 
ing the allocation of a single task, a set of tasks, swap tasks or share tasks with other agents). helps agents to 
escape local minima and reach the global optimum re-allocation in a number of steps. However, although 
tractable for small numbers of tasks and agents, the hill-climbing algorithm may take a large and impractical 
number of contract iterations for large number of tasks and agents. 19 Furthermore, although representing 
OCSM-contracts is tractable as the scale of the problem increases, the same is not true for searching a 
contract that increases the social welfare (Sandholm 1999). As the scale of the task set increases: 
the evaluation of just one contract requires each contract party to compute the cost of han- 
dling its current task and the tasks allocated to it via the contract. With such large problem 
instances, one cannot expect to reach the global optimum in practice. Instead, the contracting 
should occur as long as there is time, and then have a solution ready: the anytime character of 
this contracting scheme becomes more important (Sandholm 1999). p., 237. 
The inability to escape local minima in negotiation is acknowledged in this thesis (detected as deadlocks in 
a contract's utility dynamics). However, in this thesis, agents negotiate over atomic services, or 0-contracts. 
This is because of the agentification process that assigns ervices to agents (section 1.1). There may only be 
a single service provider for the types of problems considered in this research (e. g. cost-and-design ser- 
vice provided by agent DD in the ADEPT scenario, section 1.4.1). excluding the possibility of M-contracts. 
Likewise, an agent may not be capable of performing another agents' tasks (e. g. a user agent, IPCA agent, 
cannot perform the tasks/services of a telecommunication service provider agent SPA, section 1.4.2). This 
excludes the possibility of swaps in contracts (S-contracts). Finally, since each service is usually performed 
by a unique agent, different tasks cannot be clustered and assigned to a single agent (excluding the pos- 
sibility of C-contracts). For example, the service Provide-Customer-Quote is performed by a single 
autonomous agent who is the only agent that has necessary domain expertise and resources to solve the 
problem(s). For these reasons, a decision mechanism is required that helps escape local minima in the task 
allocation algorithm. No analysis is provided as to the computational implications of the contracting proto- 
col when the problem domain is scaled up, not in terms of the number of tasks, but in terms of the number 
of issues involved in integrative bargaining (when agents negotiate not just over the price of a task/service 
19Sandholm found that the TRACONET algorithm took "multiple hours ofnegotiation onfive Unix machines" for a large-scale real 
world distributed vehicle routing problem (Sandholm, 1993). - 
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but also its quality and delivery time). Multiple issue negotiation is an important feature of the types of 
problem domains of this thesis. 
3.2.5 The Persuader System 
The PERSUADER system was developed to model adversarial conflict resolution in the domain of labour 
relations which can be multi-agent, multi issue, and single or repeated negotiation encounters (Sycara. 1987). 
The system uses both case-based reasoning (CBR) and multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) for conflict 
resolution problems (Sycara 1987,1989). PERSUADER is different to the CNP in that negotiation is mod- 
eled as an incremental modification of solution parts (rather than composition of partial solutions) through 
proposals and counter-proposals. The model, with its iterative nature, is used to narrow the difference be- 
tween the parties involved, takes into consideration changing environments, and models social reasoning 
(by modeling other parties' beliefs) as well as belief modification of parties. 
The system represents and reasons about three types of agents: a company, the union and the mediator. 
The latter agent's task is to engage in parallel negotiations with the parties when conflicts arise. Specifically, 
the mediator generates an initial compromise which both the union and the company evaluate from their 
own perspective. If the initial solution is acceptable to both parties then the process is terminated. Otherwise 
the mediator's task is transformed into considering whether to change the proposal or whether to attempt to 
change the belief of the disagreeing parties using persuasive argumentation (as defined in section 1.3.3). 
In this context, negotiation is viewed as an iterative process since the parties entering negotiation have 
disparate goals. This "distance" in their goals is iteratively reduced to zero. To do this, agents must have 
the capacity to predict and evaluate whether new proposals do actually narrow the difference. Furthermore, 
agent communication is directed towards those parts of the proposal which are acceptable or unacCept- 
able which implies that agents must be able to evaluate their plans and possibly modify or construct new 
ones based on this feedback. In addition to this deliberative component of negotiation, agents must also 
be reactive since the world changes constantly. That is, the expected goals and behaviours of other agents 
may change (through irrationality for example-note, the mechanisms are designed to handle irrational 
behaviour, unlike game theoretic models). Finally, since negotiation is viewed as a narrowing of the differ- 
ences between goals and since agents are unwilling to give up their own goals, then they must be convinced 
to do so. Therefore negotiation requires persuasive argumentation. 
3.2.5.1 Evaluation of the PERSUADER System 
The PERSUADER system models both the iterative process of negotiation and the multi-issue nature of 
interactions. Therefore, these two features of the system capture some of the problem requirements of this 
thesis. However, mediation is unsuitable for the problem domains of this research since negotiation is a 
mutual selection of outcomes. Furthermore, in the problem domains of this research, it is not necessary for 
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the agents to have similar beliefs at the end of negotiation. For example, inter-organizational agents may 
have diametrically opposed beliefs at the end of negotiation over the price of a service; the motivation of 
the Vet-Customer agents is to maximize price while the Customer-Service-Division agent seeks to minimize 
price and although they may settle on an agreed price, their goals have not changed. Therefore persuasion 
(operating over beliefs) is not a necessary condition for coordination in this problem domain. 
In this and sections above, coordination models were presented that successively modeled the nature 
of interactions in open systems, where protocols of interactions are less normative and more descriptive and 
informal. The next three sections reviews other DAI models of negotiation that, although more descriptive 
in nature, have nonetheless design features that are relevant to the problem and the approach of this thesis. 
3.2.6 Constraint Directed Negotiation 
Constraint Directed Negotiation (CDN (Sathi & Fox 1989)) is an algorithm that belongs to the class of 
negotiation models that represent the decision making in negotiation as a constraint satisfaction process. It 
was developed by Sathi and Fox for the problem of resource re-allocation and is the precursor of the model 
presented in the next sub-section by Barbuceanu and Lo. Resource reallocation, or the adjustment of initial 
resources, is performed through the buying and selling of resources between agents. The authors have 
applied CDN to the real world problem of workstation requirements within an engineering organization 
(Sathi & Fox 1989). There, resources are workstations used by each group within the organization and as 
projects change so do the requirements of the groups. Therefore, the initial allocations of the resources have 
to be adjusted to reflect the new requirements. 
The central concern of CDN is not so much with the communication protocol, but rather with the 
decisions, or the resolution mechanisms, involved that provide the content of communication. That is, 
66what is communicated about an agent's bargaining position and how their positions are to be changed 
over time". The mechanism the authors suggest is the constraint directed negotiation where the constraints 
represents agents' objectives together with their utilities. Constraints are used for both offer generation and 
offer evaluation. At the conflict point the agents then negotiate either by modifying the current solutions 
or the constraints until a compromise is reached. "Thus joint solutions are generated through a process 
of negotiation, which configures or reconfigures individual offerings" (Sathi & Fox 1989), p. 166. The 
authors argue that because in the problem of resource reallocation there are many dependencies amongst 
the constraints of many agents (closely resembling the distributed planning problem), then a theory that 
only models how constraints affect individual offers, such as game theory, is inadequate (e. g. under market 
mechanisms an agent a sells resource S, to agent b for X12 and agent c sells to agent a resource S3 for 
X20). What is required is a theory that can model multiple constraints that are conditional upon multiple 
offers (e. g. agent a offers resource S1 to agent b ifagent c allows access to a over resource 
S3). The authors 
claim that in the latter case there is a need for more cooperative mediator-driven egotiation. They propose 
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a distributed constraint mechanism to solve this type of cooperative problems. 
In CDN the negotiation process is seen as a directed search in the problem space. The problem state is 
defined firsts' followed by an evaluation of states and finally generation of new solution states. Agents can 
make either simple transactions involving the selling and buying of a resource from one group to another. 
Alternatively, agents can make cascades involving open or closed chains of buying and selling between two 
or more groups. The problem state is then defined as a set of transactions and cascades that are formed by 
pairing buy and sell bids for resources. 
These problem states are then evaluated using constraints. The authors elaborate on the contents of 
constraints, their classification hierarchy and a methodology for evaluating them. The content of constraints 
are represented as attributes of a resource, where each resource is described as a set of attribute-value pairs. 
The requirement(s) of agents then place restrictions on the attribute value. These restrictions are then 
classified into three constraint types (see (Sathi & Fox 1989), p., 169). The evaluation of offers involves 
firstly giving each constraint, or restriction on values, an importance and a utility function that represents 
preferences agents have about the offered transaction over the given constraint. Furthermore, the utilities 
are thresholded to represent minimal acceptability condition. Offered attribute values below this threshold 
are considered a violation of the constraint. Furthermore, in the resource reallocation problem most of 
the constraints are qualitative in nature. For example, an agent may own a Unix box and may require a 
Mac instead for a project. The agent may specify the buy and sell bids as conditional, one of their three 
classifications of constraint types, meaning that the Unix box is sold by the agent unless the agent receives 
a bid for the Mac. Therefore, the utility functions represent he ordinal preferences of the agents. Finally, 
an offer is evaluated over the total set of constraints by combining the individual utilities of all the sub- 
constraints. The combination policy they use are the elimination by aspects and lexicographic semi-order 
(Tversky 1969, Payne 1976, Svenson 1979, Johnson & Payne 1985). Agents then use these strategies to 
identify their favorite alternatives. The elimination by aspects combination strategy works by comparing 
the utility of each constraint with the corresponding utilities on other constraints. Offers with the lowest 
utilities on any constraint are eliminated from the consideration. This process continues until only one offer 
remains. This strategy is particularly well suited for qualitative constraints. Lexicographic semi-order is 
similar to elimination by aspects. However the method of elimination is different. It works by examining 
each constraint of an offer and eliminating those offers that have a lower value than a dominant alternative. 
The strategy is applied by using the elimination process operations on first the most important constraint, 
followed by less important constraints. 
Given the overall utility of the offer, derived from using the elimination by aspects and lexicographic 
semi-order strategies, an agent evaluates the offer as: i) acceptable (the offer is above the threshold on 
all constraints but is not better (or what they call dominate) every other offer, ii) dominant (the offer is 
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above the threshold on all constraints but is better (or what they call dominate) than every other offer or iii) 
unacceptable (the offer is below a threshold of at least one constrain). 
Constraints are also used to generate solution states. Offers are generated via satisfaction and relax- 
ation of constraints and are based on a set of qualitative operators which are motivated by human negotiation 
problem solving (Pruitt 198 1). The operators, or search strategies, are: 
composition (bridging)--compositionoccurs when anew option is developed by combining together 
two existing alternatives which satisfy both parties' most important constraint. Sometimes in such 
cases both parties receive all they were seeking due to discovery of a good composition. 
reconfiguration (unlinking)-when good composition agreements are not available, one or both of 
the agents must make selective changes in their offer. As the authors state "reconfiguration is the 
process of regrouping the bundle of negotiated goods". For example, consider an agent m who 
requires a Unix box running LaTeX Version 3.14159 (Web2C 7.3.1). Assume that agent n is offering 
a Unix box but with FrameMaker v. 5.01 as the only word processing tool. The Unix box is therefore 
reconfigured by n to satisfy m's requirements at a cost to n. 
relaxation (log-rolling)-is defined as when an agent ignores a specific constraint on an unacceptable 
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i5l where considerable benefits can be gained by both parties. As the authors state "relaxation 
provides an approximate technique for selecting transactions or cascades that perform the best on the 
most important constraints for each individual". 
Typically, a good solution is found that maximizes the number of bids satisfied by composing and reconfig- 
uring bids iteratively and not on simple pair-wise exchanges. 
3.2.6.1 Evaluation of the Constraint Directed Negotiation 
The CDN is novel in the manner it integrates informal models of negotiation, inspired by human negotiation 
problem solving. with AI techniques. The work presented in this thesis closely resembles the CDN in 
many respects. The conflict resolution mechanism of CDN is relevant to the problem domains of this 
thesis. The algorithm emphasize the importance of preferences of agents over multiple constraints, explicit 
representation of strategies as search operators, time deadlines and privacy of information in negotiation. 
For this reason the CDN shares many features with the developed coordination framework. The decision 
mechanisms of both systems are presented as evaluatory and offer generation processes. 
However. both the evaluatory and the generation mechanisms of CDN do not model some of the 
requirements of the domains of this thesis. In CDN the constraints are qualitative in nature, whereas in 
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the domains of this thesis constraints, represented as limitations on issue-value pairs that are exchanged 
between agents, can be both quantitative and qualitative. Therefore evaluatory utility functions are required 
that model preferences of agents for both types of constraints. The possibility of offers that contain both 
qualitative and quantitative issues means that an evaluation utility function is required that can represent the 
combined preferences of an agent over the constraints and is likely to include, because of the quantitative 
issues, arithmetic operations to consolidate the result of each individual utility, rather than elimination by 
aspect or lexicographic semi-order strategies. Furthermore, the accuracy of the two presented consolidation 
strategies is highly dependent on the distribution of the importances agents place on constraints; the further 
apart the importances of two agents on a constraint, then the combination of the two strategies is sufficient 
to identify the agreement set (Johnson & Payne 1985). Furthermore, sometimes it may be useful to model 
the preferences of agents as a whole for a set of offers. Complications with the two chosen strategies 
arise if such policies need to consolidate the preferences across agents (Johnson & Payne 1985). Simple 
quantitative additive models are better suited for such tasks (Corfman & Gupta 1993). 
Furthermore, the CDN reconfiguration and relaxation search operators suit the problems of this do- 
main. Reconfiguration, the process of regrouping the bundle of negotiated goods, is applicable when issues 
are added and removed during negotiation. Likewise, violation of constraints in order to search for other 
types of agreements is reflected in the need for agents to make trade-offs, lowering the acceptability con- 
straint of one issue and simultaneously increasing the acceptance level of another issue. Composition, the 
search for alternatives by combining together two existing alternatives which satisfy both parties' most im- 
portant constraint, is not a feature of the problem domains of this research because agents do not know, 
and are assumed to be unwilling to provide, constraint importance information to other agents necessary 
for composition. However, although relevant the authors do not provide any formal specification of the al- 
gorithms that implement these search operators. Therefore, not only are they inspired by informal theories, 
but they can not be operationalized due to a lack of any formal models. One of the contributions of this 
thesis is the formal modeling and empirical analysis of three algorithms that implement constrained search. 
3.2.7 The Constraint Optimization and Conversational Exchange 
Negotiation Engine 
optimization methods, multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT (Keeney & Raiffa 1976, Luce & Raiffa 1957)) 
and conversational models are integrated into a single "Negotiation Engine" (NE) ((Barbuceanu & Lo 2000) 
20). The NE models more adequately, than the CDN, the multi-issue nature of negotiation, agents' goals 
and preferences, goal modification as well as the communicative lements of negotiation. In addition, the 
2OThis work complements both the CDN algorithm (section 3.2.6) and the PERSUADER (section 3.2.5) and was initiated from 
criticisms raised against the sole focus of auction technology on price of the commodity (Guttman & Macs 1998, Doorenbos, Etzioni, 
& Weld 1997). 
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engine shares a common design philosophy as the coordination framework design of this thesis. It works 
by describing the local decision problems of agents as a multi-attribute decision problem and formulated 
is constrained optimization. Then, this constrained optimization problem solver is used by each local do- 
main problem solver to find best solutions from their local perspectives. The best solution found is then 
communicated using a conversation interaction technology. If the received offer is not acceptable, then a 
constrained relaxation protocol is used to generate the next available best solution. Thus. the aim of the 
NE is to integrate both the local reasoner and the interaction system. The latter is part of the conversation 
technology that includes (Barbuceanu & Fox 1997): i) conversation plans, ii) conversation rules, iii) actual 
conversations and iv) situation rules. Conversation plans describe both how an agent acts locally, and, 
interacts with other agents by means of communication actions. Conversation rules, in turn, specify the 
permissible states (including the initial and final states) of the conversation plans. The execution state of 
the conversation is maintained in actual conversations. Finally, situation rules assist an agent with deci- 
sions about which conversations to instantiate. The conversation plans, conversation rules and the actual 
conversations conversation components of the NE can be used for normative communication models of the 
ACL component of the coordination framework (figure 1.1) of this research. Situation rules are similar to 
the service description language (SDL) developed in the ADEPT project for specifying the local service 
execution plans of each agent (Jennings et al. 2000a). Further similarities lie with the design philosophy of 
the conversation technology. It can be used for not only representing and executing a structured patterns of 
agent interaction, but also as a "scripting language'. The NE provides API-s. using its conversational and 
reasoning language (described below), for the local reasoner to construct both models of the situation and 
goals and reason about interactions with other agents. These API-s can be seen as interfaces between the 
wrapper and the local problem solver and the agent and the ACL in figure 1.1. For example, the local prob- 
lem solver can interact with the wrapper using the service description language and the wrapper interacts 
with other agents via the ACL interface. 
The MAUT and constraint optimization elements of the reasoning component of the NE are discussed 
next. In NE an agent behaves to achieve its goals. Goals can be: either composed (containing other (sub) 
goals) or atomic (immediately executable); either controllable (goal is under the control of the agent) or 
non-controllable (part of the agent's plan, but agent has to obtain the commitment of the agent controlling 
these goals for their achievement); either "on" (is achieved) or "off' (is not achieved). Agents then attach 
preferences, or utilities, towards the achievement or non-achievement of these goals. Thus agents are utility 
maximizers. Utilities not only model the preference of an agent, but also, as the authors claim, quantify 
the influences between agents where the utility of non-controllable goal describes in "some way" the power 
that the other agent has on the agent needing the goal. The final element of the language of the decision 
model is the agent roles. Roles describe the goals an agent controls and the goals it needs and function to 
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form a strategic coalition formation, choosing who to involve when needing to achieve a certain task. 
Given this language of decision making (goals, utilities and roles), the decision problem of an agent, 
P. is formulated as a constraint optimization problem: 
(G, C, U, criterion) 
where G= Igi,... , g,, 
} is a network of n goals, C=, cn} is a set of constraints of the form 
On (gj)90ff (9k) or an implication on both sides of which there are conjunctions of on-off constraints, U= 
{(gig Uon (91) 1 Uof f 
(91) 
1... 1 
(919 Uon(91)2 Uoff (91)} is a utility list consisting of a set of goals with either 
associated on/off utilities and criterion Ef tnax, min} which is either a maximization or minimization 
optimization criterion. The overall utility of the labeled goal network G, Util(L, G), is computed as the 
sum of the "on" labeled goals, plus sum of the "off" labeled goals (called the additive scoring model 
(Keeney & Raiffa 1976)), where L: G -+ long op#} is a function that maps each goal in the goal network 
with either an "on" or "off" label. Thus, solution P is a labeling L such that Util (L, G) is either maximized 
or minimized, according to the criterion. 
The authors then show that the above labeling problem P that maximized (minimizes) utility is equiv- 
alent to the satisfiability (MAXSAT) problem in optimization (Barbuceanu &' Lo 2000), p. 241. Two 
optimization algorithms are provided within the NE that operate over the same representation of the 
goal network to solve this optimization problem of an agent. One is a stochastic search based algo- 
rithm that is incomplete and not guaranteed to find a solution, but performs well on large scale prob- 
lems both in terms of time and its ability to actually find a solution (Selman, Levesque, & Mitchell 1992, 
Jiang, Kautz, & Selman 1995) and another the branch and bound search algorithm that is complete and 
guaranteed to find the optimal solution (Mitten 1970). The latter algorithm operates by maintaining the 
utility of the current best solution. If the utility of another explored partial solution does not exceed the util- 
ity of the current best solution then that partial solution is dropped and another partial solution is explored. 
The decision mechanism supplied in the NE also allows for the integration of the two algorithms, using, 
for example, a random search first for a number of runs and then using the best solution from the random 
search as a bound constraining the branch and bound algorithm to find a better solution. 
The reasoning procedures are extended by a multi-attribute utility theoretic language within the NE 
that support optimization of search for utilities over multiple issues. Specifically, agents share a set of ne- 
gotiation issues, or what the authors call the attributes of negotiation, defined as A= jai, ..., a,, 
}. The 
domain of an attribute aj, D,,,, is an interval V, h], where I and h are integers or reals, describing the range of 
values that the attribute can take. Agents then interact by exchanging multi-attribute specifications. The as- 
sumption made is that the agents share both the attribute list and the domain of each attribute. Furthermore, 
for each attribute ai there is a utility function U., : D., -+ [0,1] and agents have opposing interests over 
each issue, expressed as different directions over the maximization U,,, for each agent. Another important 
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Figure 3.5: Exemplar Utility of an Attribute aj. 
assumption the authors make is that utility function of an agent has the form shown in figure 3.5, where the 
domain of the attributes can be decomposed into a set of disjoint sub-intervals that cover the entire domain, 
such that on each sub-interval the utility is constant. Figure 3.5 shows an example of an attribute whose 
domain values between iO and il, for example, have the same utility to the agent (represented as the hori- 
zontal utility line). It follows that fewer sub-intervals, at the extreme where there is only one sub-interval 
corresponding to equal utility across all domain values of the attribute (the agent values all solutions of the 
issue equally), then the easier the resolution of that issue. Then for each sub-interval [ij, i1+11 an atomic 
goal gai is created which is on iff the value of aj is in the interval [ij j i1+1). Furthermore, the authors 
assume that although agents have different valuations over different ranges of an attribute's domain, they 
nonetheless have further acceptability constraints about what attribute values are acceptable (thresholded 
utilities of CDN perform the same function 3.2.6). _ 
For example, in figure 3.5 only values between [i3 t i4l 
may be acceptable to an agent. Given the above a MAUT problem of the NE is then the assignment of 
on-off labels to the goals of the problem that satisfy the limits of all of the attributes' domains as well as 
their acceptability constraints. This solution the authors call the deal. Also, an optimal solution is one 
that has maximum utility for the agent. A deal acceptable to both agents is one where for each attribute ai 
the acceptable set of values for the two agents have a non-empty intersection. An example of such a deal 
is shown in figure 3.5. Assume there are two agents A and B. Further assume that figure 3.5 shows the 
utility for values of attribute ai for agent A. Now assume that [i3, i4l is the set of acceptable values for A 
(this utility is the result of A having goal g3_on(g3)) and UjJ2] is the set of acceptable values for B. 
Then [i3 i j21 is the non-empty 
intersection for attribute ai. This intersection solution represents a possible 
agreement between the agents, because ach solution contains ranges of values acceptable to each agent. 
The sequences of local decision making and communication of the offers are as follows. At the first 
time step each agent represents its problem as a MAUT problem, defining attributes, goals, constraints and 
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utilities. Then each agent specifies its acceptable solution which defines the interval of acceptable values 
for each'of the issues. After defining the problem the first best solution is computed by solving the initial 
problem using the branch and bound algorithm. The branch and bound algorithm can support a concession 
protocol by searching for lower utility solutions. Lower utility solutions are generated by over-constraining 
the problem, achieved by negating the previous best solution and then adding this new constraint to the goal 
network. The best solution is communicated to the other agent at the end of each iteration of the algorithm. 
If the proposed solution is acceptable to the other agent then the process terminates successfully. Altema- 
tively, the other agent may communicate the fact that it can not find any more new solutions to the part. 
When both of the agents can not search for any new solutions, then negotiation terminates unsuccessfully. 
Otherwise, the agent that can generate new solutions continues to generate and propose them. Finally, the 
offered deal by the other agent is checked for intersection with the agent's own last offer. Negotiation termi- 
nates successfully if such an intersection exists, otherwise the agent searches for other solutions to propose 
and the process continues. The process ends when a mutually acceptable deal has been found or else no 
more solutions exists. 
3.2.7.1 Evaluation of the Constraint Optimization and Conversational Exchange Nego- 
tiation Engine 
The NE is closely related to the work reported here and models many of the features and requirements of 
the problem domains of this thesis. It models both the communication aspects of interaction (through the 
conversation technology) and complex local decision mechanisms, and a formal goal network representation 
language, that account for some of the requirements of this thesis such as: i) multiple issues ii) constraints of 
agents over these issues iii) conflicting preferences of agents and iv) a concession protocol that is guaranteed 
to flnd a solution if one exists. Furthermore, this protocol is interleaved with a stochastic search algorithm 
that is scalable to large problems and assists the concession protocol with new search locations. These two 
search protocols, as well as their combination, represents two strategies agents can use to reach agreements. 
However, the concession protocol is guaranteed to find a solution because of the assumption that the 
agents share the same domain specification of the attribute (or issue interval). Given that the interval value 
of agents are exactly the same, and it is only the acceptability constraints that differ, then it naturally follows 
that a solution must exist. Although this assumption is useful for system analysis, an approach also adopted 
in the evaluation phase of this thesis, it is nonetheless a strong assumption that is not applicable to the type 
of problem domains of this thesis. Agents do not necessarily share the same intervals over each and all of 
the issues in negotiation. Indeed, negotiation can fail when there exists no such intersection. 
Furthermore, no formal model of how utility theory is used to model power of agents or how roles can 
be used to form strategic coalitions. In addition to this, and more importantly, it is not clear, and the authors 
do not make any reference to the fact, that the developed negotiation, like the CDN above, protocol models 
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interactions amongst cooperative agents only. This can be seen in the conversational protocol described 
above where agents truthfully reveal that they can not generate any more solutions. The assumption of 
truthful revelation is strong especially among open system agents that may be selfish and have incentives to 
lie about their negotiation positions in order to maximize their own welfare. 
3.2.8 Multi-dimensional Service Negotiation as an English Auction 
Vulcan and Jennings have applied the 
- 
principles of mechanism design to model (as an English auction, 
see (Binmore 1992)), the one-to-many service negotiation between the CSD and the VC agents for the 
Vet-Custorner service in the ADEPT scenario (Vulkan & Jennings 1998). The English auction has been 
modified to handle service negotiation over multi-dimensional private value objeCtS. 21 Services are de- 
scribed by the tuple (p, 3), where p is the price of the service and 3 are the additional issues of a service. 
A service buyer's preferences are then defined by a linear utility function Ub(W) - p, that increases with 
increasing quality of the service. p is the price of the service and is restricted to a maximum value. A 
service seller's preferences, on the other hand, are defined by the cost function c, (9) + p. The preferences 
of the buyers and sellers of services are also conflicting, meaning that the preferences of both agents over 
each issue, move in the opposite directions. 
In addition to a service client (or what they call a service seeker) initiating the auction, the authors 
propose a pre-auction protocol (as well as incentive conditions and the required auction knowledge for an 
agent to initiate an auction) where the service providers can hold an auction amongst themselves. The 
winner of the auction then approaches the service-seeker with a "take-it-or-leave-if' offer. Analysis is 
provided, in terms of dominant strategies 22 that result in outcomes that are efficient (increase the sum of 
the individual utilities and are fast). Agents then need store, as knowledge, only these dominant strategies 
(hence, individually rational) of the resulting protocol. 
However, modeling a part of the ADEPT business process as an English auction has a number of 
limitations. Firstly, an English auction models one-to-many interactions, where a single auctioneer (or a 
service buyer here) interacts with a number of buyers (or a service seller). 
23 Because it is an open-cry 
auction, all the valuations of agents are publicly "heard". This may be regarded as undesirable by, for 
instance, a Vet Customer organization who does not, for competitative reasons, want to reveal its valuation 
to other Vet Customer service providers. Instead it may prefer to enter a more "private" dialogue in the form 
of one-to-one negotiations. The public revelation of valuations in an English auction also leads to possibility 
21 A private value object is an object. or a service in this case, whose worth depends solely on an agent's own preferences. See 
(Binmore 1992) for an explanation of other value type auctions. 
22A dominant strategy is a strategy that yields an expected payoff which is higher than other strategies whatever the behaviour of 
other agents and the state of the world. Note that using dominant strategies eliminates the need for agents to condition their strategies 
on beliefs. 
23Note that die principles and results of mechanism design still apply in-spite of the reversal of labels. 
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of collusions between auction buyers, resulting in lower revenue for the auctioneer (Rasmusen 1989). The 
example below from (Sandholm 1996) and (Rasmusen 1989) illustrates these collusion possibilities. Let 
buyer agent i have a valuation of 20 and all the rest of buyers have a valuation of 18 for the service on offer. 
Further assume that the bidders collude by agreeing that i will bid 6 and all the rest bid 5. If one of the other 
buyers exceeds 5 then i can observe this and will go as high as 20 and the cheater will not gain anything 
from breaking the coalition. Therefore, collusions are self enforcing in an English auction. Although 
collusions in an open environment are technically difficult to electronically implement, since agents will 
have to identify one another and agree to form a coalition, they are nonetheless possible and hard to detect 
electronically. This is especially true in virtual worlds where it is relatively inexpensive to create virtual 
identities. Furthermore, the auctioneer itself can profit from collusions, by placing agents representing it in 
the auction, who then stimulate the market by unfairly raising the bids. 
In spite of these technical difficulties electronic auction houses have provided the technological foun- 
dations of the recent rise in electronic commerce for business-to-business, business-to-customers and 
customer-to-customer applications (eBay, AuctionBot, U, Amazon, FishMarket). However, auctions, al- 
though popular, are also qualitatively problematic. Technically an auction is profitable for the auc- 
tioneer in the short tenn because of the winner's curse (Binmore 1992) which is where the winning 
bid for a good occurs above the good's market price. Therefore, in the long term a buyer is likely 
to be dissatisfied with paying for a good above its market valuation. This is more likely to be true 
for business-to-customer o business-to-business types of electronic commerce applications (Guttman & 
Maes 1998). Furthermore, some auctions (such as the English auction) may require a critical number 
of bidders before they can commence. Coupled with the communication latencies involved, bidders, 
or agents representing them, may have to make bids over several days. This problem is exacerbated 
when a buyer's bid is not the winning bid, requiring the bidder to restart the whole process of bid- 
ding once again. Apart from technical limitations, auctions "pW the buyer. against the seller and they 
tend to focus solely on the price of a good. Auctions are generally viewed as hostile exchange envi- 
ronment, where the buyers are pitted against the sellers, where neither party considers the long term 
relationships and the benefits that may actually increase profit for both. This type of relationship is 
more likely to occur between businesses and their customers or other businesses. Paying exclusive at- 
tention to price also hides from the consumer important information about the added value of a good by a 
seller, resulting in an undifferentiated and homogeneous representation of sellers (Guttman & Maes 1998, 
Doorenbos, Etzioni, & Weld 1997). 
3.2.9 Kasbah Electronic Agent Marketplace 
For some of the reasons above, negotiation technology has been proposed as an alternative solution to 
auctions as the next generation of e-commerce products (Guttman & Maes 1998). Below, one representative 
3.2. Computational Models ofNegotiation 121 
e-commerce negotiation solution, called Kasbah (Chavez & Maes 1996), is briefly reviewed. Kasbah depart 
from normative game theoretic approaches to negotiation, hence is less formal, sometimes heuristic, ad hoc 
and are user, as opposed to protocol, centered. 
Kasbah is a multi agent system application for electronic commerce (Chavez & Maes 1996). It is an 
electronic agent marketplace where agents negotiate to buy and sell goods and services on behalf of the 
user. The motivation behind Kasbah is to assist users in electronic shopping: 
by providing agents which can autonomously negotiate and make the "best possible deal" on 
the user's behalf (Chavez & Maes 1996). 
The system itself is a hosted web site where users visit to buy and sell goods. Users create buying or selling 
agents which interact in a marketplace. The marketplace itself provides a common language for the agents 
as well as a yellow pages service. The agents are simple, in that "they do not use anyAl ormachine learning 
techniques". share no common goal, have diametrically opposite aims and are autonomous (Chavez & Maes 
1996). However, motivated by acceptance by the user, the system is designed to allow the user to have a 
certain degree of control over the agents. The selling user, for example, can define the goal of the agent by 
specifying: i) the desired date to sell the item by, ii) the desired price, and iii) the lowest acceptable price. 
The reverse is true for the buyer. These parameters define an agent's goal and the achievement of this goal 
is modeled heuristically as the strategy to begin offering the item at the desired price and if it is not accepted 
then the selling agent lowers the price. The price is iteratively reduced with the constraint that the price is 
at the lowest acceptable price when the desired date is reached 
2. How the agent decreases, or increases in 
the case of a buyer, its offer is modeled as one of linear, quadratic or cubic decay functions. 
Kasbah addresses ome of the issues mentioned in chapter two and is an attempt to actually engineer 
a real world application. The system models time, actions and strategies involved in negotiation. However, 
the system fails to properly address the issues of commitments and uncertainty mentioned in the previous 
chapter. The bounded nature of agents is omitted from the model by developing very simple agents, which 
incur minimal computational costs. The majority of the computationally demanding tasks are not delegated 
to the agent, but rather remain at the user level. Therefore the agents are only semi-autonomous, since 
Kasbah only models a subset of the decision making which is involved in negotiation-the user makes the 
other decisions. Furthermore, the decisions that are delegated to the agents (called strategies in Kasbah) are 
severely limited to only three and even their selection is not autonomous, but again, is made by the user. 
Also no formal account or analysis is given of what exactly is the "best possible deal" or the likelihood of 
outcomes given strategies of agents. 
The problem of introducing multiple issues into a negotiation is also not addressed in Kasbah. Scaling 
24The reverse is true for the buyer agent 
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the problem to multi-dimensional scales influences not only the computational complexities of the search 
for solutions, but also raises the problem of the representation of preferences. Negotiation search algorithms 
are needed whose domain is constrained by the specification of user's preferences over a multi-dimensional 
space. These constraints can be restrictions over the content or the process of negotiation. Content con- 
straints specify preferences over the types of outcomes preferred by a user. These constraints can either 
be hard constraints, such as "I am willing to pay between X20 and X40for a service" or soft constraints, 
such as "quality ofa service is more important than its price". Therefore, in multi-issue negotiation a more 
sophisticated methodology is required to capture and represent user's preferences, which are ultimately 
delegated to the agents who interact with one another on behalf of the user. Constraints on the process 
of negotiation, on the other hand, specify the preference of a user about the style of negotiation such as 
the concession rate. Kasbah agents can only concede on offers. With multi-issue negotiation agents can 
also spend time searching for win-win outcomes. Therefore the agent, or the user. has more choices of 
behaviours when multi-issues are considered. Furthermore, in Kasbah the user makes the choice of con- 
cession rate. This contrasts with the prescriptive game theoretic models of negotiation where the decision 
making of the agents are normatively bounded to rational choices that are known to be optimal decisions. 
Kasbah belongs more to the descriptive models of choice whose aim is to describe how individual actually 
do, rather than should, behave. These models range from behavioural negotiation heuristics (Pruitt 198 1. 
Fischer & Ury 1981, Kraus & Lehmann 1995) that provide guidelines for negotiation decision making, 
to models that describe decisions as evolving in response to the negotiation environment (Binmore 1990, 
Matos, Sierra, & Jennings 1998, Oliver 1994). 
3.3 Assessment of Related Work 
Features of the computational models covered in this chapter are summarized in figure 3.6 along some of 
the important dimensions identified in the previous chapter. 
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Figure 3.6: Comparison Matrix of Computational Models of Negotiation 
It can be seen from the table that the problem of bi-lateral negotation has recieved little attention from the 
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computational community. Furthermore, little or no work has addressed the problem of repeated protocols, 
re4wning about uncertainties or commitments during negotiation. 
The protocol of this thesis needs to be designed for highly structured interactions between two agents 
only. Therefore, game theoretic models are an appropriate candidate for the problem of coordination. These 
inodels are not only analytically useful, but they also have several desirable properties. However, there are a 
number of criticisms of these models with regards to the requirements of the target domains of this research 
(section 3.1.9). In addition to these criticisms, the operational mapping of game theory models into DAI 
environments introduces further difficulties. As Kraus notes, in order to apply these models a designer must 
(Kraus 1997b): 
4o choose a strategic bargaining model 
4P map the application problem to the chosen model's nomenclature 
4p identify equilibrium strategies 
* develop simple search techniques for appropriate strategies 
* provide utility functions 
Although choosing a strategic bargaining model and mapping it to an application may not be too difficult, 
game theory requires that all the agreements 
be known in advance before equilibrium strategies can be 
proven. The theory's basic assumptions also mean that most game theoretic models do not consider the 
computational and communication complexities which are 
important in practical applications. Furthermore, 
rnultiple issues are not adequately represented 
in game theoretic models. 
Informal models such as CDN and Kasbah, on the other hand, are beneficial in that there is no need to 
build models of interactions from scratch-there already exists a large body of research which has devel- 
opod over a number of years in other disciplines such as 
behavioral and social sciences. However, informal 
models have a different set of limitations. Again, as Kraus notes, applying 
informal models to DAI problems 
can be done in two ways (Kraus 1997b) 
e develop heuristics for cooperation based on informal models (e. g. (Kraus & Lehmann 1995)) or 
* apply informal models to DAI problems after formalizing the models (for example through logics 
(Kraus, Nirkhe, & Sycara 1998)) 
However, there is a need for evaluation techniques such as simulations or empirical analysis in both cases 
above since informal models do not formally analyze the 
behaviour of the system (unlike game theoretic 
Inodels). 
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The aim of this chapter has been to show that the general requirements of the target domains together 
with the need for developing a flexible decision mechanism have meant that the negotiation wrapper cannot 
be adequately modeled using normative game theoretic models. Instead, these requirements have meant 
adopting a more descriptive approach that provide decision heuristics. However, an agent is cast (having 
preferences) and described (a utility maximizer) and analyzed (in terms of Nash, pareto-optimality and 
reference solutions) in the nomenoculture of game theory, but their decision making are based on informal 
and descriptive models. Therefore, because of the limitations of informal models mentioned above, the 
developed model is empirically evaluated to discover properties of the wrapper (see chapter 5). 
When viewed operationally the developed coordinationframework (the protocol, services and the rea- 
soning models, see figure 1.1) is normative in that the agent is required to adopt the protocol of interaction 
specified by the communication language, but is free to adopt any decision strategy (or any implementation 
of the wrapper) to execute within the protocol. This means that a game theoretic agent can interact with a 
heuristic rule based agent using the framework. They differ in what decision schemes they use to imple- 
rnent the negotiation wrapper. However, for evaluation purposes a descriptive approach is adopted, where 
the interaction protocol and a set of strategies is imposed on the agent. 
Chapter 4 
A Service-Oriented Negotiation Model 
A formal account of the developed coordination framework is the subject of this chapter. This formaliza- 
tion specifies two protocols of interaction (section 4.1) and three negotiation decision making mechanisms 
(section 4-2). This formalization is intended to model the important issues identified in chapter two and 
addresses the criticisms of the related approaches described in chapter three. The context in which the 
service-oriented negotiations take place has already been described in the first chapter (section 1.4). 
4.1 Interaction Protocols 
A protocol of interaction is required because sub-problems interact during domain problem solving and 
agents therefore have to communicate and interact (section 1.3). A protocol of interaction can also reduce 
the uncertainties involved in strategic interactions (section 2.2.6.3). Thus protocols of interaction assist 
agents in their problem solving. The computations involved in such problem solving can usefully be cate- 
g -line computations are the processes involved in the local deliberation , orized 
into on-line and off-line. Off 
phase of what to offer and are presented in section 4.3. On-line computations, on the other hand, are the 
processes involved in the communication of the deliberated offer itself. The on-line computations, as well 
as the knowledge required for computation, are discussed in this section. There are two protocols: one for 
negotiation proper and the other for issue manipulation. Two protocols are needed because the language 
and rules of interactions differ when agents are exchanging contracts during negotiation to when they com- 
inunicate about which issues should be included or retracted from the current set of issues in negotiation. 
The negotiation protocol is described first. 
4.1.1 The Negotiation Protocol 
The design of the protocol of interaction has been motivated by the normative models of coordination such 
as game theory (see chapter 3). 1 Agents' interactions are constrained by the rules of a normative structure 
which specifies their interactions independently of their roles. The interaction is modeled as an alternating 
I Note that a norm refers to prescriptive rules of the game (in the game theoretic sense). 





Figure 4.1: The Negotiation Protocol. 
sequence of offers and counter-offers (sections 3.1.7,3.2.3) which terminates with either a commitment 
by 
both parties to a mutually agreed solution or else terminates unsuccessfully. The protocol (figure 4.1) starts 
with a dialogue to establish the conditions for the negotiation. These conditions are mutually satisfied in this 
pre-negotiation phase and must specify the set of initial issues (see section 2.2.2) as well as a shared meaning 
of the not only these issues but also the meaning of the conversation terms of the ensuing interaction (the 
primitives shown in figures 4.1 and 4.2). Additionally, during this pre-negotiation phase agents may agree 
on which role will begin the negotiation, acting as the initiator of the protocol, while the other role becomes 
2 
the responder to the role who initiated the negotiation. 
Then, the agent who was selected to make the first offer proceeds to make the first offer for contract 
(transition from state 1 to state 2 or 3-the or transition, representing who starts the negotiation, is shown 
in figure 4.1 as the arc joining the two possible proposals given state 1). Note the protocol is for integrative 
negotiation, where agents negotiate over packages, rather than individual issues. After that, the responding 
agent can make a counter-offer (see section 4.4) or a trade-off (see section 4.5.2) (moving to state 2 or 
3 depending on who was the initiator). The initiating agent can in turn make a new counter-offer or a 
new trade-off (going back to state 2 or 3). Since the information models of the other agent(s) (such as the 
reservation values, the weights and preferences of each issue) are not publicly known, offers may be outside 
the mutual zone of agreement. Additionally, even though offers may be within a zone of agreement, they 
may nonetheless fail to meet the current aspirational demand of the other agent. For example, if an (seller) 
2 In cases of no agreement the conflict may be resolved through randon-dy selecting which which role will be the initiator and which 
role will be the responder 
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agent is demanding a price over X20 for a service, with price reservation values of [10,30], and the other 
(buyer) agent has offered X15, then although the offer is within the reservation values of the seller, the 
buyer's offer fails to meet the current aspirational needs of the seller. Therefore, agents may iterate between 
states 2 and 3, taking turns to offer new contracts. In either of these two states. one of the agents may accept 
the last offer made by the opponent (moving to state 4) or withdraw from the negotiation (moving to state 
5). Agents always withdraw from the negotiation process when the negotiation deadline has been reached. 
While in state 2 or 3, agents may start an ellucidatory dialogue to establish a new set of issues to 
negotiate over (see section 5.2.3 for more details). This transition to the issue manipulation sub-protocol 
is represented in figure 4.1 by the primitive newset to the issue protocol. The execution of the negotiation 
protocol is resumed when either the agents have agreed to a new set of issues (represented in figure 4.1 
by the accept primitive from the issue sub-protocol back to the negotiation protocol where negotiation 
resumes with a new set of issue) or else when then agents have failed to come to an agreement over a new 
set of issues (represented in figure 4.1 by the withdraw primitive from the issue sub-protocol back to the 
negotiation protocol where negotiation resumes with the same issue set as before). 
This negotiation protocol is a natural extension of the contract net protocol (section 3.2.3) permit- 
ting iterated offer and counter-offer generation and permitting the modification of the set of issues under 
negotiation. The presence of time deadlines guarantees termination of the protocol. 
4.1.2 Issue Protocol 
As mentioned in section 2.2.2, agents may not share the same goal set at the outset of negotiation. Al- 
ternatively, agents may identify an issue that they both agree on in the course of negotiation. Conversely, 
there may be a need to introduce a new issue(s). Therefore, there is a need for a protocol that normatively 
specifies how the set of issues in negotiation can be amended. 
The protocol for establishing a new set of negotiating issues (figure 4.2) is isomorphic to the negotiation 
protocol described in figure 4.1, with the exception that the meaning of the primitives and the content of 
this protocol (a new set of issues) are different to the negotiation protocol of figure 4.1. Additionally, the 
choice of the initiator of this sub-protocol is strategically determined by the agent who wishes to initiate 
this sub-protocol while executing the negotiation protocol. The pre-negotiation phase is omitted (since 
the current set of issues has already been agreed). The object of negotiation, contract 0, is replaced by a 
new set of issues S, and primitives propose and trade-off are replaced by newset-a request for a new set 
of issues to be included in to the negotiation. Each negotiating agent can start a dialogue over a new set 
of issues S where the numbers reflect the same state as the main negotiation protocol. Thus, if agent a 
starts the issue manipulation dialogue with the utterance newset(a, b, S) while in state 3 in the negotiation 
protocol, in figure 4.1, then this results in the transition from state 3 to state 2 in the sub issue-manipulation 
protocol in figure 4.2). Each agent can then either propose a new set (transition from state 3 to 2, or 2 to 3. 
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depending on who started the dialogue), accept he other's proposed set (state 4) or withdraw and continue 
with the original set (state 5). An aLrent's trateizical choice of the nrotocol usaae is cantured in the wrapper 
ncwsct(bas) 1ý n V-,, 
w. ct(a, b, S) 
5 
Figure 4.2: The Issue Manipulation Protocol. 
deliberation architecture (section 4.3). However, before the deliberation architecture is formally specified, 
first the meaning and rules of communication are informally presented in the next section, followed by the 
basic building blocks of the formalization (section 4.2). 
4.1.2.1 Nonnative Rules of the Protocol 
Communication among the agents using the protocol follows a set of normative rules represented as simple 
if-then rules. The content of the messages used in the agent communication language (ACL. shown in fig- 
ure 1.1, section 1.2) is shown in figure 4.3 and consists of: one of a limited number of primitive message 
types, the identity of the sender and the recipient (both agent identifiers), and the service concerned through 
the set of negotiation issues that describe the terms and conditions of service production and consumption. 
Additional information, and not shown in figure 4.3. may be included (such as the message number) that 
facilitates conversation management. However, figure 4.3 depicts the main requirements of the communi- 
cation protocol. 
The first three primitives (can-do, not-capable and capable) are used in the pre-negotiation state of the 
protocol. They provide "connection" capabilities, functioning to initiate negotiation for a service that is 
actually provided by a seller and is required by a buyer. Note that in this research the performative can-do 
means capable of as opposed to it is permitted to. 
The agents then enter negotiation proper and use the remaining communication primitives to provision 
services. The next four primitives are messages that agents utter when using the negotiation protocol de- 
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Figure 4.3: The Communicative Rules 
scribed in figure 4.1, and the last three are messages belonging to the issue manipulation protocol described 
in figure 4.2. The meaning of each of these primitives is described in the column entitled semantics. Rules, 
in turn, represented as contexts in figure 4.3, specify the usage of the above primitives which all agents must 
adhere to during negotiation. 
The building blocks of the formalization are introduced next. 
4.2 A Bilateral Negotiation Model 
This section presents the developed model for representing agents' knowledge about services. This model 
includes: i) the set of negotiation issues, their reservation values and importances as well as the domain 
problem solver's preferences over each issue (section 4.2.1), ii) the roles agents can adopt in service-oriented 
negotiation (section 4.2.2). and iii) the thread of offers and counter-offers exchanged in negotiation (section 
4.2.3). The role of this model is to support the decision making functionalities of the wrapper during multi- 
attribute bilateral negotiation. 
4.2.1 Issues, Reservations, Weights and Scores 
The aim of this section is to formally represent issues. This representation will serve as a data structure 
during the negotiation process. An informal example of multi-issue negotiation is presented first, followed 
by a formal treatment. 
The object about which agents negotiate is referred to as a contract (0 in figure 4.1). Contracts rep- 
resent the bid (or offer) on the table during negotiation and the 
final contract at the end of a successful 
negotiation. The contract structure is derived almost exactly 
from the types of legal contract which are 
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often used to regulate current business transactions (Jennings et aL 2000a). 
Figure 4.4 is a sample contract from the BT business process management domain (section 1.4.1). 
The contract contains both an identification and a negotiation part. The identification part is shown in 
figure 4.4 by the slots service-name, contractid, Server-agent and client-agent. These features function to 
uniquely identify the contract under negotiation. The negotiation part is represented by the remaining slots 
and describe the actual issues agents negotiate over. Note that the any ambiguity over both the meaning 
and the value of both the identification and the negotiation issues is assumed to have been resolved at pre- 
negotiation phase of interaction. For example, it is assumed that both agents know the meaning of the 
contract attribute price and also have a common value (dollars for example). The attributes of this sample 
C()ntract are described next. 
The service-name is the service to which the agreement refers and contract-id is the contract's unique 
identifier (covering the case where there are multiple agreements for the same service). Server-agent and 
client-agent represent the agents who are party to the agreement. Delivery-type identifies the way in which 
the service is to be provisioned-services can be provisioned in two different modes depending on the client 
agent's intended pattern of usage and the server agent's scheduling capabilities: (i) one-off. the service 
is 
provisioned each and every time it is needed and the agreement covers precisely one invocation; (ii) on- 
demand: the service can be invoked by the client on an as-needed basis within a given time frame (subject to 
some maximum volume measurement). 
The contract's scheduling information is used for service execution 
and management-duration represents the maximum time the server can take to 
finish the service. and 
start-time and end-time represent the time 
during which the agreement is valid. In this case, the agreement 
specifies that agent CSD can invoke agent 
DD to cost and design a customer network whenever it is required 
between 09: 00 and 18: 00 and each service execution should take no more than 320 minutes. The agreement 
also contains constraints uch as the volume of 
invocations permissible between the start and end times, the 
price paid per invocation, and the penalty the server 
incurs for every violation. The penalty mechanism, in a 
similar manner to the leveled commitment protocol of 
Sandholm. (section 3.2.4), models commitments (see 
section 2.2.5). client-info specifies the 
information the client must provide to the server at service invocation 
(in this case CSD must provide the customer profile) and reporting-policy specifies the information the 
server returns upon completion. 
These issues are formally specified next. Let i (i E {a, b}) represent he negotiating agents an dj 
(j E 1L..., n)) the issues under negotiation. The set of issues in real world negotiations is assumed to 
be finite. Let Dj' - [min3, max; * ] be the intervals of values for quantitative issue j acceptable by agent 
i. Values for qualitative issues, in turn, are defined over a fully ordered domain - Dji = (ql,... , qn)- 
11owever, because qualitative issues do not have interval values they can not be handled in a similar fashion 
to quantitative issues. The solution to this problem 
is to redefine min" or tiiaxja of a qualitative issue as the J 
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Contract Name Instantiated Values 
service-name: cost-&-design-customer-network 





duration: (minutes) 320 
start-time (GMT): 9: 00 
end-time (GMT): 18: 00 
volume (per invocation): 35 
price: (per costing) 35 
penalty (per lateness): 30 
clientinfo: customer-profile 
reporting-policy: customer-quote 
Figure 4.4: Sample Contract 
maximum and minimum score of the issue. The notion of a score is introduced below, but a score informally 
means the utility of the issue's value. The exposition of the model only concentrates on quantitative issues. 
The extension of the current model that formally models qualitative issues can be found in (Matos, Sierra, 
& Jennings 1998). 
Here the formalism is restricted to considering issues for which negotiation amounts to determining a 
value between an agent's defined delimited range. 
Each agent has a scoring function Vj4 Dj' -+ [0,1] that 
gives the score agent i assigns to a value of 
issue j in the range of its acceptable values. For convenience, 
scores are kept in the interval 
[0,1]. 
The next element of the model of an issue is the relative importance that an agent assigns to each issue 
under negotiation. wji 
is the importance of issue j for agent i. The weights of agents are normalized, i. e. 
Wj 1, for all i in (a, b). With these elements in place, it is now possible to define an agent's F, i: 5j<n 
i ý-_ 
scoring function3 for a contract-that 
is, for a value x= (xi, ... 1 Xn) in the multi-dimensional space defined 
by the issues' value ranges: 
vi (X) =E wjý Vii (Xj) I<J<n (4.1) 
The additive scoring system is, for simplicity, a function Vill that either increases or decreases mono- 
3Non-linear approaches to modeling utility could be used if necessary, without affecting the basic ideas of the model. 
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tonically. The additive scoring function is a model of how an agent can consolidate individual preferences 
over each issue into a single preference. The advantages of this model, in comparison to elimination by 
aspects and lexicographic semi-order models, were discussed in section 3.2.6. In addition to these, if both 
negotiators use such an additive scoring function, Raiffa showed it is possible to compute the optimum 
value of x (see (Raiffa 1982), p. 164). Furthermore, the individual utility functions that are consolidated by 
the additive scoring system need to be reversible (denoted as Vý-') because, as will be shown in section 
4.5.2. the trade-off mechanism requires a mapping back from a score of an issue to its value. 
As an illustration of the above model consider the following example. Let the set of negotiation issues 
for a server agent a consist of (price, volume}-the price required to provide the service and the number of 
service instances attainable by a. In addition to this, let a have the 
following values [min",. i,,, maxa ice] P Pr 
volume] = 
[1,5]. Also assume a views the price as more important than the [10,20] and [minaol v ume, maxa 
4 
volume by assigning a higher weight to price, where 
(Wprice 1 Wvolume) = (0.8,0.2). Finally, let the value 
of an offer x, for an issue j, Vj(xj), be modeled as a linear function: 
Va rpýjce-mine. j d p 




Now consider two contracts, (11,5) and (15,2), offered by a client b to the server a. Given the above 
parameters for a, the value for the 
first offered price by b is (11 - 10/20 - 10) = 0.1, while the value for 
the first requested volume is (1 - (5 - 1/5 - 1) = 0. The total value for the offered contract is the sum 
of the weighted values for each individual 
issue (namely, 0.8*0.1+0.2*0--0.08). By the same reasoning, the 
value of the second contract 
from b is 0.55. Since the rational action is to maximize utility, a prefers the 
second contract offered by 
b. 
4.2.2 Agents and Roles 
In service-oriented negotiations, agents can undertake two possible roles that are, in principle, in conflict. 
Hence, for notational convenience two subsets of agents are distinguished 'I, Agents = Clients U Servers. 
Roman letters are used to represent agents; c, cl, c2.... will stand for clients, 8,819 82 P ... for servers and 
a, aipb, d, e,... for non-specific agents. 
In general, clients and servers have opposing interests, e. g. a client wants a low price for a service, 
whereas the potential servers attempt to obtain 
the highest price. High quality is desired by clients, but 
not by servers, and so on. 
Note that roles carry information. Thus, whereas an agent may not know the 
exact type of the other agent 
(its preferences), it can reasonably assume the direction of change of the 
preferences of the other, according to 
its role. For example, increasing offers for the value of price are 
411c subsets are not disjoint; an agent can participate as a client in one negotiation and as a service provider in another. 
4.2. A Bilateral Negotiation Model 133 
valued less by a buyer and more by a seller. Therefore, in the space of negotiation values, negotiators 
represent opposing forces in each one of the dimensions. In consequence, the scoring functions verify that 
given a client c and a server s negotiating values for issue j, then if xj ý: yj then (Vjc(xj) 2: Vje(yj) 
iff Vjs (xj) :5 Vj8 (yj)). However, in a small number of cases the clients and service providers may have 
a mutual interest for a negotiation issue. For example, Raiffa cites a case (Raiffa 1982, pg. 133-147) in 
which the Police Officers Union and the City Hall realize, in the course of their negotiations, that they both 
want the police commissioner fired. Having recognized this mutual interest, they quickly agree that this 
course of action should be selected. Thus, in general, where there is a mutual interest, the variable will be 
assigned one of its extreme values. Hence, these variables can be removed from the negotiation set. For 
instance, the act of firing the police commissioner can be removed from the set of issues under negotiation 
and assigned the extreme value "done". 
4.2.3 Iteration of Offers: Threads 
Once the agents have determined the set of variables over which they will negotiate (possibly using the 
issue-manipulation protocol, section 4.1.2), the negotiation process between two agents (a, bE Agents) 
consists of an alternate succession of offers and counter offers of values for these variables (figure 4.1). 
This continues until an offer or counter offer is accepted by the other side or one of the partners terminates 
negotiation (e. g. because the time deadline is reached without an agreement being in place). Negotiation 
can be initiated by clients or servers. 
The vector of values proposed by agent a to agent b at time t is represented as xI and the value for . -+b 
issue j proposed from a to b at time t by xta-+bU]. For convenience, the model assumes that there exists 
a common global time (the calendar time) represented by a linearly ordered set of instants, namely Time, 
and a reliable communication medium introducing no delays in message transmission (so transmission and 
reception times are identical). The common time assumption is not too strong in application domains where 
offer and counter offers frequencies are not high. 
Definition 4A Negotiation Thread between agents a, bE Agents, at time tn E Timeý noted XtLb, is 
ti t2 t3 




Xa-+bl * *, )Withtl 9 
t2 tn, where., 
1. ti+ I> ti, the sequence is ordered overtime, 
i=[, rnin', maxjl] for quantitative issues, x'+' U] E 2. For each issue j, Za-+bU] E Dq, where Dq 33j b-+a 
Db With i=1,3,5, and optionally the last element of the sequence is one of the particles j' 
faccept, withdraw}. 
A negotiation thread is active at time t,, if last(Xat"++b) V Jaccept, withdraw), where lasto is a function 
returning the last element in a sequence. 
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An offer is assumed to be valid (that is, the agent that uttered it is committed) until a counter offer 
is received. If the response time is relevant, it can be included in the set of issues under negotiation. For 
notational simplicity, it is assumed that tj corresponds to the initial time value, that is tj = 0. In other 
words, there is a local time for each negotiation thread, that starts with the utterance of the first offer. 
4.3 Responsive and Deliberative Mechanisms 
The negotiation and issue protocols, described in section 4.1. do not prescribe an agent's behaviour; an 
agent is free to instantiate any valid traversal path according to its strategy. In the next section the wrapper 
decision architecture is presented, which once instantiated by a negotiating agent designer, assists an agent 
in performing off-line computations about the decisions involved in negotiation. 
As mentioned in section 2.2.4, agents need to address the following evaluatory and offer generation 
decision problems: what initial offers should be sent out?, what is the range of acceptable agreements?, what 
counter offers should be generated?, when should negotiation be abandoned? and when is an agreement 
reached? These decision problems are formally addressed 
in this chapter by developing a generic model of 
negotiation for the wrapper. 
The offer generation components (or what is referred to as the mechanisms) of the architecture are 
distinguished from one another by the following properties: 
1. the computational and informational cost the mechanism incurs on the agent 
2. the social benefit of the mechanism for the community of agents that are negotiating 
The first property is a feature which distinguishes this work from many of the game theory models. The 
provisioning of a service 
is a real time process. Thus services are required within tight scheduling windows 
and a negotiation mechanism must respect the agent's time 
limits. Furthermore, negotiation is only a single 
element of the agent's deliberations. 
Other agent modules need deliberation resources. Therefore, the 
negotiation wrapper must not consume too much of the agent's resources. 
Agents are also informationally, 
as well as, computationally bounded. 
The second property relates to the concern for the design of a mechanism that achieves some measure 
of social (or global) welfare 
from local processing. Using these properties, different mechanisms can be 
distinguished that are concerned with the individual utility of the outcomes without concern for the social 
welfare, and ones that produce outcomes that are 
both individually and jointly preferred by the agents. For 
example, if a deal is required very soon then negotiation 
between the IPCA and SPA agents is driven by 
concern for a deal that is perhaps not socially optimal 
but one that is agreeable by both agents. On the other 
hand, for reasons of global goodness (or social welfare) of the system, if there is time to negotiate then the 
same negotiation between the 
IPCA and a SPA may involve both agents searching for deals that are not 
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only individually rational, but may also be beneficial to the other agent. Additionally, in comparison to the 
former search, the latter search is likely to be more computational and informationally costly. 
Given these properties, three mechanisms have been developed, namely responsive, trade-off and is- 
sue manipulation mechanisms, which differentially implement these properties. Figure 4.5 describes the 
execution model of the agent's reasoning during negotiation. Given the negotiation deadline the 
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Figure 4.5: Functional View of the Agent Architecture. 
opponent's last offer (x'b--,. ) and the agent's last offer (x' :, 
I ) the responsive and trade-off mechanisms i. +b 
to 
multaneously compute a new offer (xa-+b) while the issue manipulation mechanism may generate a new 
set of negotiation issues. The mechanism's evaluatory component (Iresponsive , Itrade-off, Jissue-Man in 
figure 4.5) then makes the decision to either accept (accept) or reject (withdraw) the opponent's last offer 
t or offer the opponent a new contract (x to Xb-+a9 a-+b) 
in the case of responsive and trade-off mechanisms 
or a new set of issues 
QS}) in the case of issue-manipulation. The final choice of which mechanism's 
suggestion to offer is handled by the meta-strategy module 
(section 4.7). The processes involved in each 
mechanism are described next. 
4.4 The Responsive Mechanism 
Responsive mechanisms generate offers and counter offers through linear combinations of simple functions, 
called tactics. Tactics generate an offer, or counter offer, for a single component of the negotiation object 
(or issue) using a single criterion (time, resources or the behaviour of other agents). These criteria are 
Chapter 4. A Service-Oriented Negotiation Model 136 
1notivated by an agent's computational and informational boundedness. For example, the time limits and 
the resources used in negotiation so far, directly constrain the granularity of the search for an outcome. With 
increasing time limits or on-line costs, an agent may prefer deals of lower score than ones that are higher in 
score but which may be unattainable given the time and resource constrains. Likewise, uncertainty of others 
can in the simplest way be handled by reproducing other's behaviour (Axelrod 1984). A more sophisticated 
uncertainty handling methodology is presented later, but the reproduction of others' behaviour has proven to 
be a highly successful, and computationally simple, interaction strategy (Axelrod 1984). Different weights 
in the linear combination allow the varying importance of the criteria to be modeled. For example, when 
determining the values of an issue, it may initially be more important to take into account the other agent's 
behaviour than the remaining time. In which case, the tactics that emphasize the behaviour of other agents 
will be given greater precedence than the tactics which base their value on the amount of time remaining. 
However, agents need to monitor and be responsive to their changing environment. Therefore, to 
achieve flexibility in negotiation, the agents may wish to change their ratings of the importance of the 
different criteria over time. For example, remaining time may become correspondingly more important 
than the imitation of the other's behaviour as the time by which an agreement must be in place approaches. 
-Mis modifying behaviour is referred to as a strategy and it denotes the way in which an agent changes 
the weights of the different tactics over time. Thus, strategies combine tactics depending on the history of 
negotiations and the internal reasoning model of the agents, and negotiation threads influence one another 
by means of strategies (see section 4.4.3). 
4.4.1 Evaluation Decisions 
t 
When agent a receives an offer from agent b at time t, 2b-+a (represented as y in figure 4.5), it has to rate the 
offer using its scoring function. If the value of 
V(xtb,. ) is greater than the value of the counter offer agent 
to 
a is ready to send at the time t' when the evaluation 
is performed, that is xa-+b with t' >t (x' >y in figure 
4.5), then agent a accepts. Otherwise, the counter offer is submitted by the mechanism to the meta-strategy 
component. Expressing this concept more formally: 
Definition 5 Given an agent a and its associated scoringfunction Va, a's Interpretation (I) at time t' of 
t sent at time t< t', is defined as: an offer Xb-+a 
withdraw(a, b) if t, > t, 
responsive t 
M, Z, 
(t'q X'b-,. ) accept (a, b, x'b-,. 
) IfVa(Xb-+a) ýt Va(X', 
-+b) 
tr 
offer(a, b, Xa-+b) otherwise 
to 
where xa-+b Is the contract that agent a would offer to 
b at the time of the interpretation and Vml., is a 
constant that represents the time by which a must 
have completed the negotiation. 
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The result of is one of the primitives specified in the negotiation protocol (figure b 
4.1 section 4.1.1). The primitive offer is used to extend the current negotiation thread between the agents 
to with a new offer xa-+b (0 in figure 4.1). The primitives accept and withdraw terminate the negotiation. 
The evaluation function can also be viewed as representing the goal-test function of section 2.2.8 that 
evaluates whether a goal state has been reached or not (an agreement in the form of cross-over in offers). 
This interpretation formulation also allows modeling of the fact that a contract unacceptable today can be 
accepted tomorrow merely by the fact that time has passed. 
4.4.2 Offer Generation Decisions-Tactics 
ti in order to prepare a counter-offer, Xa-+bs agent a uses a set of simple functions called tactics, that generate 
new values for each variable in the negotiation set. The following families of tactics have been developed: 
Time dependent. If an agent has a time deadline by which an agreement must be in place, these 
tactics model the fact that the agent is likely to concede more rapidly as the deadline approaches. The 
shape of the curve of concession, a function depending on time, is what differentiates tactics in this 
set. 
2. Resource dependent. These tactics model the pressure in reaching an agreement hat the limited 
resources-e. g. remaining bandwidth to be allocated, money, or any other-and the environment- 
e. g number of clients, number of servers or economic parameters-impose upon the agent's be. 
haviour. The functions in this set are similar to the time dependent functions except that the domain 
of the function is the quantity of resources available instead of the remaining time. 
I Behaviour dependent or Imitative. In situations in which the agent is not under a great deal of 
pressure to reach an agreement, it may choose to use imitative tactics to protect itself from being 
exploited by other agents. In this case, the counter offer depends on the behaviour of the negotiation 
opponent. Another function of this tactic family is to provide default behaviours when there is un- 
certainty about what action to take (see section 2.2.6). The imitation of others' behaviour can thus 
serve as a default action when an agent is uncertain about what to do next. The tactics in this family 
differ in which aspect of their opponent's behaviour they imitate and to what degree the opponent's 
behaviour is imitated. 
This set of tactics is motivated by the domain characteristics of many types of problems mentioned in 
section 1.4.3. where the time and resources of an agent and thibehaviour of other agents are key features. 
Unlike the models of chapter three, these tactics explicitly motivate rationales for concessions or demands, 
based on a number of environmental and behavioural characteristics. They determine how to compute the 
value of an issue (price, volume, duration, quality, ... ), by considering a single criterion (time, resources, 
Chapter 4. A Service-Oriented Negotiation Model 138 
... ). The set of values 
for the negotiation issue are then the range of the function and the single criterion is 
its domain. 
Given that agents may want to consider more than one criterion to compute the value for a single issue, 
the generation of counter proposals is modeled as a weighted combination of different tactics covering the 
set of criteria. The values so computed for the different issues will be the elements of the counter proposal. 
5 For instance, if an agent wants to counter-propose taking into account two criteria: the remaining time 
and the previous behaviour of the opponent, it can select two tactics: one from the time dependent family 
and one from the imitative family. Both of these tactics will suggest a value to counter propose for the issue 
under negotiation. The actual value which is counter proposed will be the weighted combination of the two 
independently generated values. 
To illustrate these points consider the following example. Given an issue j, for which a value is 
under negotiation, an agent a's initial offer corresponds to a value in the issue's acceptable region, (Le in 
[Minja, tnaxj]). For instance, if a's range is [XO, X20] for the price p to pay for a good, then it may start the 
negotiation process by offering the server X10 -what initial offer should be chosen is something the agent 
can learn by experience. The server, agent b, with range [. C17,05] may then make an initial counter-offer 
of X25. With these two initial values, the strategy of agent a may consist of using a (single criterion) time 
dependent tactic which might make a reasonably large concession and suggest X15 since it does not have 
much time in which to reach an agreement. Agent b, on the other hand, may chose to use two criteria to 
compute its counterproposal-e. g a time dependent tactic (which might suggest a small concession to X24 
since it has a long time until the deadline) and an imitative tactic (which might suggest a value of X20 to 
mirror the X5 shift of the opponent). If agent b rates the time dependent behaviour three times as important 
as the imitative behaviour, then the value of the counter-offer will be (0.75 * 24) + (0.25 * 20) = X23. This 
process continues until the agents converge on a mutually acceptable solution. The origin, and subsequent 
evolution of these relative weightings may be the result of expert domain knowledge, experience derived 
from previous negotiation cases, or conditional on other factors. 
It should be noted that not all tactics can be applied at all instants. For instance, a tactic that imitates 
the behaviour of an opponent is only applicable when the opponent has shown its behaviour sufficiently. For 
this reason, the following description of the tactics pays particular attention to their applicability conditions. 
4.4.2.1 Time Dependent Tactics 
in these tactics, the predominant factor used to decide which value to offer next is time, t. Thus these 
tactics consist of varying the acceptance value for the issue depending on the remaining negotiation time 
(an important requirement in the target problem domains-section 1.4.3). modeled as the above defined 
The initial offer is modeled as being a point in the interval of values of the issue under constant ta 
sValues for different issues may be computed by different weighted combinations of tactics. 
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negotiation. Hence, agents define a constant rj* that when multiplied by the size of the interval. determines 
the value of issue j to be offered in the first proposal by agent a. 
The value to be uttered by agent a to agent b for issue j is modeled as the offer at time t. with 
0: 5 t: 5 ta max, by a function Cta depending on time as the following expression shows: i 
t U, minja 
+ ja (t) (tnaxja - minjl) If Vja is decreasing 
Xa-ýb 
minja+(l-aja(t))(maxj*-minj") If Va is increasing 
A wide range of time dependent functions can be defined simply by varying the way in which aja(t) is 
computed. However, functions must ensure that 0< ctj; (t) :51. aja(0) = rja and aja(t" .. ) = 1. That is, M 
the offer will always be between the value range, at the beginning it will give rcja as a result and when the 
time deadline is reached the tactic will suggest to offer the reservation value6. Two families of functions 
with this intended behaviour are distinguished: polynomial and exponential (naturally, others could also be 
defined). Both families are parameterized by a value 0E R+ that determines the convexity degree (see 
Figure 4.6) of the curve. These two families of functions were chosen because of the very different way they 
model concession. For the same large value of fl, the polynomial function concedes faster at the beginning 
than the exponential one, then they behave similarly. For a small value of P, the exponential function waits 
longer than the polynomial one before it starts conceding: 
- a)(rnin(t, 
t_.. ))j 
aj'(t) + (1 K%, j Polynomial: j t: &GO 
Exponential: aja (t) =e 
In comparison to Kasbah (section 3.2.9) that only models three offer generation functions, these families 
of functions represent an 
infinite number of possible tactics, one for each value of P. However, to better 
understand their behaviour they are classified, 
depending on the value of P, into two extreme sets showing 
clearly different patterns of 
behaviour. Other sets in between these two could also be defined: 
1. Boulware 7 tactics [(Raiffa 1982), pg. 481. Either exponential or polynomial functions with P<1. 
This tactic maintains the offered value until the time is almost exhausted, whereupon it concedes 
up to the reservation value8. The behaviour of this family of tactics with respect to 0 is easily 
6The reservation value for issue j of agent a represents the value that gives the smallest score for function VI. Tie function V, 6 
depends on the reservation value for agent a and issue j-4he range [minj,, maq]. If V, 11 is monotonically increasing, then the 
reservation value is minj"; if it is decreasing the reservation value 
is max,,,. 
7LcmueI Boulware was a vice-president of the General Electric Company, who rarely made concessions in wage negotiations. His 
strategy was to start with what he deemed to be a 
fair opening bid and held firm throughout the negotiations. 
813esides the pattern of concession that these functions model, Boulware negotiation tactics presume that the interval of values for 
negotiation is narrow. Hence, when the deadline 
isreached and 1. the offer generated is not substantially different from 
the initial one. 
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ale Q(t 
Figure 4.6: Polynomial (left) and Exponential (right) Functions for the Computation of ct(t). Time is 
presented as Relative to tmax, 
mi"(1 to )0 
understood taking into account that limpO+ e 
I- inn; 
= rj4 and limo-+O+ rj + (i - 
in(t, to-o. ) r r-j-)(- ,, q. 
The Boulware tactics can be selected as a technique to handle uncertainty (see section 2.2.6.2); when 
others' preferences are unknown, then one possible strategy is to remain firm and demand the same 
throughout the negotiation. 
2. Conceder [(Pruitt 1981), pg. 20]. Either exponential or polynomial functions with 0> 
1. The agent quickly goes to its reservation value. For similar reasons as before, we have 
in q j=1 and limg, +. x j 
Resource-dependent tactics are similar to the time dependent ones. Indeed, time dependent tactics can 
I>-- seen as a type of resource dependent tactic in which the sole resource considered is time. Whereas 
time vanishes constantly up to its end, other resources may have different patterns of usage. Time and 
resource dependent actics are also similar in that they are both an attempt to model bounded rationality 
(see section 2.2.8), in that they attempt to generate successful outcomes given the available information and 
computational resources. Resource dependent tactics are modeled in the same way as time dependent ones; 
that is, by using the same functions, but by either: i) making the value of ta .. dynamic or ii) making the M 
function a depend on an estimation of the amount of a particular resource. 
4.4.2.2 Dynamic Deadline Tactics 
The dynamic value of t" .. represents aheuristic about the quantity of resources that are in the environment. M 
The scarcer the resource, the more urgent the need for an agreement. In the target application domains, the 
most important resource to model is the number of agents negotiating with a given agent and how impatient 
they are to reach agreements. On one hand, the greater the number of agents who are negotiating with 
agent a for a particular service s, the lower the pressure on a to reach an agreement with any specific 
individual. While on the other hand, the longer the negotiation thread, the greater the pressure on a to come 
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to an agreement. Hence, representing the set of agents negotiating with agent a at time t as: NO (t) 
(ilXit++. is active), the dynamic time deadline for agent a is defined as: 
ta = 14 . 
INa(t)12 
max Ei IXi++a I 
where jil represents the time agent a considers reasonable to negotiate with a single agent and IXit.,. I 
represents the length of the current thread between i and a. Notice that the number of agents is in the 
numerator, so quantity of time is directly proportional to it, and averaged length of negotiation thread is in 
the denominator, so quantity of time is inversely proportional to it. 
4.4.2.3 Resource Estimation Tactics 
The resource estimation tactics generate counter-offers depending on how a particular resource is being 
consumed. Resources could be money being transferred among agentsý the number of agents interested 
in a particular negotiation, and also, in a similar way as before, time. The required behaviour is for the 
agent to become progressively more conciliatory as the quantity of resource diminishes. The limit when 
the quantity of the resource approaches nil is to concede up to the reservation value for the issue(s) under 
negotiation. When there is plenty of resource, a more Boulware behaviour is to be expected. Formally, this 
can be modeled by having a different computation for the function a: 
aj*(t) = nj' + (1 - Kj)e-*""*"6(') 
where the function resource" (t) measures the quantity of the resource at time t for agent a. Examples of 
functions are: 
* reSoUrCea(t) = 
IegourCea(t) =,, a 
IN*(t)lg 
Li IXi ,.. I 
9 resourcell (t) = min (0, t- t' . ý) M 
In the first example, the number of negotiating agents is the resource. That is, the more agents negotiating 
the less pressure to make concessions. The second example models time as a resource in a similar way as in 
the previous section. The more agents, the less pressure, and the longer the negotiations the more pressure. 
Finally, the last case also models time as a resource, but in this case the quantity of resource decreases in a 
linear fashion with respect to time. 
4.4.2.4 Behaviour Dependent Tactics 
This family of tactics compute the next offer based on the previous attitude of the negotiation opponent. 
These tactics have proved important in co-operative problem-solving negotiation settings (Axelrod 1984), 
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and so are useful in a subset of the problem contexts (see Section 1.4.3). Like Boulware tactics, these tactics 
can also be selected for as a technique for handling uncertainty. However, whereas Boulware tactics handle 
the uncertainty of strategic interaction by ignoring the behaviour of the opponent, these tactics condition 
their actions on the observed behaviour of the other(s). 
The main difference between the tactics in this family is in the type of imitation they perform. One 
farnily imitates proportionally, another in absolute terms, and the last one computes the average of the 
proportions in a number of previous offers. Hence, given a negotiation thread 
t. -24 t. -26+1 
t. -28+2 ts-2 ta-I t, Xb-+a I Xa-4b I Xb-+a ,..., Xb-+a , Xa-+b, Xb-+a 
with 6 ': ý 1, the following families of tactics are distinguished: 
Relative Tit-For-Tat: The agent reproduces, in percentage terms, the behaviour that its opponent 







Xl*- Ul, minj"), tnaxj") tm-2J+2U) a-+b Xb-+a 
2. Random Absolute Tit-For-Tat: The same as before but in absolute terms. This means that if the 
other agent decreases its offer by X2, then the next response should be increased by the same X2. 
Moreover, a component is added which modifies that behaviour by increasing or decreasing (depend- 
ing on the value of parameter s) the value of the answer by a random amount. This random element 
is introduced to enable the agents to escape from a loop of non-improving contract offers, or a local 
minima in the social welfare function (meaning that the contracts being exchanged have the same util- 
ity to both agents). M is the maximum amount by which an agent can change its imitative behaviour. 
The condition of applicability is again n> 25. 




+ (- 1)'R(M), min"), maxj*) Xa-+b a-+b b-+a b-+a I 
where 
0 If Vjl is decreasing 
1 If Vjl is increasing 
and R(M) is a function that generates arandom value in the interval [0, M]. 
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3. Averaged Tit-For-Tat: The agent computes the average of percentages of changes in a window of 
size -y >I of its opponents history when determining its new offer. When y=I the behaviour is 
similar to the relative Tit-For-Tat tactic with 6=1. The condition of applicability for this tactic is 
n> 2-y. 
4- ,. 
xt'+'U) = min(max(Xb-+a x tR-l a-+b t, 'I a-+b 
U), minja), maxj") 
Xb-+a 
Different tit-for-tat tactics were designed to empirically evaluate, similar to the tournament games of 
Axelrod (Axelrod 1984), the relative success of different manners in reproducing behaviour of others. 
4.4.3 Strategic Reasoning-Strategies 
The aim of agent a's negotiation strategy is to determine the best course of action (see section 2.2.4) which 
will result in an agreement on a contract x while keeping V' as high as possible. However, maximization 
of the scoring function (a task of the wrapper) must consider changes in the agent's environment. This task- 
environment coupling is needed because an agent's behaviour should change as the environment changes 
(hence the name responsive for the mechanism). In practical terms, this equates to how to prepare a new 
counter offer, taking into consideration a number of ever changing factors. 
In the model, an agent has a representation of its mental state containing information about its beliefs, 
its knowledge of the environment (for example, time or resources), and any other attitudes (desires, goals, 
obligations or intentions) the agent designer considers appropriatO. The mental state of agent a at time t is 
noted as MSI. The set of all possible mental states for agent a is denoted as MS.. 
When agent a receives an offer from agent b, it becomes the last element in the current negotiation 
thread between the agents. If the offer is unsatisfactory, agent a generates a counter offer. As discussed 
earlier, different combinations of tactics can 
be used to generate counter offers for particular issues. An 
agent's strategy determines which combination of tactics should be used at any one instant (this concept is 
similar to the concept of mixed strategies in game theoretic models (Gibbons 1992)). 
pefinition 6 Given a negotiation thread between agents a and b at time t,,, X. **,., b, over domain D 
t" 
,, andafinite set ofm tactics'O Ta =II Di xx Dp, with last(X. 
tý, 
b) = x, -+ 7* Ti : MSa 
a weighted counter proposat xta"", is a linear combination of the tac ic given by arh ts mat ix of weig ts 
t. +l ra-+b 
gThere is no prescription of a particular mental state, but rather this work aims towards an architecturally neutral description to 
ensure maximum, generality for the model. 
IOThis definition uses the natural extension of tactics to the muld-dimensional space of issues' values. 
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lill 712 ... ^tl m 
t. +i 
72 1 722 ... ^12m ra-+b 
'fp I oYp2 ... 7pm 
defined in thefollowing way: 
tn+l t Xa-+bU] = (]P. *, b*T"(MS. 
t-+'))D, j] 
where (T(MSaot, `))(i, j1 = 
(7*i(MSat*+'))U], Iyji E (0,11 and for all issues j, Ei': I-yji = 1. 
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Xt" 0x a++b a-+b 
Many-party negotiations are modeled by means of a set of interacting negotiation threads. The way this 
is done is by making a negotiation thread influence the selection of which matrix Ir is to be used in other 
flegotiation threads. Thus, 
Definition 7 Given a, bE Agents, a Negotiation Strategyfor agent a is anyfunction f such that, given 
as mental state at time tn, MS,, , and a matrix of weights at time tn, r, 
t--4b. generates a new matrLx of 
weightsfor time tn+l, i-e- 
rtn+l =f (rt- a-+b a-+b9 
MSat") (4.2) 
A simplistic example of the application of the model would be to have a matrix r built up of Os and ls and 
I for all t. This would correspond to using a fixed single tactic for each issue at every having Fta+-+b : -- rta-+b 
instant in the negotiation. Consider another example of when a weighted combination, as opposed to binary 
and static weighting, could be useful. The example involves negotiation between the VC (Vet Customer 
agent) and the CSD (Customer Service Department agent) for the Vet-Custorner service, taken from the 
ADEPT application (section 1.4.1). For simplicity assume that there is only a single issue, the price of the 
service. Further assume that both agents are currently under no time pressure to reach an agreement. Given 
these conditions then both agents may begin negotiation by assigning a value of I to the Boulware tactic and 
0 to all others. However, after the exchange of a number of offers and an increase in time pressure to reach 
a deal. one (or both) of the agent(s) may begin to reduce the weighting of the Boulware tactic and begin 
to place higher weighting on the Conceder tactic (believing that concession may result in an agreement 
being reached sooner rather than later in the negotiation). This example informally shows the usefulness of 
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strategies in modeling a smooth transition from a behaviour based on a single tactic (e. g. Boulware, because 
the agent has plenty of time to reach an agreement) to another one (e. g. Conceder, because time is running 
, out). Smoothness is obtained by changing the weights affecting the tactics progressively (e. g. from I to 0 
and from 0 to I in the example). The current model has been extended to include the evolution of strategies 
(Matos, Sierra, & Jennings 1998). 
4.4.4 Functional Architecture of the Responsive Mechanism 
The above model is a generic description of the components of the responsive mechanism. It is generic 
because there can be an infinite number of tactics (and their corresponding strategies)--the model does 
rjot commit to any particular agent architecture 
by specifying that an agent's decision mechanism should 
be described through N tactics and their corresponding strategies. However, for practical purposes agent 
architectures are needed that commit to a concrete 
instantiation, and follow from, this generic model. A re- 
sponsive agent architecture 
has been developed to empirically evaluate the behaviour of different tactics and 
strategies (described in the next chapter), and which can 
be used as the responsive mechanism component 
C)f the negotiation wrapper shown 
in figure I. I. 
The overall architecture of this responsive mechanism is shown in figure 4.7. The boxes labeled 
&pOlpoly, resource and tit-4-tat represent the time, resource and behaviour dependent tactics respectively. 
The unfilled ovals represent the input parameters into both the tactics and, possibly, the strategy. The latter 
inputs are the possible set of inputs because in the formal model nothing is said about the actual mental 
state of the agent. The output of each tactic 
(the offer suggested by each tactic, represented as 'Tltd, -101rd, lobd 
for the contract offer suggested by the time, resource and behaviour dependent tactics respectively) is repre- 
sented as filled ovals. 
The agent's strategy then modifies the weights attached to each tactic (represented by 
boxed ovals, labeled Wtd) Wrd and Wbd, for weights of the time, resource and behaviour dependent tactics 
respectively). The 
final offer, filled oval labeled 4 is then computed as the summation of individual offers 
from the tactics, after being modified by their strategy selected weights, represented as the *+ operation. 
The value of this final offer, represented as filled oval labeled V(x'), is computed as the linear sum of all 
the issue's weighted values, represented 
by the box +wi * V(x'i). The responsive mechanism was devel- 
oped as a set of simple 
functions that solves the decision making problems of an agent given its limited 
information and computational capabilities. The decision mechanism of the wrapper was then extended by 
two more complex (deliberative) mechanisms, namely an 
issue trade-off mechanism (section 4.5.2) and an 
issue manipulation mechanism (section 4.6). These 
deliberative mechanisms are discussed next. 
4.5 The Trade-off Mechanism 
The responsive mechanism implements an iterated search 
for a contract with a value that is acceptable to 
both parties. The mechanism can be used to model iterative concession over the score of the contract by 
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Figure 4.7: Functional View of the Responsive Mechanisms. Ovals depicts data structures, boxes processes, 
and arrows, flow of information 
an agent (based on a number of environmental factors, such as the deadline or the amount of computational 
resources used), until a point of intersection (or what will be referred to as a cross over of offers) occurs 
between the value of the offered contract and what the agent is about to offer. Although this mechanism 
proved useful in a number of real-world applications (FIPA97 1997, Jennings et aL 2000a), cross over 
evaluation is inefficient in that 
it fails to find joint gains, reaching outcomes that lie closer to the pareto- 
optimal line (Gibbons 1992). In particular, the mechanism cannot discriminate between contracts that have 
different scores for the issues, but which have the same overall score (Corfman & Gupta 1993). Therefore, 
possible joint gains are missed. To improve the efficiency of the outcome, while respecting the information 
and computational constraints, a trade-off mechanism 
has been designed that searches for potential joint 
gains. The interpretation component of this mechanism is described first in section 4.5.1 followed by the 
offer generation mechanism in section 4.5-2. 
4.5.1 Trade-off Mechanism Evaluation 
-rbe evaluation of a contract from the trade-off mechanism perspective involves: 
a withdraw(a, b) If t> tmax 
, trade-off(t, xt a b-+a) accept(a, 
b, A t-l b-+a) If Va(Xtb-.,,, ) 2! Va(Xa-+b 
trade-off(a, b, xt' otherwise a-+b) 
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where the content of the primitive trade-off (ia or 0 in figure 4.1) is computed by the function given in -+b t 
equation 4.4. Note the similarity between the trade-off and responsive mechanism (section 4.4.1) evaluation 
function. In both interpretations, negotiation terminates unsuccessfully for the same reason; when the end 
time of the negotiation has been reached. However, the interpretation functions do differ. Negotiation 
terminates successfully in the responsive mechanism when the value of the offered contract is higher than 
the one the agent is about to send out (x"). Negotiation terminates successfully in the trade-off mechanism 
when the value of the offered contract is higher than the previous offer of the agent (xt- 1). This is because, 
as will be shown, the trade-off mechanism can only hill-climb (in utility landscape) in the direction of 
higher utility for the agent performing the trade-off. Therefore, the offered contract, from the other agent, 
has to have a lower utility to the agent performing the trade-off. Likewise, any mechanism must respect 
the time deadlines of negotiation. As will be shown in this section, the real difference between the two 
interpretations are the mechanisms involved in generating the primitives offer and trade-off. 
In spite of the similarities between responsive and trade-off interpretations (and as will be shown below 
in section 4.6.1) the evaluation components of each mechanism are functionally separated from one another 
(see figure 4.5). This separation of concerns between the interpretation component of each mechanism and 
its respective offer generation component allows differential and modular reasoning interpretation policies 
to be adopted for each mechanism according to the requirements of the agent designer. 
4.5.2 Trade-off Mechanism Offer Generation 
In the responsive mechanism, agents propose a series of contracts that have diminishing score to themselves. 
However, in choosing to make a trade-off negotiation action an agent is seeking to find a contract that has 
the same score as its previous proposal, but which is more acceptable to (has higher score for) its negotiation 
opponent. Therefore, when an agent implements a trade-off mechanism it behaves as though it is motivated 
to search for types of outcomes that increase joint gains. The next section presents the developed solution 
to the problem of how to reason about "more acceptable' contracts given the uncertainty of the opponent's 
Preferences. 
4.5.2.1 FUZZY SimilasitY 
The computation involved in making a trade-off over issues in negotiation is likely to be more costly than 
the simple responsive mechanisms described above. However, an agent may be cooperatively motivated to 
increase the joint gains over an outcome given the costs involved. For example, two agents can engage in a 
more elaborate search of the space of possible outcomes if one or both are under no time pressures to reach 
an agreement soon. Furthermore, the trade-off mechanism must select a contract that increases the likely 
score of the opponent, given that the agent does not know its Preferences. This means that the agent (call 
this a) in negotiation with another agent (call this b) must be provided with a mechanism to: 
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select a subset of contracts all of which have the same utility as a's previous offer x 
2. select from this subset a contract (xI) that agent a believes (represented by the predicate B") is most 
preferable by b over x 
That is, B' (Vb (x) > Vb (x)) and V. (x) = V. (x'). It therefore follows from the combination of this belief 
and the fact that agent a believes the proposition B`(Va(x') + Vb(x') > V. (x) + Vb(x)) (x' increases 
the joint utility). The problem being addressed in this section is how to model the agent's uncertain belief 
(predicate Ba) in the second step of the mechanism's operation. A number of alternatives were considered 
(section 2.2.6) and the solutions from game theory (section 3.1.6) enumerates the various possible choices 
in modeling uncertainties. Computing conditional probabilities and formulating subjective expected utility 
appears a reasonable methodology for handling the uncertainties involved. However, as noted in section 
2.2.6, the approach is problematic. Firstly, assigning prior probabilities is practically impossible for the 
types of problems addressed here (where there can be an infinitely large set of outcomes and the outcome 
set itself can change dynamically in the course of negotiation through the inclusion and retraction of issues). 
Even if assigning prior probabilities was practically achievable for interactions that are repeated (hence per- 
rnitting the use of probability update mechanisms uch as Bayes rule (Russell & Norvig 1995)), the same 
is not true for encounters in an open system-the prior probabilities may simply be wrong, exacerbated by 
the one-off nature of encounters, preventing the update of prior distribution. Secondly, as mentioned pre- 
viously, the formulation of decisions 
based on subjective expected utility introduces the silent out-guessing 
problem-the agent designer's choice of probabilities 
is based on guesses about the probable choices of 
others, whose choice in turn is dependent on the guesses about the probable choices of the first. 
Therefore a solution is sought that is simple and applicable to types of problems present in both closed 
and open systems. The heuristic employed 
in this thesis is not to directly model the likely choice of the 
other, but rather, to select the contract that 
is most "similar`7 or "close to! ' to the opponent's last proposal 
(since this may be more acceptable to the opponent). That is, the heuristic models the donwin and not the 
other agent. The agent can then use this 
domain model to induce the possible default preferences of the 
other. For example, if the seller has 
demanded a payment of X20 for a service then a client of the service 
can heuristically assume that the seller will prefer an offer of 
X18 to X10 because the former is closer, or 
more similar, than the latter to the 
initial demand by the seller. 
The concept of fuzzy similarity can be used to compute similarity (Zadeh 197 1). This shift in emphasis 
from the probable choices of others to the closeness of two contracts means that any theory that makes the 
same ontological commitments as 
logic (such as probability theory, where facts are either true or not and 
probabilities represent the degree of 
beliej) is inappropriate. However, when modeling concepts such as 
closeness, tallness or heaviness a different 
logic is required that models the degree of truth-a sentence is 
--sort or' true. Most people would hesitate to say whether the sentence "Carles is tall" is true or not, but 
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would more likely say "sort of'. Note, this is not an uncertainty about the external world (we are sure how 
tall Carles is), rather it is a statement about the vagueness or uncertainty over the linguistic term "tallness" 
or similarity/membership of a class prototype. However, an important point to note is that the use of fuzzy 
similarity and probability are not exclusive. Indeed, the agent can use the heuristic of fuzzy similarity to 
derive the prior probabilities of the other's choices from the domain and then update these prior probabilities 
in the course of interactions using Bayes rule. Thus, fuzzy similarity can be used to "bootstrap" decision 
mechanisms that operate on the basis of choice distributions. 
The next section describes in more detail the notion of similarity and the developed algorithm for 
perfoming such trade-offs. 
4.5.2.2 Trade-offs: A Fonnal Model 
An agent will decide to make a trade-off action when it does not wish to decrease its aspirational level 
(denoted 0) for a given service-oriented negotiation. Thus, the agent first needs to generate sometall of the 
potential contracts for which it receives the score of 0. Technically, it needs to generate contracts that lie on 
the iso-value (or indifference) curve for 0 (Raiffa 1982). An iso-value corresponds to fixing one of the x or 
y values in the pair (x, y) in figure 3.1 and then selecting an iso-value amounts to considering only contracts 
on that line. Because all these potential contracts have the same value for the agent, it is indifferent amongst 
them. Given this fact, the aim of the trade-off mechanism is to find the contract on this line that is most 
preferable (and hence acceptable) to the negotiation opponent (since this maximizes the joint gain). More 
formally, an iso-curve is defined as: 
Definition 8 Given an aspirational scoring value 0, the iso-curve set at level Ofor agent a is defined as: 
iso. (0) = {x 1 V'(x) = o} (4.3) 
From this set, the agent needs to select the contract that maximizes the joint gain. A trade-off is then defined 
as: 
Definition 9 Given an offer, x, frvm agent a to b, and a subsequent counter offer, y, frvm agent b to a, with 
0= Va (x), a trade-offfor agent a with respect to y is defined as: 
trade-cff, (x, V) = arg max ISim(z, y)} (4.4) 
zEiso. (O) 
where the similarity, Sim, between two contracts is defined as a weighted combination of the similarity of 
the issues: 
Definition 10 The similarity between two contracts x and y over the set of issues J is defined as: 
Sim(x, Y) = 1: wj"Simj (xj, yj) (4.5) 
JEJ 
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with Ej, j wja =I and Simi being the similarity function for issue j. These weights may represent 
the level of importance the agent believes the opponent places on issues. For example, an oil company 
negotiator, in negotiation with an ecologist, may safely assume that the pollution risks are weighted more 
importantly by an ecologist than the oil production costs when reasoning about what deal to offer. 
Following the results from (Valverde 1985), a similarity function that satisfies the axioms of reflexivity, 
symmetry, and t-norm transitivity can always be defined as a conjunction (modeled, for instance, as the 
minimum) of appropriate fuzzy equivalence relations induced by a set of criteria functions hi. In fuzzy set 
theory, t-norm. or triangular norms, play a central role by providing generic models for intersection and 
union operations on fuzzy sets (Pedrycz & Comide 1998). A criteria function is a function that maps values 
from a given domain into values in [0,1]. Correspondingly, the similarity between two values for issue j, 
Si7nj (xj, yj) is defined as: 
Definition 11 Given a domain of values Dj, the similarity between two values xj, Yj E Dj is: 
Simj (xj, yj) =A (hi(xj) ++ hi(yj)) (4.6) 
I<i<m 
where {hl,.. -, h,. } is a set of comparison criteria with hi : Dji -+ 
[0,11 and ++ is an equivalence operator. 
Concrete criteria functions are given in section 5.4.1.3 and I- I h(xj) - h(yj) I is used as the equivalence 
operator (since this is a straightforward measure of the absolute distance between two points). 
Consider the example of colours in order to illustrate the modeling of similarity in a given domain. 
D,,, jours = {yellozv, violet, magenta, green, cyan, red .... }. In order to model how 'similar' two given 
colours are, different perceptive criteria can be considered. For instance, there are 'warm' colours and 
Gcold' colours. With respect to this criterion, yellow and orange are more similar that yellow and violet. 
Related to the 'warmness' of colours, Newton (Newton 1972) established in 1666 the proportionality factors 
between colours; that determine which should be the size of painted surfaces in order to be in perceptual 
equilibrium. For instance, yellow has luminosity 9 and violet luminosity 3. This means that if we paint two 
squares, one in yellow and one in violet, their surfaces have to be in relation I to 3 in order for the result 
to be in 'equilibrium'. that is, the yellow square must be one third of the violet square in size. Another 
relevant perceptual criterion of colours is their visibility. There are various physiological characteristics of 
the human visual field, distribution of cones and rods, that ensure some colours are better perceived when 
moving away than others (Marr 1982). Green is the colour with the worst visibility and yellow and cyan 
are those with the best visibility. Other criteria like memory or dynamicity have also been studied. These 
criteria can then be used to model the colour example as (functions are presented extensively as sets of pairs 
(input, output)): 
ht = {(yellow, 0-9), (violet, 0-1), (magenta, 0.1), green, 0.3), (cyan, 0.2), (red, 0.7) 1 
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(yellow, 0.9), (violet, 0-3), (magenta, 0.6), green, 0-6), (cyan, 0.4), (red, 0.8) 1 
h, =I (yellow, 1), (violet, 0.5), (magenta, 0.4), green, 0.1), (cyan, 1), (red, 0.2) 1 
where ht, hi and h, are the comparison functions corresponding to temperature (warm is 1, cold is 0), lumi- 
nosity (maximum is 1, minimum 0) and visibility (again maximum is I and minimum 0) respectively. With 
these functions and using min as conjunction, the following can be obtained through simple arithmetic: 
SiMcolour (yellow, green) = 
min (1 -I ht (yellow) - ht (green) 1,1 -Ih, (yellow) - h, (green) 1,1 -Ih, (yellow) - h, (green) 1) 
= min (0.4,0.7,0.1) = 0.1 
or, 
SiTncolour(cyan, violet) = min(O. 9,0.9,0.5) = 0.5 
4.5.2.3 The Trade-off Algorithm 
The trade-off algorithm performs an iterated hill-climbing search in a landscape of subset of the possible 
contracts. The search proceeds by successively generating contracts that lie closer to the iso-curve (repre- 
senting the agent's aspiration level), followed by the selection of the contract that maximizes the similarity 
to the opponent's last offering. The algorithm terminates when the last selected contract lies on the iso- 
curve. 
r step I 
2 
Figure 4.8: Schema of the trade-off algorithm with N=3 and S= 
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The algorithm, shown schematically in figure 4.8, starts at the contract y, the opponent's last offer, and 
moves towards the iso-curve (the solid line marked iso-curve in figure 4.8) associated with the agent's last 
offer, x. This approach to the iso-curve containing contract x is performed sequentially in S steps (three in 
figure 4.8). Each step starts by randomly generating N new contracts (three, one filled and two patterned 
ovals in figure 4-8) that have a utility E greater than the contract selected in the last step yJ (or yO =y 
if it is the first step). N is referred to as the number of children. Each new contract yJ+1 so generated 
satisfies v(YJ+I) = v(yi) + E, and they all have the same utility to the agent (shown as the dotted line 
connecting all the children at each step). From the generated children contracts, the one that maximizes the 
similarity with respect to the opponent's contract y is selected (shown as the filled oval that becomes the 
parent of the next set of children in figure 4.8). E is computed as the overall difference between the value 
y- The overall effect of the algorithm is of x and y divided by the number of steps. That is, E= 
'LO-EW. 
to sequentially explore a subset of the possible space of contracts and select for the next step the one that 
maximizes the similarity with respect to the other agent's contract offer. 
Presented below is the algorithm responsible for generating a new random contract. This algorithm 
will thus be invoked N times at each step in order to compute the best trade-off contract (giving SN calls 
in total). The algorithm generates children by splitting the step gain in utility, E, randomly among the set 
of issues under negotiation. 
This algorithm shows only the computations involved in making a single step, of size E in figure 4.8, 
towards the iso-curve specified by x. It functions as follows. Firstly, the maximum utility that can be 
gained for each issue is computed as the difference between the full aspiration of the agent's preferences 
and the utility of the contract that is being modified y (line 1). Note, at the first step of the algorithm 
iteration y will be the opponent's offered contract. In subsequent iterations the contract will be a sibiling of 
y. Each weighted individual utility gain is then summed to determine the overall weighted amount of utility 
that can be gained (line 2). Next, because the "consumption! 'of this utility gain has a random element (line 
5), a degree of tolerance is set to allow for a degree of fiexibility for the processes (steps between lines 
4 and 7) that may "overstep" the iso-curve (line 3). The process of consumption of the available utility 
(computed in line 2) begins by allowing each issue to consume a random amount (line 5) between 0 and 
the limits computed in line 1. The store of the total amount consumed by each issue E,, is then updated as 
the addition of the old store and a linear weighted sum of each of the individually consumed utilities (line 
6). The total amount that can be consumed is then recomputed given the newly consumed amount (line 
7). If the amount consumed is less than the total amount E the process of consumption continues until the 
maximum (E or the step size in figure 4-8) is reached. The utility gain of each issue is then normalized to 
I once the issues have consumed all of the step utility gain E (line 8). Finally, the utility gained by each 
issue is remapped to actual values that correspond to the new utility (line 9). 
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inputs: YJ; /* last step best contract. yo =Y 
E; /* step utility increase */ 
VO; /* value scoring function 
Outout: Vj+'; /* child of yj */ 
begin 
(1) V(yi); 
(2) Emaz: ýEwifi; 
(3) 6= O-OlEmaz 
if (Ema-, >E+ 3) then 
begin 
(4) k: = 0; E. :=0; 
while (E, < E) do 
k: = k+1; 
(5) rk := random(0, Fj); i 
(6) En := En + Fj wirik; 




(8) Ej :=E, I 
(9) y, 2+1 := vi I 
(vi(yJi) + Ej) ; 
end 
else raise error 
end 
P compute the maximum utility gain foreach issue*/ 
P compute the total maximum utility gain*/ 
P compute the average number of iterations*/ 
/* initialize number of steps and utility gain counters */ 
/* randomize utility gain for each issue 
/* update utility gained in iteration k */ 
/* compute potential utility gain for next iteration 
/* normalize the gains*/ 
/* compute value for each issue in new contract 
153 
Figure 4.9: The Trade-Off Algorithm 
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4.5.2.4 Algorithmic Complexity 
When analysing the complexity of the trade-off algorithm the first thing to note is that it includes a call to a 
random number generator inside the main loop (step 5). This has a direct impact on the number of iterations, 
and hence on the time the algorithm will take. Assuming the random number generator is probabilistic in 
nature, a 'big-O' analysis of the complexity cannot be made (Aho, Hopcroft, & Ullman 1985). However, 
what can be computed is an "average case" assuming that the random generator is perfect. 
Let n be the number of negotiation issues. Steps 1,5,6,7.8, and 9 all need a time which is O(n) 
(1 :5i< n). The time used by the algorithm will be proportional then to the number of iterations, k, of the 
while loop, multiplied by the cost of each iteration (which, as said, is 0(n)). That is, it will be proportional 
to kn. The possible magnitude of k is derived next. The while loop will terminate when En becomes bigger 
than E. It is known that before entering the loop for the first time En.,, = Ej wiTi and En. ý > 
E+6. En 
is the weighted addition of the portions rik generated 
by each iteration. On average, and assuming perfect 
random number generation, at every 
iteration En will be incremented by half of each issue's maximum 
2-L. 
Thus, in the first iteration, the algorithm potential utility gain given to the random generator, 
that is, E, E 
will consume a half of En,,.,, i. e. En =0+ Ej wi which 
is -E. In the second, a half of the remaining 22 
amount, that 
is a half of -E, i. e. -E. In general, the algorithm consumes 
E 
24 44n2ý- at step 
k and leaves 
Ew E The average value for k can en 
. g- 
for the next step. That is, En at step k is En = En.. - th 
2 
be computed as a function of the 
difference between E... and E. Given that the algorithm stops when 
E>E 
E,, > E, have Em,, x - L: ý2-9LL > 
E, that is, En.. -E ý=PL& . 
The step before had E>E,,,., ý - 
E. 
2 
As En.. -E>6 is considered to Taking this latter inequality, it is easy to see that 
k<I+ log 
be true, then k<1+ log 
E 7-. A policy to decide which value to assign to 6 could be to fix its value as 
a percentage of 
Emax. For instance, making 6a 1% of Enaz would mean that k<1+ 109 E- , that 0.01Eý., 
is k<1+ log100 < 8; eight iterations on average. 
Summarizing, if 6 is fixed as a percentage c of Em.., 
it can be see that the average number of 
iterations is k1+ logic. Thus, on average the total time of the 
algorithm 
is proportional to (1 + log 
1)n. 
c 
Thus, the average time the algorithm takes to complete is linear with respect to the number of issues 
in the negotiation. This linearity 
is a desirable property of the algorithm considering one of the aims of this 
research has 
been to develop decision mechanisms that respect the computational limitations of the agents. 
The trade-off mechanism can grow 
in complexity, although only linearly, with growing number of issues. 
However, an agent can reason explicitly about the time costs of engaging 
in trade-off negotiation given 
knowledge of the above analysis that the complexity grows 
linearly with the number of issues. Therefore, 
as complexity grows then agents can reason 
about what course of action to take. For example, if during the 
negotiation the number of 
issues grows to such an extent that the trade-off computation becomes too costly, 
then an agent wanting to 
implement a trade-off may use the issue-manipulation mechanism to remove some 
4.6. The Issue Set Manipulation Mechanism 155 
issues. This reduces the costs involved in the trade-off deliberation. Generally, the complexity levels of the 
trade-off algorithm can be used as triggers for initiating issue-manipulation mechanism that may help reduce 
the complexity of the trade-off algorithm. This decision can be made by the meta-strategy component of 
the agent architecture (section 4.7). 
4.6 The Issue Set Manipulation Mechanism 
The other deliberation mechanism is the issue set manipulation. One motivation behind the design of this 
Imechanism has been the need to escape the problem of local minima in the social welfare function. This 
can be achieved through restructuring the problem. Recall that a local minima in the social welfare function 
refers to the negotiation context where the utility of the exchanged contracts is the same as the previous 
step-the agents are exchanging the same contracts, hence the joint utility of the possible deal given the 
exchanged contract, or the social welfare function, is constant. 
At other times it is not the need to escape local minima that motivates modification of the issues in- 
volved. in negotiation, but rather agents preferences over dimensions of services that can be substituted, 
removed or added to. Note that whereas the trade-off mechanism operates over the complementary dimen- 
sions of a service, the issue-set manipulation operates over the dimensions of a service that are modifiable 
(Topkis 1988). For example, in the telecommunication scenario (section 1.4.2), agents negotiate over a 
static set of issues, informally defined as core issues. However, the negotiation between SPAs and NPAs 
additionally consists of offers over non-core issues. For example, a SPA may begin QoS negotiation with a 
jVpA specifying only Bandwidth. However, subsequently NPA may decide to include into the QoS negoti- 
ation a packetloss issue with a high value if SPA has demanded a high capacity Bandwidth. Alternatively, 
SPA may decide to remove the Bandwidth issue from the QoS negotiation with NPA if IPCA has changed 
its demand from a high quality video service to a standard audio service. Similarly, as shown in the example 
of agreement over the firing of the police commissioner by both the police office union and city hall (section 
4.2.2). issues can also be removed when agents agree to their resolution. 
4.6.1 Issue Manipulation Evaluation 
The evaluation of a contract from the perspective of the issue manipulation mechanism is defined as: 
withdraw(a, b) If t> ta 
sue-manipulate tft) If Va 
max 
ý: Va lai 





newset(a, b, S) otherwise 
where the content of the primitive newset (S in figure 4.2) is computed by the functions given in equations 
4.7 that expand or equations 4.8 and 4.9 that reduce the set of negotiation issues (section 4.6.2). Note the 
similarity between this evaluation and the responsive (section 4.4.1) and trade-off mechanism's (section 
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4.5.1) evaluation functions. It terminates successfully if the utility of the new set of issues (and their 
corresponding values) is greater than the newset he agent is about to offer. 
4.6.2 Issue Set Manipulation: A Formal Model 
Negotiation processes are directed and centered around the resolution of conflicts over a set of issues J. 
This set may consist of one or more issues (distributed and integrative bargaining respectively). For sim- 
plification, the ontology of the set of possible negotiation issues, J. is assumed to be shared knowledge 
amongst the agents. It is further assumed that agents begin negotiation with a pre-specified set of "core' 
issues, Jc*"* C J. and possibly other mutually agreed non-core set members, J"cOre C J. Alterations to 
JcOl*e are not permitted since some features such as the Price of services are mandatory. However, ele- 
ments of J"` can be altered dynamically. Agents can add or remove issues into j-core as they search 
for new possible, and up to now unconsidered, solutions. 
If Jt is the set of issues being used at time t (where J1 = (ji, ..., j, 1), 1- il is the set of issues 
not being used at time t, and xt., b = (xUl],... xU,, ]) is a's current offer to b at time t, then issue set 
manipulation is defined through two operators: add and remove. 
The add operator assists the agent in selecting an issue j' from J- JI, and an associated value xD'], 
that gives the highest score to the agent. 
Definition 12 7he best issue to add to the set JI is defined as: 
add(J') =arg max, { max V(xt 9 xU])} (4.7) jEJ-J z[jJEDJ 
where o standsfor concatenation. 
An issue's score evaluation is also used to define the remove operator in a similar fashion. This operator 
assists the agent in selecting the best issue to remove from the current negotiation set Jt. 
Definition 13 7he best issue to removefrom the set P (from a's perspective), is defined as: 
remove(J') = arg max ... 
IV'(x)1 (4.8) 
jiEJ$-Je 
with x= (X'Uil, ---, X'Ui+ll, X'U. 
1) 
The remove operator can also be defined in terms of the aforementioned similarity function (section 
4.5.2.2). This type of similarity-based remove operator selects from two given offers x, from agent a 
to b. and y, from agent b to a, which issue to remove in order to maximize the similarity between x and y. 
Therefore, compared to the previous rernove operator, this mechanism can be considered as more cooper- 
ative: 
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Definition 14 7he best issue to removefrom a's perspectivefrom the set P is defined as: 
remove(J') = arg max.,. {sim(x', y)} (4.9) 
ii Eji _je 
with x'= (xUil,... xUi-il, xUi+ll,... xU, ]), and y= (yU, ],... yUi-, ], yUi+, ],... yU,, ]) 
It is not possible to define a similarity-based add operator since the introduction of an issue does not permit 
an agent to make comparisons with the opponent's last offer (simply because there is no value offered over 
that issue). 
Another computational requirement of these mechanisms is the need for an agent to dynamically re- 
compute the issue weights. The re-computation of weights is defined by first specifying the importance of 
the added issue, Ij, with respect to the average importance of other issues. That is, the weight the new issue 
should have in the set of issues with respect to the weight of the other issues- Ij = wjl(Ei, j wi/n), 
where n is the new number of issues. Then: 
Definition 15 The weight ofadded issue j, wj, is defined as: 
ii 
wj : -- (n - 1) + Ij 
W! S = 
(1 - wj)wi Vi E Yl.... P 
Wo i0i 
where wj is the importance of the issue j, n is the new number of issues, wi is the old weight for issue i and 
wil is its new weight after the inclusion of issue j. Thus computation of w'i attempts to "fit" in the weights 
of other issues within the "space left over" when the new issue has been included. 
Re-computation of weights when an issue is removed in turn is defined simply as re-normalizing the 
remaining weights: 
Definition 16 7he weight of the remaining issues i after an issue j has been removed is defined as: 
1 
1-wj 
Agents deliberate over how to combine these add and remove operators in a manner that maximizes some 
measure such as the contract score. However, a search of the tree of possible operators to find the optimum 
set of issues may be computationally expensive because the size of the search tree can grow to combi- 
natorially large sizes. This problem is not addressed in this thesis and is postponed for future work by 
implementing anytime algorithms that produce closer to optimal search results when given increasingly 
more time, but nonetheless produce, possibly sub-optimal, results when they are stopped anytime (Aho, 
Hopcroft, & Ullman 1985). Then given these algorithms and the negotiation time limits it is possible to 
compute a, possibly sub-optimal, solution that increases some measure such as the contract score or social 
welfare. 
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4.7 The Meta Strategy Mechanism 
The fact that there are three potential choices of mechanisms to use for generating a proposal poses another 
decision problem for the agent, namely which to use. This decision is referred to as the meta-strategy of 
the agent since the process involves making decisions about which of the decisions should be selected for 
the generation of the proposal. Recall the argument from section 2.2.8 for the need to develop not only 
Computationally tractable search algorithms that can traverse problem state-spaces that may be deep with 
wide branching factors (figure 2.3) and can operate under strict time limits, but also the need for reasoning 
rnechanisms about these different algorithms. This meta reasoning is needed because each algorithm carries 
different costs and benefits. 
Another role of a meta strategy in negotiation, apart from a cost and benefit analysis of each mechanism 
in a given environment, can be described through an example that shows different "negotiation dancee' 
(Raiffa 1982) implemented by the responsive and trade-off mechanisms (figure 4.10). Issue manipulation 
dynamics are not represented since the behaviour of this mechanism is to alter the space of possible deals. 
The filled ovals are the values of the offered contracts from agent I to agent 2 from agent I's perspecfive, 
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and the unfilled ovals represent the converse, the value of the offered contracts from agent 2 to agent I from 
agent 2s perspective. The filled oval at 
(0.5,0.5) represents the reference point (section 3.1.4). 
Figure 4.10 A represents one hypothetical execution trace where both agents generate contracts with 
the responsive mechanism. Each offer has lower utility for the agent who makes the offer, but relatively 
more utility for the other (movement towards the reference point). This process continues until the second 
condition of the responsive evaluation function (section 4.4.1) of one of the agents is satisfied (Va (xbt_O. ) 
Va(x to 
a-+b))--referred to as 
the cross-over in utilities earlier. The responsive mechanism can select different 
outcomes based on the rate of concession adopted for each issue (the angle of approach to the reference 
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point in figure 4.10 A). Although in figure 4.10 A this final outcome is hypothetically represented as the 
reference point, it will be concretely shown in the next chapter that this is not necessarily the case if each 
agent assigns a different rate of concession according to the weight of the issues involved-responsive 
mechanisms can also reach better deals than reference. 
Figure 4.10 B represents another hypothetical execution trace where both agents now generate con- 
tracts with the trade-off mechanism. Now each offer has the same utility for the agent who makes the offer, 
but relatively more utility for the other (movement towards the pareto-optimal line). The trade-off mecha- 
nism searches for outcomes that are of the same utility to the agent, but which may result in a higher utility 
for the opponent. This is schematically shown in figure 4.10 as a line of approach directed towards the 
pareto-optimal line. Once again, this is a simplification for purposes of the exposition-an offer generated 
by agent I may indeed have decreasing utility to agent 2 (arrow moving away from the pareto-optimal line) 
if the similarity function being used does not correctly induce the preferences of the other agent. 
A meta strategy (figure 4.10 Q is then one that combines either "dance' towards an outcome. One 
rationale for the use of a meta-strategy mentioned above is reasoning about the costs and benefits of different 
search mechanisms. However, an additional rationale, observable from the example shown in figure 4.10 
B, is to escape from the local minima of the social welfare function. If the social welfare function is 
taken to be the pareto-optimal line, which maximizes the sum of the individual utilities, then, because of 
the privacy of information (an important feature of many domains, section 1.4.3). agents can not make an 
interpersonal comparison of individual utilities in order to compute whether their offers do indeed lie on, 
or are approaching, the pareto optimal line which measures the global goodness of offers. " Given that 
the position of offers with respect to the pareto-optimal line can not be compared and the fact that the 
evaluation function of the trade-off mechanism (section 4.5.1) only terminates when the time runs out or 
there is a cross-over of utilities, then the agents enter a loop of exchanging the same contract with one 
another. That is they remain in a local minima. A solution is therefore needed to escape this local minima. 
Figure 4.10 C shows one such solution where the local minima is escaped by both agents switching to 
a responsive mechanism and conceding utility. This concession may, as shown in figure 4.10 C, indeed 
satisfy the second condition of the trade-off evaluation function where offers cross-over in utilities (thereby 
terminating the negotiation process). Alternatively, agents may resume implementing a trade-off algorithm 
until such a cross-over is eventually reached or time limits are passed. Alternatively, the meta-strategy may 
change the problem state-space by implementing the issue-manipulation mechanism which changes the set 
of possible outcomes through adding or removing issue(s). 
II Indeed, another p otocol may be to allow one agent to "change points on its iso-curve and let the other agent select the one that 
maximizes its utility (Raiffa 1982). However, this protocol assumes agents will not only reveal their preferences, but will also do so 
honestly (assumptions which are not made in this thesis). 
Chapter4. A Service-Oziented Negotiation Model 160 
The above example shows how different combinations of mechanisms, by either both or the individual 
agents, leads to different final outcomes. For instance, a meta strategy which continuously switches between 
responsive and trade-off mechanisms creates a contract score trace that is similar to an ever decreasing step 
function. Conversely, a meta strategy that only permits the responsive mechanism to generate contracts 
results in a contract score trace which may (depending on the parameters of the responsive mechanism) 
decrease in a linear fashion. Note, that at the first time step in its negotiation an agent must choose the 
responsive mechanism. It then has a choice of other mechanisms in the course of negotiation. This is 
because the trade-off mechanism must have a previous contract to compute the iso-contract curve. 
In general, the evaluation of which search should be implemented is delegated to a meta-level reasoner 
whose decisions can be based on factors such as the opponent's perceived strategy, the on-line cost of 
communication, the off-line cost of the search algorithm (or its path cost), the structure of the problem or 
the optimality of the search mechanism in terms of completeness (finding an agreement when one exists), 
the time and space complexity of the search mechanism, and the solution optimality of the mechanism 
when more than one agreement is feasible. A formal treatment of a meta-strategy is postponed for future 
work. However, the contributions of this work with respect to the meta-strategy are the identification of 
the computational role and rationale of meta-strategies in the dynamics of negotiation processes that often 
involve uncertainties and computational boundedness. Furthermore, the role and effect of candidate meta- 
strategies are also empirically analyzed in the next chapter. 
4.8 Summary 
A formal decision architecture of the wrapper framework and two protocols of interactions were presented 
in this chapter. The decision architecture is based on three mechanisms: responsive, trade-off and issue 
set manipulation. The rationale for their design was provided in terms of computational, information and 
motivational states of an agent. The responsive mechanism is computationally simple and requires only 
minimal information about the state of the other agent. An agent that implements a responsive strategy is 
motivated by pressing environmental needs to terminate negotiation and reach an agreement that has lower 
social welfare or joint utility. Conversely, deliberative mechanisms (trade-off and issue set manipulation) 
may increase the social welfare-hence an agent that implements a deliberation mechanism is said to be 
motivated by concern for social welfare. However, these mechanisms are computationally more complex 
and their operations require more information about their opponent. 
The next chapter empirically analyses the behaviour of a number of concrete agent architectures that 
directly follow from the presented generic model. The aim of these experiments is to test the behaviour of 
the responsive and trade-off mechanisms in a number of different environments. Empirical analysis of the 
issue set manipulation mechanism is deferred to future work, since algorithms must first be designed. 
Chapter 5 
Empirical Evaluation 
This chapter is a description of the evaluation phase of the research. The model presented in the previous 
chapter defines and formalizes a range of negotiation behaviours which can be implemented by the wrapper. 
However, which of these behaviours will be successful in which negotiation contexts cannot be predicted 
from the theoretical model alone. This is because: a) the developed model only specifies a negotiation 
framework that can be "tuned" to the needs of a negotiating agent designer, b) there are a large number of 
interrelated variables within the wrapper and a broad range of situations that need to be considered, and c) 
some parts of the model are heuristic in nature (for example, a meta-strategy that engages in trade-off mech- 
anism always until a local minimum in the social welfare function is detected is a decision heuristic whose 
efficacy across different types of environments can not be determined a priori; see section 3.3). The designer 
who uses the wrapper needs additional information about the interaction profiles of the components of the 
wrapper and it is the "tuning" of these profiles which produces the results. Therefore the approach adopted 
in this research has been to empirically evaluate representative components of the wrapper with the final 
aim of determining the most successful behaviours in various types of situations. The experiments reported 
here are exploratory studies (Cohen 1995). In such studies, general hypothesis are formed that state the 
underlying intuitions about causal factors. Experiments are then conducted by creating a simulation "lab- 
oratory" that generates data, the observation of which either supports or refutes these general hypothesis. 
Manipulation studies, on the other hand, are more specific and investigate the system via detailed causal 
hypothesis. As Cohen notes, exploratory experiments help us to 'find needles in the haystack whereas 
manipulation experiments put the needles under the microscope, and fell us whether they are needles and 
whether they are sharp', ' (Cohen 1995), p. 6. 
5.1 The Experiment Set 
Three sets of experiments are reported in this chapter. One set relates to the empirical evaluation of the 
responsive mechanism of the wrapper (sections 5.3. and 5.4), other to the trade-off mechanism (section 
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5.5) and final one to the meta-strategy mechanism (section 5.6). For the reasons outlined in section 4.8, 
the issue-manipulation mechanism is currently excluded from the analysis. The responsive experiments 
are divided into two complementary sections. In the first section (section 5.3) the investigation is focused 
on determining the behaviour and inter-dependencies of the responsive model's basic constituent elements, 
namely tactical decision making. This analysis will then lay the foundation for subsequent experimental 
work reported in section 5.4 which investigates strategic decision making. Throughout this chapter the 
former experiments will be referred to as either non-strategic or pure-strategy experiments because tactics 
are assigned a binary weight value foryij of either 0 or 1, and this value is static throughout he negotiation 
thread. Alternatively, the latter experiments will be referred to as strategic, since the tactics' weights can 
be assigned any value in the interval [0,1]. Strategic experiments are further subdivided into static strategy 
and dynamic strategy experiments, for experiments where the weight of a tactic is static throughout the 
negotiation or dynamically modified in the course of negotiation, respectively. Section 5.5 reports on the 
experimental procedure and outcomes of the empirical evaluation of the trade-off mechanism. Finally, 
section 5.6 details the empirical evaluation of the meta strategy mechanism. 
Before this, however, the next section discusses the foundational principles of the design of the exper- 
iments. 
5.2 Experimental Design Principles 
A negotiation context can involve many issues and parties with different agent aspiration levels and time 
limits. To handle this environmental complexity experimental design consideration, together with a number 
of simplifying assumptions, are necessary for empirical analysis of the negotiation model that is embedded 
in such a complex environment. Experimental design principles define and categorize the variables of the 
-laboratory". These design principles are expanded on in this section. 
Experimental variables can either be independent or dependent (Cohen 1995). Independent variables 
are defined as those variables whose values are under the control of the experimenter. Dependent variables, 
in turn, are defined as those variables whose values are not under the control of the experimenter. Instead, 
the values of these are observed by the experimenter as measurements. The type of either of these variables 
must be one of the following: i) categorical, ii) ordinal or iii) interval (Cohen 1995). With categorical 
variables, the measurement (for dependent variables) or assignment process (for independent variables) 
designates a category label to the variable. For example, the categorical dependent variable outcome can be 
assigned a value Accept or Withdraw after making a measurement. Ordinal variables, on the other hand, 
can be ranked, but the distances between these points are meaningless. For example, the time deadline of 
negotiation for the experiments, t" ,., is designed as an ordinal independent variable which can 
be assigned M 
values long, medium and short term. Distances between ordinal scales are meaningless (it can not be said 
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that the difference between long and short is equal to medium). Finally, with interval (or ratio) scales 
both the distances between variable points and the ratios between data sets are meaningful. For example, 
distances in the amount of utility a mechanism procures for an agent can be compared not only in a single 
trial but also across trials. A condition for ratio scale parameters is that the zero point is known. 
Variables can also be transformed by mapping from one scale into another. Mapping information from 
one scale into another enables i) analysis of the types of environments and ii) statistical operations that were 
previously inaccessible (see description below for examples). Transformation of scale is useful because it 
can be used as a data abstraction tool since it allows analysis of groups, or types, of environments rather than 
individual, concrete environments. For example, transformation of negotiation deadlines from an interval 
scale into a ranked ordinal scale is an abstraction tool that ignores the actual differences within and across 
the groups of variables long, medium and short term deadlines and instead emphasizes the differences in 
rankings. Members that have a long term negotiation deadline have values for t,... that are higher than 
short term members. Nothing is said about their magnitudes. 
5.3 Non-Strategic Experiments 
The aim of this set of experiments is to investigate the behaviour of individual tactics (non-strategic) for 
decision making in a number of environments. A knowledge of how individually different pure tactics 
behave in different environments can then be captured as decision guidelines for the responsive strategic 
decision making component of the wrapper. 
The experiments involve selecting a particular tactic, generating a range of random environments, then 
allowing the agent to negotiate using the chosen tactic against an opponent who employs a range of other 
tactics. Various experimental measures related to the negotiations are then recorded. In particular, section 
5.3.1 defines the experimental environments and the tactics, section 5.3.3 describes the experimental mea- 
sures, section 5.3.2 defines the experimental procedure, section 5.3.4 describes the experimental hypotheses 
and discusses the results, and finally section 5.3.4.4 summarizes the results and conclusions reached. 
53.1 Experimental Independent Variables 
The experimental independent variables are discussed in this section. In pure-strategy experiments, inde- 
pendent variables are defined in terms of i) environments of negotiation (section 5.3.1.1) and ii) the tactics 
available for decision making (section 5.3.1.2). The complete set of independent variables is shown in fig- 
ure 5.1. The assignment of values to independent variables is under the control of the experimenter who 
is constrained by limiting the complexity of analysis. The variable scale denotes the type of the variable 
(either categorical or interval), variable range denotes the set of possible values available which can be 
assigned to the variable and variable transformation denotes the mapping from one scale to another. 
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Figure 5.1: Pure Strategy Experimental Independent Variables 
5.3.1.1 Environments 
Environments, in these experiments, are characterized by the number of agents they contain, the issues 
which are being discussed, the deadlines by when agreements must be reached and the expectations of the 
agents. Since there are infinitely many potential environments (infinite number of agents and issues), select- 
ing a representative and finite subset of environments is necessary to find a means of assessing an agent's 
negotiation performance. To this end, experiments are conducted between only two agents, categorically 
labelled as client and server, negotiating over only a single issue, price. The last simplification is relaxed 
in the next set of experiments where agents negotiate over a number of issues. Since there is only one issue, 
its weight (wja) can only be assigned the value of 1. The position of the initial offer on the reservation values 
(r. a, section 4.4.2.1) is transformed from an interval independent variable to an ordinal scale of high and 
low initial offers (see section 5.3.4.3 for details of the transformation). 
The negotiation interval, [minj, maxj"], is also an interval valued independent variable whose scale 
is infinite. To overcome this problem, an agent's reservation values are transformed to an ordinal scale 
whose actual scale is computed as follows. The difference between the agent's minimum and maximum 
values, for price, is computed using two variables: Oa (the length of the reservation interval for an agent 
a) and 4ý (the degree of intersection between the reservation intervals of the two agents; ranging between 
0 for full overlap and 0.99 for virtually no overlap). In this case, for each environment, the independent 
variable min' is assigned value 10 (min' price price ý-- 
10). 4ý is set to 0 (4ý = 0), Oa is randomly selected 
between the ranges of 110,30) for both agents, and the negotiation intervals are computed as maxc = 
minc + 01; min' = Oc-lý + minc; max' = min' + 0'. Note, these values for computing the interval 
lengths of the interval value are chosen arbitrarily because the scoring function of the offers models the 
ordinal and not the cardinal relationships between the reservation values. ' 
The independent variable t' ... which assigns the negotiation deadline of the experiments for each M 
agent, is transformed from the interval to an ordinal scale of short and long term deadlines. This transfor- 
Note the server's minimum reservation value is never lower than the clienf s minimum. This is because degenerate negotiations 
in which offers arc immediately accepted are not interesting. 71is method of generating reservation values also means a deal is always 
possible since there is always some degree of overlap. 
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mation facilitates the analysis of outcomes in groups of deadlines, ignoring the differences within a group 
and emphasizing the differences across the groups. The group long term deadlines is defined as samples 
within the values of 30 - 60 ticks of a discrete clock. Short term deadlines are defined as samples within 
values 2- 10 ticks of a discrete clock. 
Given this situation, the experimental environment is uniquely defined by the following variables: 
[te .., nc, xl, minc - maxc -, mins ., ma in pricet price I price 
xPoricel. 
5.3.1.2 Tactics 
The second simplification involves selecting a finite range of tactics, since the model allows for an infi- 
nite set (e. g the range of P is infinite which means there are infinitely many time dependent tactics). For 
analytical tractability, the tactics are divided into nine groups (see figure 5.2); three each from the time, 
resource and behaviour dependent families. An equal number for each family is chosen to ensure the re- 
sults are not skewed by having more encounters with a particular type of tactic. The three members of the 
time-dependent family are chosen to correspond to behaviours that concede in time in a boulware, linear 
and conceder fashion. These categories of behaviours are chosen since they represent extreme behaviours; 
(boulware and conceder) as well as an in-between control rate (linear) which concedes linearly. These 
categories of time-dependent tactics correspond to the transformation of interval values for P into the ordi- 
nal scale 0.01 - 0.2 for the boulware category, 1.0 for the linear category and 20 - 40 for the conceder 
category. The three members of the resource-dependent family are also chosen that correspond to a de- 
creasing rate of concession as the rate of resources used increases. These categories of resource-dependent 
tactics correspond to the transformation of interval values for 14 into the ordinal scale 1 for the impatient 
category, (1,5) for the steady category and 15,10} for the patient category. Finally, the three members of 
the behaviour-dependent family are also chosen to correspond to the different types of imitation according 
to the given sub-family parameters. 
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5.3.2 Experimental Procedure 
The experimental procedure consists of sampling each tactic group for every environment since the subject 
of interest is the behaviour of tactic families rather than single, concrete tactics. For each environment ek, 
k indexes the environments, two matrices are defined to represent the outcomes of the client, gameek, and 
the server, game',,,, when playing particular tactics. The client's tactics are indexed by the rows i and the 
server's by the columns j, so gameeA- [i, j] is the outcome of the client when playing tactic i against a server C 
playing tactic j. Each tactic plays against all other tactics in each environment, hence 1<i, j :59. 
To produce statistically meaningful results, the experimental measures described below are averaged 
over a number of environments and summed against all other tactics for each agent. Therefore this analysis 
is based on the performance of a tactic family across all other tactic families. The precise set of environ- 
ments is sampled from the parameters specified in section 5.3.1 and the number of environments used is 
200. This ensures that the probability of the sampled mean deviating by more than 0.01 from the true mean 
is less than 0.05. The experiments were written in Sicstus3.7.1 Prolog and ran on SunOs 4.5 Unix machines. 
5.3.3 Experimental Dependent Variables 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the tactics, the following measures are considered which calibrate: 0 the 
intrinsic benefit of the tactic family to an agent (section 5.3.3.1); ii) the cost adjusted benefit which moder- 
ates the intrinsic benefit with some measure of the cost involved in achieving that benefit (section 5.3.3.2) 
and iii) the performance of the intrinsic utility relative to a control condition (section 5.3.3.3). 
5.3.3.1 Intrinsic Agent Utility 
The intrinsic benefit is modeled as the agent's utility for the negotiation's final outcome, in a given environ- 
ment, independently of the time taken and the resources consumed (Russell & Wefald 1991). This utility, 
U. el,, is calculated for each agent for a price x using a linear scoring function: 2 
max eice -Z U,, ek('T) = 
maze je. -min 




if no deal is made in a particular negotiation, then the value zero (the conflict point, see section 3.1.4) is 
assigned to both UIh and U, ",. However, by defining the utilities in this manner no distinction can be made 
between deals made at reservations and no deals. Therefore in certain experiments the intrinsic utility is 
only computed for cases in which deals are made. 
The outcome of the negotiations, as presented in the previous subsection, is represented in the matrix 
garnee'. Hence the utility for a client c when negotiating using a tactic i against a server s using tactic j in a 
environment ek is U, 'h (game", [i, j]). C 
2The simplicity of this utility function is acknowledged4 but the intention here is to investigate the properties of the model and not 
the utility functions per se. The role of the utility function is evaluated in section 5.5 
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5.3.3.2 Cost Adjusted Benefit 
In addition to knowing the intrinsic utility of a tactic to an agent, the relationship between an outcome's 
utility and the costs involved in achieving it is also useful information in making strategic or meta-strategic 
decisions about the costs of a given mechanism (see argument in section 4.7). The type of cost considered 
in these experiments is on-line, as opposed to off-line cost, because the former are more machine or re- 
source independent than the latter. For example, calculating the off-line computational cost of a mechanism 
may require calibration of performance with respect to memory usage, speed and time which is machine 
architecture dependent. On-line costs, on the other hand, are not dependent on the architecture of the agent, 
but rather the load the agent's reasoning process places on the communication infrastructure. 
The cost adjusted benefit (B) of tactic pairs i and j in environment ek is defined as follows: 
B. 'k (i, j] = U. " [i, il - C. 'h [i, 
To define the on-line cost function, C, the notion of a system is introduced. A system, in these experiments, 
is a set of resources that can be used by the agents during their negotiations. The usage of these resources 
is subject to a tax T which is levied on each message communicated between the agents. Therefore, the 
greater the communication between the agents, the greater the cost to the agents. So: 
tanh(IX,,,,,., I *T) 
where I Xý, ++. j I is the length of the thread at the end of negotiation between a client using tactic i and a 
server using tactic j. tanh is an increasing function that maps the real numbers into [0,1] and 7determines 
the rate of change of tanho. T is sampled between the ranges of [0.001,0.1]. In short, the greater the 
taxation system, the more costly the communication and the quicker the rate at which the cost rises to an 
agent for each message. 
The system utility, on the other hand, is coarsely defined as the total number of messages in negotiation 
which indirectly measures the communication load the tactics incur at the agent level. 
5.3.3.3 Experimental Controls 
The control conditions for these experiments are based on the arguments from cooperative game theory, 
presented in section 3.1.4. The outcome attained by a pair of tactic families is compared with the regular 
Nash solution (equation 3.1 and figure 3.2 A, section 3.1.4), implemented by a protocol in which agents 
declare their true reservation prices (an incentive compatible and direct protocol, section 3.1.8) at the first 
step of negotiation and then share the overlap in the declared reservation values. This choice is both fair 
(i. e. is Nash) and pareto optimal (in that the outcome is beneficial to both agents and any deviation results in 
an increase in utility for one at the cost of a decrease in utility to the other). For example, consider a client 
agent c and a server agent s having price reservation values [minPcrj,,, maxPcjj and [minP8, jc., maxp8, jcj 
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respectively and max' -> min' -. The control outcome 0 for a given environment eA: is then defined price - PrSC 
as: 
C)eA, = 
maxc -+ mins I price 
2 
Applying the definitions of utility presented earlier, the utility of the control game, U. 'h (0", ), for agent a 
can then be computed. Given this, the comparative performance of agents using the responsive mechanism 
of the wrapper with respect to the one shot protocol, is defined as the difference between the intrinsic agent 
utility and the utility the agent would have received in the control protocol: 
Gaina" [il il = U. 'k (gamea" 
li, il) - U, ' "' (0") 
5.3.4 Hypotheses and Results 
The experiments considered here relate to two main components of the negotiation model: i) the amount 
_, and 
ii) the relative value of the initial offer, r. These two of time available to make an agreement, t1m. a 
factors are chosen because the parameters which influence the behaviour of the tactics (with the exception 
of resource-dependent tactics for N number of agents) are dependent on the available time limits and the 
initial offers, rather than the number of agents, the number of issues, their weights or their reservation values 
(note that these variables are constant in these experiments). 
To test the effects of varying deadlines on agreements, the experiments are classified into environments 
where the time to reach an agreement is large (section 5.3.4.1) and those where it is small (section 5.3.4.2). 
Likewise for initial offers; there are environments in which the initial offer is near the minimum of the 
agent's reservation values and those where it is near the maximum (section 5.3.4.3). The reservation values 
are computed as described in section 5.3.1 with 01 = 011 = 30 and (b =0 (refer to figure 5.2 for the key to 
the experimental tactics). Each abbreviation is further postfixed by the agent's role (e. g BC and BS denote 
a client and a server playing tactic B respectively). 
5.3.4.1 Long Tenn Deadlines 
The hypotheses about the effect of long term deadlines are: 
Hypothesis 1: In environments where there is plenty of time for negotiation, tactics which 
slowly approach their reservation values will gain higher intrinsic utilities than those which 
have a quicker rate ofapproach. However, they will makefewer deals. 
Hypothesis 2: The utility to the system will be high when tactics have long deadlines since 
large numbers of offers will be exchanged. Consequently, there will be a large difference be- 
tween a deal's intrinsic and cost adjusted utilities. 
Concrete values need to be provided for the experimental variables to evaluate these hypotheses. In this 



























Figure 5.3: Average Intrinsic Utilities and Deals Made for Pure-Strategy Experiments in Long Term Dead- 
lines: A) Average Intrinsic Utility For Both Deals And No Deals, B)Average Intrinsic Utility For Deals 
Only, Q Percentage of Deals Made, D) Average Intrinsic Utility For Both Deals and No Deals for Increas- 
ing Values of P. 
are sampled within thirty and sixty ticks of a discrete clock. Note that t' ., >t, ' .. and tc 8 M m 
tmax 
are permitted. Since high values of Ka over-constrain the true behaviour of tactics, the value of r. is set 
to 0.1 for both agents. In each environment, the order of who begins the negotiation process is randomly 
selected. 3 Considering hypothesis I first. It was predicted that a tactic which approaches reservations at the 
slowest rate (Le a Boulware) should attain the best deals. However, from figure 5.3. A the observation is that 
the most successful tactics are Linear, Patient and Steady. These tactics are characterized by the fact that 
they concede at a steady rate throughout the negotiation process. The next most successful group are the 
behaviour dependent tactics. Note, these imitative tactics never do better than other tactics; the best they 
3The initiator of a bid is randomly chosen because in earlier experiments it was found that the agent which opens the negotiation 
fairs better, irrespective of whether the agent is a client or a server. This is because the agent who begins the negotiation round reaches 
CIO .=1 before the other agent, hence deriving more 
intrinsic utility. See section 2.2.5 for further arguments concerning the PrSce 
(dis)advantagcs of the opening bid. 
Chapter5. Empirical Evaluation 170 
do is gain equal utility to the best tactic (Axelrod 1984). The worst performing tactics are Conceder and 
Impatient, both of which rapidly approach their reservation values. 
The observation that Boulware tactics make significantly fewer deals than all the other tactic families 
(figure 5.3. Q helps explain Boulware's unexpectedly poor performance. Taking this into account, the 
average intrinsic utility for only those cases in which deals are made (figure 5.3. B) was examined. This 
shows that when Boulwares do make deals, they do indeed receive a high individual utility (as predicted). 
It is hypothesized that the reason why Boulware tactics perform poorly is caused by the imitating 
responses of the behaviour dependent tactics, thereby effectively increasing the numbers of Boulwares in 
the population. To test this, the final average intrinsic utility for deals only of Boulware tactics is compared 
across: i) all other tactics and ii) all other tactics apart from behaviour dependent tactics. It is found that 
the success of Boulware tactics increased by 10% in the latter case. 
From these observations, it can be concluded that the initial hypothesis does not hold because of the 
composition of the tactic population. It is predicted that in an environment in which there is plenty of 
time to reach a deal, Boulware should rank higher than tactics that approached reservation values quickly. 
However, for Boulwares to prosper in the experimental environment, they should adopt a value for P which 
is between 0.7 and 1.0 (figure 5.3. D). 
Moving onto the second hypothesis. Figure 5AA confirms the results for the first part of this hy- 
pothesis; the tactic that uses the most system resource is Boulware and the least is Conceder. In addition, 
although Boulware tactics have higher intrinsic agent utilities than conciliatory tactics (Conceder and Im- 
patient), when the the cost of communication is taken into consideration the converse is true (figures 5.4.13). 
This accords with the intuitions in the second part of hypothesis 2. The cost adjusted utilities of the remain- 
ing tactics are approximately similar. The reason for this is that cost adjusted benefit, which is the product 
of the intrinsic utility and a function of the number of exchanged messages, is sensitive to large fluctuations 
in the product and assigns similar utilities to non-extreme values. 
Finally, it can be observed that the comparison of the tactics with respect to the controls follows the 
same broad pattern as the intrinsic agent utility (figure 5.4. Q. Steadily conceding type tactics (Linear, 
Steady and Patient) on average perform better than the controls, the conciliatory types (Conceder and Im- 
patient) perform worse. This is to be expected, since the closer the tactic's selected deal to the deal which 
is the mid-point of the reservation intersection (intrinsic utility of 0.5-because of the complete overlap of 
the reservation values), the closer to zero the differential between the intrinsic utility and the control utility 
becomes. As can be seen from figure 5.3. A, the only tactics which approach or exceed an average intrinsic 
utility of 0.5 are those which concede at a steady rate. 










































Figure 5.4: Average Non-Intrinsic Utilities and Control Utilities for Pure-Strategy Experiments in Long 
Term Deadlines: A) Average System Utility, B)Average Cost Adjusted Utility, C) Comparisons to Control. 
5.3.4.2 Short Term Deadlines 
Changing the environmental setting can radically alter the successfulness of a particular family of tactics. 
Therefore, an experiment is carried out to investigate the behaviour of tactics in cases where deadlines are 
short. For this case, the hypotheses are: 
Hypothesis 3: When there is a short timeframe to negotiate, tactics which quickly approach 
their reservation values will make more deals. 
Hypothesis 4: Since deadlines are short, the number of messages exchanged to reach a deal 
will be small. ConsequentlY thesyStem utilitýv will be low. 
In this context, short term deadlines are obtained by sampling values for t' ,,, and t' ,., 
between two and ten in M 
ticks of a discrete clock. The remainder of the experimental setup is as before. Figure 5.5 shows the results 
obtained for these experiments. The first observation is that for most tactics, the overall intrinsic utility, the 

















































Figure 5.5: Comparative Data For Intrinsic, System and Cost-Adjusted Utilities And Deals Made For Pure- 
Strategy Experiments in Long And Short Term Deadlines. A) Average Intrinsic Utility, B) Percentage 
Number of Deals C) Average System Utility, D) Average Cost Adjusted Utility. 
than the respective measures for the long deadline experiments. A lower system utility is expected since 
fewer messages can be exchanged in the allocated time. Note that since Conceder and Impatient are quick to 
reach agreements, their utilization of system resources is independent of the time constraints. Also, because 
fewer messages are exchanged, the agents pay less tax and, consequently, keep a greater percentage of their 
derived intrinsic utility (figure 5.5. D). These findings are all in line with the predictions in hypothesis four. 
However, the other measures require further analysis. 
With long term deadlines, most tactics, apart from Boulware, make deals approximately 90% to 95% of 
the time, whereas with short term deadlines only Conceder makes anything like this number. This reduction 
is either because the tactics are insensitive to changes in their environment (e. g resource dependent tactics) 
or because they have a slow rate of approach to reservation values (e. g Boulware). Time insensitivity means 
the other tactics fail to make many deals when interacting with these tactics. Because the length of the 
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thread is independent of the deadline, the resource dependent tactics cannot distinguish between short and 
long term deadlines. This claim is supported by the observation that Impatient gains equivalent intrinsic 
utility independently of deadlines (figure 5.5A). Furthermore, resource dependent tactics are differentiated 
with respect to p, the amount of time an agent considers reasonable for negotiation. If an agent does not 
reason about deadlines and erroneously assumes avalue for p which is close to or above tm.,, then it will be 
unsuccessful in environments where deadlines are important. The relatively low intrinsic utility of Patient 
and Steady (ranked 9th and 7th respectively-figure 5.5A) supports this claim. When the deadline is long, 
resource dependent tactics with p>1 gain large intrinsic utility because they approach reservation values 
in a steady way. However, the same behaviour in short term deadlines is less successful. The imitative 
tactics also exhibit a reduction in average intrinsic utility. This is to be expected since these tactics imitate 
the relatively larger rate of concession of other tactics (especially time dependent tactics) when the deadline 
is shorter. 
Hypothesis three is supported by the relative reductions in intrinsic utility for Boulware, Steady and 
Patient and by the comparative increase for Conceder and Impatient. Whereas in long term deadlines, 
Boulware, Steady and Patient ranked higher than the conciliatory tactics, the reverse is true for short term 
cases. With short term deadlines, tactics that quickly approach their reservation values gain higher intrinsic 
utility than those which are slower. 
Again, it is observed that the dominant tactic is one which concedes at a steady rate (i. e Linear), 
suggesting that the best tactic, independent of time deadlines, is one that approaches reservation values in a 
consistent fashion. The behaviour dependent tactics also gain relatively high utilities in both cases, ranking 
third and fourth for short and long term deadlines respectively. Thus, whereas most tactics have large 
fluctuations in rankings across environments, the behaviour dependent family maintains a stable position, 
indicating its general robustness and usefulness in a wide range of contexts. This is because these tactics 
stick firm to avoid exploitation and reciprocate concession. 
5.3.4.3 Initial Offers 
In the formal model, an agent's reservation values are private. This means no other agent has any knowledge 
of where in the range of acceptable values an opponent begins its bidding process, nor where it is likely 
to end. Given this constraint, an agent must decide where in its reservation ranges it should begin its 
negotiation offers. That is, what should be the value of ra in the face of this uncertainty? To help answer 
this question, the following hypothesis is formed: 4 
Hypothesis 5: When the deadlinefor agreements is not short, making initial offers which have 
values near the maximum of Up', i,, leads to deals which have higher intrinsic agent utilities 
4 Note: U;, ice increases and Upc,. ice decreases with increasing price offers. 
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Figure 5.6: Average Intrinsic And System Utilities For Pure-Strategy Experiments With Low And High 
Initial Offers: A) Average Intrinsic Utility For K' E 10-01,0.21, B) Average Intrinsic Utility for K" E 
{0.8,0.991, C) Average System Utility For K' E 10.01,0.2) and D) Average System Utility For K" E 
{0.8,0.991. rec = 0.1 For All Cases. 
than initial offers near the minimunt of U" i,,. In other words, a server that starts biddiiig pr 
close to ntaxp', j, is more likely to end up with deals that have a higher utilitv than a server p 
who starts bidding close to min`, j, The converse is truefor the client. p 
To test this hypothesis, both agents are allowed to have reasonably long deadlines, tc,,,,, = t, 'M, = 60, and 
K" is made a constant at 0.1 (i. e the client is cautious in its first offer). Therefore, the single independent 
variable is K", which is sampled between the values 
[0-0 1,0.2] for high initial price offers and [0.8,0.99] 
for low initial offers. All other environmental variables are chosen as in previous experiments. Figure 5.6 
confirms the prediction that a server which begins bidding at values near the maximum of U' (figure price 
5.6. A) has a higher average intrinsic utility than a server that begins bidding at values near the minimum of 
















Figure 5.7: Percentage of Successful Deals For Low and High Initial Offers: When K' = 0.1 And A) 
r. 8 E 10.0 1,0.2 1, B) K" E 10.8,0.99 1. 
Us j, (figure 5.6.13). Moreover, if r, ' is close to K" (the client starts bidding at low values and the server pr 
begins with high offers), then both agents gain equivalent utility in most cases and take many rounds of 
negotiations before a deal is found (figure 5.6. Q. This is because the tactics begin their negotiation at some 
distance from the point in the negotiation space where bids have values which have a mutually acceptable 
level. 
Conversely, if K' is not close to K' (both the client and server start bidding at low values), then the 
client benefits substantially more than the server. This is because the initial offers of the server are now 
immediately within the acceptance level of the client (confirmed by the number of messages exchanged 
before a deal is reached (figure 5.6.13)). Thus, the client gains relatively more utility than a server, since the 
initial offers of both agents are low and deals are made at low values. 5 The influence of K on the behaviour 
of tactics can be further explained from the observations shown in figure 5-7. K" is used by all tactics for 
generating the initial offer but, for exposition purposes, only the results with respect to the Boulware tactic 
family are discussed (since this offers the greatest difference in behaviour). When K' is low, Boulwares have 
a lower percentage of deals relative to other tactics (figure 5.7. A). Conversely, when K' is high, Boulware 
almost equals all other tactics in the percentage of deals they make (figure 5.7. B). This is because at low 
values of K', the shape of the acceptance level for Boulware is almost a step function, whereas when K' is 
high it is a straight line near to or at inin'. Thus a server playing a Boulware tactic makes a small number 
of high utility deals when the acceptance levels tend towards being a step function (compare figures 5.7. A 
5When KI is distinctly different from KI there is little differentiation among intrinsic utilifies. This is why r. ' = 0.1 for both 
agents in sections 5.3.4.1 and 5.3.4.2. 
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and 5.6. A), but makes larger number of lower utility deals when the acceptance level is almost a straight 
line (figures 5.7. B and 5.6.13). Therefore, as the value of r. increases, the likelihood of a deal increases, but 
the utility of the deal decreases. 
5.3.4.4 Summary of Non-Strategic Experiments 
it has been formally shown elsewhere that agents are guaranteed to converge on a solution in a number of 
very constrained situations (e. g. when two agents implement a time-dependent tactic, then the negotiation 
over an issue is guaranteed to converge if there is an overlap in the joint reservation values of that issues) 
using the tactical component of the wrapper's responsive mechanism (Sierra, Faratin, & Jennings 1997). 
The aim of the sections above was to extend these results empirically and to evaluate the non-strategic part 
of the responsive mechanism of the wrapper in a wider range of circumstances. To this end, a number of 
basic hypotheses were defined about negotiation using the tactical component of the wrapper. In particular, 
with respect to tactics the following were discovered: (i) irrespective of short or long term deadlines, it is 
best to be a linear type tactic, otherwise an imitative tactic; (ii) tactics must be responsive to changes in their 
environment; and (iii) there is a tradeoff between the number of deals made and the utility gained which is 
regulated by the initial offers. 
The aforementioned results confirmed (and rebutted! ) a number of basic predictions about negotiation 
using the tactical component of the wrapper. Next, the analysis is extended to strategic interactions. 
5.4 Strategic Experiments 
The aim of the previous experiments was to investigate the effects of non-strategic decision making. The 
aims of the experiments in this subsection are to empirically explore the causal relationships between 
strategic decision making on the dynamics and outcomes of negotiation. The overall aim is to empiri- 
cally evaluate the postulate that consideration of a number of environmental factors and changes of these 
considerations (or dynamic strategies), lead to better negotiation outcomes than considering a number of 
environmental outcomes but not changing this initial consideration (static strategies). In addition to this, 
it is postulated that static strategies, in turn, leads to better negotiation outcomes than considering only 
one environmental factor (pure strategies). As will be shown below, better outcomes are defined as ones 
that maximize the joint utility of outcomes (a global measure). Therefore, from a global perspective, 
dynamic strategies >- static strategies >- pure strategies, where >- is should be read as the "bet- 
ter" operator. 6 Furthermore, the objective of the experiment is to show that changing of strategies per se is 
more beneficial than non-adjustment. Therefore, the objective is not to analyze the behaviour of different 
types of f () given in equation 4.2, but rather the relative performance of a single strategic decision making 
6Note, strictly speaking only the dynamic strategies are strategies as defined in section 4.4.3. However, for terminological simplicity 
throughout this chapter static consideration of one or a number of environmental factors will be referred to as strategies. 
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Figure 5.8: Strategy Experimental Independent Variables 
compared to a non-strategic decision making. 
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The methodology of the experiments is similar to previous experiments-evaluation of a number of 
hypotheses in various types of environments as opposed to concrete cases. To this end, sections 5.4.1 
introduce the data abstraction methodology and statistical methods necessary for definition of environments. 
Section 5.4.2 then defines the experimental measures, section 5.4.3 details the experimental procedures and, 
finally, section 5.4.4 presents the hypotheses and the discussion of results. 
5.4.1 Experimental Independent Variables 
This section introduces the set of experimental independent variables for the strategic experiments that 
are under the control of the experimenter. Like the non-strategic experiments, the set of experimental 
independent variables collectively define the environment of negotiation (section 5.4.1.1) and the tactics 
available for decision making (section 5.4.1.2). However, in the experiments reported in this section there 
is an additional set of variables, the strategy variables (section 5.4.1.3), which define the available strategies 
in negotiation. These experimental independent variables are introduced in figure 5.8. As before, the 
assignment of values to these variables is under the control of the experimenter whose main objective is to 
choose values for these variables that lower the complexity of the analysis. Note, in general throughout he 
experiments the actual concrete values of the independent variables mean very little in themselves. It is the 
relative relationship of an independent variable's value with respect o others that is important. Therefore, 
throughout the following exposition the actual values of independent variables are no longer justified and 
their values should be interpreted in comparison to other dependent variable values. 
Environments 
In these experiments, like the previous pure-strategy experiments, an environment is defined by the number 
of agents, the number of issues involved in negotiation, the deadlines to reach a settlement and the aspiration 
levels of agents. In these experiments negotiations are conducted between only two agents, categorically 
labelled as player and opponent. However, in the pure-strategy experiments agents negotiate over multiple 
quantitative issues 1price, quality, time, penalty). The set of negotiation issues is expanded from one to 
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four so as to facilitate a comparative analysis with the results of the trade-off mechanism experiments (which 
requires a minimum of two issues, section 5.5). This analysis is also restricted to quantitative issues, because 
the behaviour of both the responsive and trade-off mechanisms are less smooth with qualitative issues. This, 
in turn, masks the underlying behaviour of the model. For example, concession over qualitative issues 
produces scoring function outputs that are "bumpy", containing discrete points (since qualitative issues are 
naturally discrete valued objects). Likewise, the trade-off of a qualitative issue with a quantitative one often 
produces a transfer of score from one issue to another which may require the introduction of an auxiliary 
issue into the trade-off consideration to accommodate the correct score that needs to be transfered in trade- 
off. For example, consider a client of a service negotiating over a quantitative issue price and a qualitative 
issue colour. Let the reservation values of the issue price be [10,20], with score value ranges between 
[0,1] , dictated by a continuously decreasing scoring function for increasing values over price. Let the 
reservation values of colour be [red, blue, green] with an associated score of [0.8,0.4,0.1] respectively. 
Let the previous offer of the agent about to make a trade-off offer be [20, green]. Further assume that the 
iso-value is set at 0=0.3 (section 4.5.2.2), meaning that a score of 0.3 must be re-distributed among the 
two issues. One such re-distribution may be to decrease the score on the issue price by 0.1 (thus the agent 
should offer less than 20 for the next offer overprice) and increase the score on colour by 0.2. However, an 
increase of 0.2 to the score of colour will map to an offer of between green and blue, which is not permitted. 
Another issue may have to be introduced to accommodate this residue score. Alternatively, the loss in score 
overprice can be computed given the gains that can be obtained from colour. However, this last solution is 
not satisfactory since it gives higher precedence to qualitative issues, and fails in cases where offers straddle. 
or are close to, the reservation values. Again, this masks the behaviour of the mechanisms and since the aim 
of the experiments is to analyze the underlying mechanisms, agents negotiate over quantitative issues only. 
The other independent variables are as follows. The importance level for each negotiation issue is 
assigned concrete values 10.1,0.5,0.25,0.15) for the player and f 0.5,0.1,0.05,0.35} for the opponent. 
These weights are chosen because they allow comparative analysis of results with trade-off mechanisms, 
since they permit operation of the latter mechanism. For practical purposes, similar to pure-strategy exper- 
imentsý the issues' interval values are converted from an interval to an ordinal scale which specifies both 
the length of the interval for each issue and the degree of overlap between the respective interval values 
for each issue (see section 5.3.1 for a more in-depth discussion of the methodology for computing interval 
values). The type of intervals considered in these experiments are those where the lengths of the interval 
values are equal and perfectly overlapping for each issue for both agents and are assigned the following 
values: Again, similar to pure-strategy experiments, the length of the interval value for each issue is chosen 
arbitrarily because the score of the offers models the ordinal and not the cardinal relationships between 
the interval values. Furthermore, to simplify the overall problem and reduce the complexity of analysis, the 
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minprice 10, maxpri, e = 20 
minquality 5, maXquality = 30 
mintime = 20, maxtime = 50 
minpenalty = l, maXpenalty = 10 (5.1) 
same interval values are assigned to both agents (hence a perfect overlap in interval values). The implication 
of this design are: i) that in bi-lateral negotiations between agents that both use a linear scoring function the 
reference point (or the most equitable outcome) is exactly at the mid point of an issue's interval value, with 
a score of exactly 0.5 for each agent and ii) a deal always exists. Note, that the actual concrete values for 
the intervals are insignificant and any values that obey the perfect overlap requirement will suffice. If one or 
both agents implement a non-linear scoring function then this mid point must "shife' along the utility scale. 
Fixed interval values with perfect overlap permits analysis of results with respect to a known reference 
point. Sampling interval values and the degree of overlap leads to a more complicated analysis of results 
because the location of the reference point can only be ascertained on an average basis. 
The independent variable t" ..., is assigned the same values as the previous pure-strategy experiments. M 
The group long term deadlines is defined as samples within the values of 30 - 60 ticks of a discrete clock. 
Short term deadlines are defined as samples within 2- 10 ticks of a discrete clock. 
5.4.1.2 Tactics 
The other independent variables that are subject to transformation are the responsive tactics. To reduce the 
complexity of the analysis task, experiments are conducted using only the time-dependent and behaviour- 
dependent actics (since time is a resource and time-dependent families model time sufficiently). The pa- 
rameters of these tactics are randomly sampled. The same three members of the time-dependent family 
are chosen as for the pure-strategy experiments (figure 5.2); these correspond to behaviours that concede in 
time in a boulware, linear and conceder fashion. Again, to reduce the complexity of the experiments, only 
the relative-titfortat sub-family (section 4.4.2.4) is chosen to represent behaviour-dependent tactics. This 
category is defined as the transformation of interval values for 6 into concrete value of 1. That is, relatively 
mimicking every last offer of the other agents. When the length of the negotiation thread is below 6 (Le in- 
sufficient offers have been exchanged between the agents) the titfortat default behaviour is to be a conceder 
with a0 value that is sampled within values of [1.0,3.0]-a conceder tactic that is more conceder than a 
linear, but within certain limits of concession. A concrete tactic is chosen for each negotiation experiment 
by sampling within the range of the specified ordinal scale of that tactic. 
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In these experiments an agent's strategy amounts to i) the initial assignment of relative importance weights 
for all issues (or computing the matrix 170, see section 4.4.3) given the four experimental categories of 
tactics TE (baulware, linear, conceder, titfortat}, and ii) the modification of this initial consideration. 
An element of the r matrix is indexed by -lij, the weight of tactic j for an issue i. A row of the r matrix is 
indexed by yi, the tactics weight array for an issue i. The relative differences in the assignments of values 
to each of -yij in the yj array defines the agent's strategy for an issue in negotiation. For continence these 
strategies are labelled as follows. Given a set of tactics jE IT}, a strategy for the issue i in negotiation can 
be one of the following: 
tough: where j= boulware and -yij is assigned a higher weighting than other tactics k, j 54 k 
* linear: where j= linear and -yij is assigned a higher weighting than other tactics k, j0k 
9 conceder: where j= conceder and -lij is assigned a higher weighting than other tactics k, j0k 
* titfortat: where i= titfortat and yij is assigned a higher weighting than other tactics k, j0k 
As a simplification, the same strategy is applied to all issues. That is, the yj arrays for all the issues 
are the same. For example the r matrix: 
boulware linear conceder titfortat 
price 1 0 0 0 
quality 1 0 0 0 
time 1 0 0 0 
penalty L1 0 0 0j 
specifies a strategy that assigns the boulware tactic the highest weightfor all issues. Again, this simplifica- 
tion is intended as a measure to reduces the total number of free experimental variables and hence reduce 
the complexity of analysis. Therefore, the exposition will be described with reference to a single issue only 
(, yj array). Application of the same strategy to each issue throughout the negotiation can serve as a base- 
case for future experiments that are more complicated and whose analysis is made more accessible from 
the base-case results. Note also, that the strategy label is derived from the highest weighted tactic, not to 
be confused by the tactic itself. Thus, a -1i array with a value of [0.7,0.1,0.1,0.1] denotes a tough strategy. 
Conversely, a -ti array with a value of [0.1,0.7,0.1,0.1] denotes a linear strategy, and so on. Since the aim 
of these experiments is to evaluate the differences between non-strategic and strategic 
decision making, the 
agents' strategies are evaluated in three classes of experiments: 
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* pure strategies 
o mixedl strategies 
o mixed2 strategies 
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The differences between the classes of experiments are defined by i) the magnitude of the initial rO matrix 
and ii) the presence or absence of change in this initial ro matrix. A pure strategy simply consists of the 
assignment of binary values for yij to the available tactic set. For example, for each issue a pure and tough 
strategist in the experiment consists of assignment to the tactic set lboulware, linear, conceder, titfortat} 
the -yj array values [1,0,0,0] which does not change throughout the negotiation. Likewise, a pure and 
conceder strategist in the experiment would consist of yj assignment [0,0,1,0] to all issues which does not 
change throughout he negotiation. Therefore, pure strategies are the same as the base experiments where an 
agent's strategy consists of a static assignment of value 1 to one of the available tactic independent variables 
corresponding to the desired strategy. 
A mixed I strategy, on the other hand, consists of the assignment to the same tactic set of continuous, 
as opposed to binary, yij values which also do not change throughout the negotiation. For example, a 
value of [0.8,0.066,0.066,0.066] for all issues in r denotes a mixedl tough strategist. Thus, whereas 
pure strategies model the use of a single tactic in generating an offer, mixed strategies use a combination 
of tactics to generate offers (see section 4.4.3). Unlike pure strategies, because -yij is an interval valued 
variable, with the constraint that -yij E [0,1) and EjET IN = 1.0 for all i, there can be an infinite number 
of values of yij that implement the given strategy. However, the value of oyij has to obey an additional 
constraint that its value is within the range [0.25,0.9]. This constraint restricts the range of possible values 
of yij for a given strategy to be below a pure-strategy (hence 0.9 and not 1.0) and above the level where 
the tactic has equal weighting with the other tactics (since there are four tactics, the lower bound of the 
constraint is 0.25). For example, a yj array value of [0.8,0.066,0.066,0.066] specifies a tougher mixedl 
strategist than a comparative yj value of [0.5,0.166,0.166,0.166]. In the former case, the boulware tactic 
has more of an input into the decision of the next offer generation than the other tactics, whereas in the latter 
case the other tactics have relatively more of an input in the decision making. Thus a tactic's influence on 
the final decision can range from no influence to fully dictating the decision (the case for a pure strategy). 
Therefore, to investigate different initial magnitudes of -tij, the degree of a tactic's magnitude/decision 
ly i of issue i for tactic strength is made an independent variable flij, defined as the initial strength of the jý, 
j at time 0. Assignments of initial values for each flij (for each issue and each tactic) then define ro, the 
initial strategy of an agent at time 0 for all issues. 
A mixed2 and tough strategist is similar to a mixedl. strategy, but now the initial I" array is dy- 
namically modified throughout the negotiation. For example, a tough mixedl strategy for an issue may 
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correspond to the -fio array value of [0.8,0.066,0.066,0.066] (the agent considers the time factor to be im- 
portant and does not change this consideration). However, these initial values of the -fiO array are subject 
to change throughout he negotiation in the case of mixed. 2 experiments. Thus mixed2 strategies model not 
only the combination of tactics for generating an offer (same as mixed I strategies), but also the transition 
in this combination during the course of negotiation (see section 4.4.3). This transition is formally specified 
as the f () function (equation 4.2) that maps rt- to rt-+,, where t,, denotes the current time. However, like 
interval valued variables, there can be an infinite number of such mappings. In the case of these experiments 
the modification of the initial I' for all issues i is dictated by the following policy (equation 5.2) based on 
the notion of similarity (see equation 4.6): 
if 0.9 < sim(x, Y) < 1.0 
If 0.7 < sim(x, y) < 0.9 
If 0.4 < sim(x, y) < 0.7 
If 0.0 < sim(x, y) < 0.4 
then increase(Yi, boulwarev A) 
then increase (^fi, titf ortat i A) 
then increase (7i, linear 9 A) 
then increase (Iti, conceder i A) 
(5.2) 
where x and y are the agent's and the opponent's last offer respectively, and sirn(x, y) is the similarity 
between the two contracts. There can be any number of modification policies, but rule 5.2 is chosen because 
it is simple and easily adjustable for experimental purposes (through modification of either the conditions 
of the rule or the action of the rule). Furthermore, since the objective of the experiment is to show that 
changing of strategies per se is more beneficial than non-adjustment, any reasonable rule which implements 
a modification of r would suffice. 
The modification rule encodes the heuristic that if the agent believes that the two contracts x and y are 
very close then it should adopt a more boulware strategy (since large changes, by being conceder, for ex- 
ample, may move the point of cross over of offers to positions where deals are less beneficial). On the other 
hand, if the two contracts x and y are believed to be dissimilar then a conceder strategy should be adopted 
since movements in concessions may lead to the approaching of the zones of cross over of offers. In between 
these two extremes, a linear and titfortat strategy should be adopted. Since for most strategies (especially 
with long term deadlines) the initial offers in negotiation are unlikely to be near the cross over of an issue 
interval (recall the results in section 5.3.4.3), the overall effect of the rule is to initiate a rate of concession 
to the crossover and then begin to lower this rate as crossover is approached. However, the consequence of 
rule 5.2 is to change the strategy of the agent independently to a new state, making the behaviour of mixed2 
strategies an experimental variable that can not be manipulated. To overcome this problem, another variable 
(A) is added that modifies the behaviour of the rule under the control of the experimenter. The effect of A is 
to regulate the amount existing strategies change (i. e. it is a form of "resistance' to change). Thus, whereas 
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the initial magnitude of the ro matrix completely defines mixed I strategies, mixed2 strategies are defined 
by both the initial magnitude of IFO and the dependent variable A, which specifies the percentage of change 
permitted to the initial 11 matrix by rule 5.2. For example, a tough strategy for an issue i can be defined as 
, yjO = [0.8,0.066,0.066,0.066] in mixedl experiments. The same strategy in mixed2 experiments is then 
defined as a combination of the initial 7jO array, [0.8,0.066,0.066,0.066] and the degree to which this tough 
strategy is allowed to be changed by rule 5.2. The degree of modification is given in percentile form, where 
the given yij is increased by the specified percentile. The amount increased is removed equally from all 
other tactics, since EjET'tij = 1.0 (section 4.4.3). Thus aA value of 80% over would specify a tougher 
mixed2 negotiator than a value of 5%, because a 80% change modifies to a greater extent the initial value of 
the tough strategy (0.8) than a 5% change. It should be noted that higher numbers for A result in dynamics 
of change in r that quickly reach the state where they are pure strategies. 
The weights used for the similarity computation for the precondition of the update rule (sim" infigure Wj 
5.8, equation 4.5 and section 4.5.2.2) are [0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25], reflecting the agent's uncertainty about the 
other agents' issue importance evaluation (see section 5.5 for an explanation of other choices). The choice 
of criteria function (hjI in figure 5.8) is likewise infinite. The discriminatory power-the magnitude of the 
difference between the input and output-of the criteria function (equation 4.6) is set so that it exhibits two 
properties. Firstly, that it has more discrimination within the issues' interval values (as compared to values 
outside this range), since all of the negotiation will take place in this region. Thus, maximal discrimination 
should be between an issue's min and max values. This interval value requirement is parameterized by the 
independent variable c. When c is low, the function should be maximally discriminative for values within the 
issue's interval limits (mutatis mutandis when e is high). Secondly, different discriminatory power within 
the interval range is also desired, to support different similarity measures for different issues (for generality 
and extension of these functions to trade-off experiments). For example, for one issue it may be desirable 
to have maximal discrimination at the center of the interval values, whereas for another issue maximal 
discrimination may be desired at the extremes of the interval values. This requirement is parameterized 
using the variable a. When a is high, more discrimination is placed towards the maximum of the interval 
values (mutatis Mutandis when it is low). The following function satisfies these two requirements: 
21x-minj x-min a_ h(x) = 







Figure 5.9 shows the effect of varying e. Thus the discrimination power of the function decreases with 
increasing values of c. In these experiments, in order to be quite discriminatory, c is fixed at 0.1 for all 
issues. For all issues, a values are fixed to be equal: aPrice = a9111i'Y = time = aP111"Ity = 1, so as to 
have linear criteria functions (Ms), having equal discrimination power across the issue's interval values. c S 
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Figure 5.9: Criteria Functions For An Issue Min = 10, Max = 20 
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and a are made constant to reduce the number of free variables in the experiments. However, normally the 
setting of values for c and ct reflects the agent's domain knowledge. 
The values for the -yj array used for the strategy of each issue for each experiment class are shown in 
figures 5.11,5.12,5.13 and 5.14, corresponding to benchmark, increased Qjj for the opponent, increased 
f2ij for the player and decreased Qjj for both the opponent and the player respectively. Recall that an 
increase (or decrease) in the initial values of an issue i strategy for tactic j at time 0 (, yP. ) across experiments tj 
is denoted as an increase (or decrease) in Qij. Note also that the top row of each experiment class denotes the 
strategies of the player and the bottom row of each experiment class denotes the strategy of the opponent. 
The benchmark experiments are included to establish a comparison criteria on the effect of increasing either 
0 the opponent's or the player's -yij, or, conversely, decreasing both agent's -y: Pj levels, on the dependent 
variables. Following the same indexing convention as before, Aij is the value tactic j can be changed for 
issue i. Furthermore, Ai arrays and -yj arrays are identical for each issue [price, quality, time, penalty]. 
it may be useful for the forthcoming discussion of results to imagine different tactics as different 
forces that attempt to "move" the score of the contract to a mutually acceptable point, the contract score 
at the cross over of offers. Figure 5.10 presents this analogy schematically, for one issue (for example 
price). Imagine the agent is a client. Therefore lower prices are preferred to higher prices. A boulware 
tactic therefore attempts to generate prices that are distributed close to the minimum, whereas on the other 
extreme a conceder tactic generates price offers that reach the maximum quicker. Other tactics generate 
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Figure 5.10: Analogy of Tactics As Forces. 
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offers on this minimum maximum continuum. A pure-strategy can then be envisaged as a mechanism that 
views a single force to reach the focal point. A mixed I strategy, on the other hand, can be envisaged as 
considering a combination of forces to reach this convergence point. This is shown in figure 5.10 as the 
resultant force, the dotted line labeled mixed. The exact combination mixture (where the resultant line lies) 
is controlled by f1j. A mixed2 strategy can then be envisaged as a resultant force that not only considers a 
combination of forces, but also modifies the considerations as the environment changes. Note that there can 
be an infinite number of mixedl resultant forces (mixtures) in between the tough and conceder strategies, 
corresponding to infinite values for f1j. However, whereas a mixed I is a concrete selection and adherence 
to only one of these infinite possibilities, a mixed2 strategy also permits the "movement" of the resultant 
(the diagonal line in figure 5.10) along the tough-conceder axis (controlled by the independent variable A). 
Figure 5.11 shows values for the experimental independent variable -ti array that are used as a benchmark 
for the other experiments which manipulate f1i (the magnitude of the initial strategy, or yjO) for an issue 
i. For pure experiments, the strategies are simply assigned the value of 1.0 for the appropriate strategy 
for both the player and the, opponent. In mixed I experimental classes, the value of the dominant tactic 
((tough, linear, conceder, fitfortat)) is assigned a value proportionally higher (three times) than the rest 
of the other tactics. Again, it is the ordinal, rather than cardinal, relationship between the variables that is of 
interest. The value of the dominant tactic is computed to be in the range [0.25,0.9] (as discussed in section 
5.4.1). Since the values of the independent variables shown in figure 5.11 form the evaluation benchmark 
for the experiments that manipulate Oij, theyij for mixedl of the dominant tactic j is set to 0.5 (within the 
constraint [0.25,0.9]). 
The remaining -ti array for the other tactics is simply computed as the distribution of the residue 
weights according to the policy (1 - -yij)/3. This policy is chosen because the aim of the experiments is to 
Max Tough Min 
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evaluate the relative and not the absolute differences in yj array. Mixed2 strategies, as mentioned above, are 
defined in terms of the two independent variables: initial -ti array and the percentage permissible change 
of this value Ai by the weight update rule 5.2. The initial yij for the dominant tactic of the strategy is set 
at 0.625 and the values of Ai array are, respectively, set to [5,25,50,40] for boulware, linear, conceder 
and titfortat strategies. These values reflect the relative persistence of the initial yj array in the course of 
negotiation. That is, for all issues, at each step in negotiation, a tough strategy permits only a 5% change to 
, yboulwaret a linear permits relatively more changes to Iflineart conceder most of all, and titfortat in between 
linear and conceder strategies. The value of I for mixed2 experiments is higher than mixed I experiments Nj 
(0.625 and 0.5, respectively). A higher value for oyilj is chosen because the update rule (especially in the 
case of conceder strategies) can reduce -IiOj too quickly to below mixed I levels, thereby making it difficult 
to discriminate the results of mixed I and mixed2 experiments. Thus the strategy in the mixed2 experiment 
classes is defined through the magnitude of the initial 0 and the relative permissible changes to this value Wi 
through Aij. 
Note that the strategies of both the player and the opponent are constant and the same for all the 
experimental classes in the benchmark experiments. Generally, results are sought for types of environments. 
Therefore, yij should ideally have been statistically sampled, allowing evaluation of contexts where -tij is 
not fixed. However, this methodology is not adopted because one of the aims of the experiments is to 
investigate the effect of f1i (or the strength of the strategy) on the dependent variables. To investigate 
the effect of f1j, the -tij distribution would have to be divided into bin sizes over the interval [0.25,0.9] 
(corresponding to the constraint above). Collecting values of -yij into small bin sizes and then statistically 
sampling each bin size would have resulted in distributions of yij with similar values since the bin size is 
significantly small. , 
The independent variables shown in figures 5.12 and 5.13 show the experimental variables where 
the isomorphism between the player and opponent benchmark strategies is broken. Together with the 
independent variables shown in figure 5.14, these environments directly evaluate the effect of varying fli. 
These variables are assigned these values to investigate the effect of either the opponent or the player 
increasing the value of f1i respectively. Note that since pure strategies are binary valued variables they 
cannot be included in Ili experiments. Thus, in figure 5.12 the player dependent variables are unmodified 
from the benchmark experiments hown in figure 5.11. However, the values of -yij and Aij are increased 
for the opponent. yij of the dominant tactic is increased from 0.5 to 0.8 (Oij = 0.3). The implication of 
this change is that the opponent in this environment is much more tough, linear, conceder or titfortat in its 
strategies. Likewise, the value of Aij is relatively higher than the benchmark case, resulting in strategies 
that allow rule 5.2 to more freely modify yij according to the distance to crossover in offers. Figure 5.13 
shows the converse of 5.12, where the dependent variables for the opponent are the same as the benchmark 
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Figure 5.14: Strategies For Both Agents Decreased flij 
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Variable Name Variable Scale Variable Ranges 
cycles interval [1, tMax] 
Va(outcome) interval [0,1] 
V" (reference) value 0.5 
VII(pareto) interval 10,11 
Figure 5.15: Experimental Dependent Variables 
case in figure 5.11 and it is the player that has increased magnitude of strategy. 
Iss 
Finally, the effect of varying Ili for both the player and the opponent from the benchmark is shown 
in figure 5.14. yij is decreased from 0.5 to 0.3 resulting in strategies that, although they are still defined 
as strategies, have nonetheless a lower influence on the final decision. This allows other tactics to have 
relatively more strength (than the benchmark case) in the final decision. Likewise, Aij for the mixed2 
experiment class is uniformly lowered to a 5% level for all strategies, resulting in an environment where the 
, yi array is modified smoothly across all strategies. 
5.4.2 Experimental Measures 
The previous section described the independent variables that can be manipulated by the experimenter and 
their effects observed on the dependent variables. Figure 5.15 shows the experimental dependent variables, 
one calibrating the process of negotiation (cycles), and three others for measuring the outcome of negotia- 
tion. Each dependent variable are described in more depth in the sections below. 
5.4.2.1 , Communication 
A much simpler form of on-line cost, compared to the pure-strategy experiments, is defined by the indepen- 
dent variable Cycles. Cycles calibrates the total number of messages exchanged in the course of a single 
negotiation run of the experiment (or the communication message load a strategy places on an agent). This 
simple form of on-line cost is used to disassociate the costs from the intrinsic utility of the strategy (method- 
ology of the pure-strategy experiments) so that the agent can make decisions about the communication cost 
of the strategy, rather than the resulting cost-adjusted utility. The statistics used for Cycles are simply the 
average number of messages exchanged for a strategy pairing across all experimental runs. 
5.4.2.2 Intrinsic Utility 
outcome is the categorical variable that measures the final outcome of negotiation in terms of success 
(Accept) or failure (Withdraw). Given an outcome the intrinsic utility of a deal, Va(autcome), is the 
individual agent utility of the deal. The form of the utility function is the same as the one given in pure- 
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strategy experiments reported in section 5.3.3.1, defined as the linear scoring function: 
V"(X) =E wi'Vi'(xi) I<J<n 
where x is the outcome, n is the total number of issues, and the value of the individual issue j to agent a, 
VP (xj), is computed as: 3 
max, *-xj 




where increasing and decreasing refer to the direction of change in score as the value of that issue 
increases. For example, increasing the price of the service decreases the score for a client, but increases it
for a seller. Like Cycles, the statistics for Va(x) are simply the average utility of the deal when using a 
strategy across all experimental runs. 
5.4.2.3 Experimental Controls 
The analysis of the observed average utility data distribution will be made with respect to three reference 
points: i) the constant-sum line (see section 2.2.3), ii) the reference point and iii) the pareto-optimal line. 
See figure 3.1 for an explanation of each of these points. Recall from section 2.2.3 that the significance of the 
constant-SUM line is that outcomes that lie on this line result in individual agent utility whosejoint score adds 
up to 1.0-that is VP"Y"' (outcome) + Vopponent (outcome) = 1.0. This line is used as a control because 
outcomes that lie on it represent distributive bargaining situations and conversely, integrative bargaining for 
the outcomes that lie above it. Indeed, in negotiation over a single issue (distributive negotiation) the sum 
of utilities of an outcome has to be equal to 1 when the scoring functions of both agents are linear-an 
outcome with a utility of 0.8 for one agent determines the maximum the other agent can receive for this 
outcome is 0.2. In fact, for single issue negotiations the constant-sum line is the pareto-optimal line-there 
is no other deal that both agents prefer without one agent being worse off. It is by introducing multiple 
issues that the sum of individual utilities can be different to 1.0. Therefore the strategies could be evaluated 
with respect to the integrative and distributed bargaining dimension. However, as will be shown below, the 
experimental choice to assign the same IF matrix to each issue results in the responsive mechanism selecting, 
at bestý outcomes that lie on the constant-sum line, and, at worst, outcomes that lie below this line. The 
constant-sum line is included, together with the pareto-optimal line, for comparative analysis of the results 
obtained with the trade-off mechanism. Note, for multi-issue and differentially weighted issues, outcomes 
can lie below the constant-sum line, representing outcomes whose joint utility is lower than 1.0. 
Outcomes that lie on the constant-sum line represent one set of possible distributions of utilities, or 
ways of "dividing the utility pie". These outcomes are not equitable (recall that equitable is defined as equal 
distribution of utilities)-a utility distribution of (0.8,0.2) and (0.1,0.9) both equivalently maximize the 
sum of the individual utilities, but the first outcome is more favorable for the first agent and the second 
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outcome is more favorable for the second agent. As mentioned in section 3.1.4. the Nash point is an 
equitable outcome, computed as the deal that maximized the product of the final utilities (see figure 3.1). 
However, recall the argument presented in section 3.1.4 against the use of the Nash solution for multi- 
dimensional negotiation-whereas computation of the Nash solution is straightforward for distributive (or 
single issue) negotiations (indeed, the Nash solution was the control measure in the previous non-strategic 
experiments), the same is not true for integrative negotiations involving different importance levels and 
intervals for each issue. For these reasons, the Nash solution control outcome is replaced with the reference 
outcome, simply computed as the intersection at the mid point of each agent's interval value for all issues. 
Unless stated otherwise, the reference point for a pair of linear scoring functions is specified as the utility 
coordinate point (0-5,0.5) and is constant in the experiments because the interval values of agents overlap 
perfectly and do not change. 
The Pareto-optimal measure is included for comparative analysis of data across the responsive and 
trade-off experiments. Pareto-optimality (Va(pareto)) is computed as the outcome that maximized the 
sum of the deals. Five pareto-optimal outcomes are computed and a line that joined the utility value points 
of these five deals is used as a control line of the closeness of the experimental outcome to a pareto-optimal 
outcome (see (Raiffa 1982), pp. 163-165). The first pareto optimal deal is simply a value of 1 for the player 
and 0 for the opponent, (1,0). The second is the converse (0,1). The third pareto optimal outcome is 
computed by selecting the values for each issue xj in negotiation that maximizes the combined value of all 
the issues for both agents: 
E(W, player * V(--, Oayer)) + E(Wopponent * V(Xjopponent )) 
where Wj is the weight of issue j. The fourth pareto optimal outcome is computed by selecting the values 




J: ( opponent * V(Xjopponent)) ))+0.5 wj 
The final pareto optimal contract is computed by selecting the values for each issue that maximizes player 
utility plus twice the opponent utility. This gives the opponent more weight: 
Emplayer 
* V(. Zjptayer)) +2 
E(w opponent * V(_, jopponent)) j 
The pareto-optimal line, in turn, is indicated in the figures of results as the solid line that connects these five 
points. 
Where appropriate, statistical averages and standard deviation of averages across strategies will be 
given, respectively, to represent the center of the density and the variation of a group of outcome distribu- 
tions with respect to the reference point. For example, four different strategies that result in a sum total 
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utility average of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.0 identify a distribution of different strategy outcomes 
which lie exactly on the reference point. Variations in the averages then indicate the distance of the final 
average outcome from the reference and the standard deviation measures the degree of variation of the av- 
erages from the reference point. Averages and standard deviations of a group of strategies will be presented 
only for the opponent since the distribution of outcomes for the player is simply one minus the average of 
the distribution of the opponent. 
5.43 Experimental Procedure 
The experimental procedure consists of games between each pairing of player and opponent strategies 
(tough, linear, conceder, titfortat) for each of the 0 settings in figures 5.11,5.12,5.13 and 5.14 and for each 
of the experiment classes (pure, mixedl, mixed2). This procedure is shown algorithmically in figure 5.16. 
Two strategies are paired to begin negotiation by selecting initial Sli levels for all issues for both the 
player and opponent for each type of experiments (line 12). A game then consists of playing the player 
strategy against the opponent strategy N times (line 13). On each run f irst, Pboulwares Xonceden Plineart 
r, ontroW and 
butf ortat (where f irst is the agent that proposes the first contract and rcontroW is a random 
sampling of yij. described more below) are sampled for each agent (lines 8,9.10 and 11). N is set at 300 
runs which means that the probability of the sampled mean deviating by more than 0.01 from the true mean 
is less than 0.05. At the end of each run, the depedent variables Vplayer (autcome), Vopponent (outcome) 
and cycles are measured (lines 14,15 and 16). After N runs, the averages for all the dependent variables 
are computed (lines 18-22). Note the difference in the analysis between these experiments and the previous 
pure-strategy experiments reported in section 5.3. In the latter set of experiments the analysis was at the 
collective level, where the final average measure of dependent variable (such as utility) of a strategy was 
summed and averaged across all other strategies. However, the analytical unit of this set of experiments is 
the average of dependent variable measure for a pair, rather than a collection of strategies. 
For the mixed I experimental class there are two additional opponent strategies for each of the player 
strategies, corresponding to the controls (line 10). The player in the mixed I experimental class plays 
not only against the opponent strategy, but also a controll opponent (where the opponent's strategy is 
simply the -ti array [0-25,0.25,0.25,0.25] for all issues and all tactics) and a control2 opponent (which 
corresponds to a random sampling of r). Controll is included to evaluate the performance of various 
mixed I strategies against a strategy that behaves linearly across all tactic sets and thus reflects an opponent 
that is uncertain about which strategy to choose. Note that the r matrix of Control 1 is almost the same as 
the r matrix of both agents in experiments where 0 is decreased linearly for both agents (mixed I strategies 
in figure 5.14). Therefore, these controls are only significant in other experimental f1i levels. Control2, on 
the other hand, is included to evaluate the performance of strategies against a random benchmark. Controls 
are not possible for the pure experimental class since the values of yij are binary. Mixed2 strategies do not 
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0i := 1[0.5,0.5], [0.5,0.8], [0.8,0.5], [0.3,0.3]1; /* number of changes in magnitude of strategy 
strategyPl"" := (tough, linear, conceder, titfortat); /* player's strategy */ 
strategy*pponent := (tough, linear, conceder, titfortat); /* opponent's strategy 
class := 1pure, mixedl, mixed2j; /* classes of experiments 
N; /* number of experimental runs 
k : =I class 1; 7n : =I 
il 1; p : =I strategyP"Il" 1; o : =I strategy opponent 1; 
I :=0; n :=0; i :=0; j :=0; r :=0; N := 300; 
begin 
(1) reference: = argmaxx{VP"'Yer(x) * 
Voplxpnent W); 
(2) pareto: = argmax. 
{Vplayer(X) + Vopponent(X)); 
(3) while(I < k) do I :=I+1; 
(4) while(n < m) do n :=n+1; 
(5) while(i < p) do i :=i+1; 
(6) while(j < o) do j :=j+1; 
(7) while(r < N) do r :=r+1; 




enVopponent := sample (topponen t qopponent 60P nent,, 6op=ent nt max r 
JOPPone (9) Wboulware I Comod r li titfortat 
(10) control, := [0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25]; contrO12 := random(O, 1); 
(11) first: = random (player, opponent); 
(12) pair8ij := (strategy? " ", strategyjopponent). 
(13) (threatfil, outcomesrj) := play(pair8ij, first, enVplay,,, envopponent, controli, contrO12); 
(14) vir plover := VP"Y'r(outcomer. ); 
(15) Vri opponent := Vopponent (outcomersj); 
(16) cycle8ij := tength(threacrij); 
(17) endwhile 
Uplayer FN player (18) Vi'j IN; 
Uopponent: = 
opponent 
(19) ij EN=l IN; vir 






Figure 5.16: Experimental Procedure Algorithm 









Figure 5.17: Experimental Class Execution Order 
193 
encounter any other control strategies either since the aim of these experiments is to show that modification 
of strategies per se is better than non-modification. Thus, the best one can achieve is interactions between 
a mixed2 strategy and a highly stylized negotiator (mixedl and pure strategies in these experiments), as 
opposed to a random or another purposeful mixed2 strategist. 
The experiments are also restricted to games between similar experimental class (see figure 5.17). 
Thus strategies are evaluated for cases when both the player and the opponent are pure, mixed I or mixed2 
strategists. Encounters between, for example, a pure player and a mixed I or a mixed2 opponent (and 
vice-versa) are excluded because the generated data set in the latter case would be very large. In the former 
case, the number of generated data points is 224 (number of player strategy * number of opponent strategy 
* number of f1i experiments-- ((4 *4* 4) + (4 *6* 4) + (4 *4* 4))). In the latter case the generated data set 
is of size 736 making the analysis complex. The experiments were written in Sicstus3.7.1 Prolog and ran on 
HP Unix parallel machines at the Centre de Supercomputaci6 de Catalunya CESCA (Barcelona), utilising 
four CPUs, 7MB of memory and lasted 1112.41 seconds. 
5.4.4 Hypotheses and Results 
The experimental hypotheses and results are presented in this section. Because the aim of the experiments 
is to investigate the benefits of dynamic strategic decision making over static and pure strategies (and not 
necessarily the causal relationship between a given strategy type and a combination of any number of 
dependent variables), results are presented and discussed for each experimental class (pure, mixedl. and 
mixed2) and their effects on the individual dependent variables: i) the final average utilities for outcomes, 
ii) the communication load and iii) the number of successful outcomes. Thus the aim is not so much an 
analysis of the effects of, for example, a pure-strategy on the final average utility of an outcome and its 
relationship with the communication costs, but rather the differential effects of pure, mixed I and mixed2 
strategies on a single dependent variable, in this example, the final average outcome. Note. that all the 
hypotheses for the effects of strategies on final average utilities will be quantitatively represented as the 
relationship between the expected outcome utilities and i) the reference point representing the maximum 
joint gain that is also equitable and ii) the constant-sum line outcomes representing maximum joint utility 
that may not be equitable. 
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Before presenting the individual hypotheses and results a side-effect, observable in all of the forth- 
coming data, is identified, directly resulting from the choice of assigning the same -ti array to all the issues. 
For example, a tough strategy specifies a tough strategy for all the issues in negotiation. The observation 
from all the data is that the best joint outcome any combination of strategies, in either pure. mixed I or 
mixed2 experimental classes, can attain is a contract score at the mid point of the cross over of the agents' 
interval values (or the reference point), independently of the pairing of strategies. This is so for the fol- 
lowing reason. The independent variable [minj, maxj*] of both agents has been designed to be perfectly 
overlapping, for all the issues [price, quality, time, penalty]. The weights of the player and opponent 
for each of the issues are [0.1,0.5,0.25,0.15] and [0-5,0.1,0.05,0.35], respectively. These weights mean 
that the player views quality to be the most important issue, followed by time, followed by penalty and 
finally, least important issue, price. The opponent, on the other hand, views price as the most important, 
followed by the penalty, followed by the quality and finally time. Given these interval values, importance 
weights and the linear scoring function of section 4.2.1, the value of the reference point [15,17.5,35,5.5] 
(mid point of each issue, section 5.4.1.1) for the player is computed as: 
(0.1 * 0.5) + (0.5 * 0-5) + (0.25 * 0-5) + (0.15 * 0.5) = 0.5 
It is trivial to show that the same score (0.5) will result for the opponent for the same reference point 
[15,17.5,35,5.5]. Now consider another contract, X', in the space of possible deals, [18,20,35,5.5]. This 
contract will be more beneficial to both agents, because: 
Vplayer(X') = (0.1 * 0.2) + (0.5 * 0-6) + (0.25 * 0.5) + (0.15 * 0.5) = 0.52 
Vopponent (X) = (0.5 * 0.8) + (0.1 * 0.4) + (0.05 * 0.5) + (0.35 * 0.5) = 0.64 
Thus increasing the values for the issues price and quality from the reference contract values to the X' 
contract value is more beneficial to both agents (Le moving north-easterly in the direction of the pareto- 
optimal line). However, in these experiments the responsive mechanism is a concession protocol which 
can not support increase in utility scores where agents begin the negotiation from the reference point and 
then move towards more pareto-optimal contracts. Furthermore, agents are assumed to be unaware of one 
another's interval values, making the computation of the reference contract ([15,17.5,35,5.5]) impossible. 
One way agents can reach Y, or better, is to select one outcome from the space of possible outcomes. Next 
the agents assign a different r matrix to each issue. In this example this means that the player concedes 
more on the price'and leis on quality of a'service. Conversely, the opponent can concede more on quality 
than on price. The combination of these two r matrices means different concession rates on different issues 
in such a way as to reach Y. or better. However, this policy of making strategic decisions (assigning yj 
arrays for each issue) dependent on the weight of an issue (for example, a more important issue will be 
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Figure 5.18: A) Key For Pure and Mixed2 Strategy Pairings. First Entry of Label Specifies The opponent 
Strategy And The Second The player. B) Key For Mixed I Strategy Pairings. First Entry of Label Specifies 
The opponent Strategy And The Second The player. 
assigned a higher -yij value to boulware tactic) is not adopted in the experiments because, as was mentioned 
in section 5.4.1.3, of the need to control the number of free experimental independent variables. Indeed, 
these experiments are viewed as base-case strategic experiments which form the basis for the design of 
future strategic experiments. 
5.4.4.1 Pure-Strategy Utility Results 
The effects of a pure-strategy on the set of dependent variables has already been discussed in section 5.3. 
However, the methodology of analysis is different (see section 5.4.3) hence the experiments are repeated 
here in these new environments for comparative reasons. 
The expectation for the results of these experiments are summerised by the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 7: Pairings of two pure strategies that approach their interval values less quickly 
will result in final average outcomes that are lower in joint utility than pure strategy pairs 
where at least one strategy approaches the intervalfaster 
The hypothesis states the intuition that an encounter between, for example, two tough strategies will result 
in a group utility that is worse than when at least one of the strategies concedes (since concession increases 
the other's share of the utility). For the discussion of average utility results see figure 5.18 A for the key of 
each strategy pair for the average utility data for pure and mixed2 experiments and figure 5.18 B for mixed I 
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Figure 5.19: Comparative Final Joint Average Utility For Pure Strategies. A) Average intrinsic Utility For 
Short Term Deadline, B) Average Intrinsic Utility For Long Term Deadline. 
experiments (which include the two control conditions). 
Figures 5.19 A and B show the observed average outcome utilities for the player (x axis) and the 
opponent (y axis) of the pure-strategy benchmark experiments with the independent variables shown in 
figure 5.11. 
The first observation is that the argument in section 5.4.4 (that because the -yj arrays for each issue 
are the same the responsive mechanism can not do better than outcomes lying on the constant-sum line) 
is supported by the observations of outcome utilities in both short term and long term environments. No 
strategy pair does significantly better than the reference point, by moving north easterly towards the pareto- 
optimal line, independently of the time limits. 
Hypothesis 7 is also supported by the observed data in figure 5.19. The data in figure 5.19, A is clus- 
tered into roughly four groups. The first group (shown as groupl), are the best outcomes, in that they are 
closest to the reference point, thus resulting in a more equal distribution of final utilities. groupl members 
are the strategy pairings (linear, linear), (conceder, conceder) (titfortattitfortat), (linear, titfortat), and 
(titfortat, linear). These strategies correspond to the cases where both agents adopt a concessionary ap- 
proach to the cross over of the interval values. The group's total mean and standard deviation is 0.485 and 
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0.04 respectively (recall that outcomes with a perfect coincidence with the reference point will have a mean 
and standard deviation of 0.5 and 0.0 respectively). The observed standard deviation of groupl statistically 
represents the tightest cluster of these outcomes around the reference point in figure 5.19, A. 
The next two groups of outcomes, group 2 and group 3, also lie on, or close to, the constant-sum line, 
but the distribution of individual outcomes is less uniform compared to groupl. group2 members are the 
strategy pairings (tough, conceder), (linear, conceder), (titfortat, conceder), which lie on the north west 
sector of the outcome grid (resulting in higher valued outcomes for the opponent, since only the player is 
conceder in all their strategies). Conversely, mirroring group2 outcomes is graup3, whose members are the 
strategy pairings (conceder, tough), (conceder, linear), (conceder, titfortat). These lie on the south east 
sector of the outcome grid resulting in higher valued outcomes for the player, since opponent is conceder 
in all its strategies. 
Finally, group4 is the clustering of outcomes that do not lie on the constant-sum line (south west sector 
of the outcome grid) and occur with the strategy pairings (tough, tough), (tough, linear), (tough, titfortat), 
(titfortat, tough) and (linear, tough). group4 outcomes are the worst outcomes because they result in fi- 
nal joint average utilities that are lower than all other outcomes. These four groups of observations upport 
hypothesis 7 -in groups 1,2 and 3 there is at least one strategy that approaches its interval faster than the 
others. However, in group4 both are either tough or imitate a tough strategy or are linear. 
Roughly four groups are once again observed when the environment is changed from short term to long 
term deadlines, figure 5.19, B. However, this time there are less members in group4-(tough, linear) and 
the converse member (linear, tough) now belong to group2 and group3 respectively. This further supports 
the stated hypothesis since group4 is now purely composed of tough strategies. However, although a 
strategy that approaches its interval value slowly does individually badly, collectively (similar methodology 
as the previous tactic experiments, when the results are averaged across all other strategies) there is an 
increase in final average utility. Results show that, for example, a tough player strategy gains an average 
of 5% of utility when utilities are averaged across all other strategies in long term deadlines. It is interesting 
to note that the performance of a tough strategist is lowered when more time is given for negotiation when 
encountering a titfortat strategist. Statistically the total average of outlying data decreased from 0.247 to 
0.182 with a standard deviation of 0.067. This result is explained by the fact that the titfortat strategy 
is a conceder until it can begin to imitate other's responses. Therefore, under short term deadlines the 
strategy concedes (hence moves closer to constant-sum line), whereas in longer term deadlines it has more 
opportunity to imitate the other's strategy (tough in this consideration) and as such becomes tough too 
(hence a deal is only possibly reached in the last few moments of negotiation). This pushes the outcomes 
further away from the constant-sum line. In general, for all the experiments described below noticeable 
effects of time limits on strategies are more observable for data that calibrate the process (the costs of 
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communication) and less on the outcome of negotiation. Note, this is not to be confused with the observation 
of the previous pure-strategy experiments where there was a significant difference across deadlines. As 
was shown in the results of group4 in long term deadlines, the collective final average utility of a strategy 
when summed and averaged across all other strategies (methodology of the pure-strategy experiments) does 
increase. However, the analytical unit of these experiments are average joint utilities for a pair, rather than 
a collection of strategies. 
5.4.4.2 Mixedl. Strategy Utility Results 
The expectations for the results of these experiments are summerised by the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 8: A weighting policy that allows all tactics an input into the decision making 
results in a larger number of outcomes that are closer to being equitable, than one that only 
considers a single tactic. 
Hypothesis 9: The more equal this weighting of each ofthe tacticsfor both agents: 1) the more 
equitable thefinal outcome and ii) thefewer the number of outcomes that lie off the constant- 
sum line. That is, variation of tactic weightings by either party results in less fair outcomes 
and more outcomes that lie off the constant-sum line. 
Hypothesis 8 states the intuition that in decision making a combination of tactics (a mixedi strategy) is 
better than a single tactic (pure-strategy). The argument is as follows. In the given set of tactics (or "forcee'), 
boulware, linear, conceder and titfortat. two (linear and conceder) concede at different rates (possibly 
three, titfortat given the other is a conceder or linear) and one (possibly two-titfortat encountering a 
boulware) does so at a relatively much slower rate. Therefore, if equity, or some fair joint utility, is 
required then, as was shown in the results of the previous section, only encounters between a few pairs of 
pure concessionary strategies will achieve this expectation. Indeed, overall, encounters between all of the 
pure strategies will lead to outcome utilities that have a distribution within the space of possible deals that 
is more variable since the outcomes between agents will be based on individual tactics. For example, a 
pairing of tough and tough pure-strategies will result in a final joint utility that is significantly different to 
a pairing of conceder, conceder pure-strategies. Variability in the final average utilities is to be expected 
(since some pure strategies will reach the reference point, but encounters between others will not). On the 
other hand, encounters in mixed I strategies are expected to be comparatively less varied, since they are no 
longer between unique tactics, but a combination of tactics. For example. to reach a fair solution an agent 
in mixed I experiments does not have to "wait to meet" an agent who is adopting a pure conceder or linear 
strategy; conceder and linear pure strategies are present, to some degree, in all mixed I strategies of the 
other agents. 
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The expectation over the effects of this relative weighting of a tactic compared to the other tactics ((I) 
is given in hypothesis 9. This hypothesis captures the expectation that the more equal the weighting of all 
the tactics by both agents (a resultant force that lies equally between the tough and conceder tactics, by 
both agents) then the more likely the final outcome is to be an equitable one. This is expected because 
when the distribution of tactic weights are less varied by both agents, then when these two agents meet 
the boulware, titfortat component of their strategy pairs are more resistant to concession. However, this 
resistance is compensated for by the conceder, linear, titfortat components which approach the cross over 
of offers at a quicker rate. Derivable from this argument is the expectation that inequality in the weight of 
tactics, by either party, should result in more variation of outcomes, similar to pure strategies-departure 
from an equal weighting of tactics, by either party, should result in outcomes that resemble more closely the 
results from pure-strategies. Variation in these experiments will be quantified with respect to the reference 
point and the departure of outcomes from the constant-sum line. 
Figure 5.20 shows the final average agent utilities for mixed I strategies in short term deadlines. Fig- 
ure 5.20 A represents the observed final average utility outcomes for the benchmark player and opponent 
independent variables (figure 5.11). Compared to the pure-strategy results of figure 5.19, two patterns can 
be observed from the collected data that support hypothesis 8. Firstly, the center of the distribution of out- 
comes is closer to the reference outcome. Statistically the center of the distribution of points lying on or 
close to the constant-sum line is of a higher value of 0.479 with a lower standard deviation of 0.0077 as 
compared to a standard deviation of 0.25 for the points in the pure experiments. Almost all the points lie 
on the constant-sum line-compared to pure strategies, the number and magnitude of points lying off the 
constant-sum line is much lower (there are no longer any groups of outcomes). Specifically, the largest 
magnitude "breakaway" is for encounters between a tough player and a tough opponent. Other previ- 
ously breakaway outcomes ((tough, titfortat), (titfortat, tough) and (linear, tough)) are much closer to the 
constant-sum line and the reference point than the results observed for pure experiments. Therefore, in such 
an environment, a combination of tactics (hypothesis 8) does indeed appear better than using a single tactic 
in generating offers in responsive mechanisms. Thus agents do not have to wait to "meef' a concessionary 
strategy to reach fair deals since all strategies have some degree of concession incorporated in them. 
Hypothesis 9 is tested by changing the environment from a benchmark player and opponent to an 
opponent with a higher f) value (figure 5.20 B, as specified by the independent variables of figure 5.12). 
Two patterns are observable in the collected data. Firstly, the center of the distribution moves away from 
reference point towards the player in the south easterly direction (this increase of the distribution variation 
along the constant-sum axis will be referred to as "elasticity" of data points). The overall direction of the 
observed shift is towards higher utilities for the player. Statistically this corresponded to the total average 
of points lying on or close to constant-sum line value of 0.436 with a standard deviation of 0.11. Thus 
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Figure 5.20: Comparative Average Utility For Mixed I Strategies in Short Term Deadlines. A) Benchmark 
B) opposition Increased Qt, C) Player Increased Qt D) Both Decreased Qt- 
the outcomes that lie on the constant-sum line are of relatively higher value to the player. This pattern is 
expected from hypothesis 9 since with higher 0 values the opponent is more concessionary for conceder 
strategies (linear, conceder, titf ortat). This means that a shift should occur away from the opponent 
reference point and towards the player. 
The second observation is that the change in the environment (increased Qt for the opponent) pro- 
duces more breakaway final outcome utilities from the constant-sum line than the benchmark experiments. 
Furthermore, the observation closely resembles the outcome distribution of pure-strategy experiments, sup- 
porting the second part of hypothesis 9-unequal weightings of tactics by either agent result in more out- 
comes that lie off the constant-sum line. Again, like the pure experiments the breakaway points consist of 
encounters between a tough opponent and a tough, linear or titfortat player. 
Hypothesis 9 is given symmetric support when the player has a higher Q value and the opponent is 
specified by the benchmark values. This environment is described by the independent variables in figure 
5.13. Results are shown in figure 5.20 C, the converse of 5.20 B. Once again, there is an elasticity of 
data points, but in an opposite manner to the previous environment. However, the relative movements are 
more towards the opponent this time (opponent statistical average for outcomes lying on or close to the 
















































1 02 score(player) score(player) 
201 
Figure 5.2 1: Comparative Final Joint Average Utility For Mixed I Strategies in Long Term Deadlines. A) 
Benchmark B) Opposition Increased Qt, C) Player Increased Qt D) Both Decreased Qt. 
constant-sum line increased from 0.436 to 0.51 with a standard deviation of 0.109). As before, the only 
breakaway points are encounters involving a tough player. 
Hypothesis 9 is positively supported when both agents' environments are changed from the benchmark 
environment to one where the value of Qt is decreased (from the benchmark level) to a level where all other 
tactics have more of an input in decision making (independent variables shown in figure 5.14). The final 
outcomes across all strategies almost converge to the reference point (figure 5.20 D), corresponding to a 
total final joint average utility of 0.497 with a standard deviation of 0.015, the lowest standard deviation 
in the results thus far. Thus, the more equal the weighting of all tactics, by both agents, the more closer 
the final agreement is to the mid-point of the intervals. This is because some tactics function to reach the 
minimum of the interval values (conceder, linear), whereas others function to remain at the maximum of 
interval values (tough, titf ortat). The resultant position reached is the mid-point of the interval. 
Overall, the results imply the causal relationship that i) a combination of tactics outperforms pure 
strategies and ii) a near equal combination of the possible set of tactics by both agents results in better 
social outcomes (figure 5.20, D) than a differential combination policy of tactics (figure 5.20, A, B, Q. 
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Figure 5.21 shows the same set of experimental environments as figure 5.20, but now the deadline to 
reach an agreement is extended from a short to a longer term. For the benchmark cases the outcomes further 
support hypothesis 8 and 9. The results are now more evenly distributed along the constant-sum line and 
with less breakage (with the exception of (tough, tough) encounters) than short term deadlines (summed 
total average of 0.51 with a standard deviation of 0.096). The implications of this observation are that: 
i) when given enough time to negotiate, the strategies are almost uniquely distinguished by the solution 
point they reach (hence a more even distribution of outcomes) and ii) the sum of these deals are all almost 
1.0. Whereas in pure-strategy experiments an increase in time deadline (figure 5.19 A and B) does not 
significantly increase the sum of the joint outcomes (resulting in outcomes that lie below the constant-sum 
line), the same change in the environment results in better joint outcomes. 
The same elasticity pattern is observed as previously when either the opponent or the player negoti- 
ates with higher fl values, shown statistically by an increase in average utility for the opponent from 0.414 
(standard deviation of 0.079) to 0.50 (standard eviation of 0.13) between figures 5.21 B and C respectively. 
once again, the outlying outcomes are encounters between strategies that are slower to reach the cross over 
point of offers. 
Finally, once again the best outcomes are observed when both agents' environment are changed from 
the benchmark environment to one where the value of f) is decreased (from the benchmark level). Again, the 
final outcomes across all strategies almost all converge to the reference point (figure 5.21 D), corresponding 
to a total finaljoint average utility of 0.499 with a standard deviation of 0.017. These combined observations 
shown in figures 5.20 D and 5.21 D imply that outcomes cannot be distinguished when both agents adopt 
an almost equal weighting of possible tactics (low values of fl for strategy magnitudes). This means that 
outcomes are independent of the strategies the agents select (a collapse of all points on to the reference). 
This is because all strategies in this environment are defined as an almost equal weighting of tactics, where 
the difference between the weightings for each strategy is insignificant. Hence all strategies are almost 
equal with small variations (shown in the data by the magnitude of the standard deviation of the results). 
The expectation for this result is stated in hypothesis 8; in this environment the point of the crossover 
between the offers is reached by almost equally combining the suggestions of all tactics. Thus whereas the 
boulware tactic may suggest different offers, its input is approximately only one quarter or, at maximum, 
a third of the final decision ([0.23,0.3], see figure 5.14). On the other hand, the concessionary tactics may 
suggest concession rates that are very different to a boulware tactic, but nonetheless they are also only a 
quarter or a third part of the final decision. The overall effect of the strategies in this environment is an 
equal integration of the suggestions of different tactics into a single concession rate. In so doing, each of 
the individual differences between tactics are ignored and a new combined concession rate is computed. As 
will be shown later, this hypothesis, that in this environment strategies integrate different concession rates 
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into a single concessionary rate, is supported by an almost constant communication load across all strategy 
pairings shown in figure 5.26. 
5.4.4.3 Mixed2 Strategy Utility Results 
The expectation for the results of these experiments are surnmerised by the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 10: Modification ofa strategy during the course ofnegotiation will result in higher 
valued andfairer social outcomes than non-modification. 
This hypothesis states that the combination of i) considering a number of tactics in decision making and 
ii) modifying this consideration, should result in outcomes that maximize the equity joint utility of the out- 
come. This is expected because the update rule should change the weights of each tactic in such a way as to 
reach the cross over in the contract score according to how close the offers are to one another. Thus, at the 
beginning of negotiation it is expected that offers are dissimilar. The degree of dissimilarity in turn depends 
on the starting position of the resultant shown in figure 5.10 (or the initial r matrix). However, the resul- 
tant is incrementally adjusted (according to rule 5.2 whose actions are dependent on the evolving similarity 
between offers) towards the tough end of the spectrum (fl) by both agents as offers become more similar to 
one another. This process continues until offers converge. Thus, if both agents are implementing rule 5.2 for 
update of weights and their interval values are perfectly overlapping, then final outcomes should be closer 
to the reference point than mixed I strategies. The observed final joint average utility outcomes are shown 
in figure 5.22 for dynamic strategies (mixed2) in short term deadlines. The overall observation for all the 
J1 variations (independent variables shown in figures 5.11,5.12,5.13,5.14) is that all of the outcomes are 
distributed on the constant-sum line with no breakaway points. The average of the utility distributions along 
the constant-sum line are now 0.50,0.489,0.533 and 0.488 for benchmark, opposition, player and both 
decreased 0 levels respectively, with standard deviations of 0.0866,0.123,0.10 and 0.035 respectively. The 
same averages for mixed I strategies were 0.479,0.384,0.436 and 0.497 for benchmark, opposition, player 
and both decreased 11 levels respectively. The combined observations that there are no outlying breakaway 
outcomes (hence all outcomes are maximized) and there is an increased final joint average utility distribu- 
tion around the reference point (hence higher equitable outcomes) gives support to hypothesis 10. Thus, 
changing strategies in short time deadlines results in better joint outcomes than a mixed 1 strategy. For ex- 
ample, a tough mixed I strategy throughout he negotiation results in breakaway points, but changing from 
being concessionary to a tough type strategy resulted in better social outcomes. 
Finally, figure 5.23 shows the results for the same set of environments but for longer term deadlines. 
once again there are no breakaway outcomes with average distributions along the constant-sum line values 
of 0.509,0.448,0.557 and 0.499 for benchmark, opposition, player increased 0 and both decreased 
0 
levels respectively, with standard deviations of 0.04,0.082,0.089 and 0.0012. The interesting point to note 
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Figure 5.22: Comparative Final Joint Average Utility For Mixed2 Strategies in Short Term Deadlines. A) 
Benchmark, B) Opponent With Increased Q, C) Player With Increased Q, D) Both With Decreased Q. 
is that when all tactics are weighted almost equally by both agents (figure 5.23 D), the final outcomes 
converged exactly to the reference point (average distribution of 0.499 and standard deviations of 0.0012, 
the lowest in the experiments). Thus in environments where both agents weight their tactics uniformly 
(figure 5.23 D) the final outcome is independent of the individual strategies. This result is expected from 
the combination of hypothesis 9 of mixedl strategies and the behaviour of the update rule. That is, when 
both agents weight each tactic almost equally, then the initial concession rate to the cross over of values is 
computed as the combination of both concessionary and non-concessionary tactics, into a unique concession 
rate that is the resultant of the combination. This initial concession rate is then updated by the rule given in 
equation 5.2 independently of the type of strategy, selecting a convergence policy to the cross over of offers 
which is dependent of the context (the similarity) of negotiation. 
5.4.4.4 Pure-Strategy Cost Results 
In this section the hypotheses and observations over the dependent variable cycles are presented for the pure 
strategies. Recall that, unlike the previous pure-strategy experiments reported in section 5.3, the analytical 
unit of these experiments is average cost for a pair of strategies, rather than a collection of strategies. 
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Figure 5.23: Comparative Final Joint Average Utility for Mixed2 Strategies in High Time Deadlines. A) 
Benchmark B) Opposition Increased Qt, C) Player Increased Qt D) Both Decreased Ot. 
The dependent variable cycles directly measures the communication load a strategy incurs during the 
negotiation. The results for mixedl and mixed2 strategies are presented in the two subsequent sections. 
Due to legend space restrictions, the strategy labels on the x axis have been abbreviated to b, 1, c, t for 
tough, linear, conceder and titfortat strategies. 
The intuitions and expectations about the communication load of a pure strategy are captured by the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 11: Pure strategies that concede comparatively less slowly will result in corre- 
spondingly higher communication costs. 
This hypothesis is simply based on the fact that some tactics (boulware or titfortat when it encounters a 
boulware) approach the minimum of the interval values less slowly, thereby prolonging the negotiation 
thread. The support for hypothesis II is given in the observed results of figure 5.24 A and B, showing 
the observed communication load for different pure-strategy pairings in short and long term deadlines re- 
spectively. The first support for the hypothesis is deduced from the inverse observation that encounters 
between any strategy and a canceder result in fewer exchanges of offers than other combinations, indepen- 













Figure 5.24: Communication Loads For Pure Strategies. A) Short Term Deadlines B) Long Term Deadlines. 
dently of the environment. Furthermore, more offers are exchanged in longer term deadlines. However, 
whereas in most pairings the amount of communication increases with increasing time limits, encounters 
with a emiceder result in almost constant communication load. That is, encounters with a c(niceder result 
in the same number of offer exchanges independently of the time limits. Finally, positive confirmation of 
hypothesis II is obtained with the observation that the highest number of offers exchanged is between the 
tough and titfortat pairings, the same pairings in the final joint average utility observed data that exhibited 
breakaway patterns from the constant-sum line (figure 5.19). Taken together, these results indicate that 
encounters between pure strategies that have a slower rate of approach to the interval values not only result 
in poorer social outcomes, but also incur a high communication overhead. 
5.4.4.5 Mixedl Strategy Cost Results 
The intuitions and expectations about the communication load of a mixed I strategies are captured by the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 12: /it the general case, a strategy that combines tactics will result in an increased 
number of negotiation rounds. Specificalýv, the amount of communication used is afunction of 
the amount of mixture involved between tactics that reach intenals slowl. v or rapidl. y. 
The above hypothesis is based on the expectation that when only a single tactic is selected for generation of 
offers (a pure-strategy) then, as confirmed in the previous section, those tactics that have a slower concession 
AB 
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rate to the interval values will result in a higher number of offer exchanges. However, when tactics with a 
different concession rate to the interval values are combined, then the number of exchanges will generally 
be greater than the pure strategy case. A higher number of exchanges are expected because concessionary 
tactics are now combined, to some degree, with less concessionary tactics like boulware and titfortat. 
Therefore, since each strategy has an element of less concessionary behaviour then more communication 
is to be expected. This is a general hypothesis since the specific number of offers exchanged depends on 
the "amount of this mixture" (or r matrix) policy of the strategy. The overall expectation is that fewer 
exchanges of offers are likely when both agents "move' the resultant force (figure 5.10) of their tactic 
combination from a boulware tactic to a conceder tactic. 
Figure 5.25 A, B. C and D show the observed results for the communication load of pairings of mixed I 
strategy types in short term deadlines (for benchmark, opposition, player increased Ot levels and both 
decreased Ot levels respectively). Hypothesis 12 is not supported in short term deadlines. The observed 
data suggests, similarly to pure strategies, that in short term deadlines virtually all the encounters between 
all the different types of strategies take the same number of cycles to complete. This is also observed for 
tnixed2 experiments (see figure 5.27 A, B, C and D) which are described in the next section. This result is 
due to the small window of opportunity constraining the time within which strategies must reach a deal (this 
sub-hypothesis is supported by the observation that in comparatively longer term deadlines strategies are 
differentiated, see figure 5.26). Because this "window" is small all strategies use almost all of the limited 
time to search for deals. A short term deadline is defined as 2- 10 ticks of a discrete clock. Therefore, 
strategies have on average 4 ticks of a clock to reach a deal. As shown in figure 5.25, nearly all strategies 
"consume' this available time. Therefore, a better differentiator of strategies in short term deadlines is 
not the communication load of the strategies, but rather the number of deals reached or their utilities, or a 
combination of both. This result is carried over to other strategies, where in short term deadlines the number 
of cycles in negotiation is independent of not only the pairings of the strategies within a given type of 
strategy (pure, mixed I or mixed2), but also across different types of strategies. Therefore, communication 
load can not be used as a decision criteria in short term deadlines. The agent may rely instead on other 
relevant criteria such as the intrinsic utility of the outcome or the number of successful deals reached. For 
example, if the utility of deals is used as a decision criteria for which strategy to select then, as shown by the 
results in figure 5.22, a mixed2 strategy can lead to better social outcomes. A significant effect of strategy 
pairings on the communication load is observed in patterns of data for longer term deadlines for both mixed I 
and mixed2 experiment types (figures 5.26 and 5.28 respectively). The claim that the number of exchanges 
in a mixed I strategy will generally be greater than the pure-strategy case is supported by an increased total 
average number of cycles across all strategies. Quantitatively, the total average number of cycles across all 
strategies are 17.18 for pure strategies (figure 5.24 B) and 22.58 for benchmark mixed I strategies (figure 




Figure 5.25: Communication Loads For Mixedl Strategies in Short Term Deadlines. A) Benchmark B) 
Opposition Increased f1t, C) Player Increased f1t D) Both Decreased ilt 
5.26 A). Hypothesis 12 is further supported by the observations when the opponent (or conversely the 
player) had a higher f1t level than the benchmark environment (figure 5.26 B and C respectively). This 
environment tests the proposition that the specific number of offers exchanged depends on the "amount 
of mixture' involved (or r matrix) policy of the strategy. Compared to the benchmark case, increasing 
, yij (moving towards a yij array distribution that resembles more closely the pure-strategy yij), causes 
tactics that approach their interval quickly (or slowly) to decrease (or increase) the communication loads. 
For example, increasing the yij of a conceder tactic from the benchmark case results in a lower number 
of exchanges in negotiation (figure 5.26 B). Conversely, increasing the -tij of a boulware tactic from the 
benchmark case results in an increased number of exchanges in negotiation (figure 5.26 B). Note also that 
the latter encounters are the group of pairings that exhibited breakaway from the constant-sum line (figure 
5.21 B). 
, The results of mutual and uniform integration of concessionary tactics with less concessionary tactics 
by both agents in long term deadline environments is shown in figure 5.26 D. The expectation that the com- 
munication load of mixed I strategies pecifically depends on the amount of "mixture'of tactics is positively 
supported in figure 5.26 D, where an equal combination of concessionary and non-concessionary tactics re- 
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Figure 5.26: Communication Loads For Mixedl Strategies in Long Term Deadlines. A) Benchmark B) 
Opposition Increased f1t, C) Player Increased f1t D) Both Decreased f1t. 
suit in an increase in communication costs of conceder type strategies and a decrease in communication 
costs of tougher strategies. 
5.4.4.6 Mixed2 Strategy Cost Results 
The intuitions and expectations about the communication load of mixed2 strategies are captured by the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 13: In the general case, dynamically changing strategies in the course ofnegotia- 
tion, according to some subjectivefunction, will result in fewer negotiation rounds than static 
strategies. 
Hypothesis 13 has essentially the same form as hypothesis 12. However, the difference in the prediction is 
that in the general case a mixed2 strategy will result in fewer exchanges of offers. That is, in the types of en- 
vironments considered in these experiments, the modification of the r matrix according to some subjective 
function (here the perceived closeness between offered contracts) should result in fewer exchanges of offers 
since the interval values of agents are perfectly overlapping. If the interval values are perfectly overlapping 
and agents begin their offers at the maximum of their interval values, then subsequent offers should quickly 
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Figure 5.27: Communication Loads For Mixed2 Strategies in Short Term Deadlines. A) Benchmark B) 
opposition Increased 11t, C) Player Increased f1t D) Both Decreased [It. 
become more similar when at least one agent makes a concession. Offers become similar quickly because 
the update rule 5.2 gives higher weightings to concessionary tactics when offers are not close to one an- 
other. In essence the update rule modifies the behaviour of each strategy with another tactic (concessionary 
or retaliatory) according to the perceived closeness of offers. If distances between contracts are large then a 
tactic that concedes is given higher importance. As the offers approach one another the similarity between 
offers increases, resulting in a higher weighting for boulware tactics. The overall effect of these two rates 
of approach is to quickly approach the mid-point of the intervals, followed by a slower rate of concession 
until a cross over of offers occurs. In a mixed I strategy, on the other hand, the rate of approach to mid-point 
is constant. For example, a tough strategy in mixed I consists of approaching the interval at a rate that is 
constant and slow. This should naturally result in more exchanges of offers than an equivalent tough mixed2 
strategy whose behaviour is to concede initially (because contracts are dissimilar-rule 5.2), but become 
tough as offers become more similar. 
The observations and explanation of the results for the short term deadline environment (figure 5.27) 
have already been described in the section above. Figure 5.28 shows the final observed communication 
results for the mixed2 strategies with long term deadlines. The comparative data for benchmark cases of 
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Figure 5.28: Communication Loads For Mixed2 Strategies in Long Term Deadlines . A) Benchmark B) 
Opposition Increased f1t, Q Player Increased f1t D) Both Decreased f1j. 
mixed 1 and mixed2 (figures 5.26 A and 5.28 A, respectively) supports hypothesis 13. For example, a tough 
mixed2 strategy engages in less communication than an equivalent ough mixed I strategy. In general, a 
mixed2 strategy reaches an outcome in fewer rounds of negotiation. Statistically the final sum average of 
communication cycles for all benchmark mixedl strategies (the general case) is 22.75, compared to the 
final sum average of 16.3 for the benchmark mixed2 strategies. This pattern is also repeated for 
' 
cases 
when Ot of either the opponent or the player is increased, figures 5.28 B and C respectively. Finally, 
there is no significant observed difference in communication usage between mixed l and mixed2 strategies 
when both agents weight the tactics smoothly and almost equally (figures 5.26 D and 5.28 D respectively). 
This result, in combination with others shown in figure 5.28 A, B and C. suggests that when tactics are 
mixed equivalently, offers are closer to the mid-point of the cross over (supported by the final joint utility 
observations in figure 5.23 A, B, C and D, where the final outcomes are very close to the reference point). 
Hence the update rule modifies all strategies lowly (a boulware tactic) until cross over is achieved. This 
suggest that deliberation over which combination of tactics to use will result in better social outcomes 
(figure 5.23 A, B, C and D) than a static policy, and this can be achieved at the same communication cost. 
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5.4.4.7 Summary of Strategic Experiment Results 
The above results for the three experimental classes confirm the initial proposition of the experiments-that 
dynamic strategies >- static strategies >- pure strategies, for the experimental dependent variables 
intrinsic utility and cycles. 
The utility results show that decision making using pure strategies, when viewed from a global per- 
spective (the equity or maximization ofjoint utilities represented by the reference point), results in the most 
variable set of utility outcomes. However, when tactics are mixed, but constant (mixed I strategy), there 
are significantly lower variations in final average utilities. Furthermore, a more equal weighting by both 
agents results in final outcomes that most increase the maximization of equitable outcomes. In sum, as the 
mixture of tactics is made more equal by both agents, then the closer the final outcome gets to the reference 
point. Finally, changing this initial consideration (mixed2 strategy) results in the highest maximization of 
equitable outcomes. 
Once again the variability of the communication load of the strategy is highest in the pure case. This 
can be seen by the fact that conceder pure strategies result in less communication load and, conversely, 
a tough strategy results in relatively more communication. In the case of mixedl strategies, on the other 
hand, this variability in communication across strategies becomes dependent on the amount of mixture of 
the tactics. Thus the results show that when an agent places higher weighting on concessionary tactics, the 
communication load is minimal (also independently of time limits). Conversely, almost all of the commu- 
nication resource is used by agents when they place more weight on the less concessionary tactics. Medium 
communication load, and less variability across strategies, is observed when both agents weight each tactic 
equally. Finally, a dynamic strategy according to the policy that the concession tactic be given more weight 
when offers are not similar to one another, results in the least overall communication resource usage. 
Overall the implications of these results, from the perspective of configuring an agent, using the wrap- 
per with the current set of available tactics, is that the agent designer should expect the following: 
Pure-strategies have the largest effect on the interactions. Specifically, if an agent is configured to 
interact with a pure-strategy then variability should be expected in: i) the final utility of outcomes, 
with only a few combinations of pure-strategies resulting in better social outcomes, and ii) the overall 
communication costs. 
if an agent is configured to interact with a mixed and static strategy then the designer should expect: 
i) less variability in the final utility of outcomes with relatively more pairings of mixed strategies re- 
sulting in better social outcomes, but ii) with a higher overall communication cost than pure-strategies 
because concessionary and non-concessionary tactics are now mixed (thereby increasing the overall 
communication cost). 
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if an agent is configured to interact with a mixed and dynamic strategy (given by the update rule 5.2) 
then the designer should expect: i) the least variability in the final utility of outcomes with relatively 
more pairings of mixed strategies resulting in better social outcomes than pure or static strategies and 
ii) an invariant, and almost average, overall communication cost when compared with pure or static 
strategies. 
5.5 Trade-off Experiments 
The previous two sections empirically investigated the behaviour of the responsive mechanism. In this 
section the trade-off component of the wrapper is empirically evaluated. The aim of these experiments is to 
evaluate the kernel of the trade-off algorithm (presented in section 4.5.2.3) by investigating its parameters 
in generating a single offer. Therefore these experiments are intended to discover the behaviour of the 
algorithm and assist negotiating agent designers by providing guidelines about the possible outputs of the 
algorithm given the inputs that need to be supplied by the designer. This input is the information an agent 
has about the other agent and it needs to be provided by the designer as knowledge in the acquaintance 
model (AM) component of the wrapper, shown in figure I. I. These experiments will be referred to as 
single-offer experiments. 
The next section, in turn, reports on the experiments that evaluate the process of negotiation when 
agents use a combination of, through the use of meta-strategies, trade-off and responsive mechanisms. The 
process of both agents solely making trade-offs can not be investigated because negotiation will always be 
unsuccessful. Making trade-offs means offers have non-diminishing scores, hence cross over of offers, a 
condition for accepting an offer, can not occur. Therefore the designer of an agent is provided with a higher 
level interaction analysis of the behaviour of the trade-off mechanism when it interacts with a combination 
of other mechanisms. These latter experiments are referred to as the meta-strategy experiments. 
Whereas the aim of the single-offer experiments is to investigate the kernel of the trade-off algorithm, 
in the meta-strategy experiments the subject of the investigation is the dynamics of the trade-off algorithm 
when interacting with other mechanisms. 
5.5.1 Experimental Independent Variables 
The experimental independent variables are reported in this section. Both the single offer and meta-strategy 
experiments hare a common set of independent variables, therefore, to avoid repetition in the next section, 
the set of shared independent variables is presented in section 5.5.1.1 below. Next the independent variables 
unique to the single-offer experiments are presented in section 5.5.1.2. 
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5.5.1.1 Experimental Independent Variables for Both Single-Offer 
and Meta-Strategy Experiments 
The negotiation environment is left unaltered from the dependent variables described in the strategy ex- 
periments (figure 5.8) in order to assist the comparison of the results between the trade-off and meta. 
strategy experiments with the responsive experiments, presented earlier in section 5.4.4. Briefly, the en- 
vironment in the single-offer and meta-strategy experiments consists of bi-lateral negotiations between 
agents categorically labelled as player and opponent, who negotiate over multiple quantitative issues 
[price, quality, time, penalty]. The interval values for these issues are perfectly overlapping (see equa- 
tion 5.1). The player assigns [0.1,0.5,0.25,0.15] and the opponent assigns [0.5,0.1,0.05,0.35] as the 
importance of these issues. 
The other input variables of the trade-off algorithm are the discriminatory power and the magnitude of 
the difference between the input and output of the criteria function (equation 4.6). The criteria function used 
(equation 5.3) is the same as the one presented for the responsive r update rule 5.2. Like the responsive 
experiments, e is also fixed at 0.1 for all issues in order to be quite discriminatory. Also, different ct values 
are fixed to be equal for all issues, &"" =a quality = atime = Ctpenalty = 1, so as to have linear criteria 
functions (Ws), having equal discrimination power across the issue's interval values. 6 
5.5.1.2 Single-Offer Experimental Independent Variables 
The independent variables that are specific to the single-offer experiments are: 
1. the number of children generated at each step in hill-climbing to the iso-curve (N in the trade-off 
algorithm, section 4.5.2.3) 
2. the number of steps taken to reach the iso-curve (S in the trade-off algorithm, section 4.5.2.3) 
3. the information that is available to an agent regarding the importance (or weight) the opponent places 
on each issue in computing the contract's value (equation 4.5) and 
4. the opponent's and player's last offers (x and y in equation 4.4). 
Values for the first and second variables control the amount of search performed by the trade-off algorithm. 
Experiments are run where the number of children are selected from the set f 5,100,200}. The number of 
steps to the iso-curve is selected from the set f 1,40}. The concrete numbers for both the number of children 
and the number of steps to the iso-curve individually signify very little. However, the significance of these 
values is the relative relationship between them. Thus more computation is involved when the trade-off 
algorithm generates 200 rather than 5 children at each iteration, or when it takes a larger number of steps 
to the iso-curve. The expectation, as will be shown below, is that more computation should result in better 
outcomes. 
5.5. Trade-offExperiments 215 
The third independent variable attempts to calibrate the relationship between the performance of the 
trade-off algorithm (in particular, how similarity is computed) given an agent's subjective estimates of the 
likely importance weightings of the other agent. This subjective estimation over others' weights is stored 
as information in the AM component of the wrapper. Thus, to compute whether two offers are similar, 
an agent has to make some subjective, and possibly incorrect, decision about how the other views the im- 
portance of an issue. Specifically, in single-offer experiments an agent can have either perfect, partial, 
imperfect or uncertain information on how the other agent weights the issues that are input into its simi- 
larity function (equation 4.5). The agent chosen to perform the single-offer tradeoff is the player. Then, 
in experiments with perfect information, the algorithm, in computing similarity, is given the opponent's 
weights for different issues (i. e. [0.5,0.1,0.05,0.35], cardinally correct information). Partial information 
games are where the algorithm is given the correct order of importance but not the actual issue weights 
(i. e. [0.7,0.09,0.01,0.2], ordinally correct information). Imperfectgames represent he situation where the 
algorithm is given incorrect information about the other's weights (i. e. [0.1,0.2,0.5,0.2], incorrect infor- 
mation). Finally, uncertain information games represent cases where the algorithm is given undifferentiated 
weights for each issue, in this case [0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25]. The output of the trade-off algorithm can then 
be assessed when supplied with different types of information. 
The final independent variables in these experiments are the input contracts x and y (see equation 4.4) 
representing the player's and the apponent's last offer respectively. Given the interval values in equation 
5.8, contract x is set to [15,28,25,8] and y to [18,10,45,3]. Given each agent's weights and their linear 
scoring function (described in section 5.4.2.2), the agent's valuation of these two contracts are: 
VJ"'Y"' (x) = 0.835, VP"Y"* (u) = 0.195 
Vopponent (Z) = 0.344, Vopponent (y) = 0.8 
meaning that negotiation can continue since there is no cross over of offers yet, each agent still prefers their 
own offer over the other's latest offer. 
5.5.2 Experimental Procedure 
The experimental procedure consists of inputting two contracts, representing x and y, into the algorithm 
under different combination of the other three independent variables (number of children, number of steps 
to the iso-curve and the information levels) and observing the utility execution trace of the algorithm for an 
offer from the player to the opponent. All input contracts (x and y) are subject to the general constraint 
that Vplayer(y) < Vplayer(x) and Vopponent(X) < Vopponent(y). This ensures trade-off is possible by 
ruling out all those contracts that are already of a higher value to either party. A control set is also generated 
by choosing the preferred child randomly at each step approaching the iso-curve (as opposed to using the 
similarity criteria). 
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5.5-3 Hypotheses and Results 
The hypothesis in a single-offer experiment is given in terms of the input and output of the trade-off algo- 
rithm. The input is the set of importance weights of the other agent (perfect, partial, imperfect and random) 
and the output is a contract that has the same score to the agent, but some other score to the other agent. 
Specifically, the hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 15: The greater the exploration ofthe space ofpossible deals, the better the output 
of the algorithmfrom the perspective of the other agent. 
Furthermore, the quality of the algorithm's output (the score of the contract to the opponent) 
is directly dependent on the quality of information input--4he better the information, the better 
the outcome quality. 
The hypothesis simply states the intuition that a more refined search of the possible space of contracts 
should result in selecting and offering a contract that has more value to the other agent. Furthermore, this 
search should be directly affected by the information the algorithm has about the other's issue importance 
rankings. 
Figure 5.29 and the top row of figure 5.30 show the results of varying, under different information 
inputs, the number of children generated in single-offer experiments when the number of steps to the iso- 
curve is set to 40. The bottom row of figure 5.30 represents the case where the number of children is set 
to 100, but the trade-off algorithm computes the iso-contract in a single step. The dot-dash line represents 
the execution trace of the random control, the solid line emanating from y the similarity based trade-off 
execution trace, and the line joining (0,1) to (1,0) the pareto-optimal line. The output of the algorithm, x', 
is shown in figures 5.29 and 5.30 as an unfilled circle and square for the algorithm that selects the next child 
in each step based on similarity or random criteria respectively. 
Three major patterns are observed that directly and indirectly support hypothesis 15. Direct support 
is given by the first observation that when moving to the iso-curve if the space of possible contracts is not 
explored sufficiently, 5 children (figure 5.29 top row) or 1 step (figure 5.30 bottom row), then the gains of 
the opponent are at best insignificant and at worst negative. More specifically, only when the player has 
perfect information about the opponent's evaluations and the trade-off mechanism operates in I step with 
100 children will the mechanism improve the offer (from the opponent's perspective) (figure 5.30 E). The 
next best contract for the opponent is when it has the same value as x (figure 5.29 A). All other contracts 
generated by the player when not fully exploring the search space (figures 5.29 B, CD and 5.30 F) have 
lower value to the opponent than x. 
However, the opponent's benefit increases as the algorithm performs more search (from 5 to 200 
children in 40 steps-figure 5.29 top row [5 children), bottom row [100 children], and figure 5.30 top row 
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Figure 5.29: Tradeoff Algorithm Experiment: Data for 5 Children in 40 Steps (First Row) and 100 Children 
in 40 Steps (Second Row). A) & E) Perfect Information, B) & F) Imperfect Information, Q& G) Partial 
Information, D) & H) Uncertain Information. 
[200 children]). Thus, generating more children does indeed increase the utility of the opponent. However, 
the data suggests there is a point above which generation of more children does not increase the utility 
of the opponent. This is observed in the lack of any significant difference between perfect and partial 
information outcomes within either the 100 and 200 children (40 steps) result categories (compare figures 
5.29 E, F, G and H with 5.30 A, B, C and D). Furthermore, the expectation, as stated by hypothesis 15, 
that the more accurate the information about the weights of the opponent are, the better the contract score 
for the opponent is supported by the observation that the utility to the opponent is indeed increased when 
the algorithm is increasingly supplied with more correct information about the opponent's weights (seen 
as increasing utility) from incomplete to uncertain information classes. However, the hypothesis is rebutted 
for perfect and partial information cases (compare 5.29 E with G or 5.30 A with Q. This lack of significant 
differences between contracts selected under perfect and partial information conditions indicates that the 
algorithm requires only partial ordering information, rather than perfectly cardinal orderings, in order to 
compute outcomes that are better for the opponent. This is because the absolute differences in magnitude 
between the perfect and partial information classes is small Q0.5,0.1,0.05,0.35) - [0.7,0.09,0.01,0.21 = 
[0.2,0.01,0.04,0.15]), resulting in input variables that are not significantly different. The chosen value 
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Figure 5.30: Data For 200 Children in 40 Steps (First Row), and 100 Children in 1 Step (Second Row). A) 
& E) Perfect Information B) & F) Imperfect Information, Q& G) Partial Information, D) & H) Uncertain 
Information. 
for the partial weight estimation can not be made significantly different from the perfect weight estimation 
values because the actual values of the partial estimates are constrained both at the upper and lower limits 
by the perfect and uncertain weight estimation values. 
Positive support about the relationship between the quality of the input and the resultant output is given 
in the final observation that, for all environments and variable combinations, imperfect information (figure 
5.29 B and F, and figure 5.30 B and F) results in significantly poorer outcomes for the opponent than all 
the other information classes. This is only to be expected since the search is directed towards erroneous 
directions when the information supplied about the other agent is incorrect. 
Note, in nearly all cases, the similarity based trade-off out performs the policy of randomly selecting 
a child for the next step towards the iso-curve. However this pattern does not hold for the cases of reaching 
the iso-curve in one step under partial and uncertain information environments (figure 5.30 G and H). Given 
an offer is generated in I step, this is due to chance, rather than randomness being a better strategy in this 
type of environment (supported by the consistently poor performance of the random selection strategy in 
the experiments where the number of steps to the iso-curve is set to 40, figure 5.29 C, D, G and H, and 5.30 
C and D). 
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In summary, these results indicate that unless agents know, at least partially, the importance the other 
agent attaches to an issue, then the best policy for computing trade-offs is to assign uncertain weightings 
to all issues. These weightings can then be updated by some learning rule towards partial or perfect infor- 
mation models, since a) information models are private and b) erroneous predictions can result in poorer 
outcomes. Furthermore, engaging in trade-off negotiation, particularly with a high search factor by both 
parties, results in higherjoint gains. 
5.6 Meta-Strategy Experiments 
The aim of these experiments is to empirically evaluate the influence of meta-strategies that individually 
use or combine a trade-off mechanism and a responsive mechanism on: 
1. the dynamics of negotiation (section 5.6.2.1) and 
2. the outcome (section 5.6.2.2) of negotiation 
Recall from section 4.7 that a responsive mechanism implements a depth-first strategy in the negotiation 
state-space (figure 2.3), where the depth visited is a function of concession rate, which itself is a function 
of the resources left in negotiation, the time limits in negotiation and the behaviour of the other agents. 
Conversely, the trade-off mechanism can explore other parent nodes' siblings, as opposed to the siblings of 
a child node alone. A meta-strategy is then one that combines either search strategy towards an outcome 
(see figure 4.10). The aim of these experiments is to empirically capture the outcome and dynamic patterns 
of the wrapper when a combination of mechanisms are used for interactions. These patterns can then be 
used to form decision rules which agent designers can use to guide them in the selection of meta-strategies. 
TWo types of experiments are reported below. The aim of the first class of experiments is to analyze 
the process of different meta-strategy decision making (namely section 5.6.1.1). Therefore. the execution 
trace of the different meta-strategies are observed for a single run of an experiment. Consequently only a 
single outcome is observed. The aim of the second set of experiments. similar to the strategy experiments 
reported in section 5.4, is to analyze the effect of different meta-strategy decision making models on the final 
averaged joint utilities across a number of different environments 5.6.1.2. These observed final averaged 
utilities can then be used to deduce general statements about the meta-strategy experiments rather than their 
behaviour in a single run. Again this information is a useful guideline for agent designers because it can be 
used to assess the general behaviour of the given meta-strategy set. 
5.6.1 Meta-Strategy Experimental Variables 
The environment of these experiments is equivalent o the previous single-offer experiments. Briefly, the en- 
vironment consists of bi-lateral negotiations between agents categorically labelled as player and opponent. 
who negotiate over multiple quantitative issues [price, quality, time, penalty]. The interval values for 
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these issues are perfectly overlapping (see equation 5.1). The player assigns [0.1,0.5,0.25,0.15] and the 
opponent assigns [0.5,0.1,0.05,0.35] as the importance of these issues. 
In addition to the variations in the types of environments, new variables are needed that define meta- 
strategies. The first offer of both agents is generated using the responsive mechanism, since the trade-off 
mechanism requires at least one offer from the opponent. After that, an agent faces a choice of which 
mechanism to select. Since there can be an infinite number of meta strategies (as many as the potential 
sequences of choices between responsive and trade-off types of counter-proposals), the meta strategies con- 
sidered in these experiments are limited to the set (responsive, smart, serial, random). A responsive 
meta-strategy simply selects the responsive mechanism for generating an offer throughout negotiation. This 
is included to compare the trade-off mechanism against an agent that always concedes on utility. The pa- 
rameters of the responsive mechanism are set to produce concession behaviours, since being responsive 
often involves concessions in the light of environmental needs (e. g. time, resources and behaviours). A 
smart strategy consists of deploying a trade-off mechanism until the agent observes a deadlock in the aver- 
age closeness of offers between both agents, as measured by the similarity function. That is, the distance 
between the offers is not reducing. Under these circumstances, the value of the previously offered contract, 
Va(x), is reduced by a predetermined and arbitrary amount, here 0.05, thereby lowering the input value 
of 0 into the trade-off mechanism. This value is chosen as a concession rate that is relatively lower than 
the concession rate of the responsive mechanisms. Thus, a concession in smart meta-strategy is a more 
"cautious! ' concession than its responsive counterpart. A serial strategy involves alternating between the 
trade-off and responsive mechanisms. Finally, the random meta-strategy randomly selects between the two 
mechanisms and functions as the control meta-strategy. 
5.6.1.1 Process Oriented Experimental Independent Variables 
The aim of the process oriented meta-strategy experiments is to investigate the dynamics, or a single exe- 
cution trace, of different meta-strategies. Therefore, the sampling of independent variables is meaningless 
since the process is observed for only one execution trace. Thus the independent variables for responsive 
and trade-off mechanisms, as well as the associated time limits, are constant. 
In these experiments the parameters of the responsive mechanism are set as follows. The tactics 
[boulware, linear, conceder, titfortat] are set to [0.5,1,5,1] for both agents. These values reflect repre- 
sentafive members of each tactic class. For example, the value of P for a boulware tactic can range from 
values of 0 (being very tough) to 1.0 (being almost conceder). Therefore, the value of 0.5 represents an 
average tough tactic. There is only one member of each of linear and titfortat tactics and the limits of the 
conceder tactic are taken to be between 1.0 (least conceder) to 10 (the most). 
The other element of the responsive mechanism, the strategy, is set as follows. Agent strategies are 
of type mixed2 (section 5.4). The initial value of the weighting of the tactics (r matrix corresponding to 
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the initial strategy) is set to [0.7,0.1,0.1,0.11 for both agents. Therefore, both agents initially place more 
weighting on the boulware tactic. A mutual tough initial strategy is chosen because, as will be shown 
below, agents in subsequent iterations of negotiation modify this initial strategy by a policy that places less 
weight on the boulware tactic and more on the conceder tactic. Therefore, to prevent a fast approach to 
the interval values (large movement towards 0 along the x axis of the score for the player. for example, 
in figure 5.23). and hence quick agreements, the initial strategy is made to be tough, thereby allowing the 
trade-off mechanism to operate (at higher utility values--operating at 0 values towards 1.0 along the x axis 
of the score for the player, for example, in figure 5.23). 
The modification policy is simply slowly increasing the importance of the conceder tactic as the 
thread of negotiation increases. Note, this policy is different to the one reported in the previous section 
(section 5.4) that conceded or remained firm according to the similarity between offers. The policy is 
that at each iteration the weighting of the conceder tactic is increased by 30% and, correspondingly, the 
weights of the other tactics are uniformly lowered. Thus, both agents begin negotiation as tough strategist, 
but end up placing increasing importance on the conceder tactics. Therefore, the modification policy 
is chosen independently of the others' offers and is dependent on the length of the thread. This policy 
is chosen because the overall required behaviour of the responsive mechanism is concessionary. because 
the combination of a concessionary mechanism and a trade-off mechanism, through a meta-strategy, can 
equally implement the similarity based strategy modification policy. The chosen policy will always concede 
because the thread of the negotiation always increases. 
The parameters of the trade-off mechanism are set as follows. The exploration factor of the trade-off 
experiment, defined by the two independent variables number of children and number of steps to the iso- 
curve, are made a constant at 100 children and 40 steps respectively. The supplied similarity weights to 
the trade-off algorithm of each agent are set to be [0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25] (corresponding to uncertainty of 
the others' issue weightings). These values are chosen based on the previous observations in the trade-off 
experiments (section 5.5) that such a weight selection results in significant utility increases for the other 
agent (see the results shown in figure 5.29). Finally, the time limit of the both agents is set to 20 ticks of a 
discrete clock. 
5.6.1.2 Outcome Oriented Experimental Variables 
The aim of the previous experiments is to calibrate the dynamics of negotiation when agents interact with 
one another using either one or both of the developed responsive and trade-off mechanisms in a single 
type of environment. This knowledge is useful for developing an understanding of the processes involved 
in each of the mechanisms, but is less informative about the behaviour of a meta-strategy in different 
types of environments. These experiments aim to provide such an analysis by, in a similar fashion to 
the previous strategy experiments (section 5.4), shifting the focus of attention to the outcome, rather than 
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the process, of negotiation in types of environments. However, once again, in order to control the number 
of free independent variables that can be sampled, and allow some comparison with the process-oriented 
experiments above, the variables of the opponent are chosen to have the same values as the process-oriented 
experiments (section 5.6.1.1) and the variables of the player are sampled. 
More specifically, the parameters of the responsive mechanism are as follows. The same update rule 
is used as for the process-centered experiments. However, the parameters of the tactics are now sampled 
for the player. The 0 parameter of the boulware tactic is sampled within the interval [0.01,0.2] (more 
boulware than previous process-oriented experiments). The linear and titfortat tactics can not be sampled 
(since these tactics can only take on a value of 1.0). A conceder tactic is sampled within the interval 
[20,40] (more conceder than previous process-oriented experiments). Therefore, whereas the previous 
process-oriented experiments evaluate the average representatives of a tactic class, in these experiments 
more extreme tactic members are evaluated for completeness by choosing a player that is more boulware 
or conceder. 
In turn, the parameters of the trade-off mechanism are as follows. The exploration factor, defined by 
the two independent variables number of children and number of steps to the iso-curve, is once again made 
a constant at 100 children and 40 steps respectively, for the opponent. However, the number of children 
generated at each step in the trade-off algorithm for the player is now sampled between the ranges of 
[100,200] and the exact number of steps chosen is within the range [40,80]. These values are chosen so 
that, on average, the player is made to perform more of an elaborated search of the space of the possible 
outcomes. Finally, the time limit of the opponent is set to 20 and sampled within the ranges of [30,60] for 
the player. Higher time limits and a greater exploration rate are chosen for the player to allow the trade-off 
mechanism to search for better deals. 
The number of environmental samplings is set to 400. This ensures that the probability of the sampled 
mean deviating by more than 0.01 from the true mean is less than 0.05. The experiments were written in 
Sicstus3.7.1 Prolog and ran on HP Unix parallel machines at the Center de Supercomputacio de Catalunya 
CESCA utilizing four CPUs, 9MB of memory and lasted 1954 seconds. 
5.6.2 Hypotheses and Results 
Finally, the expectations and observed results of the process and outcomes of meta-strategy experiments are 
presented in the following two subsections. 
5.6.2.1 Meta-Strategy Process Hypotheses and Results 
Hypothesis 16: The more the space ofpossible deals is explored jointly, the better the joint 
outcome. However, higherjoint utilities are gained at the expense of greater communication 
between the agents. 
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The hypothesis essentially states the expectation that a pair of smart meta-strategies hould select final 
outcomes that have a higherjoint value than other types of meta-strategies. This is expected because a smart 
meta-strategy is essentially a trade-off strategy that only concedes a small amount (0.05 in this case) when a 
deadlock is detected. All other experimental meta-strategies have an element of concession involved in them 
(since the variables of the responsive mechanism have been chosen to behave in a concessionary fashion). 
Thus any meta-strategy that selects a responsive mechanism in the course of negotiation (all pairs of meta- 
strategies except (smartsmart]) should result in joint utility execution traces that "move" south westerly, 
away from the pareto-optimal line. Furthermore, meta-strategies that engage more in search for higherjoint 
utilities and less on concessions hould result in higher communication loads. This latter expectation is 
based on the intuition that a responsive mechanism generates contracts that successively approach the point 
of cross over in offers faster than the trade-off mechanism. Hence it is to be expected that a meta-strategy 
that selects the responsive mechanism should reach acceptable deals quicker than one that is smart. 
Figure 5.31 presents the data for the meta-strategy experiments investigating the process of mechanism 
selection. Individual offers between the player and the opponent are depicted as circles and squares respec- 
tively. The sequences of offers are joined by a solid line for the player and a dotted line for the opponent. 
The final agreement is depicted as the offer where the circle and square meet. The communication load is 
simply the addition of the numbers of circles and the squares. 
The observed rank ordering, in figure 5.3 1. across meta-strategy pairings over the summed joint utility 
gained for the final outcome directly supports hypothesis 16. The highest joint gain is achieved in negoti- 
ations between two smart meta-strategies. In this case, the final outcome is closer to the pareto-optimal 
line than any other meta-strategy pairing, implying that such a pairing of meta-strategies results in out- 
comes that are most beneficial to both parties. The remaining rankings for player, opponent pairings of 
meta-strategies are then [smartscrial], [serial. seriaU. [smartrandom), [smartresponsive], [serial, responsivel, [ran- 
donrcsponsivel, [randomrandoml with respectivejoint gains of 1.27,118,1.146,1.11,1.076,1.06,0.99. In 
general, the higherjoint utilities occur when at least one of the agents issmart. The random meta strate- 
gists, as expected, perform worst. 
Hypothesis 16 is further supported by the observation of the number of messages exchanged between 
agents using different meta-strategies (recall that in these experiments the number of messages exchanged 
between agents is simply the addition of the individual messages exchanged in figure 5.3 1). This indirectly 
measures the communication load a meta-strategy places on the agents. As predicted by hypothesis 16, the 
observed pattern is almost the reverse for the joint value outcomes above; with a [smartsmart] pairing in- 
curring the highest communication cost (reaching a deal at 19 rounds (recall that the time limits allowed are 
20 ticks of a discrete clock, followed by [randonirandom], [smartresponsive], [smartrandom), [smartserial] (14 
rounds), [serial, seriall (13 rounds), and [serialresponsive] (12 rounds). This observation supports the intuition 
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Figure 5.3 1: Dynamics of Negotiation Process for Meta Strategies, Pairs Denoted as Meta-Strategy of the 
player, Meta-Strategy of the oppone7d: A) smart v. smart, B) smart v. serial, C) smart v. random D) smart 
v. responsive, E) serial v. serial, F) serial v. responsive, G) random v. random, H) random v. responsive. 
that higher joint utilities are gained through greater search, which, in turn, involves more communication 
between the agents. 
5.6.2.2 Meta-Strategy Outcomes Hypotheses and Results 
The hypothesis for these experiments is the same as the process-oriented experiments, namely: 
Hypothesis 17: On average, the more the space of possible deals is explored jointly, the 
better thejoint outcome. However on average higherjoint utilities are gained through greater 
communication between the agents. 
That is, the aim of these experiments is to show that in the long run, or on average and independently 
of the type of environment, better exploration of the space of possible deals should result in higher joint 
outcomes. The expectation of the outcome-oriented experiments is no different than the experiments that 
did not involve sampling the types of environments. In the average case, those meta-strategies that involve 
more search will result in better outcomes, but at the cost of increased communication. 
Figure 5.32 supports the expectation over the joint utility part of the hypothesis. The key to the meta- 
strategy pairing is amended with the total summed average of the joint utility the pairing achieved. As 
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Figure 5.32: Final Average Utility Outcomes for Meta Strategies Pairings. 
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expected, pairings of a meta-strategy that compute counter-offers using the responsive mechanism lead to 
the worst joint outcomes (joint utility of 1.0, the outcome lying on the constant-sum line-see supporting 
data in strategic experiments, section 5.4). Only moderate joint gains above 1.0 are achieved when the 
meta-strategy of one of the agents is not purely a responsive one ([smart, responsivel: joint utility outcomes 
of 1.12, [serial, responsivel: joint utility outcomes of 1.08, iresponsive, random]: joint utility outcomes of 
1.06). At the other extreme, joint utility of outcomes is best maximized (outcomes lying closer to the pareto- 
optimal line), as expected, when agents use a smart meta-strategy. More specifically, the best outcome is 
achieved for a [smart, smart] meta-strategy with joint utilities of 1.42. In between these two extremes lie 
the outcomes that are, in the main, due to the interactions with one agent whose meta-strategy is serially 
switching between a trade-off and a responsive mechanism (the interval of joint utility outcomes of 1.15 to 
1.24). 
Once again, the meta-strategies that result in higher joint outcomes, as predicted by hypothesis 17, 
are achieved at the expense of higher communication costs (figure 5.33). The meta-strategy pairing 
[smart, smart] results in an average number of communication rounds of 19.48 (note, the proximity of this 
to the time limit of the opponent, whose deadline is fixed at 20 ticks of a clock). Conversely, interactions 
between two responsive meta-strategies resulted in poorer joint outcomes (figure 5.32), but at a relatively 
lower communication cost (10.16). 
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Figure 5.33: Final Joint Average Number of Cycles for Meta Strategies Pairings. 
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In summary, the results from the single execution trace of the trade-off algorithm (section 5.5) and 
the meta-strategy experiments (section 5.6) indicate that a better exploration of the space of the possible 
set of outcomes leads to agreements that are higher in joint gains. Furthermore, this increased search 
results in: i) higher joint outcomes on each iteration of the algorithm (section 5.5), across a single run 
in a unique environment (section 5.6.2.1) or across multiple environments (section 5.6-2-2) and ii) higher 
communication costs. 
5.7 Summary 
In this chapter, three components of the developed negotiation wrapper (the responsive, trade-off and meta- 
strategy mechanisms) were empirically evaluated by conducting a series of exploratory experiments. These 
experiments were conducted to: i) test the intuitions about the underlying causal relationships between both 
the model's key variables and the agent's environment and ii) provide some guidelines for how the wrapper 
can be "tuned" by a designer of a negotiating agent. However, manipulation experiments are needed that 
test more concrete causal hypothesis and result in better data models. Nonetheless, the exploratory experi- 
ments; reported in this chapter help "tune" some of the parameters of the mechanisms through exploration 
of a subset of the space of possible variable ranges, through different combination of agent architectures 
and environments. The experimental agent architectures, or the choice of which decision mechanism to 
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use for decision making, was restricted to responsive (tactics/pure, static strategic/mixedl, and dynamic 
strategic/mixed2), trade-off and a number of different meta-strategies that selected different combination 
of mechanisms. The experimental environments were in turn motivated by some of the features and re- 
quirements of the two target domains identified in section 1.4.3 such such time limits, certainty levels and 
number of issues. 
Hypothesis one to eight summarize the expectations of outcomes and the processes of negotiation 
when simple tactic (pure) agent architectures interact in short or long term deadlines. In these experiments 
the expectation that tactics which reach reservation values more slowly will perform better was rebutted. In 
fact, it was found that the success of a tactic is a function of not only the composition of the population, 
but also appropriateness of the tactics to respond to changes in the environment. Indeed, tactics that ap- 
proached the reservation values of an issue more slowly (more Boulware) did make high value deals but this 
benefit was reduced due to the lower number of successful deals made as well as the communication costs 
involved, specially when the population includes imitative tactics that "magnify" the toughness profile of 
the population. In fact, the best tactics were the ones that linearly approached their reservation values. Also 
confirmed was the expectation that such simple agents, which consider only a single environmental criteria, 
will result in more varied distribution of outcomes around the most equitable outcome point (hypothesis 
seven). In fact, simple agent architectures perform best (maximize their joint utilities) only in encounters 
between two pure strategies that give higher weighting to tactics that approach the reservation of an issue 
in a linear fashion. 
Hypothesis eight to fourteen, on the other hand, summarize the expectations of outcomes and the pro- 
cesses of negotiation when more complex (static strategies/mixed I and dynamic strategiestmixed2) agent 
architectures interacted in short or long term deadlines. The expectation in this set of experiments was that 
if the mixing between different tactics of both agents is more "smooth" (or the more equal the contribution 
of each individual tactic to the computation of a new overall concession rate), and if the method of com- 
putation of the new concession rate is performed intelligently according to some objective function (such 
as the similarity between the exchanged contracts), then the more equitable the final outcome for both par- 
ties. Indeed, variations by either party from these parameter settings results in distribution of outcomes that 
although maybe locally more equitable are lessjointly equitable. 
Hypothesis fifteen captured the expectations of outcomes and the processes of negotiation when an 
agent implemented a trade-off algorithm in long term deadlines (a more complex agent architecture than 
the responsive mechanism). The aim of this experiment was to evaluate whether a relationship exists be- 
tween the complexity of the search of the space of possible deals and the quality of the outcome (from the 
perspective of the opponent) and if so whether this relationship is affected by the uncertainties involved in 
trade-off negotiation. Indeed, results confirmed the expectations of such a relationship where a more re- 
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fined search of the possible space of contracts did resulted in selecting and offering a contract that had more 
value to the other agent. Furthermore, this search was directly affected by the information the algorithm had 
about the other's issue importance rankings where better information (less uncertainties) resulted in better 
contracts to be selected. 
Finally, the expectation that either on a single case (hypothesis sixteen) or the average case (hypoth- 
esis seventeen) the most equitable outcomes should be reached when both agents intelligently search the 
space of possible contracts using both the responsive and the trade-off mechanism (the most complex agent 
architecture) according to some objective function. This objective function (the similarity function) imple- 
mented the meta-strategy and directed the negotiation search by selecting the trade-off mechanism when 
the objective function was being maximized and the responsive mechanism when the local minima of the 
objective function was reached. These expectations were confirmed by the observations where it was found 
that a pair of smart meta-strategies reached deals closer to the pareto-optimal line than combination of any 
other non-intelligent combination of meta-strategies. 
The implications of these results for the designer of the negotiating agent is deferred to section 6.2.1. 
Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Future Work 
The conclusions and the directions for future work, derived in the main from the identified weaknesses, are 
jointly presented in this final chapter. However, the work reported here is reviewed first. 
6.1 Review of the Thesis 
This thesis has presented a solution for the problem of coordination among two autonomous agents that 
need to interact with one another. The solution addresses two sets of requirements identified in the first 
chapter: i) the requirements of the actual problem that the coordination system should achieve (section 
I A. 3) and ii) the requirements that arise in designing of a coordination system (section 1.1). 
The first requirement has been how to coordinate domain problem solvers that need the services of one 
another in their local problem solving. This interaction problem was defined for each individual agent as 
the tuple P= (I, C, Criteria) (equation 2.1). 1 is the set of issues that describe features of a service. C 
describes the constraints of each of these features (such as its importance level, its reservation values and an 
agent's preferences over the values it can take, as well as other environmental constraints such as the time 
and resources available for negotiation). Criteria is then defined in terms of the principle of individual 
rationality. The rationality principle adopted in this thesis was the maximization of some utility function. 
The agent interaction problem was then defined as the mutual and strategic selection of values for I that 
respect C and satisfy Criteria for each party given the normative protocol of interaction. Furthermore, 
this solution has to be mutually derived without knowledge of others' sets of constraints and also with 
limited computational resources. For this reason, the satisfaction, rather than the optimization, of Criteria 
is considered to be sufficient. Conflicts were then defined as when the local criteria of each agent negatively 
interact. The proposed solution to this constrained search has been to design a coordination framework that 
consists of. i) a protocol that assists the agents in the communication (or on-line) phase of their interaction 
problem solving and ii) a set of mechanisms that assists the agents in their deliberation (or off-line) phase 
of their interaction problem solving. Agents then use these two components of the coordination framework 
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to solve their interaction problem by representing and iteratively reasoning and exchanging offers over 
services as issue-value pairs. The novelty of the research reported here is in the deliberation mechanisms 
for multi-dimensional conflicts. Multi-dimensional interactions require reasoning over a larger set of agent 
constraints compared to single dimension. These novel aspects were driven by the requirements outlined 
in section 1.4.3 where it was shown that the target problem domains of this research, and the real world 
in general, are multi-dimensional in nature. Likewise, each of the dimensions have constraints attached 
to them and agents need to reason about these constraints explicitly. For instance, some dimensions of a 
problem are more important than others and a search for a solution is often based on such relationships. 
For example, the log-rolling strategy (Pruitt 1981) searches for new solutions by violating the constraints 
of the least important issues and further constraining the constraints of more important issues. The multi- 
dimensional nature of the interaction also indirectly leads to the requirement that agents are able to combine 
their preferences over each of the individual dimensions. Thus, agents require a model that supports the 
consolidation of preferences over each issue into a single preference. 
The main contribution of this thesis is the developed deliberation component. Three mechanisms 
were presented that, given the problem specification (the issues, their constraints and criteria), search in a 
distributed and autonomous fashion (important domain requirements, section 1.4.3) for individually accept- 
able assignment of values to each dimension of negotiation. When individual assignments are in conflict, 
detected by a set of evaluation functions, then agents use one or more of the decision options to resolve 
them. The first mechanism presented was the responsive mechanism which implements various degrees 
of concession (from no concession to full concession) according to the agent's current environment. This 
mechanism was designed to model concessionary behaviours according to how much negotiation time and 
resources were available (both requirements mentioned in section 1.4.3). Additionally, the mechanism 
models decisions based on the behavioural profile of the other agent, another important feature of the target 
domains. The concession mechanism is computationally simple (involving the execution of simple func- 
tions, called tactics, and the assignment and modification of importance weights to each tactic, called a 
strategy). Furthermore, it requires a minimal amount of information about the choices of the other(s); de- 
cisions are conditioned on the environment of the agent and minimally (through the behaviour-dependent 
tactics) on the choices of the other(s). Indeed, the only assumption made about the other(s) is that conflicts 
arise because the other agent has an opposing preference ordering over increasing domain values for all 
issues. This information is inferred by the roles agents play in interaction (e. g. a seller prefers higher prices 
to lower ones and for a buyer the reverse is true). Thus the mechanism is based on the realistic assumptions 
that: i) the agent is not omniscient and/or ii) super logical. Rather, an agent's knowledge about the choices 
of the other(s) is highly limited and its reasoning capabilities are bounded. These features of the mechanism 
were factored into the design process for the flexibility requirement of the wrapper (see below). 
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The other novel decision components of the coordination framework are the trade-off and issue- 
manipulation mechanisms (since they are computationally more complex than the responsive mechanism). 
The trade-off mechanism was developed to model cooperative reasoning over conflicts, defined as interac- 
tions where at least one of the agents is motivated by the intention to increase the social welfare function 
(globally rational outcomes that aim to make both agents better off), but achieves the current aspiration 
level over its preferences (i. e. is locally rational, satisfying the local criteria specified over each issue). This 
contrasts with the responsive mechanism that models more selfish reasoning, defined as interactions where 
agents are not interested in increasing the social welfare function, but rather only in satisfying their own 
preferences. The responsive and trade-off mechanisms jointly address the requirement, identified in section 
1.4.3, for different types of motivations over conflict. The issue-manipulation mechanism, in turn, was de- 
veloped to not only assist agents in escaping local minima in the search of the social welfare function, but 
also because the nature of the problem naturally involves modification of the set of negotiation issues at run 
time due to dynamically changing domain requirements (section 1.4.2). 
Both the trade-off and issue-manipulation mechanisms are a novel way of agents individually searching 
the space of possible deals. However, in comparison to the responsive mechanism, such searches require 
more information to be supplied about the other agent and involve more deliberation about the other agent's 
preferences. A fuzzy similarity technology has been developed to handle these requirements. Although a 
formal model of the issue-manipulation mechanism was developed, its implementation by an algorithm and 
the analysis of the algorithm's resulting computational complexity is deferred to future work. However, a 
novel trade-off algorithm was developed that implements a fuzzy similarity based trade-off negotiation and 
its complexity was shown to be linearly proportional to the number of issues. This computational tractability 
is a desirable property that fits with the key assumption of this work that the agents are computationally 
bounded. The use of fuzzy similarity also satisfies the flexibility objective with regards to the informational 
requirement of the agent, because the technique is used to model the uncertainty of an agent's beliefs over 
the preferences of the other agents' as fuzzy relationships between values of the domain, and not the other 
agents' actual preferences. This means that the agents do not have to make interpersonal comparisons of 
preferences when making trade-offs, a task that requires full knowledge of the other agent's preferences. 
When taken together, each of the mechanisms addresses a subset of the requirements identified in 
section 1.4.3. For example, the responsive mechanism can implement a selfish attitude in interactions, but is 
inappropriate for searching the solution space of possible outcomes in a more cooperative manner. However, 
whereas the trade-off mechanism is capable of performing such a search, it is computationally more costly 
than the responsive mechanisms. Given this, what is required is meta-reasoning about the various trade 
offs involved in the use of each mechanism for the generation of offers. This meta reasoning can then 
be used by an agent to address the changing requirements of the agents accordingly. Thus, the meta- 
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strategy may select the trade-off mechanism for generating service contracts to agents that belong to the 
same organization, but select the responsive mechanism with a low concession rate for service negotiations 
with agents that are from different organizations. Thus reasoning over different features of interactions 
(cooperative versus selfish interactions, computationally simple v. s more complex search, long v. s short 
term negotiation deadlines and low or high domain resource levels, which collectively form the set of 
requirements enumerated in section 1.4.3) can be modeled through a temporally changing combination 
of mechanisms as meta-strategies. A meta level deliberation mechanism was informally presented that 
implements such offer generation strategies over the available mechanism choices. 
The developed wrapper incorporating the responsive, trade-off and meta-strategy mechanisms was then 
empirically evaluated in a number of different environments. Evaluation was needed to: i) develop and test 
exploratory hypotheses about the causal relationship between the large number of mechanisms variables and 
the agent's environment, ii) assist he designer of a negotiating agent in "tuning" of the framework for given 
environments and iii) to validate the efficacy of the heuristic aspects of the model (for example, a meta- 
strategy that always involves the trade-off mechanism until a local minimum in the social welfare function is 
detected is a decision heuristic whose efficacy across different types of environments can not be determined 
a priori). For these reasons, the wrapper was empirically evaluated across a number of environments. 
In experiments involving interactions among two agents both using the responsive mechanism the largest 
variability in the results were observed if pure strategies are chosen to generate offers. The best results 
were obtained for strategic agents that modeled the generation of offers as a combination of tactics and 
modified this combination consideration in the course of negotiation. The intuitions about the trade-off 
mechanism, or a meta-strategy that frequently selects the trade-off mechanism, were also confirmed. The 
trade-off mechanism experiments found that the implementation of such strategies does indeed increase the 
social welfare function in more than one type of environment, but at an increase in communication costs, 
signifying that the search takes longer to converge on a mutually acceptable deal. Deals are made more 
quickly if the responsive mechanism is used, but the social welfare function is poor considering that higher 
joint utilities can be gained through the multi-dimensional nature of the problem. 
In addition to satisfying the requirements of the target domains, the developed negotiation wrapper 
also addresses many of the desiderata that were identified in the design of a coordination system (section 
1.1). The design requirements were introduced as the configurability requirement or the reusability and 
flexibility of the developed coordination framework for use across both open and closed distributed systems. 
The flexibility of the developed coordination framework has already been discussed above. Reusability has 
also been factored into the framework design by: 
making as few commitments to the domain problem solvers' architecture as possible. Interaction 
problem solving is separated from local domain problem solving by functionally separating the ne- 
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gotiation wrapper from the local domain expert. Thus the wrapper can be seen as providing social 
knowledge to the local asocial domain problem solver. The interface between these two modules 
supports low level information about the requirements of the domain problem solver (the service(s) it 
requires, the core and auxiliary features of the service(s), its constraints and satisfaction criteria over 
each of these features). The wrapper does not have control over or access to any of the operations of 
the domain problem solver. 
designing both cooperative and selfish decision making mechanisms into the agent's decision mak- 
ing architecture. In DPS systems agents are assumed to be cooperatively motivated in interaction. 
Conversely, in MAS agents are assumed to be selfishly motivated in interactions. Therefore, in both 
approaches a single agent attitude is hardwired into the decision making architecture. However, the 
interaction attitude of an agent ought to be a function of its environment. For example, as was seen 
in the target domains of this thesis, the same agent can enter two different types of interactions where 
one is cooperatively motivated and the other is more selfish. Therefore the agent (more correctly, the 
agent designer) needs to be supplied with both types of decision making facilities. 
* emphasizing the notion of services. Services are, like objects in the object-oriented paradigm, a 
representation of the capabilities of the local domain problem solver in providing problem solving 
expertise. Thus, like objects, services are reusable across different problem solving episodes. 
This configurability of the coordination framework has been guided by the requirement o design a library 
of different negotiation decision making strategies which the agent designer can then implement in their 
agents. The designer is free to configure his/her agent for interaction according to their prevailing objectives 
(such as strategies for increasing the social welfare function or for achievement of local objectives). This 
descriptive design approach contrasts with the prescriptive models of game theory where the most rational 
strategy of a game is analyzed and prescribed to the agent. In the latter case, however, it was shown that such 
models often make unrealistic assumptions. Therefore, the approach taken in this thesis has been to describe 
and empirically analyze the possible set of behaviours that can arise when more realistic assumptions are 
adopted. The designer of an agent is then free to choose a strategy that best suits histher problem. This 
configurability claim has been procedurally demonstrated in the successful application of the coordination 
framework to seven different application domains, ranging from business process management to electronic 
commerce. 
6.2 Discussion 
Coordination has been identified as one of the most central problems in DAI (section 1). For this reason 
the research, including the work reported here, has produced a large number of proposals for coordination 
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protocols. The coordination problem was informally introduced as a process that consists of composing (re- 
lating, harmonizing, adjusting, integrating) some coordination objects (tasks, goals, decisions, plans) with 
respect to some coordination process, which solves the coordination problem by composing co-ordination 
objects in line with the coordination direction (Ossowski 1999). This general view of coordination was 
given a more concrete interpretation through development of the negotiation wrapper. The composition 
process is achieved locally by each agent through implementing one, or a combination, of the proposed 
mechanisms. Agents then use these mechanisms, together with a communication protocol, to compose and 
exchange multi-issue contracts (the coordination objects) that increases either the local or global utility (the 
coordination direction). 
6.2.1 Guidelines for the Negotiating Agent Designer 
The empirical evaluation of the mechanisms also resulted in a number of findings that can be used to 
formulate general guidelines for agent designers wishing to use the negotiation wrapper. The aim of the 
experiments was the exploration of a subset of the space of possible variable ranges, through different 
combination of agent architectures and environments. Recall that an agent architecture is a particular in- 
stantiation of the agent that follows from the model described in chapter four. Thus given the negotiation 
model an agent designer can design a very simple negotiating agent where the meta-strategy selects only 
one mechanism. For example, the the designer may choose only the responsive mechanism for the design 
of his/her agent. Further simplification can be made when the designer chooses a responsive mechanism 
that is composed of a single tactic. These choices result in an agent that requires no meta-strategic (since 
the responsive mechanism is always selected) or strategic decisions (no f (), or pure strategy, since there 
exists only a single tactic). Such a simple agent is best represented by a Kasbah agent. As this example 
shows, an agent designers is then free to compose increasingly more complex agents by choosing different 
meta-strategies, tactic sets or strategic update functions. Additional complexities arise when negotiation 
environments are also taken in considerations. 
Therefore the aim of the experiments reported in this chapter was to evaluate which architecture- 
environment(s) leads to (un)successful outcomes. If two agent designers are motivated by some global 
system evaluation criteria, such as the sum of the joint utilities (maximized by the pareto-optimal line) or 
the reference point, then the following guidelines can be derived from the observations in these experiments. 
9 An agent designer who implements a simple agent architecture (responsive and pure strategy) should 
expect interactions that prolong the possibilities ofjoint gains. This is because simple agents may fail 
to respond appropriately to changes in their environment. This conclusion was indirectly confirmed 
by the unexpected success of linear tactics. 
9A more complex agent architecture (responsive and strategic) was then evaluated in a number of 
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different environments. It was found that the outcomes, both in terms of utilities and costs, for a 
strategic and responsive agent is a function of- 
- the composition of the responsive agent architecture-the number and types of tactics 
- the initial parameters of each individual andjoint architecture 
- and the joint local modification of these parameters by both agents 
The first guideline states the agent designer should be aware that the type and number of tactics 
of a responsive agent affects the outcome and process of negotiation. Thus a tactic set should be 
selected that adequately represents arange of desired behaviours. For example, a tactic set of mainly 
Boulwares will result in tough negotiator independently of strategic decisions. Conversely, an agent's 
behaviour will be concessionary if the domain of operations of the strategic reasoner is a tactic set 
with 0>1 (corresponding to tactics that quickly reach their reservation values). Therefore, to be 
responsive in different environments an agent requires appropriate set of tactics. 
An agent designer using the developed model must also set the initial values of the strategic reasoner. 
The initial value of weights of the tactic set corresponds to a slightly more complex agent who reasons 
about a number of environmental factors by computing a new concession rate. It was shown that 
better social outcomes follow when both agents engage in computing a new concession rate based 
on a number of environmental factors. In fact better social outcomes should be expected if agent 
designers can jointly agree on the same set of tactics and strategy for their initial settings. 
However, most equitable outcomes should be expected with even more complex agents as shown 
when a responsive agent interacted with another esponsive agent and both compute a new concession 
rate, given a set of environmental factors, according to some objective function. An agent designer 
who selects a strategy similar to a fixed (mixed I) strategy for his/her agent should expect an undi- 
rected search for a solution. However, best social outcomes follow when agents engage in directed 
search according to some objective function (in this case the closeness between successive offers). 
That is intelligent adjustment (or search), rather than constant adherence to the same environmental 
considerations, should result in better social outcomes. 
For more complex agent architectures that involve trade-off negotiation, the task of the agent designer 
is transformed from specifying "tuninge' that affect local problem solving to "tuninge' that affect 
the problem solving of the other agent. That is, the problem of the agent designer using the trade-off 
mechanism is to represent information about the other agent (as beliefs in the AM). It was empirically 
shown that this uncertainty is best addressed if the designer does not attempt to guess the information 
of the other agent (unless completely sure), but rather assigns an uncertainty to the agent's belief 
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about the other agent (note the similarity with the argument of strategic interactions presented in 
chapter two). Indeed, although not shown, better results should be expected if this uncertain belief is 
sequentially updated in the course of negotiation (learning implemented as Bayesian updating). 
If time and computation are resourceful or there is a need for increasing the social welfare of the 
outcomes, then a more complex agent architectures that involve strategically selecting between the 
responsive and trade-off mechanisms hould be expected to perform better. In particular, best social 
outcomes should be expected if the search for a solution is intelligently directed by an objective 
function that selects the trade-off mechanism when the objective function is being maximized and the 
responsive mechanism when the local minima of the objective function are reached. That is, the more 
intelligent the meta-reasoning about which mechanism to select, the more the social welfare function 
is maximized. 
6.2.2 Limitations of the Current Work 
The contribution of this thesis has been a proposal for a computational model of decision making for 
negotiating agent that has been empirically evaluated. However, this proposal only models a subset of the 
issues identified in chapter two. Much more work is required to develop richer interaction protocols that 
adequately model a more elaborate concept of coordination that is applicable to a wider set of problems. In 
particular, the following limitations need to be addressed: 
* development of an issue-manipulation algorithm 
* the cuffent negotiation model does not handle qualitative issues 
9 better models of other agents are needed 
* the current bi-lateral protocol is inadequate in capturing inter-dependencies among complex activities 
6.3 Future Work 
The proposals for future work are derived from the limitations of the work presented above and is based 
on addressing some of the additional issues identified in chapter two. In particular, the future work is 
categorized into extensions to the: 
9 decision making level 
9 interaction protocol level 
o evaluafion level and 
application level 
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6.3.1 Extensions of Decision Making 
The decision making functionality of the negotiation wrapper adequately models individual agents' deci- 
sion choices over actions and strategies given the information, time and computational constraints involved. 
However, three future directions of research still need to be addressed: i) developing an issue-set manipu- 
lation algorithm, ii) modeling of qualitative issues and iii) a methodology for modeling other agents. 
Although a formal model of how the set of negotiation issues can be manipulated, no algorithms have 
been developed. This is clearly an important direction of future research. Furthermore, the presented model 
has concentrated on resolution of quantitative issues where movements along the utility function of an issue 
is continuous. However, all mechanisms need to be extended to deal with the introduction of qualitative 
issues that have an associated non-continuous utility function. Some work has already been carried out to 
extend the responsive mechanism to handle non-continuous domain for qualitative issues (Matos, Sierra, & 
Jennings 1998). However, the trade-off or issue-manipulation mechanisms till need to be extended. 
There are two choices of approach that address the current weaknesses in modeling of other agent. 
On the one hand, mechanisms can be developed within the negotiation wrapper itself that assist the agent 
in modeling the other(s), given the current single shot, sequential alternating protocol of interaction. At- 
ternatively, the current decision mechanisms could be supplied with an alternative interaction protocol that 
allows the agents to learn and develop a model of one another. Which of these approaches to handling un- 
certainty of the others' is best is seen as an empirical question that needs to be tested for given environments 
and types of problems. 
If the first approach is adopted, then one proposal for modeling others is to develop other types of util- 
ity functions that model an agent's attitude towards risks (risk taker, neutral or aversive (Binmore 1992)). 
Although not directly modeling other agents' decisions, a utility function that takes into account an agent's 
attitude towards uncertain'events, given a sure event, does indirectly model other(s) by modeling the ex- 
pected utility an agent will gain given the uncertainty of others' choices. Although this approach has weak- 
nesses. identified in chapter two, it is a reasonable choice of an extension because: i) the modifications to 
the proposed model to handle this addition are minimal, requiring the design of utility functions that model 
agent's preferences in risky environments and ii) to be a Bayesian agent, or to compute the expected utility 
of a deal, requires supplying agents with an a priori probability distribution of the likely outcomes. Recall 
that the source of these a priori distributions has been a criticism leveled against the Bayesian approach. 
However, similarity measures, modeling the problem domain and not an agent, can be used as the a priori 
distribution in such cases. 
63.2 Extensions of the Protocol 
In some situations, however, the initial a priori distribution may simply be wrong. The solution to this 
problem is closely related to the second approach proposed above to better model the other agent-that 
Chapter 6. Conclusions and Future Work 238 
is the current decision mechanisms can be supplied with an alternative interaction protocol that supports 
learning. Then if interactions are repeated, a Bayesian agent can update the similarity induced a priori 
distributions given the evidence it gains from interaction. 
The currently proposed set of mechanisms can also be appended by other mechanisms to better handle 
the uncertainty of others' actions, even if the first choice is not adopted; i. e. the decision mechanisms of 
the wrapper are kept without any alterations. In particular, what is needed is to append to the current set 
of decision mechanisms learning algorithm(s) that assist the agent in better "tuning" each of the wrapper's 
decision mechanism parameters. For instance, learning algorithms can be used in the responsive mechanism 
to modify not only parameters of the individual tactics (e. g. 0 or 6 of the time-dependent and behavior- 
dependent tactics respectively), but also the agent's strategy (f () that modifies the r matrix, section 4.4.3). 
Likewise, learning algorithms can be useful in approximating values for the weights the other agent(s) place 
on each of the issues (IWI). Such knowledge is useful for the operation of all of the mechanisms. ' For 
instance, as was empirically shown in the trade-off experiments (section 5.5.3) better approximations of 
others' weights results in an increase in the social welfare function. A better knowledge of other agents' 
attached importance to each issue is highly relevant information in making trade-offs. This information can 
also be usefully utilized in the issue-set manipulation mechanism for making decisions about which issues 
to add or remove. Finally. learning algorithms can be applied at the meta-strategy level to condition the 
selection of the most appropriate mechanism to the history of previous interactions. For example, the trade- 
off mechanism may have resulted in higher success frequencies than other mechanisms in the course of 
previous interactions between two given agents. More sophisticated learning can involve an agent learning 
which mechanism to select from the relationship between the features of the current interaction with those 
of previous interactions with other agent(s). The extension of the current model with such Case-Based 
reasoning learning algorithms (Kolodner 1993) is natural because the developed similarity technology can 
be used to model such relationships between the present and the past cases. 
However, as noted in section 2.1.4, the replacement of a single-shot with a repeated interaction proto- 
col has a number of significant consequences on the agent architecture. Although agents can benefit from 
learning in a repeated interaction protocol, additional mechanisms must also be designed to support rea- 
soning in such environments. Repeated interactions have been extensively studied in game theory (Axelrod 
1984) due to their role in resolving multiple equilibria problems through the development of systems of 
conventions. Thus, if a game has multiple equilibria and if agents interact repeatedly, then they can decide 
on a single equilibria as a convention (driving on the left or right is an example of such a convention). 
An example of how agents' reasoning changes in a repeated game was briefly introduced in section 2.2.5. 
This knowledge, again although possibly incorrect. can nonetheless be revised and updated in subsequent interactions given the 
outcome of the past interactions. 
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There, it was shown that the dynamics of negotiation altered in repeated games. In particular, the stability 
of Mrs Shee's strategy of action (up) depended on her observation of Mr. Hee's strategy choice. Thus, an 
agent's current choice is dependent on the future choices of others. Agents must therefore reason about this 
type of action contingency given the reputation of other(s) and how much the agent can trust them from 
their commitment history. 
, 
Another extension to the protocol is also necessary not only when the frequency of interactions is 
considered, but also when the size of the agent society is considered an important factor to model (section 
2.1.1). The size of the society becomes important when the types of problems considered are not just 
restricted to the resolution of conflicting preferences between only two parties, but, rather, extends to a 
number of agents performing distributed problem solving in a group. As it stands, the proposed coordination 
framework is inappropriate for the latter types of problems. In order to solve this type of problem, the 
coordination framework needs to be modified so that multiple agents can exchange not offers over services, 
but plans, goals or other meta-attitudes uch as intentions (Dennett 1987). The evaluatory components of 
the decision mechanisms can then be used to evaluate plans, goals or intentions from a local perspective. 
However, plan, goal or intention generation mechanisms would need to be designed to generate offers 
over plan, goal or intention alternatives. New mechanisms are therefore needed because the input into 
the current set of mechanisms needs to be changed from an issue (together with its associated reservation 
values, weights and preferences) to a higher level structures such as plans, goals or intentions which are 
composed differently and exhibit different properties to issues. Therefore, other reasoning mechanisms are 
required that generate offers over higher level representations. 
Multi-lateral negotiations also open up the possibility of extending the wrapper to model coalitions 
where a collection of agents form a group to perform or achieve a common objective (Kahan & Rapoport 
1984, Sandholm & Lesser 1997, Shehory & Kraus 1995). For example, buyers in a market economy often 
form large coalitions to reduce sellers' prices. The problem then is how to modify or adapt the current 
wrapper so that agents can reason about coalitions. One such solution may be to allow agents to form a 
group using some coalition forming algorithm (coalition formation has been extensively studied in game 
theory (Kahan & Rapoport 1984, Binmore 1985, Sandholm & Lesser 1997, Shehory & Kraus 1995)). 
Then the reasoning about the interactions between the agent representing the coalition and the other agents 
(one-to-many interactions) can be directed by the wrapper decision mechanisms. However, the suggestion 
here is to increase the social welfare function of the coalition by supplying within the wrapper adaptive 
algorithms that assist the representative agent to dynamically modify the reservation values of each of the 
issues given multiple offers from a number of other agents. The suggestion is that the wrapper can be 
used to reason not about how to form a coalition, but how to behave on behalf of the coalition. Note 
also that this functionality can be applied in normal one-to-many service negotiations. Work is currently 
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underway to investigate multi-lateral protocols and negotiation decision strategies for design of an exchange 
system where N number of sellers engage in parallel negotiations with a single buyer for the procurement 
of a service. Decision functions are currently being developed that generate offers based on simultaneous 
consideration of many threads of negotiation. 
6.3.3 Extensions to the Evaluation Work 
The penultimate proposal for future work is to further evaluate the developed coordination framework. Al- 
though the wrapper has been empirically tested in a number of environments, this evaluation has nonetheless 
been carried out within a limited environment (e. g. interactions are only amongst agents that adopt the same 
wrapper architecture). Thus, the observed results are only valid for two agents that utilize a wrapper archi- 
tecture. Although control measures were included and the results were compared to optimal solutions, it 
would be interesting to perform comparative evaluation of the performance of an agent utilizing an agent 
architecture derived from the proposed negotiation model and one that utilizes some other architecture. 
This comparative study can then be used to benchmark the performance standard of different architectures 
with respect to the optimal solutions. One possibility of performing such a comparative evaluation is the 
submission of the architecture (or its output as a strategy) to market competitions such as the Trading Agent 
Competition held at ICMAS 2000 (TAC 2000) where trading agents bid to buy and sell goods, in order to 
maximize a given objective based on the goods bought and sold and the prices of the exchanges. In such 
cases, the coordination framework can then be used as a "laboratory" to test which of the possible set of 
strategies are likely to perform the best in the competition. 
6.3.4 Extensions to Other Application Domains 
Finally, another line of future work is to extend the application of the coordination framework to other types 
of problems. The configurability requirement has been one of the central design concerns of the framework. 
As was shown in the first chapter, its application to seven different domains has procedurally demonstrated 
the configurability claim. However, further evaluation of this claim is required. Specifically, better metrics 
are required that test the applicability of the framework to different domains. Indeed, such an evaluation is 
intended to be carried out in a future application of the framework at The Center for Coordination Sciences 
at MIT. The aim of this project is to use the developed coordination framework for system recovery in 
cases when exceptions occur, such as the failure of a single agent, corrupted or invalid information within 
the system or erroneous execution schedules. In such cases agents can enter negotiation to either prevent 
predicted future failures or recover from failures that have occurred (Dellarocas & Klein 2000). Because 
exceptions can occur across many different types of domains then domain problem solvers require social 
interactions to recover from such failures. Thus the configurability of the framework (as well as the benefits 
of negotiating agent technology in comparison to traditional methods) can be evaluated more objectively. 
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